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Abstract 
In the late 1990s the Antarctic Treaty System (ATS) and the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) faced a shock caused by 
the illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing of marine resources in the Southern 
Ocean. This challenge has the potential to undermine the credibility of the A TS and it also 
reveals the extent of the threat posed to the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean by 
commercial exploitation without adequate scientific understanding. 
Although the Patagonian toothfish faces commercial extinction, and despite the 
unsustainable incidental mortality inflicted on the seabirds of the Southern Ocean, the 
CCAMLR regime may be transformed by this shock into a more effective environmental 
regime. This will be demonstrated by an analysis relying on the use of regime theory to 
investigate the effectiveness of CCAMLR in responding to the IUU fishing problems. In 
developing the analysis of CCAMLR theory relating to epistemic communities and regime 
change will also be explored. 
The background to the establishment of the A TS will be briefly covered. The development 
of CCAMLR will be assessed in two parts. The first part looks at the development of 
CCAMLR before IUU fishing became a serious problem. The second part is a close focus 
on the development of the IUD fishing problems and the reaction by CCAMLR and its 
member states. The thesis finds that while CCAMLR has experienced a phase of creative 
tension leading to improved effectiveness in the past, currently it is pushing the limits of 
rational use of marine living resources in the Southern Ocean. 
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CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
In the late 1990s the Antarctic Treaty System CATS) and the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) faced a shock caused by 
the illegal, unregulated, and unreported (IUU) fishing of marine resources in the Southern 
Ocean. The challenge posed by this shock has the potential to undermine the credibility of 
the CCAMLR and ATS regimes as the source of governance authority for the Southern 
Ocean. It also reveals the extent of the threat posed to the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean 
by commercial exploitation without adequate scientific understanding of the potential 
impact of harvesting activities on that ecosystem. Although the Patagonian toothfish 
(Dissostichus eZeginoides) faces commercial extinction, and despite the unsustainable 
incidental mortality inflicted on the seabirds of the Southern Ocean, CCAMLR may be 
transformed by this shock into a more effective international environmental regime, before 
other species, such as the Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni), are affected by 
overexploitation. This will be demonstrated by an analysis of the effectiveness of 
CCAMLR in responding to the IUD problems relying on the use of regime theory. If the 
CCAMLR regime is ineffective, then this has the potential to undermine the wider ATS 
regime within which it is embedded. If the CCAMLR regime is effective then the A TS 
regime should be strengthened. 
The Antarctic continent and the surrounding Southern Ocean is the scene of efforts to find 
a balance among the different goals of commercial exploitation of resources, the 
preservation of the environment, and the continuing conduct of scientific research. This is 
carried out against a background of complex sovereignty issues and strategic interests, 
which have so, far been largely resolved through cooperation and peaceful methods. One 
dramatic example of this was when the failure of all the Antarctic Treaty Consultative 
Parties (ATCPs) to ratify the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource 
Activities (CRAMRA), led to the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic 
Treaty (hereafter the Madrid Protocol) in 1991. This fifty year moratorium on mineral 
activities in Antarctica resolved a major crisis within the ATS regime. The current shock 
does not present as dramatic a crisis, but it still demands attention. 
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Until the mid-1990s the CCAMLR regime, despite some criticism, was generally regarded 
as a fisheries regime with the potential to be effective. It had developed a system that 
promised to balance the environmental and exploitation goals of the regime, and the role 
that science played in the process had been clarified. When the Convention entered into 
force in 1982 no one predicted that CCAMLR, designed in large part to regulate krill 
fishing, would be faced with the problem of secretive, illegal and unregulated fishing in the 
Southern Ocean for a largely unheard of species, with the accompanying deaths of 
hundreds of thousands of seabirds, and the creation of an elaborate smuggling network to 
evade the need to comply with government regulations. The rise of IUU fishing in the 
Southern Ocean in the early 1990s has disrupted the ordinary routines of CCAMLR. 
Although the impact of IUU fishing on toothfish and the associated problem of incidental 
mortality of seabirds is of serious concern, this has been more of a political shock than a 
crisis. A political crisis similar to the CRAMRA situation would probably have been 
resolved within a few years with either a visibly changed or strengthened regime, or a 
sudden collapse of the regime. The shock posed by IUU fishing has now been sustained by 
CCAMLR for approximately six years. This has focused political attention, but if the 
problems are not adequately addressed in an effective and timely manner, then the 
CCAMLR regime could slide into a period of decline, or even decay into complete 
ineffectiveness. In assessing the effectiveness of CCAMLR it will be interesting to 
examine whether the shock has been absorbed and dealt with by change in the existing 
regime, or if a full crisis is developing that requires the creation of a new regime. 
The definition of IUU fishing can be presented in several different formats, covering 
illegal, unregulated, unreported, and undermining or unauthorised fishing activities. 
Fishing is illegal when it occurs in the national jurisdiction of territorial waters or an 
Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) without being in accordance with a license or permit for 
fishing there. Fishing is considered to be unregulated when it occurs in the Convention 
Area without being in accordance with CCAMLR regulations, or if it is conducted in the 
high seas area on stocks that straddle the Convention Area. Fishing is undermining the 
Convention when it is carried out under flags of convenience, where the vessel is flagged 
to a third-party that is not a CCAMLR Member in a way that obstructs the purpose of 
CCAMLR. Illegal and unregulated fishing also tends to be unreported - which reduces the 
accuracy of available information to the CCAMLR Scientific Committee on the Southern 
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Ocean's fish and bird stocks and affects the ability for sound management by the 
CCAMLR Commission. 
IUU fishing is a broad concept with some ambiguity, but in general IUU fishing is being 
conducted by 'bad actors' targeting high value species. David Balton defined the bad 
actors of ocean fisheries as "fishing vessel owners who do not observe agreed fishing rules 
(or EEZ fishing rules) and the flag States that fail to take action against them."] The IUU 
acronym appears to have originated in the late 1990s, possibly in Australia. A good actor 
by comparison, is a state, company, or individual that does play by the rules required to 
support a sustainable fishery. Bad actors tend to undermine good actors. They are a classic 
example of free riders in politics and of the problem which Garett Hardin called the 
tragedy of the commons? 
The scope of the IUU fishing problem on CCAMLR is found in three main areas. The first 
of these is the effect on the species directly targeted by IUU fishing: 
During 1997 the amount of illegal and unregulated fishing has far exceeded the 
global Total Allowable Catch (TAC), with consequent financial gains. If illegal and 
unregulated fishing continues at the current level the population of Patagonian 
toothfish will be so severely decimated that within the next 2 to 3 years the species 
will be commercially extinct. Some areas are already showing signs ofthis.3 
The second area is the effect of incidental mortality on seabirds caught on longline hooks 
set by the IUU fishers. In 1998 the CCAMLR Commission noted: 
that estimates of seabird by-catch mortality from unregulated fishing in the 
Convention Area in 1998 (50 000 to 89 000 seabirds) are essentially similar to 
those of 1997 ... It noted further that these levels of by-catch are: 
(i) about two orders of magnitude greater than in the regulated fishery 
(ii) unsustainable for the albatross, giant petrel and white-chinned petrel 
populations concerned4 
I David Balton, "Dealing With the 'Bad Actors' of Ocean Fisheries", Address at Conference on Fisheries 
Management, Norway Graduate School of Economics, Bergen, Norway, May 20,1999, 
http://www.state.gov/www/policYJemarksI1999/990520 _ balton _ fisheries.html (site visited 11 October 
2000). 
2 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, 162, 1968, pp.1243-1248. 
3 'Australia Welcomes Norwegian Government Action On Illegal Fishing', Joint Media Release Alexander 
Downer (Minister for Foreign Affairs) and Warwick Parer (Minister for Resources), 
http://www.dfat.gov.au/media/releases/foreignl1998/fa098 _98.html (site visited on 22 November 2000). 
4 CCAMLR-XVII, 6.22, p.27. 
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Because the Dissostichus species (spp.) are a predator species relatively high up the food 
chain in the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean, there have been fewer effects on dependent 
species than might otherwise have been the case. The problem of incidental mortality can 
not be effectively addressed without addressing the problem of IUU fishing as well. In the 
third area of economics the Dissostichus spp. have commanded a high price in the 
international market. In 1997 Australia estimated the total wholesale value of the IUU 
catch of toothfish to be in the order of half a billion Australian dollars, and that it was 
likely that over 100 vessels were involved in the illegal fishing activities. 5 In addition at 
least thirty-three people have also died while engaged in harvesting activities directed 
towards Dissostichus spp. over the years from 1993-2000.6 
Sources 
The thesis research relies on a combination of primary and secondary sources. Primary 
sources include the various reports of the CCAMLR Commission and the CCAMLR 
Scientific Committee (hereafter referred to just as the Commission and the Scientific 
Committee respectively) from 1982 onwards.7 Interviews with some of the New Zealand 
nationals present at CCAMLR negotiations in the late 1990s were carried out. Use has also 
been made of contemporary media articles, press releases, and informational bulletins from 
different governmental and non-governmental organisations. Secondary sources of books, 
and journal articles, have also been used extensively in elaborating accounts of Antarctic 
and ATS history, CCAMLR negotiations and development of CCAMLR. The focus has 
been on political and legal sources, not on the science of the issues, as this lies outside my 
expertise. In general I have accepted the summaries of the scientific approach as presented 
byCCAMLR. 
I was privileged to be allowed to attend the meeting of CCAMLR in 1998 as an adviser 
attached to the New Zealand delegation. This afforded me the opportunity of attending the 
meetings of both the Scientific Committee and the Commission, as well as the Standing 
5 CCAMLR-XVI, 5.31, p.12. 
6 Two crew died aboard the Friosur V in the 1993/94 Season in Area 48.3. CCAMLR-XIII, Annex 5, SCOI 
Report, 1.7, p.l02. Seventeen crew died in the sinking of Sudur Havid 6 June 1998. CCAMLR-XVII,2.23, 
pA. Fourteen crew died in the sinking of the Amur 10 October 2000, (see n170 chapter 5, p.l83). 
7 The reports of the Commission are given in the abbreviated style CCAMLR-(meeting number), paragraph, 
page, and the Scientific Committee's reports are abbreviated to SC-CAMLR-(meeting number), paragraph, 
page. 
5 
Committee on Administration and Finance (SCAF) and the Standing Committee for 
Observation and Inspection (SCOI). This gave me access to otherwise unobtainable draft 
documents and the opportunity to meet and discuss the problems of CCAMLR with 
delegates from around the world. This opportunity was limited by my own inexperience 
with conference diplomacy, and a confidentiality agreement that restricted my use of some 
knowledge gained from the meeting where I have been unable to confirm a point through 
public sources. Sources for the most recent CCAMLR meeting in 2000 are still limited as 
the final versions of the reports of the various CCAMLR committees are unlikely to be 
publicly available before mid-200 1. 
Structure of the Thesis 
After this introduction the second chapter of this thesis will concentrate on regime theory 
with a view to treating CCAMLR and the A TS as regimes. This starts with an overview of 
the basic definitions of regime theory, and how they can be applied to the ATS and 
CCAMLR. The different schools of thought in regime theory are presented, followed by 
expanding on the concept of effectiveness and how it relates to regimes. Gaps in the 
current scholarship of regime theory are identified and the methodology for the analysis of 
the case study of CCAMLR is presented. The thesis will concentrate on the factors related 
to regime effectiveness, the concept of an epistemic community and theory related to 
regime change. 
The third chapter will cover the general background of the geography and history of 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, leading into a more focused study of the development 
of the ATS and the legal background for current issues, especially issues related to 
sovereignty. This will be followed with an overview of global environmental macro-trends 
that impact on the Southern Ocean, and some background on previous exploitation of the 
marine environment of the Southern Ocean. 
The fourth chapter will start to cover the detail of the case study, with an examination of 
the historical development of the CCAMLR regime. This examines the basic structure of 
participation and decision-making in the regime and how this affected the development of 
the role of scientific advice, conservation measures, and the system of observation and 
inspection. An assessment of the effectiveness of CCAMLR in its early period will be 
6 
made. It will be argued that after a period of ineffective tension, the CCAMLR regime 
developed into a potentially effective regime. 
The fifth chapter will cover the development of the IUU problem in the Southern Ocean 
and the response from CCAMLR. The new fisheries developed under CCAMLR 
management are discussed. Then the rise of IUU fishing is covered and the response by 
CCAMLR is examined in close detail, followed by a similar treatment of the related 
problem of incidental mortality. Some of the obstacles to effective conservation measures 
are then analysed before an initial assessment of the effectiveness of CCAMLR in dealing 
with the IUU problem is made. The argument is made that CCAMLR is pressing the limits 
of the concept of rational use contained within its conservation objectives. 
The sixth chapter will use regime theory in an attempt to analyse the effectiveness of the 
CCAMLR regime in its response to the IUU fishing problems. The areas of interest 
outlined in chapter two will be applied to the case study material presented in chapters 
three to five. The aim is to try and consolidate and refine regime theory relating to the 
effectiveness of regimes, with a particular interest in the areas of epistemic communities 
and regime change. Conservation measures implemented by CCAMLR and counterfactual 
arguments about the CCAMLR regime will be examined. An attempt will be made to 
identify the epistemic communities associated with the CCAMLR regime, tracing their 
activities and demonstrating their influence and impact in relation to the IUU fishing 
problems. 
In the seventh and final chapter the conclusions of the thesis will be presented. The IUU 
problems are a hard case for CCAMLR that demonstrate that the regime does matter. 
Important changes that have happened to CCAMLR and the ATS will be assessed and a 
statement made about how effective CCAMLR and the ATS have been. Possible solutions 
to the IUU problems and policy recommendations will be outlined in the light of the 
potential scenarios for future progression of the problems. The contribution of this thesis to 
regime theory will be presented by accounting for the importance of the various factors of 
effectiveness. I will attempt to expand and refine theory as it relates to regime change, and 
to see whether the case study has confirmed or undermined the epistemic community 
concept. Areas for future research will be discussed. 
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CHAPTER 2 
Regime Theory and CCAMLR: Governance Without Government 
This chapter will attempt to give an overview of regime theory in three parts. The first part 
will outline the basic definitions of regime theory, which will be applied to the ATS and 
CCAMLR regimes. The second part deals with the development of regime theory, its 
history and main schools of thought. The third part is a critique of regime theory and the 
gaps in current scholarship. The three areas of focus for use in later analysis relate to 
effectiveness, epistemic communities, and regime change. The fourth part of the chapter 
deals with the methodology that will be used to analyse the case study in chapter 6. 
Definitions - What is an International Regime? 
It is important both to define international regimes, and to distinguish between different 
types of regimes. 1 What is, and is not, a regime? The consensus definition of international 
regimes developed by Krasner is: 
International regimes are defined as principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures around which actor expectations converge in a given issue-area. 
Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Nonns are standards of 
behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are specific prescriptions 
or proscriptions for action. Decision-making procedures are prevailing practices for 
making and implementing collective choice.2 
Regimes are usually treated as intervening variables between basic causal factors, the 
outcomes achieved, and the behaviours demonstrated by the actors involved. Some of the 
basic causal factors are: power, interest, values, and knowledge. A regime is a form of 
governance system in an issue area? 
I Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ziirn, "The Study ofInternational Regimes", European 
Journal of International Relations, 1 (3), 1995, p.269. 
2 Stephen D. Krasner, International Regimes, Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1983, p.l. 
3 Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, 1994, p.26. 
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International regimes are a special case of international institutions or organisations.4 This 
is because in most cases "all international organizations are characterized as regimes, but 
not all regimes are viewed as international organizations."s The existence of an 
international organisation implies an explicit, formal regime, with a bureaucracy or charter. 
This is a narrow and legalistic view, but a wider definition would be less precise. Regimes 
tend to be restricted to one issue area, while an institutional organisation such as the UN 
may be involved in many different issue areas. The "most salient difference between 
regimes and organizations is that regimes - being sets of principles, norms, rules, and 
procedures - do not possess the capacity to act".6 In this respect the ATCPs have in the 
past retained the power to act in the area covered by Antarctic Treaty, rather than 
delegating it to any institution. 
Criticism of the consensus definition has been made on grounds that its components are 
indistinguishable and vague. There is broad agreement on treating regimes as social 
institutions and on characterising regimes as issue-area specific.7 The difficulty lies in 
developing a formal conceptualisation of what makes up an international regime. Various 
neologisms have also been coined, such as 'policy coordination' or 'governance system', 
but regime remains the most common term in use to describe the mechanisms that states 
use to solve problems in international governance. As Helen Milner observed: "Defining a 
regime remains a difficult task; one could say that despite the consensus definition 
proposed by Krasner a decade ago, the concept is still essentially contested."g 
The Antarctic Treaty System regime 
Christopher Joyner writes that "The normative rights and duties, rules and procedures laid 
out in the Antarctic Treaty and associated agreements combine to constitute an Antarctic 
regime.,,9 The term 'system' gradually became an adjunct to the name of the Antarctic 
4 The terms institution and organisation appear to be interchangeable. 
5 Helen Milner, "International Regimes and World Politics: Comments on the articles by Smouts, de 
Senarclens and Jonsson", International Social Science Journal, 138, 1993, p.494. 
6 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, "Interest, Power, Knowledge: The Study of 
International Regimes", Mershon International Studies Review, 40, 1996, p.179. 
7 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zurn, op. cit., p.270. 
8 Helen Milner, op. cit., pp.493-4. 
9 Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental 
Protection, University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, South Carolina, 1998, p.96. A different angle is 
taken in Davor Vidas, "The Antarctic Treaty System in the International COlmnunity: an Overview" in Olav 
Schram Stokke, and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of the 
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Treaty and was codified in 1979.10 The Antarctic Treaty is the core of a network of 
regimes that are linked to the parent regime and each other, forming an ATS regime. 
Various terms have been used to describe the relationship between the ATS as a whole and 
its various parts. The individual regimes have been variously described as 'embedded', 
'nested', or 'cradled sub-regimes,ll within the wider ATS regime. The Antarctic Treaty is 
the parent regime because it was the first regime, and the associated sub-regimes all 
originated from decisions made within the Antarctic Treaty regime. This 'grand regime' 
shares many common goals, principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, 
although differences do exist between the different sub-regimes. This creates what Joyner 
called the "Antarctic normscape for ATCP governments.,,12 
Regimes require at least one issue area that acts as a focus for the regime. The different 
sub-regimes of the ATS regime can be considered as regimes in their own right because 
they are focused on different issue areas. So CCAMLR is the regime dealing with the issue 
of living resource management in the Southern Ocean, the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) is the regime dealing with the issue of sealing, 
and the Madrid Protocol is the regime dealing with the issue of environmental protection in 
Antarctica. Issue areas need to be defined spatially and in terms of activity as they can 
expand or contract over time. One emergent issue area is the question of how to regulate 
and control tourism activities in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. So far this issue is 
being handled by the ATCPs without the creation of a new regime. 
As these regimes are all part of the same system, a change in the credibility or 
effectiveness of one regime can strengthen or undermine the system as a whole. The sub-
regimes are subordinated to the Antarctic Treaty, but the level of dependence on the 
Antarctic Treaty varies between the sub-regimes. CCAMLR meets separately from the 
Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting (ATCM), unlike the Madrid Protocol's Committee 
for Environmental Protection (CEP) which meets at the same as the ATCM. Although 
CCAMLR has principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures in common with 
Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996, pp.39-40. Vidas compares the usage 
of the term 'system' to the conceptualisation of international law as a system. 
10 The fIrst reference to the Antarctic Treaty system appears to be in Recommendation X-Ion Antarctic 
Mineral Resources, Antarctic Treaty, Report o/the Tenth Consultative Meeting, Washington, D.C., 
September 17-0ctober 5,1979, Department of State: Washington D.C., 1979. 
11 Christopher C . Joyner, op. cit., p.l 0 l. 
12 ibid., p.I 02. 
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the Antarctic Treaty regime, its main linkages to the ATCPs are either informational or 
through common membership. The CCAMLR Executive Secretary reports to the ATCM 
on CCAMLR activities, and reports relevant ATCM decisions back to meetings of the 
Commission. An observer from SCAR sometimes attends meetings of the Scientific 
Committee, and a CCAMLR observer can attend SCAR meetings. Membership is one 
source of linkage between the different ATS regimes, as many, but not all, members of the 
Antarctic Treaty regime are also members of the different sub-regimes. The ATCPs are 
reluctant to try and direct CCAMLR through the ATCM and its recommendations, and 
have restricted themselves to resolutions.13 Considerable overlap still exists between the 
different regimes as business may be dealt with by more than one regime. For example, the 
concept of a making the Balleny Islands a protected area has been discussed for three years 
at meetings of both CCAMLR, and CEP. 14 
The ATS regime is also influenced by external regimes. These are regimes which have not 
originated from the Antarctic Treaty regime, and the membership of these regimes often 
includes actors who are not associated with the ATS regime. Linkages between external 
regimes and the ATS regime are often indirect, relaying on the state actors to coordinate 
information. The figure on the following page is one attempt at illustrating the linkages 
between the different components of the ATS regime, and eleven of the external regimes 
which exercise some influence on activities in the area covered by the ATS regime. 15 The 
CRAMRA regime has been included, despite it currently being in limbo. 
13 Three resolutions supporting the introduction and implementation of a catch documentation scheme by 
CCAMLRhave been made by the ATCPs during 1999-2001. ATCM XXIII Resolution (3), SCM XII 
Resolution (2), and ATCM XXIV Resolution (1). 
14 New Zealand, The Balleny Islands Aide Memoire, IP09, XXIV Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, 
2001, http://www.ln.mid.ru/website/24atcmin.nsflinformation?OpenView, (site visited January 10,2002). 
15 These external regimes include: the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), 
the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL), the 1972 
Convention on the Prevention of Marine Pollution by Dumping of Wastes and Other Matter (the London 
Dumping Convention), the 1972 Convention on the International Regulations for Preventing Collisions at 
Sea (COLREGS), the 1946 Convention for the Regulation of Whaling (IWC), the 1992 UN Framework on 
Climate Change, the Convention on Biological Diversity, the 1985 Convention for the Protection of the 
Ozone Layer and its 1987 Montreal Protocol, the 1995 UN Agreement for the Implementation of Provisions 
of the United Nations Convention of the Law of the Sea relating to the Conservation and Management of 
Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNIA) and the 1989 Convention on the Control of 
Transboundary Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal. 
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Figure 116 
The Antarctic Treaty System Regime 
Principles in the ATS regime 
The concept of values is important because it underlies the origins of the principles and 
norms used by a regime, which in turn generate the rules and procedures of that regime. A 
value is esteemed by states, or other actors, for its own sake. 17 A value represents an 
objective to be achieved. Values may derive generally from the international system, or 
they may be specific to a given issue area. The preservation of the Antarctic continent in a 
pristine condition is something that is of value to some actors, because this will preserve 
16 This figure is based on a figure originally found in Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.97. Joyner includes the 
external regimes in what he terms the Antarctic Regime for simplicity. 
17 ibid., p.85. 
12 
the usefulness of the continent as a scientific laboratory. Other actors might value the 
preservation of the continent on aesthetic grounds. Different values can be ordered in a 
hierarchy of values. This hierarchy will determine the priorities that actors will use to 
choose between different principles, norms, rules, and procedures when there is a conflict 
between them. 
The consensual definition for regimes holds that "Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, 
and rectitude.,,18 These principles can be explicit or implicit and "involve goal orientations 
and causal beliefs cast at the level of general policy arenas.,,19 Several key principles can 
be found in the A TS regime, although there are some differences of opinion as to what 
these principles are, and some specific principles apply only to the CCAMLR regime. The 
Antarctic Treaty reflected three fundamental principles for establishing cooperation and 
avoiding conflict in the Antarctic: the value of the compromise on sovereignty, the 
importance of avoiding conflict in Antarctica, and cooperation for scientific research. The 
original commitment to environmental protection was limited to a single reference in the 
Antarctic Treaty?O Davor Vidas offers a different listing of principles, with the protection 
of the environment as one of three principles of the Antarctic Treaty and the preservation 
of the freeze on the sovereignty issue as a value goal common to all of the principles?l 
Principles relating to economiC exploitation were left to be developed later with the 
negotiation of the CCAMLR and CRAMRA regimes. While the CCAMLR regime was 
successfully negotiated and entered into force, the CRAMRA regime has not entered into 
force as a result of the increasing value attached to the goal of environmental protection. 22 
The advent of the Madrid Protocol marked the rise of environmental protection as a value 
that is now fundamental to the planning and conduct of all activities in Antarctica, and this 
value is represented in the more rigorous and extensive principles of the Madrid Protocol. 23 
Developing these principles into new rules and decision-making procedures has been more 
difficult, with the liability annex still under negotiation nine years later. 
18 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit. 
19 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zilrn, op. cit., p.273. 
20 Appendix I, Article IX (1) (t). 
21 Davor Vidas, "The Antarctic Treaty System in the International Community: an Overview" in Olav 
Schram Stokke, and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: the Effectiveness and Legitimacy o/the 
Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996, pp.44-45. 
22 See Chapter 3, pp.77-78. 
23 Lorraine M. Elliott, International Environmental Politics: Protecting the Antarctic, St. Martin's Press, Inc: 
New York, 1994,p.196. 
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The principles of the CCAMLR regime are derived from when the actors involved with the 
ATS regime had a different hierarchy of values. Conservation values were important but a 
value was attached to economic exploitation that displaced environmental protection as a 
primary goal of CCAMLR. The principles used in negotiating CCAMLR were that 
Consultative parties were to retain prime responsibility for the protection and conservation 
of the environment, the provisions of Antarctic Treaty Article IV on territorial claims were 
not to be affected, and that the regime boundary could extend north further than 60° South 
latitude to ensure effective conservation of species in the Southern Ocean ecosystem.24 
Environmental principles were first articulated for the ATS in 1970, but they have not 
always been well implemented in practice by CCAMLR.25 The CCAMLR ecosystem 
approach is based on the principles found in Article II of the Convention.26 These require 
inter alia that irreversible changes should not be made to the marine ecosystem, depleted 
stocks must be restored, and harvesting should undermine future stable recruitment levels. 
These principles reflect the interests of the ATCPs that wanted to engage in fishing 
activities, with the definition of conservation in Article II including 'rational use' of the 
resource. CCAMLR also tries to uphold a 'precautionary approach' that relies on taking a 
conservative approach to management when information is lacking.27 The tension between 
the principles of exploitation and conservation means that CCAMLR has been considered a 
flawed instrument for ensuring environmental conservation.28 
Norms in the ATS regime 
The consensus definition for norms holds that "Norms are standards of behavior defined in 
terms of rights and obligations.,,29 Norms are important, and ubiquitous, but hard to 
measure.3D They are expected by participants within a regime issue area, and prescribe the 
desirable social goals and acceptable policy means for achieving them.3! Interpretations of 
24 ibid., p.89. 
25 ibid., pp.63-64. 
26 Appendix II, Article II (3). 
27 The development of the precautionary principle is addressed in more detail in Chapter 4, pp.137-141. 
28 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.97 
29 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit. 
30 For a recent treatment of the history of the study of norms see Gregory A. Raymond, "Problems and 
Prospects in the Study ofInternational Norms", Mershon International Studies Review, 41, 1997, pp.205-
245. 
31 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.86. 
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the norms present within the ATS regime vary, and there is some overlap between norms 
and principles. For the actors involved in Antarctica some of the norms included: only 
peaceful use of the continent, non-nuclearisation of the region, peaceful settlement of 
disputes, conservation and protection of the circumpolar environment.32 Norms can be 
made explicit in formal rules, or may be implicit in informal understandings. Norms, like 
rules, can be both proscriptive and prescriptive.33 The effects of socialisation leads 
governments to comply with regime norms and this affects compliance with the rules of 
each regime.34 Violations of norms can have a trip-wire effect, causing the mobilisation of 
a collective response.35 
Lorraine Elliott identified ATS norms as being either sovereignty or interdependence 
norms. Sovereignty norms tend to favour the short term interests of states, while 
interdependence norms favour the construction of a regime.36 Adherence to sovereignty 
norms makes it more difficult to have the monitoring and compliance rules required for 
effective international environmental protection because "governments will still seek to 
maintain as much control as possible over important decision-making processes".37 Some 
commitment to interdependence norms was required in order for the Antarctic Treaty 
regime to be established. Effective management of international environmental problems 
may require more flexible attitudes to traditional conceptions of sovereignty if monitoring 
and compliance mechanisms are to be effective. In the past the hierarchy of values in the 
ATS regime has favoured sovereignty norms. Political and security concerns were placed 
before economic and environmental concerns.38 The CCAMLR regime was established in 
an era when sovereignty norms still dominated the Antarctic 'normscape' and its 
compliance rules and decision-making procedures reflect this?9 The approach of the 
Convention to sovereignty issues reinforced the deliberate ambiguity of the Antarctic 
Treaty. The Madrid Protocol represented are-ordering of the hierarchy of values within the 
ATS regime.40 The ATS regime is now more influenced by interdependence norms; 
although the sovereignty norms are still important. 
32 ibid. 
33 ibid., p.102. 
34 ibid., p.103. 
35 Gregory A. Raymond, op. cit., p.215. 
36 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.11. 
37 ibid. See Chapter 2, p.53 for treatment of the difference between formal and operational sovereignty. 
38 ibid., p.36. 
39 ibid., p.83. 
40 ibid., p.196. 
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In the past, the ATS regime has operated with a norm of institutional decentralisation. The 
ATCM rotates between ATCPs in alphabetical order, with each host providing the 
secretarial work required for that year. Apart from CCAMLR, few institutions were 
successfully created. Because of this there are no centralised or independent monitoring, 
enforcement, or inspection provisions in the ATS regime. This undermines the 
effectiveness of any commitment to environmental protection. The Madrid Protocol could 
lead to limited centralisation if the political will of the ATCPs supports the CEP 
institution.41 While there is a general consensus on the need for an Antarctic Treaty 
secretariat, there is still an ongoing debate over the potential location for the secretariat. 
While Buenos Aires is a leading contender; the United Kingdom (UK) has not supported 
this, and Christchurch or Hobart have also been considered.42 
Rules in the ATS regime 
The consensual definition for rules holds that they "are specific prescriptions or 
proscriptions for action.,,43 Rules are often a formalisation of the norms and principles, and 
can provide a framework for the decision-making procedures of the regime. These rules are 
"often stated explicitly in the formal agreements on which regimes are commonly based, 
and they facilitate assessments of implementation and compliance. ,,44 Although rules are 
usually stated in a formal format, they can be represented by informal practices as well.45 
Rules are an important characteristic of regimes because if the rules are not being adhered 
to then the strength and stability of the regime can be compromised.46 Lack of compliance 
with existing CCAMLR rules is a key problem in the IUU fishing issue. Rules can be 
changed in order to improve the effectiveness of a regime. 
The rules of the ATS regIme are laid out in the Antarctic agreements or in ATCM 
recommendations. Some of the important ATS regime rules relate to compliance and 
enforcement mechanisms, although in the decentralised ATS system these provisions are 
41 ibid., p.200. This seems to be the case to date. Despite the lengthy period of time before ratification of the 
Madrid Protocol the ATCPs established a Temporary Environmental Working Group (TEWG) to start work 
in the area required by CEP. 
42 In 2001 consensus was finally achieved on this issue at ATCM XXIV and the Antarctic Treaty secretariat 
will be based in Buenos Aires. Report of the XXIV Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting, St. Petersburg, 
Russian Federation, 9 - 20 July 2001, sections 20-24. 
43 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit. 
44 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit., p.273. 
45 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit. 
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weak. There are prohibitions against military activities, a ban on nuclear explosions and 
disposal of radioactive waste in the region, a prohibition on mining, and regulations 
governing fishing. 47 These rules support the principles and norms of the regime. The rules 
for the CCAMLR regime are laid out in the Convention or in the conservation measures 
later adopted by the CCAMLR commission. One of the reasons for adopting separate 
conventions is that the rules in the new convention would be legally binding, and therefore 
stronger than ATCM recommendations. 48 
Decision-making procedures in the ATS regime 
According to the consensus definition "Decision-making procedures are prevailing 
practices for making and implementing collective choice. ,,49 These decision-making 
procedures can be codified in a formal set of rules, such as the Rules of Procedure drawn 
up before the first ATCM.5o Procedures layout how the rules of the regime will be 
determined or modified in the future. Informal decision-making procedures can also occur, 
such as negotiations that may take place informally in the margins of meetings. Collective 
decision-making is part of the structure of regimes. 51 The key element of decision-making 
in the ATS regime is that it requires consensus. This exerts great influence on the 
implementation of rules, and how changes to its norms and principles can be made. 
Policy making in Antarctica generally revolves around ATCMs and the vanous 
institutional arrangements made by new treaty instruments, such as the Seals Commission, 
CCAMLR Commission and its Scientific Committee, and the Madrid Protocol's CEP. 52 
Special Consultative Meetings (SCM) are sometimes convened by the ATCPs to discuss 
subjects such as applications for consultative status, and negotiations for new 
agreements. 53 Meetings of experts can lead to reports that may form the basis for proposing 
recommendations at ATCMs. Less formal meetings, such as intersessional work on 
46 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.13. 
47 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.86-87. 
48 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.82. 
49 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit., p.2. 
50 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.39. 
51 Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas, "Effectiveness and Legitimacy ofInternational Regimes", in 
Stokke, Olav Schram, and Davor Vidas (eds), Governing the Antarctic: the Effectiveness and Legitimacy of 
the Antarctic Treaty System, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1996. p.l4. 
52 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.87. 
53 ibid., p.93. In 2000 an SCM was held in the Netherlands rather than an ATCM because the original host 
country, Poland, was unable to host the ATCM. 
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specific issues, can also lead to policy change in the ATS regime. The reliance on annual 
meetings for major decision-making can make for slow progress on issues that are 
developing quickly. This is something that might change if a secretariat for the Antarctic 
Treaty can be implemented with some degree of institutional authority. 54 
Decisions on matters of substance in the ATS regime are arrived at by using a consensus 
procedure. This derives from Article IX (4) of the Antarctic Treaty and was elaborated on 
in the rules of procedure before the first ATCM. A modification to the Antarctic Treaty can 
only occur by majority if there is a review conference, 55 and the Madrid Protocol also 
contains some majority decision provisions. The consensus rule is extremely important to 
the ATS regime and has a significant effect on both the legitimacy of the regime and its 
effectiveness. The legitimacy of the regime is enhanced among the state actors because the 
consensus rule gives the ATCPs what amounts to an effective veto over any proposed 
ATCM recommendation, allowing individual states to maintain favoured status quo 
provisions. The effectiveness of the ATS regime may be compromised however, because 
the consensus system allows change to be blocked. 
CCAMLR reflects the ATS regime and Article XII of the Convention requires that all 
decisions on matters of substance are to be made by consensus, although other decisions 
can be made by a simple majority. This made the consensus procedure more explicit than it 
had been in the Antarctic Treaty. CCAMLR Article IX (6) (c) also allows any member to 
notify the commission within ninety days of the adoption of a conservation measure that it 
will not bind them. This allows members to 'opt-out' of conservation measures and 
entrenches a double veto. Consensus based decision-making systems mean that only the 
lowest common denominator proposal, or the 'least ambitious program' are likely to be 
adopted. There was some minor modification of the consensus rule in the Madrid Protocol. 
Amendments to the annex become binding after one year unless a time extension is applied 
for. This can only delay not prevent amendments from becoming legally binding. 56 More 
recently created environmental regimes have tended towards majority-rule based decision-
making procedures. 
54 A more detailed description of the CCAMLR decision-making process is given in Chapter 4, pp.122-127. 
55 Appendix I, Article XII (2) (b). 
56 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit, p.198. 
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Actors in the ATS regime 
The main actors in the ATS regime can be divided into two main categories, state actors 
and non-state actors, which can be further sub-divided. There is a two-tier system of 
membership for state actors. Only the ATCPs have decision-making authority. The non-
consultative parties (NCPs) have no formal decision-making role, although because they 
now have a right of attendance at ATCMs they can exercise a degree of influence on 
decision-making. The ATCPs are further divided between the original signatories, and the 
later ATCPs - who must continue performing scientific research in Antarctica to retain 
their ATCP status. Membership of CCAMLR is divided in a manner similar to the 
Antarctic Treaty. Some states are third parties to the ATS regime, and they are only able to 
exert influence indirectly, such as Malaysia did by raising the question of Antarctica at the 
UN. Membership of the various sub-regimes of the ATS regime is not uniform among 
parties to the Antarctic Treaty. 
Traditional studies in international relations focus on the state actors, but non-state actors 
can also influence regimes and be influenced by them. The non-state actors can be divided 
into four main groups: the scientific community, international organisations, commercial 
operators, and the non-governmental environmental and conservation organisations 
(NGOs). Some of these actors operate more closely with the ATS regime than others, for 
example the International Association of Antarctic Tourist Operators (IAATO) is an 
observer at ATCMs, while fishing operators involved in IUU fishing avoid direct 
involvement with the ATS regime. 
Scientists are important actors in the ATS regime. The political credibility of state actors in 
the regime is linked directly to their conduct of scientific research. ATCPs not originally 
party to the Antarctic Treaty must continue to support scientific research to retain their 
status. The Scientific Committee for Antarctic Research (SCAR) operates as the scientific 
agency of the ATS regime and is present as an observer at ATCMs. SCAR produces advice 
that makes it a source of knowledge in the ATS regime. CCAMLR has a Scientific 
Committee that has a similar role in relation to the Commission. 
International organisations often participate in the decision-making procedures of the ATS 
regimes. In most instances this takes the form of observers invited to attend and contribute 
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to meetings. Common observers at an ATCM include the UN Food and Agriculture 
Organization (F AO), and the International Whaling Commission (IWC). CCAMLR allows 
the European Community (EC), a regional economic organisation, to act on behalf of its 
members in respect of some issue areas, and to exercise a vote. 57 Other international 
regimes can affect the ATS regime by touching on the same issue areas, such as the UN 
Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) and the International Convention for the 
Prevention of Pollution from Ships (MARPOL).58 The presence of observers from other 
international organisations allows information to be exchanged, cooperation can be 
facilitated, and it helps avoid duplication of effort. 
The participation of the environmental NGOs in the ATS regime increased dramatically 
during the 1980s. The environmental NGOs have gained a greater degree of formal 
participation over time as observers III the consultation process, and accredited 
representatives usually have access to the meeting venue. 59 One such environmental 
organisation was the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). Another 
was the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), a transnational network of 
environmental groups, of which Greenpeace International is the largest member. 
Greenpeace also pursues an independent lobbying and pressure group role in relation to 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. Environmental NGOs have been agents for change in 
the ATS regime, and they have been successful where they have been able to gain state 
support. This has required the NGOs to acquire credible scientific expertise in Antarctica, 
that enables them to propose alternatives. 
Summary 
While actors are the participants in a regime and the issue area is its focus, principles and 
norms are the basic defining characteristics of a regime. Norms and principles determine 
the rules and decision-making procedures of a regime. 6o Changes in the rules and decision-
making procedures are changes within a regime, provided the principles and norms are 
unchanged. 61 Changes in principles and norms represent fundamental political arguments, 
57 Appendix II, Article XII, (3) and (4). 
58 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.99-101. 
59 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., pp.58-59. 
60 ibid., p.ll. 
61 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit., p.3. 
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and are changes of the regime itself. This can result in a new regime for the issue area 
concerned, or no regime at all.62 If the issue area contracts then the need for a regime may 
diminish, while if the issue area expands, the need for a regime, or for the development of 
other regimes, may increase. Change in the ATS regime has been incremental rather than 
involving an abrupt paradigm shift.63 If the CCAMLR regime can cope with the IUU and 
by-catch issues by changing rules and procedures then it is at least marginally effective at 
coping with the issues. If the tensions between the goal of environmental protection, and 
the goal of rational use of the resource reduce the legitimacy of CCAMLR to participating 
actors, then CCAMLR will be less effective and could even become a 'dead letter' regime. 
Drawing conclusions about this will require a close analysis of the rules and procedures of 
CCAMLR as they have evolved to deal with the issues of the Southern Ocean, and the 
wider debate over its effectiveness. If the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making 
procedures of a regime become less coherent, or if actual practice is increasingly 
inconsistent with principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, then a regime 
is weakened.64 The closer norms and principles match rules and procedures, the more 
coherent a regime is. 65 If CCAMLR is becoming less coherent, then it may be forced to 
adapt or change rapidly in the future in order to remain effective and to retain its 
legitimacy with the actors involved in the issue area. 
The Development of Regime Theory 
The number of regimes that exist in international relations has increased steadily over the 
last century. This growth is a reflection of the growing degree of interdependence in the 
modern international system. Regimes have been adopted to avoid sub-optimal outcomes 
in interstate relations. They are desirable where action by one or a few states is incapable 
of solving a particular international problem. Some study of regimes occurred during the 
era of the League of Nations, but the bulk of the analytical work and debate in this area has 
62 ibid., pA. 
63 According to Lorraine Elliott the Madrid Protocol was not a paradigm shift but an example of cognitive 
learning. As the values held by the actors changed, the strength of the sovereignty norms gave way partially 
to interdependence norms. Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.2lO. 
64 Stephen D. Krasner, op. cit., p.5. 
65 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.1l. 
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occurred since the Second W odd War. 66 The end of the Cold War has impacted on the 
study of regimes by bringing into focus some institutions, such as the United Nations (UN) 
or General Agreement on Trade and Tariffs (GATT)/Wodd Trade Organisation (WTO), 
that had been concealed by the shadow of the Cold War conflict. These international67 
regimes or institutions have attracted attention as scholars have debated whether they have 
any influence in international relations, or if they are just peripheral epiphenomenona. 
Regime theory attempts to account for the impact of these organisations. 
Can international regimes make a difference in international relations, and is the study of 
regimes is an area worth developing further? Regimes are important if they can actually 
shape the behaviour of the actors subject to the influence of the regime. Regime theory 
should be able to formulate generalisations that help explain or predict this shaping of 
behaviour, both at an individual level for individual actors, and at the collective level for 
multiple actors. While a regime may be established with the intention of changing 
behaviour in some manner, actual behavioural changes can be incidental or accidental to 
the efforts of the regime. Behavioural changes will not always contribute to the 
effectiveness of a regime, and on some occasions behavioural change will cause problems 
for a regime. Environmental regimes are interesting because of their potential to shape the 
behaviour of actors involved in environmental problems. The rise of environmental issues 
up the international agenda means that attention is now being devoted to environmental 
regimes as well as those that deal with security and economic issues. "International 
regimes not only deserve systematic study; they virtually cry out for it.,,68 
The ATS and CCAMLR are examples of international regImes that play a role in 
international relations. One component of the role of these regimes is their contribution 
towards environmental conservation in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR is 
also responsible for managing most of the fisheries in the Southern Ocean. By studying the 
reaction of the ATS as a whole, and the CCAMLR regime in particular, to the problems of 
IUU fishing and the by-catch of sea-birds in the Southern Ocean, it should be possible to 
66 International Organization, the leading journal in the field, first appeared in 1947. 
67 Peter H. Sand, "International Cooperation: the Environmental Experience", in Jessica Tuchman Mathews, 
Preserving the Global Environment: the Challenge of Shared Leadership, W. W. Norton: New York, 1991, 
p.239. Prefers the term 'transnational' over 'international' because regimes are not confined to 
intergovermnental relations between nation-states. 
68 Robelt O. Keohane, After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy, Princeton 
University Press: Princeton, N.J., c1984, p.26. 
22 
make valuable observations about the factors of effectiveness for environmental regimes. 
Has CCAMLR succeeded in shaping the behaviours of actors in the Southern Ocean, and 
has any change in behaviour been desired by proponents of the regime? 
A brief history of regime theory 
In its history the study of international organisations has gone through several distinct 
chronological periods in which the major focus of analysis has changed and "the field is 
often described as being in a permanent search of its own 'dependent variable. ,,69 The first 
of these was a focus on formal institutions. The second focus concerned the actual 
decision-making procedures within international organisations. The idea that the formal 
arrangements of international organisations explained what they do was abandoned. This 
perspective explored the overall "patterns of influence shaping organizational outcomes." 70 
The third focus abandoned the assumption that international governance is whatever 
international organisations do. Three distinct clusters of the actual and potential roles of 
international organisation in the process of international governance were developed. The 
first cluster emphasised the roles of international organisation in the resolution of 
substantive international problems. 71 The second cluster focused on the long-term 
institutional consequences of failing to solve substantive problems through the available 
institutional means. This was called the integrationist focus. 72 The third cluster criticised 
the transformational expectations of integration theory and focused on how international 
institutions "reflect and to some extent magnify or modify" the characteristic features of 
the international system.73 The fourth and current focus is on international regimes. The 
concept of regimes reflected an attempt to fill a void in the field of international 
organisations that had developed as early assumptions were abandoned.74 Today regime 
theory is no longer considered a passing fad of American scholars. 75 
69 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, "International Organization: a State of the Art on an Art of 
the State", International Organization, 40 (4), 1986, p.755. See also J. Martin Rochester, "The Rise and Fall 
of International Organization as a Field of Study", International Organization, 40 (4), 1986, pp. 777 -813. 
70 Friedrich Kratochwil and John Gerard Ruggie, op. cit., p.756. 
71 ibid. 
72 ibid., p.757. 
73 ibid., p.758. Phrase is Stanley Hoffman's in "International Organization & the International System", 
International Organization, 24 (3), 1970, pp.389-413. 
74 ibid., p.759. 
75 J. Martin Rochester, op. cit., pp.777-778, comments on the tendency for "pack scholarship" in the field of 
international relations and at pp.799-802 argues that the popularity of the regime concept meant almost 
intellectual chaos for the international organisation field as it was too widely applied. 
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Current areas of regime theory 
The three main schools of thought in regime theory can be classified as: neoliberal, or 
interest-based; realist, or power-based; and cognitivist, or knowledge-based schools of 
thought. 76 One area of difference between each school of thought is the degree of 
importance attached to the role of institutions in world politics. This in turn depends on 
assumptions made about actors and their motivations. 
Interest-based, or neoliberal theories of regimes have come to represent the mainstream 
approach to analysing international institutions.77 These theories emphasise the role that 
international regimes play in helping states realise common interests.78 Neoliberals draw 
heavily on economic theories and game-theoretic models that portray states as rational 
egoists who care only for their own absolute gains. Interest-based theories tell us when and 
why regimes are desirable, but not when and how demand for regimes will be met. The 
functional nature of these theories run the risk of the post hoc ergo propter hoc fallacy 
where "institutions may be interpreted as having arisen because of the functions they must 
have served, when in fact they appeared for purely adventitous reasons.,,79 In the future 
different questions will need to be asked about the beliefs actors have about the effects of 
regimes, and more tests will need to be aimed at non-regime cases.80 
Power-based, or realist, theories of international regimes emphasise the "relative power 
capabilities and states' sensitivity to the distributional aspects of cooperation ... the realist 
state cares about benefits accruing to its competitors.",81 unlike neoliberal states which feel 
no envy. Consequently regimes are harder to establish and may unravel easily if the 
distribution of power or benefits shifts. There are three power-based approaches: the 
hegemonic-stability theory, Krasner's power-oriented research program, and Joseph 
Grieco's integrated alternative. 82 The hegemonic-stability theory has declined in 
importance as it has become clear that regimes can emerge in the absence of a hegemon 
that uses power to establish and maintain regimes. With Krasner, regimes are of limited 
76 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.l78. 
77 These theories are discussed at ibid., pp.l83-196. 
78 ibid., p.l83. 
79 Robert O. Keohane, op. cit., p.81. 
80 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.196. 
81 ibid. 
82 These theories are discussed at ibid., pp.196-205. 
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significance although they help states avoid uncoordinated activity and establish stability. 
Regimes themselves can be a source of power that facilitates change as substantive regime 
principles can provide a 'rallying point' for disadvantaged states.83 Grieco's theory does 
not leave much room for international institutions to play a part. Regimes are useful for 
adjusting information asymmetry, facilitating side-payments, and may promote a norm of 
. • 84 
reCIprocIty. 
The third school of regime theory is the knowledge-based, or cognitivist school. 85 This 
school is critical of interest-based theories, arguing that neoliberalism's problems are 
derived from the assumptions that it derives from realism. Knowledge-based theories focus 
on the interests of states and the beliefs of decision-makers. Theories of 'weak 
cognitivism' do not represent a fundamental attack on rationalist theories, while 'strong 
cognitivism' embraces a far more pronounced institutionalism than in either neoliberalism 
or realism. 86 Weak cognitivism emphasises the importance of ideas, learning, and the role 
of epistemic communities. Ideas are important because if an actor's beliefs change then 
their perceived interests can change.87 Learning occurs when changes in belief induce 
behavioural change. For knowledge or ideas to affect regimes they must be shared by key 
policymakers. The channel for ideas from specialists to decision makers has been called 
'epistemic communities'. 88 Strong cognitivism makes a radical critique of rationalistic 
regime theory by "seeing international regimes as embedded in the broader normative 
structures of international society.,,89 States may feel compelled to comply with norms and 
rules, even when they have both the incentive and capacity to break them, because norms 
and rules may have a compliance pull of their own. 
83 ibid., p.20 1. 
84 ibid., p.204. 
85 These are discussed at ibid., pp.205-217. 
86 The first of these is the conception of states as rational actors, the second the static approach to the study of 
international relations, and the third its positivist methodology. ibid., pp.205-206. 
87 ibid., p.207. 
88 Peter Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", International 
Organization, 46 (1),1992, pp.l-35. 
89 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.2IO. This equates regimes with other 
fundamental institutions, like sovereignty, diplomacy, and international law, that provide the rules and norms 
that make interaction possible between states. 
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Critique of Regime Theory - Gaps in the Scholarship 
Levy, Young and Ziirn identified several gaps in the existing studies on regime theory, 
finding possible directions for future research and the need for a regime database. 9o There 
is a wide gap between theory and practice with international regimes. There is a lack of 
consensus on powerful generalisations. The dominant methodology in studying 
international regimes has been on focused case studies. These do not tend to generate 
general findings. 91 Linkages between different regimes also need to be dealt with. Linkages 
are widespread, and specific regimes are often embedded in larger systems of norms and 
principles.92 The ATS regime has links to several other distinct regimes. This is not an area 
this thesis will concentrate on because "Confiating the analysis of regime effectiveness and 
the study of broader consequences is a recipe for confusion. ,,93 The areas of scholarship 
that this thesis will concentrate on are: effectiveness, epistemic communities, and regime 
change. 
Problems with the consensus definition 
The consensus definition of a regime presents two problems for regime theory. The first 
problem is in identifying the precise meaning of and the relationship among the four main 
components of regimes: principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures. Actors 
and issue areas have been easier to define and identify. There has been much debate over 
the definitions of the other terms and this is a source of criticism from realists who see 
regimes as epiphenomenona with indistinguishable components and vagueness of 
boundaries.94 The second problem is in determining when a regime exists in a given issue 
area. Patterned behaviour can emerge in the absence of a regime and it does not presuppose 
cooperation.95 Efforts to resolve this problem have focused on attempts to classify or 
identify different types of regimes. 
90 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ziirn, op.cit., pp.312-321. 
91 ibid.,p.319. 
92 ibid., p.317. 
93 Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness ofInternational Environmental regimes: A Mid-Term Report", 
International Environmental Affairs, 10, 1998, p.271. 
94 See Susan Strange, "Cave! Hie Dragones: a Critique of Regime Analysis", in Stephen D. Krasner, 
International Regimes, Cornell University Press, 1983, pp.337-354. 
95 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit., p.271. 
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One alternative to the problem of the disputes over the components of the consensus 
definition is to propose a simpler formulation to deal with the problem of indistinguishable 
components; one where the distinctions between principles, norms, rules, and procedures 
lack intersubjective meaning.96 One example of this put forward by Robert Keohane 
collapsed the complex definition into a single concept of rules by defining regimes as 
"institutions with explicit rules, agreed upon by governments, that pertain to particular sets 
of issues in international relations.,,97 This risks sacrificing the rich analysis that can be 
done using the consensus definition, such as being able to differentiate between different 
varieties of regime change.98 The development of a strong theory is the best hope for 
overcoming the ambiguities in definitional matters: "the consensus definition and its 
alternatives should be thought of as working definitions that will grow more precise and 
more sophisticated as their surrounding edifice becomes more elaborated. ,,99 
One recent reworking of the consensus definition is the suggestion of defining international 
regimes "as social institutions consisting of agreed upon principles, norms, rules, 
procedures and programs that govern the interactions of actors in specific issue areas.,,100 
This allows a distinction to be drawn between regimes and the international organizations 
which are also material entities. So while CCAMLR is a regime it is also an international 
organisation, and while the ATS is a regime it is not yet an international organisation. One 
important difference here is that international regimes do not possess the capacity to act, 
while international organisations can. 
A large variety of methods for identifying and classifying regimes have been proposed. 
One attempt to implement the consensus definition focused on explicit rules or observable 
behaviours,101 while another approach argues that regimes are best identified on the basis 
of behavioural, cognitive, or formal criteria. 102 There is a risk of circular reasoning - by 
identifying a regime based on observed behaviour and then using the regime to explain the 
behaviour, but a purely formal implementation includes numerous ineffective 'paper 
96 ibid., pp.273-274. 
97 Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations Theory, 
Westview Press: Boulder, 1989 p.4. 
98 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.180. For example see the discussion 
at pp.23-24 above. 
99 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.183. Emphasis in the original. 
100 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ziirn, op. cit., p.274. 
101 ibid., p.271. 
102 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., pp.180-183. 
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regimes' .103 The cognitive approach shifts its emphasis towards intersubjective meaning 
and shared understandings. This has been criticised for its data problems. Other possible 
typologies for regime classification include: principles and norms; rules; procedures and 
programs; actors and issue areas. 
In deciding how best to study international regimes, pragmatic analytical reasons mean that 
regimes are often conceptualised as explicit rules and agreements that are agreed upon by 
actors and embodied in treaties or other documents. 104 This approach has its disadvantages 
because the existence of formal rules does not always translate into the existence of a 
regime in an issue area. As well as the degree of the formality of the rules a second 
dimension may be needed - the degree to which actor expectations converge. 105 
Formality 
Low 
High 
Figure 2 
Regime Definitions106 
Low 
Convergence of Expectations 
High 
no regImes tacit regimes 
dead letter regimes classic regimes 
'Dead letter regimes' feature rules, but lack the same degree of compliant behaviour as a 
classic regime. Tacit regimes have more informal rules and behaviour that is consistent 
with independently inferred rules.lO? CCAMLR and the ATS regime fit the pattern for a 
'classic regime' in which both rules and rule-consistent behaviour exist. Most would agree 
that a regime exists when these conditions are met. This can be inferred when: "(1) clear 
violations remain the exception, (2) parties harmed by violations protest against them by 
implicitly or explicitly referring to the agreed upon rules and (3) violators do not deny the 
103 "It would be circular reasoning to identify regimes on the basis of observed behaviour, and then to use 
them to 'explain' observed behaviour." Robert O. Keohane, "The Analysis ofInternational Regimes: 
Towards a European-American Research Programme", Volker Rittberger (ed), in Regime Theory and 
International Relations, Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993, p.27. 
104 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.182. 
105 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit., p.272. 
106 Reproduced from Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zlirn, op. cit., p.272. 
107 See Charles Lipson, "Why are some International Agreements Informal?", International Organization, 45 
(4), 1991, pp.495-523 and 532-538. 
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rules and norms referred to in these protests."I08 Major or long-term non-compliance 
brings the existence of the regime into question. An institutional structure might survive 
past the effective end ofthe regime it was a part of, much as the League of Nations did. 
Regime effectiveness 
In the field of regime theory recent studies have focused on international environmental 
regimes. This is an area conducive to the analysis of the new analytical and normative 
concerns underlying regime analysis. I09 It helps addresses some of the blank spots in 
knowledge about regime theory, which are due to the earlier emphasis on security and 
economic regimes. Many environmental regimes are of comparatively recent origins, the 
product of negotiations in the 1980s and 1990s. The case study in this thesis focuses on 
how effective the CCAMLR regime has been in dealing with the environmental problems 
of IUU and by-catch. Because focusing on other dimensions of effectiveness could lead to 
a view that CCAMLR was effective without solving the problems it faces, this thesis will 
focus on the dimension of effectiveness as problem-solving, without trying to lose sight of 
the other dimensions of effectiveness. 110 
Different definitions of regime effectiveness will lead to different judgements about regime 
effectiveness. 111 A legal definition measures the extent to which conflicts are regulated and 
contractual obligations are met. A policy-oriented definition focuses on goals and goal 
attainment. A political definition investigates changes in actor behaviours and interactions 
and how that affects the problem. Levy, Young, and Ziirn presented the following 
definition: "effectiveness is a matter of the degree to which a regime ameliorates the 
problem that prompted its creation.,,112 According to Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger, 
"Regime effectiveness compromises two overlapping ideas. First a regime is effective to 
the extent that its members abide by its norms and rules. Second, a regime is effective to 
108 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit., p.272. 
109 ibid., p.268. 
110 Oran Young described six different dimensions to the concept of effectiveness: effectiveness as problem-
solving, effectiveness as goal attainment, behavioural effectiveness among regime member, process 
effectiveness in domestic implementation, constitutive effectiveness of social practices, and evaluative 
effectiveness. Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, 
Cornell University Press: Ithaca, 1994, pp.l42-152. 
111 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit., pp.291-292. 
112 ibid., p.291. 
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the extent that it achieves the objects or purposes for which it is intended.,,113 Regime 
resilience to external change also helps explain why regimes matter. 114 This is an area 
addressed by Stokke and Vidas when they investigated the effectiveness of the ATS and 
CCAMLR regimes by looking in part at how they dealt with external challenges to ATS 
authority. They also use a problem-solving definition of effectiveness: "the effectiveness of 
a regime is understood as the impact it has on certain problems which it addresses".115 
Effectiveness and compliance 
The extent to which CCAMLR members abide by, or comply with, the norms or rules of 
the regime is an important factor in effectiveness. Effectiveness is linked conceptually with 
compliance but is still distinct from it. Ronald Mitchell defined compliance as "an actor's 
behaviour that conforms to a treaty's explicit rules." 11 6 Although compliance does not 
necessarily equate with effectiveness, more compliance will usually lead to a more 
effective regime than less compliance Will,117 but Mitchell found that "Greater compliance 
is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for effectiveness.,,118 Young in 1998 
preferred the use of behavioural consequences as a measure of regime effectiveness, such 
as outputs, outcomes, and impacts. This was because "a tum toward implementation and 
compliance as a way of conceptualizing effectiveness is apt to be accompanied by a loss of 
analytic rigor and a constant battle with empirical messiness.,,119 
There is often a separation between the members of a regime, and those actors whose 
behaviour is the ultimate target of action taken by that regime. For the CCAMLR regime, 
while states are members, it is often the behaviour of fishing companies which is being 
targeted. Implementation of regime rules requires domestic prescriptions. It remains an 
open question what kind of domestic structure is most effective. 12o There is a need to 
113 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.178. Emphasis in the original. 
114 ibid. 
115 Olav Schram Stokke and Davor Vidas, op. cit., p.15. Emphasis in the original. 
116 Ronald B. Mitchell, "Compliance Theory: An Overview", in James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, and Peter 
Roderick, Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, Earthscan Publications Ltd, 
London, 1996, p.5. 
II? "Regimes with strong compliance mechanisms can be expected to alter the behavior of regime participants 
considerably." Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zlirn, op. cit., p.278. 
118 Ronald B. Mitchell, op. cit., p.25. 
119 Oran R. Young, "The Effectiveness of International Environmental regimes: A Mid-Term Report", 
International Environmental Affairs, 10, 1998, p.269. 
120 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zlirn, op. cit., p.315. 
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identify the sources of compliance other than the enforcement and sanctions model and to 
get beyond the idea that the probability of being caught and punished is the key 
determinant in compliance. The absence of central enforcement may not be a critical 
weakness for a regime. Numerous sources of compliance may operate simultaneously. 
Compliance is valuable if it leads to accomplishing the goals of a regime. However, even if 
the behaviour of the actors involved has changed, this may not be enough to address the 
problems for which a regime was created. If the rules are weak, then compliance may not 
lead to effective problem-solving. The fact that an actor is compliant with the rules of a 
regime does not necessarily mean that a regime itself has induced that compliance. 
Compliance can occur as a result of independent self-interest. In these instances the rules 
of a regime will reflect existing and intended future behaviours, and compliance is not 
caused by the regime but merely coincides with it. 121 Compliance can also occur as a result 
of interdependent self-interest. In these instances the presence of a regime may over time 
reinforce the incentives for compliance. 122 Legitimate rules exert a normative pull toward 
1· 123 comp lance. 
There are a variety of reasons for non-compliance. Non-compliance can occur as the 
preference of actors because the benefits of compliance do not outweigh the costs. A state 
can be interested in signing a treaty but not complying with it. This can be the result of a 
'free-rider' seeking to avoid the costs of compliance, because the resources required for 
compliance need to be used elsewhere, or because the actor does not value the benefits of 
compliance. 124 Non-compliance can occur due to the incapacity of the actors involved. The 
actor may lack the financial, administrative, or technological capabilities to comply. This is 
often a problem for developing countries.l2S Non-compliance may also be due to 
inadvertence. While the actors sincerely intend to comply with the rules of a regime they 
are unable to. This can occur where a target set in good faith when conditions were 
uncertain is found to be impossible to achieve. 126 The control that states have over 
121 Ronald B. Mitchell, op. cit., pp.7-9. 
122 ibid., pp.9-11. 
123 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zi.irn, op. cit., p.277. 
124 Ronald B. Mitchell, op. cit., pp.1l-l2. 
125 ibid., pp.12-13. 
126 ibid., p.13 .. 
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individual activities involved in marine resource management is tenuous. 127 One method of 
overcoming non-compliance is to give positive rewards for compliance in order to increase 
the incentives for compliance. Another remedy is deterrence through the threat or use of 
sanctions, which raises the problems of enforcement. 
Effectiveness and enforcement 
Enforcement is an activity conducted by the actors involved with a regime to induce 
compliance with the rules and norms of a regime. Enforcement can involve the use of 
sanctions. To be effective sanctions have to be both credible and potent. 128 Social 
opprobrium is a form of sanction through diplomatic efforts that can be used to pressure 
actors to comply. Specific reciprocity, "promising to comply if others comply and 
threatening to violate if others violate",129 can also be used to elicit compliance, although it 
can be difficult to implement in a multilateral environment. 130 Enforcement of the rules of 
the CCAMLR regime against individuals acting on the high seas requires detection. This 
raises the question of who is collecting and interpreting this information, and what use they 
will put it to. 
The ATS regIme is not empowered to implement punitive sanctions when rules are 
breached, relying on the actions of its members. Even if it was so empowered the 
consensus rule would probably prevent joint sanctions from being implemented. The 
CCAMLR executive secretary has a limited ability to close fisheries,131 but this is reliant 
on the members implementing the fishery closure among their flagged fishing vessels. The 
possibility of unilateral sanction by individual actors is possible. The United States has 
used the threat of unilateral sanctions to encourage countries to comply with CITES and 
the IWC, but has only once imposed trade sanctions in relation to a violation of an 
127 Gregory Rose and George Paleokrassis, "Compliance with International Environmental Obligations: A 
Case Study of the International Whaling Commission", in James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, and Peter 
Roderick, Improving Compliance with International Environmental Law, Earthscan Publications Ltd: 
London, 1996, p.149. 
128 Leesteffy Jenkins argues in favour of sanctions in "Trade Sanctions: Effective Enforcement Tools", in 
James Cameron, Jacob Werksman, and Peter Roderick, Improving Compliance with International 
Environmental Law, Earthscan Publications Ltd: London, 1996, pp.221-228. 
129 Ronald B. Mitchell, op. cit., p.16. 
130 ibid., pp.15-16. 
131 CCAMLR Conservation Measure 611XII 'Ten-day Catch and Effort Reporting System' allows the 
Executive Secretary to close a fishery once the total allowable catch has been completed. 
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international environmental agreement. 132 This form of sanction can cause some tension 
with the free trade principles of the WTO. 
The concept of an epistemic community 
The concept of epistemic communities rests on some general assumptions about the world 
today. Firstly, science and the provision of scientific advice is extremely important in 
modern society. Secondly, conditions of uncertainty create a need for advice in policy 
determination. Uncertainty is a situation in which actors must make decisions without 
adequate information about the issue, or where the consequences of their actions are not 
well understood. CCAMLR was created in conditions of uncertainty, and although 
improved today, the provision of scientific advice remains an integral part of policy-
making in CCAMLR. The definition of an epistemic community offered by Peter Haas is 
that: 
An epistemic community is a network of professionals with recognized expertise 
and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue-area. Although an epistemic community 
may consist of professionals from a variety of disciplines and backgrounds, they 
have (1) a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-
based rationale for the social action of community members; (2) shared causal 
beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading or contributing to 
a central set of problems in their domain and which serve as the basis for 
elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions and desired 
outcomes; (3) shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined 
criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise; and 
(4) a common policy enterprise - that is, a set of common practices associated with 
a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably 
out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. 133 
Epistemic communities "differ from interest groups in that the epistemic community 
members have shared causal beliefs and cause-and-effect understandings. If confronted 
with anomalies that undermine their causal beliefs, they would withdraw from the policy 
debate, unlike interest groups.,,134 Interest groups and social movements have shared 
principled beliefs, but not shared causal beliefs. The broader scientific community is 
132 Leesteffy Jenkins, op. cit., p.225. 
133 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", 
International Organization, 46 (1), 1992, p.3. 
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different because of the lack of the shared normative commitments found in an epistemic 
community.135 They have shared causal beliefs, but not shared principled beliefs. 
It can take a shock or crisis to overcome inertia, to realise that uncertainty exists and that 
advice from an epistemic community is needed. Information generated by an epistemic 
community can also create that shock. 136 There are four areas in which an epistemic 
community can be of assistance: 
"First, following a shock or crisis, epistemic communities can elucidate the cause-
and-effect relationships and provide advice about the likely results of various 
courses of action ... Second, epistemic communities can shed light on the nature of 
the complex interlinkages between issues and on the chain of events that might 
proceed either from failure to take an action or from instituting a particular policy 
... Third, epistemic communities can help define the self-interests of a state or 
factions within it ... Fourth, epistemic communities can help formulate policies.,,137 
In less politically motivated cases epistemic communities can have even greater influence 
in the policy-making process by pointing out which alternatives are viable. 138 Epistemic 
communities aim to control problems not societies so they "should not be mistaken for a 
new hegemonic' actor that is the source of political and moral direction in society 
Epistemic communities are neither philosophers, nor kings, nor philosopher-kings. ,,139 
Adler and Haas argue that epistemic communities can influence the creation and 
maintenance of international regimes at four stages: policy innovation; policy diffusion; 
policy selection; and policy persistence. Policy innovation allows epistemic communities 
to exert influence by: "(1) framing the range of political controversy surrounding an issue, 
(2) defining state interests, and (3) setting standards.,,140 For policy diffusion: "Epistemic 
community members play both direct and indirect roles in policy coordination by diffusing 
ideas and influencing the positions adopted a by a wide range of actors, including domestic 
and international agencies, government bureaucrats and decision makers, legislative and 
corporate bodies, and the public.,,141 The size of an epistemic community tends to be very 
135 ibid., p.19. 
136 ibid., p.14. 
137 ibid., p.15. 
138 ibid., p.16. 
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small, often under thirty-five people. What matters is the respect and influence within their 
discipline that the epistemic community members have. The timing of the idea is also 
important. An epistemic community can be a very transient creation. When it comes to 
policy selection: "Epistemic communities create reality, but not as they wish.,,142 Political 
factors and other considerations affect solicitation and use of advice from epistemic 
communities. Policy persistence occurs through socialisation and persistence by an 
epistemic community. "New ideas and policies, once institutionalized, can gain the status 
of orthodoxy.,,143 One factor affecting persistence is the maintenance of consensus within 
the epistemic community. If consensus is lost then authority is diminished and decision 
makers pay less attention to advice. I44 Communities that lose their consensus can generate 
disagreements leading to a loss of influence, or even the collapse of regimes they have 
defended. 145 
Karen Litfin points out that under conditions of uncertainty the norm is more likely to be 
"epistemic dissension,,146 than consensus. The Imowledge may be consensual, but the 
interpretations of it can vary. 147 In a more general criticism of the definition of epistemic 
communities Litfin notes that: "First, it skirts epistemological questions. Second, it is 
overly optimistic about the ability of consensuallmowledge to minimize political conflict. 
Third, it reduces the power of epistemic communities to conventional political skills, 
thereby ignoring the central dimension of rhetorical competence.,,148 Litfin argued that the 
role played by 'lmowledge-brokers' may be more useful in explaining how a particular 
policy is adopted. A knowledge-broker is an intermediary between the producers of the 
knowledge and the policy-makers who use that knowledge. 149 A Imowledge-broker frames 
and interprets the science,I50 translating and communicating Imowledge, rather than 
engaging in policy advocacy. 151 Access to information is crucial for a Imowledge-broker to 
be in a position to influence how it is disseminated. Litfin is highly critical of the primacy 
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of consensual knowledge and argues that what IS really important IS discourse not 
consensus. 
Evolution has been used as a metaphor for epistemic communities, but this metaphor has 
its limits because ideas do not become extinct - they are kept for future use. 152 Reality is 
socially constructed and ideas inform policy. "While epistemic communities provide 
consensual knowledge, they do not necessarily generate truth.,,153 Organisations are not 
always captured by an epistemic community. "Members of epistemic communities 
involved in environmental regimes have subscribed to holistic ecological beliefs about the 
need for policy co-ordination subject to ecosystemic laws. ,,154 This suggests a good fit for 
CCAMLR, because its policies try to manage the entire ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. 
This is a tempting area to explore because no one has investigated the CCAMLR regime 
closely enough to establish evidence of an epistemic community, with the exception of 
Lorraine Elliott.155 If such an 'invisible college' can be identified a contribution to theory 
may be made by exploring how it has worked in reality with the IUU and by-catch issues 
and what its contribution to the effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime has been. 
Cognitivists have argued that "when epistemic communities are widely spread, even in the 
absence of leadership by a strong state, environmentally effective regimes are possible.,,156 
This can happen through epistemicly informed bargaining, and epistemic communities are 
supposed to be most influential during a shock or crisis. It will be interesting to examine 
the sources of ideas, discourse, and leadership in CCAMLR as it attempts to deal with its 
problems. 
Epistemic communities - the other groups problem 
The concept of epistemic communities may be an important contribution in understanding 
the role of the scientific community in regimes, but the concept has been criticised. Dave 
Toke has questioned their alleged dominance over environmental policy at the expense of 
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environmental groups.157 "Environmental groups do not have the same canons of validity 
as epistemic communities simply because their principles do not require such tests.,,158 
Toke argued that environmental groups can be just as important as epistemic communities 
when it comes to shaping the interpretation or form, and acceptance or projection of norms. 
Toke questions whether scientists are in a better position to be the bearers of the truth 
because "it is extremely difficult to find an environmental issue that does not depend on 
normative, socially constructed, as opposed to positivistically inspired judgements".159 
Toke argued that when scientists are divided, then environmentalists are still able to 
advocate. 
Claire Dunlop replied to these criticisms and expanded on them. 160 "It is not in dispute that 
Haas has failed to produce an approach capable of accommodating the multiplicity of 
actors, epistemic and non-epistemic, who at various junctures influence the norms of 
decision-makers and, crucially, of one another.,,161 The point of distinction with 
environmental groups is that "the claims to influence by interest groups or social 
movements would not be undermined decisively by the discovery of technical anomalies 
which are irreconcilable with the received wisdom.,,162 Among the problems there is an 
inability to explain interactions of epistemic communities with other actors, and a lack of 
critical empirical testing. The basic methodological complexity of implementing such a 
micro-level approach, means that identifying an epistemic community can be very 
difficult. Dunlop believes that the current approach remains that of 1992, with 
contradictions and omissions in the idea that remain hidden and await exploration. 163 
'Other groups' are a problem in that they exist as potential rivals or allies to the epistemic 
communities: "the much-vaunted 'consensual knowledge' may overstate the influence 
these expert enclaves alone can have.,,164 James Sebenius argued that being apolitical yet 
politically empowered seems unfeasible. Influence arises from bargaining with other actors 
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that turns a 'natural coalition' into a 'winning coalition' .165 Success may require other 
politically astute groups to be involved. The current framework of epistemic communities 
is unable to accommodate bargaining. 166 Dave Toke noted the blurred roles between 
scientific and environmental groups: "environmental groups can sponsor scientific research 
and scientists can sometimes explicitly appeal to normative objectives.,,167 Environmental 
groups can linle the concerns of different epistemic communities together. "The test that is 
increasingly applied to the scientists who are variously backed by environmentalists or 
business interests is how much their arguments and findings resonate with an increasingly 
democratised public debate." 168 Credibility depends on producing information via a 
process that is transparent, procedurally fair, and dominated by professional norms. 169 
States are not losing their place as dominant actors, but NGOs are gaining influence in 
regimes. NGOs have both the desire and the capacity to intervene and can playa role in 
framing issues, acting as watchdogs, or pressure groups. 
Regime change 
In the past, attention has focused on regime creation, but regimes change continuously over 
time and some decline or go out of existence. Do regimes have identifiable life cycles and 
can propositions be developed about the process of growth and decay?170 Oran Young 
observed that regimes may have a life cycle, usually growing in effectiveness over time, 
but in some cases outliving their usefulness. 171 The CCAMLR case study may potentially 
be that of a regime in decline, and if so, then it may be able to reveal some potential 
generalisations about regimes in decline. Robert Keohane and Joseph Nye developed four 
models for understanding regime change: "(1) economic processes, (2) the overall power 
structure in the world, (3) the power structure within issue areas, and (4) power capabilities 
as affected by international organization. ,,172 These models may be useful in explaining 
change in the CCAMLR regime. 
165 James K. Sebenius, "Challenging Conventional Explanations of International Cooperation: Negotiation 
Analysis and the Case of Epistemic Communities", International Organization, 46 (1), 1992, pp.325-326. 
166 Claire Dunlop, op. cit., p.142. 
167 Dave Toke, Green Politics and Neo-liberalism, Macmillan Press Ltd: London, 2000, p.72. 
168 ibid., p.74. 
169 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, Power and Interdependence, third edition, Longman: New York, 
2001, p.225. 
170 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael ZUrn, op. cit., p.318. 
171 Oran R. Young, op. cit., p.272. 
38 
The economic process model focuses on using technological and economic changes to 
explain regime change. 
"The first premise of an economic process model of regime change is that 
technological change and increases in economic interdependence will make 
existing international regimes obsolete .... The second premise is that governments 
will be highly responsive to domestic political demands for a rising standard of 
living ... The third premise of this model is that the great aggregate economic 
benefits provided by international movements of capital, goods, and in some cases 
labor will give governments strong incentives to modify or reconstruct international 
regimes to restore their effectiveness ... Thus, regime change will be a process of 
gradually adapting to new volumes and new forms of transnational economic 
activity." 173 
The problems of this model lie in its weak treatment of politics. It abstracts from interests 
that may diverge between different groups, and assumes that politico-military decisions are 
separate from economic decisions. 174 
The overall power structure explanation assumes that the distribution of military power 
between states determines the power structure of the international system, which in turn 
determines the nature of international regimes. 175 The appeal of this model lies in its 
simplicity and parsimonious prediction. As the power of states changes, so the rules of 
international regimes will change accordingly. The model predicts a strong tendency 
towards congruence of outcomes among issue areas due to the fungibility of military 
power. 176 Leadership in maintaining a regime is most likely in a hegemonial system, where 
leadership requires foregoing short term gains in order to preserve the regime. l77 Changes 
in power, such as a situation of eroding hegemony, can bring about the subsequent end of 
the regime. The problems of this model lie in the difficulty it has in explaining change 
when the United States continued to hold military dominance, but declined relatively in the 
global economy. More factors are required to account for post World War Two changes in 
threat perception, relative economic strength, and the process of decolonisation. 178 
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The issue structure model holds that power capabilities among states are not easily 
transferred between different issue areas, and different issue areas will have different 
power structures. This model is similar to the overall structure model in that the strong 
states (in an issue area) will make the rules. 179 The model assumes that attempts to draw 
linkages between different issue areas will be unsuccessful. Less powerful as a theory 
because it requires more information, but it is a more discriminating theory as the analysis 
of politics is conducted by issue area. The model distinguishes between activity within a 
regime and activity influencing the development of a new regime, as the power resources 
used in the two areas can differ. 18o Regime change occurs "because of the difference 
between influence and benefits under an existing regime and the expectations of 
dissatisfied states about the effects of new rules.,,181 Understanding regime change requires 
understanding both structure and process, the way in which capabilities become outcomes. 
A simple structural explanation involves a shift of overall or issue-specific capabilities 
leading to regime change. A sophisticated structural explanation has a regime creating a 
bargaining process, which leads to a pattern of outcomes. If the pattern is incongruous with 
power. structure (overall or issue specific) there will be regime change to reduce 
incongruity.182 The issue structure model has its problems. Successful issue linkage means 
outcomes are no longer dependent on power resources in the issue area, and linkage can 
come from weak states. 183 The model also ignores domestic and transnational actors. 
Simplicity is a good starting point for analysing regime change, but provides only a partial 
explanation. 
The international organisation model uses the term 'international organisation' to refer to 
multilevel linkages, norms and institutions, intergovernmental and trans governmental ties. 
This model treats networks, norms and institutions as independent variables in explaining 
regime change. Once established international organisation will be hard to eradicate or 
rearrange. 184 "Power over outcomes will be conferred by organizationally dependent 
capabilities, such as voting power, ability to form coalitions, and control of elite 
networks.,,185 The model provides a dynamic of regime change, and allows for regime 
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inertia. International regimes can be changed by decisions that are affected by international 
organisation. One major source of regime change is other organisations. The model does 
have its problems, because it is complicated and requires more information, it does not 
predict change from a single variable and is less deterministic. The factors in this model 
are more temporary and reversible than with the structural models, and if states chose to 
destroy regimes, then structural models become more important. 186 
Do regimes matter? 
The realist argument that regimes are epiphenomenona is dealt with by answering the 
question about whether or not regimes make a difference in international relations. In 
determining if regimes do make a difference most regime research has focused on four 
interrelated questions: regime creation, regime persistence, regime consequences - do 
regimes make a difference - and long term consequences. Developing a comprehensive 
theory of regimes will require addressing all of these questions. 187 Regime creation is an 
area of regime theory that has received a lot of attention in the past but will not be a major 
focus of this thesis because the ATS has already been well covered by existing 
scholarship.188 Each school of thought focuses on a specific variable in the study of 
international regimes: 
Neoliberals stress self-interest as a motive for cooperation among states and for the 
creation of, and compliance with, international regimes. Realists emphasize that 
considerations of relative power affect the substance of international regimes and 
circumscribe their effectiveness and robustness. Cognitivists point out that both the 
perceptions of interests and the meanings of power capabilities are dependent on 
actors' causal and social knowledge. 189 
Attempts are being made to formulate a synthesis of the different schools. 
When it comes to effectiveness the central questions are: "Do regimes matter and what 
proportion of the variance in world affairs is attributable to the operation of these 
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institutional arrangements.,,190 Oran Young has put forward the concept of a 'hard case' as 
an analytical device to test if a regime makes a difference even during adverse conditions. 
"A hard case when it comes to the effectiveness of international institutions· is a situation in 
which participants have both incentives and opportunities to disregard or change 
institutional requirements.,,191 Factors leading to this condition include: 
One or more of the prominent members of the subject group are predisposed to 
dislike the outcomes they expect a regime to produce. It is comparatively easy to 
violate the rules of the regime either without detection or in such a way that 
incontrovertible evidence of the violation is difficult to obtain. Ongoing changes in 
the character of international society raise doubts about the sociopolitical or 
intellectual underpinnings of the regime. 192 
The more factors that are present the harder the case is for an institution to have some 
influence in shaping behaviour. If institutions can survive and shape behaviour in hard 
cases then they should be more influential under more benign conditions. 193 
The CCAMLR regime meets several of the hard case criteria in respect of the IUU and 
seabird by-catch issues. If the CCAMLR Commission moves to impose further restrictions 
on fishing in the Southern Ocean then the CCAMLR members that conduct fisheries there 
are unlikely to be satisfied with the outcome. If the CCAMLR regime fails to address the 
problem then the conservation minded members are unlikely to be satisfied with the 
outcome. In the past it has been easy to violate the CCAMLR rules and avoid detection, 
although with the introduction of VMS and the more active enforcement of Southern 
Ocean EEZ by some states this is more difficult than it was. It has still proven difficult to 
punish individual actors within CCAMLR member states that have been responsible for 
IUD fishing in the Southern Ocean. While elements of the regime are being disregarded it 
will be interesting to investigate changes in the regime that are being attempted or 
implemented. The environmental NOOs may be presenting a challenge to the 'rational use' 
principle of the CCAMLR regime through their calls for a moratorium on fishing for 
toothfish, although whether this represents a wider change in the character of international 
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society is not clear. This could be demonstrated by a change in the values of fishing states 
to reflect a conservation goal. The significance of this call for a moratorium is that it has 
the potential to undermine the interest that fishing states have in continued membership of 
CCAMLR or with continued compliance with its rules. This is a hard case because there 
are incentives and opportunities to disregard or change the regimes requirements. 
The assertion that regimes make a difference by altering calculation of actors' interest or 
changing capabilities has been elaborated but not rigorously tested. The impact of regimes 
on the self-interest of governments can have two effects on state strategies. First, a regime 
can act as a focal point for expectation convergence. By reducing uncertainty and 
providing guidelines for legitimate actions, the regime creates feasible patterns for 
agreement. In the long run a state may change its self-interest to match the rules of the 
regime. Second, a regime can constrain behaviour by limiting access to decision-making 
and prohibiting some actions. Violators of regime rules can find that their reputation is 
affected. 194 There is a need to trace the behaviours of states to see how closely policies 
actually follow regime principles, rules, and institutions. The impact of regime can be 
found by tracing "internal decision-making processes to discover what strategies would 
have been followed in the absence of regime rules." On what issues did self-interest clash 
with regime rules? Did incentives to abide by rules outweigh incentives to break rules? 
How much impact did the regime rules have? Do regimes promote their own growth?195 
Methodology for the Analysis Chapter 
In analysing the CCAMLR regime there are a large variety of factors and variables that can 
be studied, and several different techniques for doing so. Two of the main styles of 
analysis are natural experiments focused on the issue area over time, and thought (or 
counter-factual) experiments. Oran Young stated in 1994 that "our understanding of the 
determinants of effectiveness in international governance systems is rudimentary at this 
stage".196 What are the factors that operate as determinants of regime effectiveness? The 
issue here is the tension between parsimony and explanatory power. Single factor accounts 
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are simple to articulate but do not hold up well to empirical examination.197 The eight 
factors that this thesis will explore as determinants of problem-solving effectiveness for the 
CCAMLR regime are: transparency; robustness; transformation rules; capacity of 
governments; distribution of power; interdependence; issue area; and intellectual order. 
This is done partly for ease of analysis, and also because a boundary line needs to be drawn 
to prevent the devising of new factors ad infinitum. Intellectual order as a factor overlaps 
with the methodology that will be used for investigating the concept of epistemic 
communities in the CCAMLR regime. 
The problems of case studies 
The dominant methodology in regime research has been focused case studies. There is 
reason to be concerned with the selection bias resulting from this, because it makes natural 
experiments based on variance in the elements used to classify regimes difficult. This 
thesis is based on the case study of the CCAMLR sub-regime within the broader 
framework of the ATS regime. The approach being taken is to assess the effectiveness of 
one issue area, that of IUU fishing and the associated problem of incidental mortality. 
However, different issue areas are not always neatly separated in the real world and 
developments in one issue area can affect other areas. It is difficult to analyse broader 
effects due to the complexity of the situation. 198 In this respect regimes are useful for social 
learning and broader learning occurs when "a principle applicable to more than one issue 
area proves successful in specific cases.,,199 An increasing density of international regimes 
may even initiate movement towards political integration. 200 A second area of broader 
consequences are between international society and transnational relations. Regimes 
contribute towards the rise of transnational issue networks, epistemic communities, and 
transnational social movements. This contributes to the growing challenge towards 
traditional notions of sovereignty?Ol Because of the difficulty in analysing broader 
consequences this is not an area that this thesis will focus on. This is because of the need to 
compare and contrast regimes across different issue areas and the CCAMLR case study is 
focused on one issue area. 
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Natural experiments 
Natural experiments can be used to compare different issue areas or a single evolving 
regime over time. A natural experiment could be used for CCAMLR if there are "situations 
that remain largely unchanged over time except for alterations in the character of the 
prevailing regime. ,,202 In this respect the performance of CCAMLR in dealing with the 
IUD and by-catch problems can be measured against earlier efforts to conserve other 
fisheries stocks in the Southern Ocean. One critical area for observing differences will be 
to analyse the impact of the conservation measures that are implemented by the 
Commission. These measures represent the rules of the CCAMLR regime, and may also 
indicate normative changes that may be taking place in the regime. 
Thought experiments 
Analysing the effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime may be done with thought 
experiments and the construction of counter-factual arguments. This: "technique involves a 
rigorous effort to recontruct [sic] the flow of events as it would have unfolded in the 
absence of some key factor ... and to compare the results with the actual flow of 
events.,,203 The causal pathways that are constructed for this need to be carefully supported 
with empirical evidence?04 As has been pointed out "the real measure of a regime's 
effectiveness involves a comparison with what would have happened if the regime had 
never existed.,,205 It can be difficult to isolate the impact of a regime on its issue area. One 
way of overcoming the problem of comparing the outcomes is to focus on the process. 
Counter-factual arguments need to be carefully framed to allow the behaviour of key actors 
at critical junctures to be studied. This involves looking at the decision-making processes 
within the Antarctic Treaty and CCAMLR regimes, focusing on the important branching 
points, and asking what path would have been followed if the regime did not exist or 
different choices were made at the critical juncture. There are several areas of questioning 
that can be explored. If the regime did not exist how would policies actually effecting the 
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environment have been different? If the regime had been different how would policies 
effecting the environment have been different? What feasible regime arrangements could 
be imagined that could have produced more effective policy in the issue area? This will 
involve a close account of the details of how each outcome came about. This may highlight 
the role of individual mechanics for compliance, and demonstrate any learning that may 
have happened.206 
Transparency as a determinant of effectiveness 
Transparency is a crucial factor in the effectiveness of regimes and promoting transparency 
is one of the most important functions of regimes?07 Transparency is an elusive concept, 
but it can be used to refer to the availability of regime-relevant information, and the 
openness of a regime and its decision-making procedures to external observers. 
Transparency varies across different regimes, within regimes, and over time. The 
information provided by transparency about the issue area that a regime is concerned can 
be used for a variety of purposes. Information on the state of the environment and on the 
impact of regulated activities can facilitate coordinated action by the supporters of a 
regime. It allows reciprocity by providing reassurances about cheating, or by detecting 
evasion it can act as a primer for sanctions. It provides the informational basis for revision 
of the rules and norms of the regime. In summary transparency facilitates compliance, 
effectiveness and the ability to assess both?08 The opaque nature of regimes can lead to 
attenuated accountability. 209 
Ronald B Mitchell categorises the information supply systems of regimes into three 
categories: self-reporting, other reporting, and problem reporting?lO Self-reporting is 
information provided by an actor on its own behaviour. Self-reporting of information relies 
on the support of the actors targeted by the regime. If support declines, or demands 
increase, then the quantity and quality of self-reporting may decline. Other-reporting is 
information provided by an actor on other actor's behaviour. This information is most 
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likely to be provided by an actor that is a victim of the behaviour concerned, or of an actor 
that is supportive of regime norms. The information can only be provided where the 
capacity exists for the information to be collected. If behaviour and impact can be 
concealed then other-reporting is difficult. Problem reporting is information on the effects 
of behaviours and nonbehavioural aspects of the problem. It focuses on the state of the 
problem. 
Increasing transparency is generally assumed to equate to increased effectiveness for a 
regime, although this is not always the case. Some degree of diplomatic secrecy is required 
for negotiations to succeed and too much transparency may inhibit cooperation. 
Transparency may also be traded off in favour of other objectives of the regime. The types 
of actors involved may also influence the ability of a regime to create transparency, 
regimes with liberal democracies will probably be more transparent.211 Effectiveness-
oriented transparency focuses on how well the actors are collectively doing at achieving 
regime goals. Compliance-oriented transparency focuses on how well individual actors are 
doing at fulfilling regime commitments. There are demanding standards of evidence that 
must be met before regime rule violation can trigger a sanctioning response. Political 
dynamics mean that many regimes "end up with fundamentally effectiveness-oriented 
information systems.,,212 This has generally been the case with the ATS regime, which has 
few rules for sanctioning deviant behaviour among its members. In judging how well the 
CCAMLR regime does in terms of effectiveness-oriented performance the question is does 
CCAMLR produce prompt, high quality, accurate information of the behaviours and 
problems it seeks to remedy? There is a possibility that as a regime matures pressure will 
develop for compliance-oriented transparency in addition to effectiveness-oriented 
transparency.213 
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Robustness as a determinant of effectiveness 
The effectiveness of an international regime is affected by the robustness of the social-
choice mechanisms that it uses?14 For example, the 'law of capture' is an established social 
choice mechanism for high seas fishing that means whoever is the first to capture a fish is 
now the owner of that fish. The procedures used for arriving at social choices can vary in 
two different dimensions. One dimension is that of robustness and fragility. "A social-
choice mechanism is robust, in contrast to fragile, to the extent that is it can [sic] withstand 
perturbations or disruptive occurrences arising in conjunction with the activities it 
governs.,,215 The second dimension is that of robustness and brittleness: "the robustness, in 
contrast to brittleness, of social choice mechanisms is a matter of their capacity to adjust to 
changes or disturbances occurring in the broader social environment without undergoing 
radical transformation.,,216 
These two dimensions do not always match up. Robustness in a regime may be temporary, 
after gaining robustness there may be a period of stability after which problems may cause 
a regime to decline. A regime can not remain effective without the in-built capacity for 
change. Factors that might affect robustness include: changing membership, changing 
economic conditions, and new technology. Excessively brittle or fragile regimes can not be 
effective. This gives a wide framework of questions to be investigated. Are the ATS and 
CCAMLR regimes robust, brittle, or fragile? What broader changes in the social 
environment might impinge on the effectiveness of those regimes? Are they too brittle or 
too fragile? 
Transformation rules as a determinant of effectiveness 
The robustness of a regime can be linked with the regime's transformation rules. A regime 
that can change its rules and procedures in response to problems or broader social changes 
is more likely to be robust than a regime that can not change its rules. It is not as easy to 
alter the rules of international regimes as it is to make changes in a domestic situation. 
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When change does occur it tends to be far reaching and may appear to occur suddenly?17 
The defection by France and Australia from CRAMRA and the subsequent negotiation of 
the Madrid Protocol happened over a relatively short period, but the pressure from 
environmental NGOs against CRAMRA had been in place since the beginning of 
negotiations. Change in a domestic setting tends to be more gradual and continuous. Some 
regimes, such as the UN, have their own legislative mechanisms, and legislative 
conferences exist as an ad hoc measure. In the ATS regime there exists the possibility of a 
review conference for the Antarctic Treaty at any time from thirty years after the Antarctic 
Treaty entered force, although this option has not been exercised. The Madrid Protocol 
incorporates a fifty year review period. CCAMLR does not have a specified review 
conference provision and must rely on its own decision-making procedures to change its 
rules. In an extreme situation an entirely new treaty could always be negotiated by the 
ATCPs if CCAMLR was considered a failure. 
A well designed regime may have more stringent transformation rules that will increase the 
effectiveness of the regime. However, unless "it is easy to violate the dictates of existing 
institutions with impunity, conditions that make it hard to restructure or replace 
institutional arrangements will contribute to their effectiveness.,,218 The rules of the ATS 
regime have often been violated by its members,219 but in theory the consensus system 
leads to rules and conservation measures that are supported by all the members, and that 
this will increase the rate of compliance with the rules. The disadvantage is that this makes 
the regime resistant to change because it is very easy for regime members to impede 
change if they do not find the change to be in their interests. The ATS regime consensus 
decision-making procedure is unlikely to be changed. Only an acute paralysis in decision-
making could lead to that substantial a change. A regime could be called an 'evolutionary 
regime' if it has a decision-making procedure that allows it to revise rules, thus fostering 
learning and problem solving?20 Static regimes may prove brittle in the face of external 
change. 
217 ibid., p.l81. 
218 ibid. 
219 See Chapter 5, pp.l90-192, for examples of violations ofCCAMLR rules by CCAMLR member 
nationals. 
220 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit., p.278. 
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Capacity of governments as a determinant of effectiveness 
International regime effectiveness varies with the capacity of the member governments to 
implement regime provisions.221 International regimes require action by their members to 
implement provisions within their jurisdiction and to comply with the relevant rules. This 
includes making and enforcing laws, as well as making sure that civil society actors are 
able to take part in policy making and implementation.222 There are many factors that limit 
their ability to do so, such as resource constraints, interest group politics, and non-market 
failures. 
Resource constraints limiting the capacity to govern exist on all states, especially 
developing countries, so that there is often a large gap between the ideal implementation 
required and the actuality that is achieved. This means that effective regimes may be those 
with "clear-cut rules calling for action on the part of a small number of actors whose 
behavior is easy to monitor.,,223 The patterns of interest are always affected when an 
international regime seeks to change existing behaviour. Some sets of interest may be 
affected negatively, others may be affected positively,z24 Interest group politics affects the 
capacity of governments after the negotiations phase is over by shifting their efforts to 
blocking the implementation of a regime's provisions in the domestic context. Non-market 
failures are a political counterpart of market failures. Using incentive systems rather than 
command-and-control regulations to channel behaviour may be as valid for international 
regimes as for domestic situations,z25 
A government that lacks the capacity to comply with the provisions of a regime is unlikely 
to be in a position to exercise leadership within that regime. Regimes usually require 
leadership from some of the members to be effective. Large numbers of low-capacity 
members may cause an institution to fai1.226 Does CCAMLR have a high proportion of 
low-capacity members? Regimes can act to foster the transfer of information, skills, and 
expertise that will allow member capacity to be increased. Some regimes act as a conduit 
221 Oran R. Young, op. cit., p.183. 
222 Robert O. Keohane, Peter M. Haas, and Marc A. Levy, op. cit., p.20. 
223 Oran R. Young, op. cit., p.184. 
224 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zlirn, op. cit., p.295. 
225 Oran R. Young, op. cit., p.185. 
226 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zlirn, op. cit., p.297. 
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for financial support?27 This is not especially relevant to the ATS regime as it is largely 
funded to only cover its operating costS?28 What efforts, if any, is CCAMLR making in 
this direction? 
Distribution of power as a determinant of effectiveness 
The effectiveness of an international regime can be circumscribed by asymmetry in the 
distribution of material power among its members?29 When the powerful members are less 
constrained this can produce a class system that is coercive of the weaker members. 
Asymmetry creates a power elite that can impose a regime on the actors involved in an 
issue area, but the effectiveness of the regime is reduced if the powerful actors will be in a 
position to ignore the regime. Because this may increase compliance from the weaker 
members the circumscription does not necessarily make the regime less effective?30 Where 
the distdbution of power is more symmetrical it is harder to establish a regime, but the 
regime may be more effective once established.231 An optimal level of distribution of 
material power has enough asymmetry to allow one or more actors to take a leadership role 
in establishing or maintaining a regime.232 
The distribution of material power can affect a regime's ability to bring about behavioural 
change. For example, the United States has used fishing quotas in its EEZ as a power 
resource to promote compliance with IWC quotas?33 It is worth noting that "coercive 
power by itself is no guarantee of success; it must be concentrated among proponents of 
institutional objectives.,,234 One strand of hegemonic stability theory suggests that a 
concentration of power in a state is virtually a necessary condition for institutional success. 
The enforcer prevents 'free riding', especially in a situation like marine fisheries where 
there are incentives to defect because of the problem of the tragedy of the commons. 
It will be difficult to establish whether or not material power plays a role in the decision-
making processes of the CCAMLR sub-regime, and in eventual compliance with the rules 
227 Robert O. Keohane, Peter M. Haas, and Marc A. Levy, op. cit., p.23. 
228 See Chapter 4, pp.116-117 for details on CCAMLR funding. 
229 Oran R. Young, op. cit. 
230 ibid., p.186. 
231 ibid. 
232 ibid. p.187. 
233 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zilrn, op. cit., p.296. 
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promulgated by the CCAMLR Commission. The key members to investigate would be the 
United States, which appears to have played a key role in pushing forward the Catch 
Documentation Scheme (CDS) in attempting to deal with the IUU fishing problem, and 
those states which have been most involved in IUU fishing activities, such as Chile, 
Norway, and Spain. In addition, what other members are acting as leaders in attempting to 
resolve the problems? Do the powerful members of the CCAMLR sub-regime support its 
objectives? How does material power compare with 'epistemic power' in the ATS regime? 
Interdependence as a determinant of effectiveness 
The effectiveness of an international regime can vary directly with the level of 
interdependence among the actors involved.235 Interdependence is an elusive concept, one 
definition of interdependence holds that "Interdependence arises when the actions of 
individual members of a social system impact ... the welfare of other members of the 
system.,,236 Members of international society will have differing ratios of internal to 
external dependencies. A high internal ratio means a preoccupation with domestic affairs. 
A rising external ratio leads to a state of interdependence with other members of 
international society. Interdependence has been increasing since the Second World War. 
This trend seems unlikely to reverse in the foreseeable future, so international regimes are 
unlikely to be a temporary aberration in international relations. 
Interdependence creates incentives to create and comply with regimes. First, "the behavior 
of the members of an interdependent system generates reciprocal side-effects or 
externalities that individual members can not ignore as they pursue their own interests.,,237 
The ATS regime is in part a result of the interdependence of the state actors who had 
developed an interest in Antarctica and were unable to achieve their objectives through 
unilateral actions. Second, the "growth of interdependence also contributes to the 
effectiveness of institutional arrangements by enhancing the capacity of each member of 
the social system to retaliate for the infractions of others.,,238 Regimes control mutual 
interference and make behaviour predictable. They also provide forms of social pressure to 
234 ibid. 
235 Oran R. Young, op. cit., p.188. 
236 ibid. 
237 ibid., p.l89. 
238 ibid. 
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-use against rule violators.239 Within the ATS regime social pressure has normally been kept 
within the margins of meetings, although environmental NGOs will also apply public 
pressure. Some questions that can be framed from this include: how interdependent are the 
members of the ATS regime? Is the increasing interdependence likely to result in a more 
effective regime for CCAMLR? 
Nature of the issue area as a determinant of effectiveness 
Some international regimes may be more effective because they operate in a relatively 
b ·· 240 Th ATS' ., h emgn Issue area. e regIme operates III an Issue area t at presents some 
significant challenges. The sheer size of the space it encompasses and the harsh geography 
and climate of the Antarctic region requires significant government capacity to operate 
safely in the region. The territorial sovereignty problem increases the ambiguity of many 
norms and rules. Considerable uncertainty exists about some of fundamental scientific 
concerns in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean, such as what affect' global warming' will 
have, and the nature of the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean These factors can all help 
prevent implementing effective solutions to problems. Problems can be marked by 
unambiguous shocks or crises, or may be firmly established on the international agenda. 
Lack of early warnings and time lags between decision-making and implementation can 
prevent effective reaction to a problem: "time-lags often delay the emergence of crisis until 
[ fishery] stocks have been drawn down so low that no effective institutional responses are 
available.,,241 To what extent was the IUU problem an unambiguous crisis for the 
CCAMLR sub-regime? How long did it take for CCAMLR to develop an effective 
reaction to the IUU problem? 
Intellectual order as a determinant of effectiveness 
The effectiveness of international regimes will vary with the strength of the intellectual 
order that supports it. Regimes are expressions of cognitive constructs designed and spread 
by human beings. "International institutions cannot remain effective for long after the 
erosion or collapse of their intellectual substructures.,,242 If a new system of ideas appears 
239 ibid., pp.189-190. 
240 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zi1rn, op. cit., p.297. 
241 ibid., p.298. 
242 Oran R. Young, op. cit., p.190. 
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it will put pressure on a regime to transform. If a system of ideas has collapsed and there is 
no new cognitive framework, then there can be a period of protracted ambiguity when 
there are no rules in place to guide actions. One important idea in international relations is 
the concept of the sovereign state. This concept can be seen as being undermined by the 
effect of increasing interdependence or it can be seen as responding by changing its nature. 
While states persist in retaining formal sovereignty, they now permit "their operational 
sovereignty - their legal freedom of action under international law - to be eroded,,243 in 
order to get the outcomes they desire. This is a point relevant to the ATS and the 
compromise on sovereignty issues in the Antarctic region. 
It is difficult to document broad framework world views, but not impossible for regimes 
with regional or functional issues?44 The ideas that underpin the ATS regime are expressed 
in the principles and norms that underlie it. These ideas have been challenged in the past 
by new systems of ideas, such as the common heritage principle, and the A TS regime has 
modified its system of ideas in order to remain effective. One of the principles underlying 
the CCAMLR sub-regime has been that of 'rational use' of the marine resources of the 
Southern Ocean. This principle is being challenged by the environmental NGOs that 
support a moratorium as the most effective method for preserving the Patagonian toothfish 
and the related ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. It will be interesting to see how this issue 
progresses and what impact it will have on the CCAMLR sub-regime as it could cause an 
argument between conservation minded members and those that favour harvesting. 
Epistemic community methodology 
Investigating epistemic communities is one way of analysing change in the intellectual 
order of a regime.245 According to Peter Haas the way to demonstrate the impact of an 
epistemic community on policymaking involves the following: 
With respect to a specific community, they involve identifying community 
membership, determining the community members' principled and causal beliefs, 
tracing their activities and demonstrating their influence on decision makers at 
243 Marc A. Levy, Robert O. Keohane, and Peter M. Haas, "Improving the Effectiveness ofInternational 
Environmental Institutions", in Peter M. Haas, Robert O. Keohane, and Marc A. Levy (eds), Institutions for 
the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection, MIT Press: Cambridge, Mass., 1993, 
pA16. Emphasis in original. 
244 Oran R. Young, op. cit., P .191. 
245 See pp.31-37 above for an introduction to epistemic community theory and its problems. 
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various points in time, identifying alternative credible outcomes that were 
foreclosed as a result of their influence, and exploring alternative explanations for 
the actions of decision makers. 246 
Before an epistemic community can be analysed for its contribution towards the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR such a community must first be clearly identified. There may 
be more than one epistemic community present within CCAMLR. Care has to be taken in 
distinguishing the epistemic community from other groups. The factors outlined by Haas 
can be used here in an effort to understand the role that epistemic communities may have 
played in the decision-making of the CCAMLR regime. 
The initial assumption is that the Scientific Committee will be the core membership for an 
epistemic community in CCAMLR. Associated to this are Scientific Observers included in 
national delegations to the Commission. The Commission is the decision making body, but 
the decisions are made by individual states. It will be interesting to see if consensus at the 
Scientific Committee level leads to consensus at the Commission level and how this is 
affected by bargaining. What happens before and after the emergence or persistence of the 
epistemic communities influence? Has the epistemic community, or communities, been a 
significant factor in relation to IUU fishing? Has it contributed to regime effectiveness or 
regime learning? Oran Young warned of the possibility of post hoc ergo propter hoc 
reasoning, finding an epistemic community when there is success, and failing to find an 
epistemic community when there is failure. 247 Is CCAMLR currently a case of an 
epistemic community that is failing in respect of the IUU problems? 
Regime change methodology 
The approach recommended by Keohane and Nye is to seek explanations with simple 
models, and add complexity later.248 The approach here will be to start with the economic 
process model and then add the other models,z49 The different models may apply well or 
poorly at different times and conditions. The economic process model predicts that regime 
change will be based on technological change and growing economic interdependence. 
246 Peter M. Haas, "Introduction: Epistemic Communities and International Policy Coordination", 
International Organization, 46 (1), 1992, p.34. 
247 Oran R. Young, International Governance: Protecting the Environment in a Stateless Society, Cornell 
University Press: Ithaca, 1994, pp.96-97. 
248 Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, op. cit, pp.50-52. 
249 See Chapter 2, pp.37-40. 
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What are the technological changes affecting CCAMLR? This model predicts that 
CCAMLR will be undermined by change, but will not disintegrate. The politics of the 
issue will resolve around adjusting to a new equilibrium introduced by technological and 
economic change. The overall power structure model is less useful, but predicts 
congruence between issues. Do the powerful actors in CCAMLR create linkage on issues 
on which they are in weak positions? The issue structure approach holds that in an issue 
area power resources related to vulnerability will dominate resources relevant to sensitivity 
within a regime, and predicts that where contrary outcomes occur powerful states will 
force changes in the regime. The international organisation model can be used to help 
explain how CCAMLR has an inertial force that allows it to persist, by examining how 
some states benefit from its norms, networks, and institutions. 
There are no well-tested empirical generalisations to explain how and why regimes change. 
Theories of regime change need to incorporate how domestic politics and international 
regimes influence each other?50 This is required if the reasons for states' preferences 
changing are to be understood. Structural theory remains useful, as self-interest can be 
consistent with regime formation and maintenance?51 Regimes can survive changes in 
power distribution, which means that explanations for regime change are unlikely to be 
simple?52 This might occur because although establishing regimes can be difficult, 
maintaining them may be easier. Regimes can survive a deterioration of relations between 
its participants. For example, during the Falkland/Malvinas Islands War between Argentina 
and the United Kingdom both parties continued to engage in ATS negotiations.253 Regimes 
can survive an apparent failure to solve a problem if they are 'evolutionary' or 'dynamic'. 
"If a regime seems too weak as initially constituted to achieve its institutional goals ... this 
may trigger a dynamic leading to a strengthening of the regime itself.,,254 A fundamental 
shift in domestic politics could also change a party's international interests. Regimes may 
be unable to survive the loss of key members, and the ATS or CCAMLR would experience 
difficulty if any of the territorial claimants found that the regime was no longer worth 
complying with. 
250 ibid., p.279. 
251 ibid., p.280. 
252 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Zfun, op. cit., "Some regimes acquire a life of their own and 
remain intact long after the forces that produced them have dissipated or shifted to other issues. In other 
cases, regimes that have proved effective for relatively long periods collapse quickly as circumstances (often, 
but not always, involving technological developments) change." 
253 See Chapter 3, note 61, p.66. 
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Summary 
This thesis will attempt to apply the theory of regimes to the case study. It will be a 
consolidation and refinement rather than an attempt to bring regime theory to a new level. 
The next three chapters will outline the case study, with the bulk of the analysis of the case 
study taking place in chapter 6. Analysing changes in CCAMLR conservation measures 
and other rules will show outputs and the impacts on IUU fishing and sea-bird by-catch. 
This will enable an assessment of outcomes and behaviour shaping to be made. One area of 
investigation relevant here is the extent to which rules are being complied with, and the 
significance of any changes to the CCAMLR rules. If CCAMLR is being effective in these 
areas then it should continue to survive without becoming a 'dead letter' regime. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Background to the ATS and CCAMLR 
This chapter will cover several background topics. The geography of Antarctica and the 
Southern Ocean will be detailed. Then, the initial political development of Antarctica will 
be summarised, from discovery and exploration through to territorial claims and the 
foundation of the ATS. The development of the main instruments of the ATS and their 
impact on the Southern Ocean will be dealt with briefly. The impact of sovereignty issues 
on the environment will be explored. Global macro-trends which impinge on the 
environment will then be summarised and the relevant international regimes covered. 
Actual marine exploitation of whales, krill, and finfish species before CCAMLR was 
created will be covered. 
Geography: The Southern Ocean and Antarctica 
The waters around Antarctica have been variously called the Antarctic, Southern, or South 
Polar Seas.1 In 2000 the International Hydrographic Organisation delimited a fifth world 
ocean from the southern portions of the Atlantic, Indian, and Pacific Oceans. The Southern 
Ocean extends from the coast of Antarctica north to 60° South latitude. This makes the 
Southern Ocean the fourth-largest of the world's five oceans? The Southern Ocean also 
has a distinct boundary based on the convergence of cold water from the south with warm 
water from the north. The convergence between Antarctic and Sub-Antarctic waters is up 
to 50 kilometres wide at points and fluctuates between 50° and 62° South latitude.3 It acts 
as an ecosystem boundary for many species, especially krill. This convergence cuts across 
1 Mahinda Harischandra Parera, Change and Continuity in Antarctic Environmental Protection: Politics and 
Policy, PhD Thesis, Dalhousie University, 1995, p.162. Argentina used the plural Southern Oceans in an 
attempt to bolster their sovereignty claim. R. Tucker Scully, "Institutionalisation of the Antarctic Treaty 
Regime", in Wolfrum, Rudiger (ed), Klaus Bockslaffand Ingrid L. Jahn (asst. eds), Antarctic Challenge II: 
Conflicting Interests, Cooperation, Environmental Protection, Economic Development: Proceedings of an 
Interdisciplinary Symposium September I7Ih_2I'1 1985, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 1986, p.283, mentions 
an early International Oceanographic Commission debate over the definition of the term Southern Ocean 
which became so complex and heated that further discussion of the term was dropped. 
2 CIA, The World Factbook 2000, Southern Ocean, 
http://www.odcLgov/cia/publications/factbook/geos/oo.htm (last accessed 11 October 2000). 
3 Christoper C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental 
Protection, University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, South Carolina, 1998, p.2. 
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some of the regional fish stocks, and a more definitive boundary is the convergence of the 
Sub-Antarctic and sub-tropical waters, giving an absolute northern periphery for the 
Southern Ocean around 400 South latitude. Where the cold water sinles and the warm water 
rises, the sea is exceptionally rich in nutrients, and the Southern Ocean is abundant with 
marine life, especially fish, whales, seals, krill, and penguins. This marine life has attracted 
economic interest since humans first entered the region.4 
Including the waters up to the sub-tropical convergence, Antarctica's circumjacent ocean 
has an area of approximately 36 million square kilometres, about 10% of all the world's 
oceans.
s The Southern Ocean acts as a major heat sinle for the world. The Antarctic 
Circumpolar Current, which flows from west to east around Antarctica, and it is impeded 
only by the Drake Passage, the greatest ocean current in the world. 6 It moves about twice 
the volume of water as the Gulf Stream, and has a width varying from 200 to more than 
1,000 kilometres.? The Southern Ocean also has semi-permanent, drifting ice packs, which 
expand and contract with the passing seasons. The sea ice around Antarctica varies from 
up to 19 million square kilometres in area during winter to a minimum of 2.6 million 
square kilometres in summer. 8 
The Southern Ocean consists of a system of deep basins separated by three large mid-
oceanic ridges, the Macquarie Ridge south of New Zealand and Tasmania; the Kerguelen-
Gaussberg Ridge at about 800 East longitude, and the Scotia Ridge extending from the 
southern Patagonian shelf in an eastward arc to the South Shetland Islands and the 
Antarctic Peninsula. The continental shelf is narrow, except in parts of the Weddell, Ross, 
Amundsen, and Bellingshausen Seas.9 
The Southern Ocean can not be considered without taking into account the influence that 
the continent of Antarctica has on it. Where the Arctic is an ocean surrounded by 
4 lC. Beaglehole (ed.), Journals o/Captain James Cook on His Voyages o/Discovery: The Voyage o/the 
Resolution and the Adventure 1772-1775, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1974, pp.427-430. 
Mention is made of seals, whales, penguins, and birds in Cook's journals, and how seal blubber could be 
turned into oil. 
5 The ATS boundary of 60oSouth latitude contains only 20.327 million square kilometers. 
6 Parera, op. cit., p.158. CIA, op. cit., the current transports l30 million cubic meters of water per second, 
and is approximately 21,000 kilometres in length. 
7 Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law o/the Sea, Martinus NijhoffPublishers: Dordrecht, 1992, 
pp.21-22. 
8 F. M. Auburn, Antarctic Law and Politics, C. Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd: London, 1982, p.l. 
9 Karl-Hermann Kock, Understanding CCAMLR 's Approach to Management, May 2000, p.1. 
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continental land masses, the Antarctic is a continent surrounded by the Southern Ocean. 
Antarctica is an isolated continent: South America 1,000 kilometres away is the nearest 
other significant land mass, while the distance from McMurdo Base to Christchurch in 
New Zealand is approximately 3,000 kilometres. lO It was the last continent to be 
discovered and is without indigenous inhabitants. It is largely an ice-covered wilderness, 
although 2% is barren rock, and 11 % is made up of the floating ice shelves that are unique 
to Antarctica. Glaciers form these ice shelves along part of the coastline of 30,010 
kilometres. 11 The weight of the massive polar ice sheet, which can have a thickness of up 
to 4,500 meters (although the average thickness is around 2,000 meters), is enough in 
places to depress the Antarctic rock level 200-300 metersY While Antarctica has an 
average elevation of 1,850 meters, without the ice sheet it would average only 500 
meters. 13 Antarctica is the fifth-largest continent, with an area of 14.2 million square 
kilometres, about the size ofthe United States and Europe combined. 14 
Despite the snow and ice, Antarctica is a very arid place, a 'white' or 'crystal' desert that 
has approximately 90% of the world's ice and three-quarters of its fresh water locked up in 
the ice cap that covers the continent. Precipitation in the interior averages 3-5 centimetres 
per year. Antarctic temperatures are comparable to those on the planet Mars,15 with a 
temperature of -128.6°F being measured at Vostok Station on July 21, 1983. The cold is 
exacerbated by the gravity driven katabatic winds blown coastward from the interior, 
which often reach 90 miles per hour at the coast. 16 Although the Southern Ocean has 
substantial marine life, the continent of Antarctica is almost free of flora and fauna. What 
flora and fauna there is, lies concentrated along the coastline and the warmer Antarctic 
peninsula. Antarctica is the coldest, windiest, highest, driest, least accessible, and most 
inhospitable continent on Earth. 
10 Auburn, F. M., op. cit., p.1. 
11 Christoper C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental 
Protection, University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, South Carolina 1998, p.3. 
12 ibid, p.6. 
13 ibid, p.4. 
14 ibid, p.3. 
15 P.W. Quigg, A Pole Apart: The Emerging Issue of Antarctica, McGraw-Hill Book Company: New York, 
1983, p.34. 
16 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.4-5. 
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History: the Southern Ocean and Antarctica until 1959 
Discovery and exploration 
Although Captain James Cook destroyed the myth of a temperate habitable land in the 
Southern Ocean while circumnavigating Antarctica in 1772-75, he never claimed to have 
seen the continent of Antarctica. I7 In 1773, Cook opined: "I can be bold enough to say that 
no man will ever venture further than I have done and that the land which may lie to the 
south will never be explored."I8 Captain Cook's journal contained descriptions of the 
marine life of the Southern Ocean, especially reports of the whales and seals that were to 
attract commercial interest in the region in subsequent years. The discovery of Antarctica 
probably occurred during 1820-21, with three claimants to the first sighting of the 
continent, one British (Edward Bransfield), one Russian (Fabian von Bellingshausen), and 
one American (Nathaniel Palmer). 19 At this stage it was not yet clear that Antarctica was a 
continent, and not a group of islands. The claim to have made the first landing on the 
actual continent is also contested. 
Early exploration of Antarctica was to some extent a by-product of sealing?O Expeditions 
to the Sub-Antarctic in pursuit of fur and elephant seals (for their fur and oil respectively) 
had begun in 1770?1 Between 1790 and 1822, 129 British and American sealing voyages 
were recorded, 119 of them between 1820 and 1822.22 With these sealing ventures came 
the discovery of many islands and portions of the coastline of Antarctica. These included 
the 1823 discovery of the Weddell Sea by the sealer James Weddell, and the 1825 
discovery of Graham Land, the southern extension of the Antarctic Peninsula. By 1830, the 
slaughter of seals had progressed to the point where sealing was no longer commercially 
viable, and some of the seal species were close to extinction. 
17 P.W. Quigg, op. cit., p.8. Cook did, however, venture the opinion that there might be a tract ofland 
responsible for the ice that impeded his voyage. See J.C. Beaglehole op. cit., pA31. 
18 ibid, pA31. 
19 The relative merits of these claims are discussed in P.W. Quigg, op. cit., pp.10-13. 
20 P. J. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, Croom Helm Ltd: London, 1986, p.24. 
21 Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea, Martinus NijhoffPublishers: Dordrecht, 1992, 
p.29. 
22 ibid, pA. 
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After the sealers largely had quit the region, there were three major scientific expeditions 
in search of the south magnetic pole carried out during 1838-1843.23 The French explorer 
Dumont D'Urville landed on the portion of the continent now known as Terre Ad6lie (or 
Ad6lie Land) and claimed the region for France. Lt. Charles Wilkes of the US Navy sailed 
along the East Antarctic Coast and recognised that a continental land mass probably 
existed. The British explorer James Clark Ross penetrated the ice pack in 1840 to discover 
the Ross Sea and the Ross Ice Shelf?4 Apart from these expeditions, there was no 
immediate follow up of the discovery of Antarctica for almost five decades. 
Attention returned to Antarctica with the 'heroic' age of exploration of the continent. This 
was prompted in part by the 1895 International Geographical Congress, which noted that 
Antarctica was in need of research and exploration.25 In 1897-98, a Belgian expedition was 
the first to winter over in Antarctica, when their ship,the Belgica, was trapped by ice in the 
Bellingshausen Sea. Numerous other expeditions followed. This heroic era was best 
typified by the race for the South Pole between Commander Robert F. Scott of Britain and 
the Norwegian explorer Roald Amundsen in 1911-12. Amundsen reached the Pole on 
December 11, 1911, Scott on January 17, 1912. Scott's failure and death on the return 
journey have helped to create images of Antarctica as a barren wilderness. One account of 
this expedition was titled 'The Worst Journey In The World' .26 The heroic era is generally 
reckoned to have ended with Ernest Shackleton's 1914 expedition. Important trends had 
been established for the future during this era. The expeditions conducted science, and the 
resulting information was freely shared with anyone who was interested. 
Accompanying the new era of exploration in Antarctica came renewed commercial 
interest. Changes in technology, such as steam power and the harpoon gun, allowed 
exploitation of species of whales, such as the Blue or Fin whales, that had previously been 
largely immune to attempts at harvesting. New uses for whale products were also 
developed in the decade before the First World War, such as in margarine when the 
process of hydrogenation allowed whale oil to be turned into fat. 27 Soap by-products were 
23 The south magnetic pole was fmally reached by Egdeworth David on January 16, 1909. P.W. Quigg, op. 
cit., p.24. 
24 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit. pp.5-6. 
25 P. J. Beck, op. cit., p.25. 
26 One expedition member later said that "the trenches at Ypres were a comparative picnic." Apsley Cherry-
Garrard, The Worst Journey in the World,' Antarctic, 1910-1913, Chatto & Windus: London, 1937, xvi. 
27 Gordon Jackson, The British Whaling Trade, A&C Black Limited: London, 1978, pp.I78-181. 
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used as a source of glycerol for explosives, making whaling a strategic industry.28 From the 
turn of the century, whaling was the dominant industry of the region; there were nineteen 
firms involved by 1914?9 Whaling started from shore-based stations in islands, but in the 
late 1920s Pelagic Factory ships were developed which allowed whaling throughout the 
Southern Ocean. Within twenty years after the Second World War, the last whale stocks 
were exhausted.3D In 1982, the International Whaling Commission (IWC) reduced the 
commercial catch limit for whales to zero/ l and in 1994 it adopted a Southern Ocean 
sanctuary. 32 
The era of imperialism 
Despite the image of a barren wilderness, territorial claims in Antarctica were advanced in 
a haphazard way, leaving a set of unresolved disputes and hidden tensions which persist to 
this day. The United Kingdom did attempt to 'paint the continent red' at one stage, but this 
was prevented by states outside the British Empire making claims.33 Argentina, Australia, 
Chile, France, New Zealand, Norway, and the United Kingdom all claimed part of 
Antarctica sometime between 1908 and the 1940s.34 Only Australia, France, New Zealand, 
Norway and the United Kingdom mutually recognise each others' claims. 
During the 1930s there was not much scientific activity in Antarctica due to the depressed 
economic conditions. During the Second World War German raiders were active in the 
Southern Ocean in 1941, and the British responded with Operation Tabarin. This 
established a permanent British presence in Antarctica.35 After the war, major interest in 
the continent resumed with the United States 1946-47 expedition, Operation HigJifump, 
28 ibid, p.176. 
29 ibid, p.172. The fIrms involved were mostly Norwegian and British companies. 
30 ibid, p.257. lA. Gulland summarises the development of the IWC in "The Management Regime for 
Living Resources", in Christopher C. Joyner, and Sudhir K. Chopra (eds), The Antarctic Legal Regime, 
Martinus NijhoffPublishers: Dordrecht, 1988, 1998, pp.224-227. 
31 http://ourworld.compuserve.comlhomepages/iwcofflce/Schedule.htm#PARAlOe (site visited on 14 
January, 2000). 
32 This sanctuary comprises the waters of the Southern Hemisphere southwards ofthe following line: starting 
from 400S, 50 oW; thence due east to 200E; thence due south to 55°S; thence due east to 1300E; thence due 
north to 400S; thence due east to 1300 W; thence due south to 600 S; thence due east to 500 W; thence due 
north to the point of beginning. 
http://ourworld.compuserve.comlhomepages/iwcofflce/Schedule.htm#PARA 7SANCTURIES (visited on 14 
January, 2000). 
33 P. l Beck, op. cit., p.29. 
34 Emilio J. Sahurie, The International Law of Antarctica, New Haven Press: New Haven, 1992, pp.12-31. 
See also map of claims on p.x. 
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involving twelve ships, nine aircraft, and 4,700 men.36 However, much of this resurgence 
in scientific activity was still linked to establishing and protecting territorial claims, and 
groups like the British Antarctic Survey (BAS) were government sponsored. 
Other states, such as South Africa, Germany, and the United States have considered 
making claims in Antarctica.37 Japan was interested in Antarctica, but is precluded by 
Article 2(e) of the Peace Treaty with Japan from making any claim there.38 Only two 
sections of Antarctica remain unclaimed, Marie Byrd Land and an undefined sector 
between the Norwegian claim and the South Pole (about 15% ofthe continent). The United 
States developed a stance of non-recognition of the claims on the basis that effective 
occupation is a necessary requirement, while reserving their own right to make a claim in 
the future, which would be grounded on acts similar to those made by the existing 
claimants.39 Marie Byrd Land was tacitly left by other states for the United States to claim, 
although this area is considered the least valuable part of Antarctica,40 otherwise the United 
States would have to claim territory already claimed. Title would be more difficult to 
establish in an area with competing sovereignty claims. The Soviet Union (now the 
Russian Federation) does not recognise any national claims in Antarctica, and reserves 
rights based on Russian exploration and discovery, although they have no specified area of 
interest in the continent.41 
Argentina, Chile, and the United Kingdom have contentious claims which overlap in the 
Antarctic Peninsula.42 These disputes are also linked to the dispute over the 
Falkland/MalvinasIslands between Argentina and Britain, and a dispute over islands in the 
Beagle Channel between Argentina and Chile.43 In 1949 a Tripartite Naval Agreement was 
made between Britain, Argentina, and Chile, that none of their naval vessels would go 
35 P. J. Beck, op. cit., pp.31-33. 
36 ibid., p.37. 
37 For information on the proposed South African claim, see Clauses J. Dodds, 'South Africa and the 
Antarctic, 1920-1960', Polar Record, 32 (180), 1996, pp.25-42. German interest in Antarctica was curtailed 
by the outbreak of the Second World War, Emilio J. Sahurie, op. cit., p.52. 
38 ibid, p.46. 
39 ibid, pp.32-35. The position of the United States was first expressed by Secretary of State Hughes: "It is 
the considered opinion of this department that the discovery of lands unknown to civilization, even when 
coupled with formal taking of possession, does not support a valid claim of sovereignty, unless the discovery 
is followed by an actual settlement of the discovered country." 
40 ibid, p.35. 
41 Sahurie, Emilio J., op. cit., p.43. 
42 ibid, p.14. Britain claims 17% of Antarctica between 800W and 200W. Only 1 % of this claim is 
undisputed, the remainder of the claim is also claimed by Argentina or Chile, or by both. 
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below 60° South latitude. This agreement reflected the growing political importance of 
Antarctica, and the desire of the parties to avoid a military confrontation and the fiscal cost 
of stationing military forces in the region.44 
On 1 February 1952 a British party of scientists intent on rebuilding a base at Hope Bay 
had shots fired over their heads.45 The incident was resolved diplomatically, but still 
represents the only time "shots were fired [in Antarctica] by one country against personnel 
from another power.,,46 The unstable relationship between Britain, Argentina, and Chile 
was part of impetus for the negotiations that eventually led to the Antarctic Treaty. 
Attempts at resolving the territorial claims, either under UN trusteeship or as part of a 
condominium, were unsuccessful. On 7 June, 1950 there was a note from the Soviet 
government to the United States government and six of the seven claimant states declaring 
that any further discussion on the future of the Antarctic should not take place without 
Soviet involvement. This was because of the general Soviet policy that matters of 
international importance could not be negotiated without their participation.47 
The IGY and the Antarctic Treaty 
In 1950 it was suggested that a Third International Polar Year was needed to advance 
knowledge about Antarctica (the first two had been in 1882 and 1932).48 This became the 
successful 1958 International Geophysics Year (IGY), held from 1 July 1957 to 31 
December 1958. In 1957 the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) was 
formed. 49 Twelve states were involved in the IGY and sent scientific expeditions to 
Antarctica. These were the seven territorial claimants, the United States, Belgium, Japan, 
South Africa, and the Soviet Union. Cooperation between expeditions was encouraged, the 
military was excluded except for a logistics support role, and the claimants agreed to 
refrain from trying to control access to claims. 50 A 'gentleman's agreement' was reached in 
1955 to the effect that the IGY activities were without legal or political value in relation to 
43 P. 1. Beck, op. cit., p.85. This dispute was resolved with Papal assistance in 1984. 
44 ibid, pp.33-34. The agreement was renewed annually until the late 1950s. 
45 Peter J. Beck, 'A Cold War: Britain, Argentina, and Antarctica', History Today, p.16. June 1987. 
46 ibid, p.17. 
47 Emilio 1. Sahurie, op. cit., p.42, (in note 234); Chile was excluded because there were no diplomatic 
relations between the two states at that time, and see also Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.29. 
48 P.W. Quigg, op. cit., pp.46-47. 
49 Emilio J. Sahurie, op. cit., p.181. 
50 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., pJO. 
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the territorial claims.51 The effectiveness of this agreement was mixed, and the positioning 
of a United States base at the South Pole and a Soviet base at the Pole of Inaccessibility 
(the point in the Antarctic continent furthest from the sea) had unsettling implications for 
the territorial claimants. 52 Both the United States and the Soviet Union were now 
established in Antarctica. The IGY was considered an important success, with many 
scientific discoveries, such as the Van Ellen radiation belts, and it "established scientific 
research as the currency of Antarctic politics".53 
The success of the IGY, and its temporary nature, represented an opportunity to break the 
political impasse of the 1940s and 1950s, and the IGY was followed up with negotiations 
in Washington, after an invitation from United States President Eisenhower in May 1958. 
The Washington negotiations involved the twelve governments which had been involved 
in the IGY. The negotiations over the US proposal used principles that had first been 
suggested by Chile in the Escudero declaration of 1948.54 Quick progress was made after 
initial Soviet stalling was overcome. 55 Preservation of the status quo was predominant 
because reaching a consensus agreement required compromising to the lowest common 
denominator. The benefits of international cooperation in Antarctica outweighed the costs 
of continued strategic rivalry in the region. Another motivating factor in favour of 
negotiations was a fear that the Cold War confrontation between the United States and the 
Soviet Union would be extended into Antarctica, or the costs of continued rivalry among 
the existing claimants. 
The 1 December 1959 Antarctic Treaty managed to set aside the sovereignty issue for the 
time being, through a compromise in Articles IV and VIII that allowed all parties to retain 
their current position with respect to territorial claims in Antarctica. The Antarctic Treaty 
thus provided a modus vivendi that allowed everyone interested in the Antarctic to operate 
there. The Antarctic Treaty covered the area south of 60° South latitude.56 The twelve IGY 
states became the first twelve Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties (ATCPs). 
Since the Antarctic Treaty entered into force on 23 June 1961, the Antarctic region has 
kept unmilitarised and largely free from conflict. This is in keeping with the view 
51 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., pp.89-93. 
52 Emiko J. Sahara, op. cit., p.l80. 
53 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.93. 
54 ibid., p.86. 
55 P.W. Quigg, op. cit., pp.146-147. 
66 
expressed in the preamble to the Antarctic Treaty "that Antarctica shall continue forever to 
be used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of 
international discord.,,57 This principle was implemented in the first Article of the Treaty 
by requiring that: 
Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter 
alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases 
and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of 
any type of weapon. 58 
Military forces remained in Antarctica only in a logistic support role for scientific or other 
peaceful purposes. 59 The Antarctic Treaty also alleviated some nuclear fears by prohibiting 
nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste in Antarctica, making the region 
the first nuclear free area in the world.6o The inclusion of rivals such as the United States 
and Soviet Union, or Argentina, Chile, and Britain, was a major achievement in 1959. One 
significant example of conflict prevention is that the Antarctic Treaty helped insulate 
Antarctica from the effects of the 1982 war between Argentina and the United Kingdom 
over the Falkland/Malvinas Islands.61 
Articles VII and VIII established a system of observation and inspection, something which 
contributes to the effectiveness of the ATS.62 The exchange of scientists provided for in 
Article III (1) offers an alternate informal method of observation.63 Article XI provides a 
non-binding mechanism for resolving disputes among the Antarctic Treaty Parties (ATPs). 
In the first instance ATPs will attempt to resolve disputes between themselves, but if that is 
not possible then they can arbitrate the dispute through the International Court of Justice 
(ICJ). 
56 Appendix I, Article VI. 
57 Appendix I, Preamble. 
58 Appendix I, Article I, (1). 
59 Appendix I, Article I, (2). "The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment 
for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose." P. J. Beck, op. cit., pp.89-73 discusses some of the 
ambiguities and difficulties presented by this Article, but notes the general success achieved. 
60 Appendix I, Article V. 
61 P. J. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, Croom Helm Ltd: London, 1986, pp.83-85 During the 
war Argentinian and British representatives continued to sit down together in negotiations over Antarctic 
resources and a minerals regime. 
62 ibid., at pp.73-80, Beck comments on the inspection system, that it has its weaknesses and that "In practice, 
the much-vaunted inspection and observation system of Article VII has proved more apparent than real" at 
p.79. 
63 ibid., pp.79-80. 
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As well as the norm of peaceful cooperation, the Antarctic Treaty saw the establishment of 
the importance of science. Article II indicated a desire for the freedom of scientific 
investigation and cooperation of the IGY to continue. Article III established some of the 
procedures to be used to implement this principle, as does Article IX 1 (b) and (c). Some 
concern has been expressed that science in Antarctica has been a proxy for political action 
to maintain a position on territorial claims,64 especially when scientific activities involve 
potential economic resources such as hydrocarbon reserves. One example of this politico-
legal activity is how the funding to BAS was increased by over 60% after the 1982 conflict 
over the Falklands/Malvinas Islands. 65 
The Antarctic Treaty did not mean that Antarctica was internationalised, and membership 
of the ATS remained something of a private club for a long time. While the original twelve 
ATCPs will always retain consultative status, new members acceding under Article XIII66 
can only gain and retain consultative member status after demonstrating their interest "by 
conducting substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of a scientific 
station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition.,,67 Real growth in membership did not 
occur until the 1980s, when the prospect of benefits from mineral resource exploitation 
proved attractive. 68 This rush to accession stopped with the ban on mineral resource 
activity in the Madrid Protocol. 69 
One problem in the original Antarctic Treaty was the failure to establish a secretariat to 
support the administration of the treaty. Although the concept of a secretariat for the 
Antarctic Treaty is now supported in principle, there is no consensus yet on where a 
secretariat should be located - although Buenos Aires seems to be the main contender. 70 
64 ibid., pp.130-134. 
65 ibid., p.l31. 
66 Appendix I, Article XIII (1). "The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It 
shall be open for accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State 
which may be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the Treaty." 
67 Appendix I, Article IX, (2). 
68 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.l23. Brazil and India, joined in January 1984, China and Uruguay from 
April 1985, German Democratic Republic and Italy from January 1988. 
69 Christoper C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental 
Protection, University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, South Carolina, 1998, p.164. 
70 Conversation with Dr. Jane Shearer 10 February 2000. There is an unstated rule in the ATS that the 
institutional headquarters should be spread between ATCPs. Australia has the CCAMLR Secretariat in 
Hobart, Tasmania. New Zealand would have had the CRAMRA Secretariat based in Wellington if CRAMA 
had entered into force. There is a definite feeling that it is the "South American turn" for an ATS Secretariat. 
68 
This has caused problems in administering the ATS, as hosting an ATCM is an expensive 
and time-consuming exercise for the host country.71 
History: Development of the ATS from 1959 
The subsequent development of the Antarctic Treaty System CATS) has often been 
concerned with establishing regulations concerning the environment. It is appropriate to 
call it a 'system' because of the number of interlocking agreements that have been 
developed under the broad umbrella of the Antarctic Treaty. To a large extent, the ATS 
that developed out of the Antarctic Treaty has worked because it deals with the big issues, 
giving time and attention to resolving the problems which face Antarctica. One area that 
has developed significantly has been the interest in protecting the environment of 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. 
Article IX provides the bulk of the institutional framework of the Antarctic Treaty, which 
has been built on through the ATCMs that have been held over the years. This article 
required meetings to be held: 
for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting together on matters of 
common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, and 
recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and 
objectives of the Treaty.72 
While Article XII allows the treaty to be amended after thirty years by a reVIew 
conference, or by the consent of all ATCPs, this part of the treaty has not been used to 
expand the ATS. The negotiations preceding the Madrid Protocol negated the need for a 
separate review of the Antarctic Treaty. 73 
The Antarctic Treaty did not try to address economic issues, and it only briefly touched on 
environmental issues in a list of areas that the ATCM could develop measures about, 
The main current stumbling block is a refusal by the United Kingdom to support a Secretariat based in 
Argentina. See also Chapter 2, note 42, p.15. 
71 Poland was unable to host the 2000 ATCM. A special consultative meeting (SCM) was held in the 
Netherlands. 
72 Appendix I, Article IX. 
73 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., p.l64. 
69 
mentioning the "preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica". 74 This is 
not a great deal of attention to environmental issues, but in the context of 1959 it is 
understandable. This has been expanded on in three significant conventions regulating 
conservation and resource management in the area covered by the Antarctic Treaty. The 
first of these was the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (CCAS) (Done in 
London 1 June 1972, in force 11 March 1978). The second was the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR) (Done in Canberra 20 
May 1980, in force 7 April 1982). The third was the Annex II to the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty: Conservation of Antarctic Flora and 
Fauna (Done in Madrid 4 October 1991, entered into force 14 January 1998). When this 
entered force, it superseded the earlier Agreed Measures on Flora and Fauna (hereafter 
called the Agreed Measures) adopted at the 1964 Brussels ATCM III as recommendation 
III-VIII. A fourth agreement, the Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral 
Resource Activities (CRAMRA) (Done in Wellington, 2 June 1988) was signed, but is 
unlikely to enter into force in the foreseeable future. 
The Agreed Measures 
Three subsidiary objectives are mentioned in the preamble to the Agreed Measures: to 
protect indigenous flora and fauna, to foster collaborative scientific research, and the 
rational use of these fauna and flora, where rational use was left further undefined.75 
Antarctica was designated a 'Special Conservation Area', but this was not defined. The 
Agreed Measures were outlined in fourteen articles and, like the Antarctic Treaty, these 
were limited by the need to preserve the sovereignty compromise and to avoid 
jurisdictional problems. Article I established the area of the measures to be the same as that 
of the Antarctic Treaty. Article VI limited the rights to kill or capture native mammals and 
birds in the Antarctic Treaty area. Article VII sought to minimise coastal pollution and 
harmful interference, while Article VIII enabled the establishment of areas of outstanding 
scientific interest as Specially Protected Areas (SPAs). In 1972 a new category of SPA, the 
Site of Special Scientific Interest (SSSI), was established to differentiate between sites of 
scientific and conservation interest. Article IX prohibited importing non-indigenous animal 
or plant life into Antarctica without a permit. 
74 Appendix I, Article IX, (2) (t). 
75 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., p.66. 
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The Agreed Measures were limited by the fact that they could only be applied to members 
of the Antarctic Treaty, although they did try to influence the actions of third parties, and 
depended on national means for implementation. Unlike other environmental protection 
measures developed by the ATS, the Agreed Measures are not a treaty. The Agreed 
Measures also did not apply to the high seas (conservation stops at the edge of the ice shelf 
of the Antarctic continent) so a seal could be protected while it was on an ice shelf, and 
hunted when it was in the Southern Ocean. The permit system also allowed states to take 
unilateral action, and no compliance mechanisms were adopted.76 Ratification of the 
Agreed Measures was slow, and by 1972 only eight ATCPs had signed due to the difficulty 
of non-claimants enacting the required legislation.77 The Agreed Measures only became 
binding in 1983, although they had been treated as an interim guide line since 1964.78 The 
Agreed Measures have been seen as the important first step in the development of 
environmental protection in the ATS, but adherence to their requirements, especially of the 
SPAs, was marginal at times.79 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals 
In the 1964/65 split year there was a pilot Norwegian expedition in the Antarctic area 
which raised the possibility of commercial exploitation of seals occurring again. 8o This 
activity was outside the scope of the Agreed Measures, which only covered seals on 
islands or the continent. To avoid chaos and to contain this potential development, the 
ATCPs negotiated a new convention to cover the high seas in the area below 60° South 
latitude. 81 At this time a separate convention was viewed as necessary, as it was doubtful 
whether the Antarctic Treaty was competent over the high seas,82 and a separate 
convention would allow third parties to join.83 The negotiations were conducted in secret, 
with little international or non-governmental organisation interest. 84 CCAS' s most 
76 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.66. 
77 P. J. Beck, op. cit., pp.219-220, and P.W. Quigg, op. cit., pp.159-160, discuss some of the countries that 
had constitutional constraints. 
78 P. J. Beck, op. cit., p.220. 
79 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., at pp.66-72, discusses the inadequate rules and lack of proper review. 
80 Arthur Watts, International Law and the Antarctic Treaty System, Grotius Publications Limited: 
Cambridge, England, 1992, p.212. 
81 Report o/the 1988 Meeting to Review the Operation o/the Convention/or the Conservation 0/ Antarctic 
Seals, London, 12-16 September 1988, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: London, 1989, p.31 and 47. 
82 Arthur Watts, op. cit., p.212. 
83 Emilio J. Sahurie, op. cit., p.524. 
84 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.83. 
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significant contribution was that "it sought to regulate a potential problem, rather than 
waiting for the problem to have arisen and become serious.,,8s 
Seals on land were still covered by the Agreed Measures, so CCAS only covers the seals 
found on the floating pack ice or high seas of the Southern Ocean. The different positions 
on sovereignty were also preserved. The principal obligations rely on national measures, as 
there are no collective enforcement mechanisms. An annex containing detailed regulations 
is integral to the convention, and it can be amended. CCAS members can object to an 
amendment and it does not then apply to them. Provision is made for the exchange of 
information and for SCAR to act as an advisory body. If commercial sealing started, there 
was provision for a commission to be established to oversee the commercial activity, and 
for an advisory committee to be set up. 
The CCAS was reviewed in 1988 by its members. It was seen as slightly outdated because 
of its single-species approach, overtaken by the ecosystem approach embodied in 
CCAMLR.86 No significant exploitation of seals has taken place in the Southern Oceans 
since the nineteenth century; sealing has not been commercially viable and it has been 
argued that CCAS may have played a deterrent effect. 87 However CCAS was important in 
breaking new ground and facilitating CCAMLR. 88 The killing of Ross, Fur, and Elephant 
seals was prohibited, and the harvesting of Leopard, Weddell, and Crab eater seals is 
restricted. Now that dogs have been removed from Antarctica, seals are no longer killed for 
their meat, and from May 1998 to May 1999 no Seals were reported killed in Antarctica. 89 
CCAS remains "the Cinderalla of the Antarctic Treaty system,,;90 and its activation has not 
been needed. Two minor alterations were made to the CCAS in 1990, but public attitudes 
today would be unlikely to support a resumption of commercial sealing. 91 
85 Arthur Watts, op. cit., p.213. Emphasis in the original. 
86 Report of the 1988 Meeting to Review the Operation of the Conventionfor the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals, London, 12-16 September 1988, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: London, 1989, p.31. 
87 P. J. Beck, op. cit., 1986, p.221. 
88 Report of the 1988 Meeting to Review the Operation of the Conventionfor the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals, London, 12-16 September 1988, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: London, 1989, p.34. 
89 520 Antarctic Fur Seals were captured and released by Chile during that period, United Kingdom, Report 
Submitted to the XXlllrd Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting by the Depositary Government of the 
Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals (United Kingdom) in Accordance with Recommendations 
XII 2, Paragraph 2(D), XXIII ATCM IP/81, 1999. 
90 Report of the 1988 Meeting to Review the Operation of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic 
Seals, London, 12-16 September 1988, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: London, 1989, p.46. 
91 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.87. 
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Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources 
At the 1975 Oslo ATCM, the idea of a convention to regulate all marine resource activities 
in the Southern Ocean was placed on the agenda.92 This was prompted by the growing 
interest in the potential of krill harvesting, an already existing interest in fishing, and the 
memory of historical sealing and whaling activities. The anticipation of future negotiations 
concerning the exploitation of mineral resources in Antarctica may also have played a role 
in the decision to negotiate CCAMLR.93 The economic use of marine resources was not 
covered by the existing ATS framework. A convention was desired because fishing was an 
activity of interest to non-ATCPs,94 and the ATCPs did not want to be overtaken by 
outside influence or events - such as the F AO, or ongoing United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) negotiations and the gradual acceptance of the 200 mile 
Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) concept. 95 SCAR was also asked to develop a research 
plan for the Southern Ocean and this led to the initiation of BIOMASS (Biological 
Investigation of Marine Antarctic Stocks and Systems) to "acquire better understandings of 
the composition of the Southern Ocean ecosystem and the relationship among its 
species.,,96 At the 1977 London ATCM, guidelines for the negotiation of a regime for 
living marine resources were laid out. 97 
CCAMLR was negotiated at a time when environmental norms relevant to Antarctica were 
beginning to influence views, but the ATCP norms supported a synthesis of environmental 
and exploitation interests.98 These negotiations were conducted in secret, preserving the 
dominant role of the ATCPs and preventing external interference.99 Poland became an 
92 Recommendation VIII-10 'Antarctic Marine Living Resources', to be included on the agenda at ATCM-
IX. Antarctic Treaty, Report of the Eight Consultative Meeting, Oslo, 9-20 June 1975, Ministry of Foreign 
Affairs: Oslo, 1976, pAO. 
93 James N. Barnes, "The Emerging Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: 
An Attempt to Meet the New Realities of Resource Exploitation in the Southern Ocean", in Jonathon 1. 
Charney (ed), The New Nationalism and the Use of Common Spaces: Issues in Marine Pollution and the 
Exploitation of Antarctica, Allanheld Osmun: Totawa NJ, 1982, p.243 and 248. 
94 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.82. 
95 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.206. 
96 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., p.122. 
97 Recommendation IX-2, Antarctic Treaty, Report of the Ninth Consultative Meeting, London, 19 September 
- 7 October 1977, Foreign and Commonwealth Office: London, 1977, pp.13-16. 
98 P. J. Beck, op. cit., pp.222-223. 
99 For detail of the CCAMLR negotiations see David M. Edwards and John A. Heap, "Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Commentary", Polar Record, 20 (127), 1981, pp.353-
362, Ronald F. Frank, "The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources", Ocean 
Development and International Law Journal, 13 (3), 1983, pp.291-345, and James N. Barnes, op. cit., 
pp.239-287. 
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ATCP in 1977 because of its interest in krill harvesting. lOO The CCAMLR negotiations 
represent the first involvement of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in the ATS, 
with the participation of the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (ruCN) 
and two NGO representatives on the United States delegation. 101 
The CCAMLR negotiations stalled over two problems: first the problem of islands in the 
convention area to which sovereignty was undisputed, such as the French Kerguelen and 
Crozet Islands, and the position of the European Community (EC) in relation to the 
convention. One factor in the sovereignty problem was that both claimants and non-
claimants were attempting to protect interests to potential minerals exploitation in the 
future. l02 A compromise was reached over the EC issue whereby the EC only became a 
participating member once the convention was in force, and only participates where it is 
competent to do so, such as on issues of fishing for which the EC has developed a common 
policy. 103 
The CCAMLR negotiations had to find a way to take into account the undisputed claims to 
islands within the CCAMLR area while preserving the moratorium on the disputed 
territorial claims in the Antarctic. One part of the solution to this sovereignty problem can 
be seen in the French note in the preamble. This understanding applies "to waters adjacent 
to the islands within the area to which this Convention applies over which the existence of 
State sovereignty is recognized by all Contracting Parties.,,104 This allows the states with 
sovereignty to choose to "agree that the waters in question should be included in the area 
of application of any specific conservation measure"lOS proposed by the Commission. Any 
measures adopted would be enforced by the relevant state, 1 06 and the state could 
promulgate national measures that are stricter than the Commission's.107 
The other part of the solution dealt with the issue of the claims in the Antarctic. The 
CCAMLR convention repeated Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty with an additional 
phrase. Under CCAMLR Article IV (2) (b) nothing shall: 
100 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.205. 
101 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.89. 
102 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.265. 
!O3 P.W. Quigg, op. cit., pp.184-185. See also Appendix II, Article VII (2) (c) and Article XXIX, (2). 
104 Appendix II, Text of Statement included in the Final Act of the Conference, (5). 
105 Appendix II, Text of Statement included in the Final Act of the Conference, (2). 
106 Appendix II, Text of Statement included in the Final Act of the Conference, (4). 
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be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of, or as 
prejudicing, any right or claim or basis of claim to exercise coastal state jurisdiction 
under international law within the area to which this Convention applies; 108 
This deliberate ambiguity of 'coastal state jurisdiction' has been called the 'bifocal 
approach' .109 It allows states with different positions on the territorial claims in Antarctica 
to have different interpretations of the same articles in the convention. 
The aim of CCAMLR was to safeguard the environment and protect the ecosystem of the 
Southern Ocean. 110 The Convention covers all the marine living resources of the Southern 
Ocean, with the exceptions that the regulation of sealing is left to CCAS, and the 
regulation of whales is left to the International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling. ll1 The convention boundary follows the line of the convergence, not the arbitrary 
60° South latitude of the Antarctic Treaty.112 The ecosystem was defined as "the complex 
of relationships of Antarctic marine living resources with each other and their physical 
environment. ,,113 The main principles of conservation are articulated in Article II, and these 
embody what is known as the 'precautionary approach'. As conservation was defined to 
include rational use, this would eventually allow harvesting based on scientific knowledge. 
The ecosystem concept and precautionary approach were innovative and allowed 
environmental protection to move beyond the concept of Maximum Sustainable Yield 
(MSy).114 The MSY concept was too difficult to implement in practice and led to 
substantial depletion of marine resource stocks from over-harvesting. This attention to the 
ecosystem was a point of difference from traditional fisheries commissions. 115 
107 Appendix II, Text of Statement included in the Final Act of the Conference, (3) (a). 
108 Appendix II, Article IV (2) (b). 
109 See Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law o/the Sea, Martinus NijhoffPublishers: Dordrecht, 
1992, pp.226-228, and Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., pp.92-97. 
110 Appendix II, Preamble. 
III Appendix II, Article I (2), and Article VI. This was quite deliberate. Christopher C. Joyner, Governing the 
Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental protection, University of South Carolina Press: 
Columbia, South Carolina, 1998, p.I23, sees it as a 'bridge' linking CCAMLR to other international regimes 
governing the high seas. 
112 Appendix II, Article I. 
113 Appendix II, Article I (3). 
114 Some claims have been made that CCAMLR was the fIrst use of the ecosystem principle, however the 
ecosystem concept was used prior to CCAMLR, see Matthew Howard, "The Convention on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources: A Five Year Review", international Law Quarterly, Vo1.38, 1989, 
p.113, and James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.250. 
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While CCAMLR is a separate instrument, it is still intimately connected to the ATS and 
forms a significant part of the ATS. CCAMLR Article VI acknowledges CCAS, while 
Article III binds Contracting Parties of CCAMLR to the peaceful purposes and 
denuclearisation principles of the Antarctic TreatyY6 CCAMLR Article IV binds 
Contracting Parties to Articles IV and VI of the Antarctic Treaty. CCAMLR Article V (1) 
requires the Contracting Parties to ac1mowledge "the special obligations and 
responsibilities of the [ATCPs] for the protection and preservation of the environment of 
the Antarctic Treaty area.,,1l7 This means that states joining CCAMLR have to accept the 
principles that allow the Antarctic Treaty to function. liS 
Unlike the earlier instruments of the ATS, the CCAMLR convention established an 
institution with a headquarters in Hobart, Tasmania,119 and a supporting secretariat. 120 This 
is the Commission for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. 12l The 
initial framework of the Commission is outlined in Articles VII to XIII. In carrying out the 
objectives and principles of the Convention, the Commission is responsible for facilitating 
"research into and comprehensive studies of Antarctic marine living resources and of the 
Antarctic marine ecosystem;,,122 for implementing a system of observation and 
inspection,123 and has to "formulate, adopt, and revise conservation measures on the basis 
of the best scientific advice available". 124 
While the original CCAMLR Contacting Parties are always entitled to membership of the 
Commission,125 CCAMLR has two stages of membership for states that became 
Contracting Parties at a later date. While any state "interested in research or harvesting 
activities in relation to the marine living resources to which this Convention applies,,126 is 
allowed to accede to CCAMLR, an acceding state is only "entitled to be a Member of the 
Commission during such time as that acceding party is engaged in research or harvesting 
116 Appendix II, Article III. 
117 Appendix II, Article V (1). 
118 P. J. Beck, op. cit., p.228. 
119 Appendix II, Article XIII (1). 
120 Appendix II, Article XVII. 
121 Appendix II, Article VI (1). 
122 Appendix II, Article IX (1) (a). 
123 Appendix II, Article IX (1) (g). 
124 Appendix II, Article IX (1) (f). 
125 Appendix II, Article VII (2) (a). 
126 Appendix II, Article XXIX (1). 
76 
activities in relation to the marine living resources to which this Convention applies;,,127 
CCAMLR also allows for invited observers to attend CCAMLR meetings. 128 
In addition to the Commission, a Scientific Committee was established as a consultative 
body to the Commission.129 Each member of the Commission is also a member of the 
Scientific Committee.130 The initial framework of the Scientific Committee is outlined in 
Articles XIV to XVI of the Convention. CCAMLR entered into force in 1982 and at the 
end of 2001 has twenty-four members of the Commission, with another seven acceding 
states. 131 
The scope of the Convention's conservation measures are dealt with in Article IX. There is 
an opt-out clause that allows members of the Commission to state the extent to which a 
conservation measure will not be binding on them.132 If this occurs, other members of the 
Commission may review their position on the conservation measure and also opt out of 
being bound by it. 133 Otherwise, all conservation measures become binding on all members 
of the Commission 180 days after the Commission has notified all members of the 
conservation measure.134 In addition to this, all "Decisions of the Commission on matters 
of substance shall be taken by consensus.,,135 This has the effect of granting all members of 
the Commission a 'veto' over the introduction of a new conservation measure. 
CCAMLR's means of enforcing conservation measures are weak and rely on voluntary 
compliance among both its members and any other third parties who may be active in the 
Southern Ocean. There are no collective mechanisms for enforcement powers. Specific 
responsibility for imposition of penalties lies with members. A system of inspection was 
established in 1989/90, but fishery patrols suffer from prohibitive costs due to the 
127 Appendix II, Article VII (2) (b). 
128 Appendix II, Article XXIII. 
129 Appendix II, Article XIV (1). 
130 Appendix II, Article XIV (2). 
131 The members are: Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Chile, European Community, France, Germany, 
India, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Namibia, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Russian Federation, South 
Africa, Spain, Sweden, Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States and Uruguay. States that have ratified the 
Convention, but are not members of the Commission are: Bulgaria, Canada, Finland, Greece, the 
Netherlands, Peru, and Vanuatu. http://www.ccamlr.org/English/e_m_ship/e_membership.htm (site visited 
30 January, 2002). 
132 Appendix II, Article IX (6) (c). 
133 Appendix II, Article IX (6) (d). 
134 Appendix II, Article IX (6) (a) to (b). 
135 Appendix II, Article XII (1). 
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remoteness of the Southern Oceans.136 CCAMLR has found it difficult to balance short-
term economic interests with conservation needs. All resource use suffers from the 
problem of biological uncertainty, for without accurate knowledge of stocks any catch 
level could be too much. 
The Convention for the Regulation of Antarctic Mineral Resource Activities 
In the 1980s, diplomatic efforts in Antarctica focused on negotiating an agreement on 
exploiting mineral resources, starting with the Fourth Special Consultative Meeting (SCM) 
in July 1982.137 At that time, exploitation of minerals was seen as an activity which was 
legitimate and should be permitted in Antarctica. 138 CCAMLR had been seen by many 
observers as a trial of the ATS members' ability to negotiate resource issues that had 
sovereignty implications.139 However, it was going to be difficult to apply principles 
developed for renewable living resources to non-renewable mineral resources. The 
CRAMRA negotiations were significant because of the bearing that commercial mineral 
resource activity had on the sovereignty claims to Antarctic territory. The CRAMRA 
agreement was negotiated and signed but it was not ratified. CRAMRA reflected the 
sovereignty norms and political compromises of the Antarctic Treaty, with a complex 
institutional framework. 140 
An important paradigm shift occurred among the ATCPs in 1989-1991, starting with the 
announcement from Australia and France that they had withdrawn their support for 
CRAMRA and were seeking a ban on mining. 141 CRAMRA was internally inconsistent in 
its assumption that mineral development could be regulated with adequate environmental 
protection, and the public acceptability of the regime had changed. 142 Doubts existed over 
the adequacy of the environmental rules, and the strength of the compliance provisions. 143 
A key event that helped mobilise public awareness and opinion was the accident involving 
the Argentine resupply ship, the Bahia Paraiso, spilling 150,000 gallons of oil into the 
136 Karl-Hermann Kock, "Fishing and Conservation in Southern Waters", Polar Record, 30 (172), 1994, 
p.1l. 
137 On these negotiations see Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., pp.l21-l35. 
138 • 121 op. CIt., p. . 
139 Matthew Howard, op. cit., p.105, and Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., pp.87-88. 
140 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.l35. See pp.l35-152 for an examination of the provisions ofCRAMRA. 
141 ibid., pp.l63-165, the French announcement was on 20 April 1989, and the Australian announcement was 
made 22 May 1989. 
142 ibid., p.l61. 
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Southern Ocean on 28 January, 1989. 144 The collapse of CRAMRA and the introduction of 
the Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty (hereafter the 'Madrid 
Protocol') was a significant and successful test of the robustness of the ATS regime. 
The Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty 
The Madrid Protocol was negotiated quickly, in an atmosphere of some rancour over the 
defection from CRAMRA, and the important consensus rule of the ATS.145 Despite this, a 
new consensus emerged, and the ATCPs committed "to the comprehensive protection of 
the Antarctic environment and dependent and associated ecosystems" .146 The Madrid 
Protocol is a long and complex document compared to the earlier instruments of the ATS, 
and it was influenced by the design of CRAMRA. The economic interests of the ATCPs to 
Antarctic minerals were put aside, but not eliminated, just as their territorial interests had 
been under the Antarctic Treaty. The importance of environmental protection displaced the 
old assumptions about the inevitability of resource exploitation. This demonstrated the 
resilience of the ATS and the goodwill of the ATCPs in achieving a balanced 
. 147 
compromIse. 
The Madrid Protocol is comprehensive because it "establishes general environmental 
principles which must be applied to all activities in the Antarctic.,,148 Unlike the earlier 
Antarctic Treaty, all governmental and non-governmental activity by state parties is 
covered.149 Article 3 of the Madrid Protocol lays out the environmental principles, by 
making them "fundamental considerations in the planning and conduct of all activities in 
the Antarctic Treaty area.,,150 To this end, any "activity relating to mineral resources, other 
than scientific research, shall be prohibited.,,151 The political compromises of the ATS 
143 ibid., pp.152-160. 
144 ibid., p.165. A greater disaster occurred in Alaska when the Exxon Valdez ran aground 24 March 1989, 
spilling 10.8 million gallons of oiL http://www.oilspill.state.ak.us/history/history.htm (site visited 26 
February 2001). 
145 New Zealand Minister of Foreign Affairs, Russell Marshall: "Australia will have a good deal to answer 
for if it fails" in Anonymous, "Antarctic Antics", New Scientist, 122 (1667), 3 June, 1989, p.20. Christoper 
C. Joyner, op. cit., p.l65: "A residue of resentment remains over the failure to consummate the CRAMRA 
process and over the manner in which the minerals agreement was brought down." 
146 Madrid Protocol, Article 2. 
147 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.l63-164. 
148 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., p.200. Emphasis in the original. 
149 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit. p.l5l. 
150 Madrid Protocol, Article 3 (1). 
lSI Madrid Protocol, Article 7. 
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were preserved by Articles 5 and 6 of the Madrid Protocol which outline the relationship 
and consistency of the Madrid Protocol with the components of the ATS. However, Article 
13 of the Madrid Protocol requires parties to comply with the Protocol. I52 This is also 
covered by a provision for inspection by observers. 153 
Dispute settlement provisions are covered in Articles 18-20, and allow resolution through 
the ICJ or the Arbitral Tribunal established in the Schedule to the Protocol. 154 These 
provisions also cover the annexes to the Madrid Protocol. 155 This is a tighter requirement 
for dispute resolution because where parties disagree about the resolution of a dispute it 
may only go to the Arbitral Tribunal. 156 However, some limits are imposed to preserve the 
sovereignty compromise of the ATS, and neither the Arbitral Tribunal or the ICJ are 
competent to "rule upon any matter within the scope of the Article IV of the Antarctic 
Treaty",157 or on the sovereign immunity of ships in Annex IV. I58 
Although it took until 1998 for the Madrid Protocol to enter into effect with the last 
ratification by Japan in late 1997, a new institution was established: the Committee for 
Environmental Protection (CEP).159 CEP was first officially convened at the 1998 XXII 
ATCM in Troms0, although a Temporary Environmental Working Group (TEWG) was 
established at the XVIII ATCM in Kyoto to anticipate and prepare for the establishment of 
the CEP. The TEWG met three times at different ATCMs and did the basic groundwork 
for CEP. The functions of the CEP are outlined in Article 12 of the Madrid Protocol. The 
CEP lacks authority to enforce compliance with the Madrid Protocol; this is left to the 
governments of the parties to the Madrid Protocol. Both SCAR and CCAMLR send 
observers to CEP meetings. 
The transparency of the ATS was increased with the Madrid Protocol. NGOs can be 
invited to CEP meetings as observers. 160 CEP reports and documents must be made 
152 Madrid Protocol, Article 13 (1)-(3). 
153 Madrid Protocol, Article 14. 
154 Madrid Protocol, Article 19 (l). 
155 Madrid Protocol, Article 9 (5). 
156 Madrid Protocol, Article 19 (1 )-(5). 
157 Madrid Protocol, Article 20 (2). 
158 Madrid Protocol, Annex IV, Article 11 (4). 
159 Madrid Protocol, Article 11. 
160 Madrid Protocol, Article 11 (4). 
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public,161 as must those relating to environmental impact assessment,162 and managed and 
protected areas. 163 At the CEP II meeting in 1999, a decision was made that a web page 
should be established by the home country of the current CEP chair, although it was noted 
that this should be the province of an Antarctic Treaty secretariat. 164 
Five annexes were included as an integral part of the Madrid Protocol. These relate to 
environmental impact assessment (EIA), conservation of flora and fauna, waste disposal 
and management, marine pollution, and area protection and management. 165 ErA is also 
covered in Article 8 of the Madrid Protocol. The key EIA provision is that an activity may 
only proceed if it will have "less than a minor or transitory impact". 166 However, a problem 
here is that 'minor' and 'transitory' have not been defined in the Madrid Protocol and have 
been left to be worked out over time. The procedure for evaluating EIA is left with 
governments, not CEP, so the governments are able to do what they wish. Christopher 
Joyner observed that the "Protocol appears to place a great deal of faith in diplomatic 
pressure as an effective check against governments making irresponsible national 
decisions.,,167 
Annex II on the Conservation of Flora and Fauna transforms the Agreed Measures into a 
legally binding document and updates their regulations. It extends protection, bans dogs in 
Antarctica from 1994, and damaging native plants is now considered harmful interference 
to the environment. Annex III on Waste Disposal and Waste Management imposes 
obligations to reduce the waste produced and disposed in the Antarctic Treaty area in order 
to minimise interference with the natural values, scientific research, and the other uses of 
Antarctica. 168 The parameters are a little vague "as far as practicable" and "to the 
maximum extent practicable" which can make accountability difficult. 169 Some of the 
forms of disposal, such as incineration and discharge into the sea have been objected to. 170 
161 Madrid Protocol, Article 11 (5), and Article 17, (2). 
162 Madrid Protocol, Annex I, Article 6. 
163 Madrid Protocol, Annex V, Article 9. 
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Annex IV Prevention of Marine Pollution attempts to restrict the discharge of oil, noxious 
liquid substances, or sewage, and the disposal of garbage in the Antarctic Treaty area. It 
also links the ATS to the 1973 International Convention for the Prevention of Pollution 
from Ships (MARPOL), as amended by a Protocol in 1978. 171 A problem here is the 
sovereign immunity of Article 11 which prevents the annex from applying to "any warship, 
naval auxiliary or other ship owned or operated by a state and used ... only on government 
non-commercial service.,,172 This probably covers most of the ships operating in the 
Southern Ocean. 173 Compliance is the responsibility of ship flag states. 
The fifth and last Annex was on Area Protection and Management. This consolidated the 
five existing types of protected zones into two types of protected area: Antarctic Specially 
Protected Areas (ASPA) are areas to be "kept inviolate from human interference,,/74 and 
include all SPA and SSSI designated in the past;175 Antarctic Specially Managed Areas 
(ASMA) are areas where activity is expected to be conducted. 176 This annex promotes 
cooperation and coordination in Antarctica and helps avoid environmental damage. 177 
The Madrid Protocol is not a final solution to the problems of Antarctica, as it may be 
"modified or amended at any time in accordance with the procedures set forth in Article 
XII (1) (a) and (b) of the Antarctic Treaty."l78 While this requires unanimity for 
amendments, the Madrid Protocol may also be amended after fifty years from its entry into 
force, and this only requires "a majority of the Parties, including 3/4 of the States which 
are [ATCPs] at the time of adoption".179 However the prohibition on mineral resource 
activities is to remain in force until a binding legal regime on the acceptable use of mineral 
resource activities is negotiated,180 and the ban "provides powerful symbolic value.,,181 
This 'walle out' clause was inserted largely at the insistence of the United States, and is of 
some concern to environmentalists as a potential weakness of the Madrid Protocol. 182 
171 Madrid Protocol, Annex IV, Article 1 (c). 
172 Madrid Protocol, Annex IV, Article 11 (1). 
173 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., p.160. 
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The Madrid Protocol is not a permanent ban or a declaration of a world park; Antarctica 
was only designated as a "natural reserve, devoted to peace and science.,,183 There has also 
been a failure to negotiate the liability annex required by Article 16 of the Madrid Protocol, 
despite extensive negotiations. The effectiveness of any liability system depends on the 
enforcement mechanism, and this is complicated by the problems of international 
commons.
184 This failure to promulgate a liability annex represents a weakness in the 
agreement. The area of coverage is limited to 60° South latitude, and omits the Sub-
Antarctic islands outside the treaty area - something that may impede the effectiveness of 
the Madrid Protocol in protecting the environment. 185 Overall, however, the Madrid 
Protocol has revitalised the ATS in the wake of the collapse ofCRAMRA. 186 
Sovereignty and the Environment in the Southern Ocean 
The issue of sovereignty needs to be carefully considered in relation to the Southern Ocean 
because of the implications that current international law has with respect to managing the 
fisheries of the Southern Ocean under the ATS. While Antarctica, in many instances, is a 
unique area in international law, the Southern Ocean shares many of the problems of the 
high seas around the globe. 
Background to sovereignty 
Antarctica is the only continent without indigenous inhabitants. As such, it had a status of 
terra nullius (land owned by no one) before Antarctica was discovered. Discovery of terra 
nullius territory gives an inchoate title to that territory that must be perfected within a 
reasonable period for a state to clearly establish sovereignty over that territory. 187 Despite 
this, acts of discovery are a major argument used by Antarctic claimants, although it is 
usually argued that title was accrued before the claim was formalised. 188 One problem here 
is that actually identifying who discovered Antarctica, or various parts of the continent, is 
183 Madrid Protocol, Article 2. 
184 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.l69-173. 
185 ibid. pp.l65-166. 
186 ibid, p.l73. 
187 Island 0/ Palm as Case (1928) between the United States and the Netherlands, Clipperton Island Case 
(1931) between France and Mexico, Case Concerning the Legal Status o/Greenland (1931) between Norway 
and Denmark. See Arthur Watts, op. cit., pp.121-124. 
83 
extremely difficult. Another problem is that the time period for perfecting a claim is not 
defined. 
Many states have performed acts of symbolic annexation in Antarctica, such as reading 
proclamations and depositing claim markers. "Symbolic annexation is essentially 
discovery coupled with a manifestation of intent to claim.,,189 The Clipperton Island Case 
demonstrated that the effective occupation test could be modified for a small, uninhabited 
area.
190 It is difficult to imagine that an entire continent could be claimed in the same 
manner. Sighting the land and performing symbolic acts is not sufficient to sustain a claim 
in Antarctica, even though these acts have some probative value. To sustain a claim in 
Antarctica a state had to demonstrate the intention and will to act as sovereign, or animus 
occupandi. 191 This requires formal notification to other states. 192 While the claimants in 
Antarctica have advanced various theories to support their claims, such as geographical 
propinquity, geological continuity, patrimony, and sector theory, serious consideration of 
their claims remains focused on whether or not Antarctica has been effectively occupied. 193 
Of the historical methods of acquiring sovereignty, only occupation and cession apply in 
Antarctica. The cession of title between Britain, and Australia, and New Zealand can only 
be valid if the occupation by Britain was sufficient to establish a valid claim to a title in the 
first place. The international law test for occupation is derived from Article 35, Chapter VI, 
of the Act of Berlin, and from subsequent international practice. Occupation requires a 
state sanctioned settlement that is permanent, useful, and continuous. 194 In Antarctica, this 
has primarily been done through the establishment and maintenance of scientific bases. 
Some attempts at colonisation have been made, mostly by Chile and Argentina. 
The key issue here is whether or not Antarctica would be treated leniently in regards to 
fulfilling the requirements for occupation due to its inhospitable nature. The United States 
position on British claims in Antarctica articulated by Secretary of State Hughes in 1924 
188 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.6. 
189 • 11 op. CIt., p. . 
190 Emilio J. Sahurie, op. cit., pp.257-259. 
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was that a valid claim of sovereignty required actual settlement. 195 This policy was 
maintained even when permanent settlements began to be established in Antarctica in the 
1940s.196 Claimant states routinely perform state acts, such as the appointment of officials, 
issuing postage stamps, and passing legislation concerning the claimed area. The 
interpretation of effective occupation is subjective. 197 Each such claim would have to be 
treated independently.198 The view of non-claimants is that the claims are fiction. If 
Antarctica has not been appropriated then it is not appropriable and terra nullius de facto 
becomes terra nullius de jure. 199 However, if sovereignty was actually acquired at some 
stage in the past, then that sovereignty "depends primarily on the law and the facts as they 
were at that time past, rather than as they might stand today.,,200 
In the 1960s, a new alternative approach to sovereignty emerged that focussed on applying 
the common heritage principle to unique global resources, such as outer space and the deep 
seabed of the ocean flOOr. 201 The efforts of the 'Nonaligned Movement' and the 'Group of 
77' developing nations were important in creating the global politico-economic movement 
and were known as the 'new international economic order' (NIEO) in the 1970s?02 This 
approach denied the validity of any claims to the terra communis in Antarctica and the 
challenged international acceptability of the ATS. Advocates of this approach favoured a 
more representative international regime, possibly modelled on some UN-based 
organisation.203 In a similar vein are calls for a 'world park' in Antarctica, although these 
are centred around increasing the environmental protection rather than increasing the 
economic exploitation of Antarctica. 204 
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This attempt faltered when significant leaders of the developing world, such as India and 
China, chose to pursue their interests from within the ATS by acceding and gaining ATCP 
status. The CRAMRA agreement ignored the common heritage principle.2os This is 
important because the ATS is the main source of authority for Antarctica and the Southern 
Ocean at present. The ATS includes the major world powers, and with China and India a 
large proportion of the world population. As long as the ATS is able to maintain its unity 
and resiliency, it will continue to exclude rival organisations. For example, during the UN 
debates on the question of Antarctica the ATCPs maintained a united front and largely 
refused to vote on the issue?06 However, in response to external criticism, the workings of 
the ATS have become more transparent,207 and there has been a restoration of consensus in 
the UN since 1994?08 This was due in part to the Madrid Protocol removing the minerals 
stake, and the change in government in South Africa removed another source of tension. 
Rainer Lagoni pointed out that marine living resources are not the kind of resources that 
are part of the 'common heritage of mankind' in the sense of UNCLOS.209 Malaysia 
remains critical of the ATS and still believes that the UN "is the most appropriate authority 
to enforce, administer and monitor the various scientific and non-scientific activities in 
Antarctica.,,210 However, Malaysia is more engaged with the ATS than it once was. For 
example, in 1999 Malaysia planned to join a New Zealand scientific project in 2000?!! 
Antarctic Treaty: Article IV 
Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty has been of crucial importance in removing the obstacle 
of competing interpretations of the validity of the various sovereignty claims in Antarctica. 
According to Article IV (1): 
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1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) A renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or 
claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) A renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to 
territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its 
activities orthose of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica. 
Article IV manages to suspend the existing disputes over sovereignty claims. It does this 
by preserving the position of all the interested parties in a frozen state.212 This is a non-
solution to the disputes as it does not actually resolve the claims, but it does provide a 
modus vivendi that facilitates the working of the ATS. This is reinforced by Article IV (2): 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall 
constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new 
claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica 
shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
There is no foreseeable resolution to the claims while the Antarctic Treaty remains in 
force, and removal of the provisions of Article IV would cause trouble?13 The Article IV 
compromise has been perpetuated throughout the other instruments of the ATS. 
The issue of jurisdiction was a weaker element in the Antarctic Treaty. Article VIII 
provides a compromise that observers, scientific personnel, and their accompanying staffs 
were subject only to the jurisdiction of the ATCP of which they were nationals. 
Jurisdiction is important because if a nation allows its citizens to be arrested and tried by 
another state in relation to activities in Antarctica, then it is implicitly acknowledging the 
sovereign authority of that state.214 This is a loose end in the ATS because it does not cover 
commercial or private actors, such as companies and tourists, in Antarctica. This has been 
addressed only partly by the Madrid Protocol, which covers "all other governmental and 
non-governmental activities in the Antarctic Treaty area",215 but is yet to finalise a 
complete liability annex. 
212 "the Treaty did not freeze territorial claims; it merely put them on the back burner to keep warm." Keith 
Brennan quoted in P.W. Quigg, op. cit., p.196. 
213 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.63-64. 
214 P.W. Quigg, op. cit., pp.150-151. 
215 Madrid Protocol, Article 3 (4). 
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Implications for the environment - the commons problem 
The sovereignty problem remains prevalent in Antarctic politics despite the modus vivendi 
of Article IV. States are careful to preserve their position on the sovereignty issue. 
Argentina and Chile are perhaps the two most vociferous states in this respect. This 
continues to have an impact on political negotiations concerning Antarctic issues and the 
actual activities conducted by states in Antarctica. Symbolic acts of sovereignty continue 
to be expressed. Commitment to Antarctica is often measured in terms of expenditure on 
scientific research there. This could potentially be important if the ATS unravels and the 
claims are revisited. Activities conducted during the time of the ATS may still be of value 
in establishing a claim, despite the provisions of Article IV (2). 
A significant development in international law has been the establishment of EEZs after 
UNCLOS. This has interesting ramifications for the territorial claims in Antarctica and for 
the environment of the Southern Ocean. UNCLOS established that a coastal state had 
sovereignty over the adjacent territorial sea to a limit of twelve nautical miles,216 measured 
from a baseline at the low water line?17 All ships enjoy the right of innocent passage 
through the territorial sea.218 In addition to this there is a contiguous zone that extends for 
another twelve nautical miles in which states may exercise the control necessary to prevent 
and punish infringements of its territorial regulations.219 
Part V of UNCLOS establishes the specific legal regime that governs the rights of the 
coastal state and other states in the EEZ. The EEZ extends for up to 200 nautical miles 
from the baseline of the territorial seas.z20 Within this zone the coastal state has: 
sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring and exploiting, conserving and 
managing the natural resources, whether living or non-living, of the waters 
superjacent to the sea-bed and of the sea-bed and its subsoil, and with regard to 
other activities for the economic exploitation and exploration of the zone, such as 
the production of energy from the water, currents and winds;221 
216 UNCLOS, Articles 2-4. A copy ofUNCLOS can be found at gopher:llgopher.un.org/ll1LOS/UNCLOS82 
(site visited 22 March 2001). 
217 UNCLOS, Article 5. 
218 UNCLOS, Article 17. 
219 UNCLOS, Article 23. 
220 UNCLOS, Article 57. 
221 UNCLOS, Article 56 (1) (a). 
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The coastal state also has inter alia jurisdiction over all marine scientific research and the 
protection of the marine environment. 222 Other states retain freedom of navigation and 
overflight, and other lawful uses of the seas,z23 The conservation of marine resources is 
elaborated in Articles 61-68. The enforcement powers of the coastal state in the EEZ are 
laid out in Article 73. 
The problem ofEEZ claims in Antarctica 
The standard baseline for measuring zones of jurisdiction at sea is the low water mark on 
the coastline. The sea zone is linked to the land. If there is no land claim then the adjacent 
waters are part of the high seas. The Antarctic Treaty is silent on this point.224 The 
unresolved nature of Antarctic sovereignty claims complicates the issue. Australia has 
claimed an EEZ, but so far has chosen not to enforce it. The Australian argument is that the 
EEZ is now part of its existing claim, rather than an extension to its claim or part of a new 
claim - which would be prohibited by Article IV of the Antarctic Treaty,z25 The presence 
of EEZ based on Sub-Antarctic islands with undisputed sovereignty has not proven a great 
problem for the ATS, although it does complicate the arrangements made for the 
implementation of CCAMLR conservation measures. However, any attempt to enforce an 
EEZ with a baseline in Antarctica could start an international controversy. 
Finding a baseline in Antarctica is complicated by the nature of the ice shelves. Although 
permanent, they fluctuate with a perpetual process of calving off new icebergs. Half of the 
coastline of Antarctica is made of ice sheets, and the ice pack varies between 2.6 million 
km2 in March and 18.8 million km2 in September each year,z26 The Antarctic Treaty seems 
to place the ice shelves more in the territorial category of land than as part of the high 
seas.
227 The problems of ice shelves are not specifically covered by UNCLOS, but the 
222 UNCLOS, Article 56 (1) (b). 
223 UNCLOS, Article 58. 
224 See Appendix I, Article VI. 
225 Discussed by Christopher C. Joyner, "The Exclusive Economic Zone and Antarctica: The Dilemmas of 
Non-Sovereign Jurisdiction", Ocean Development and International Law, 19, 1988, pp,469-491, and in 
Kaye, Stuart and Rothwell, Donald R., 'Australian Law in Antarctica', Polar Record, 29 (170), 1993, pp.215-
218. An Australian Parliamentary Committee's Report on the application of Australian law in the AAT 
recommended establishing an EEZ adjacent to the AAT despite the problems this might cause with other 
ATCPs. 
226 Christopher C. Joyner, Antarctica and the Law of the Sea, Martinus NijhoffPublishers: Dordrecht, 1992, 
p.79. 
227 Arthur Watts, op. cit., p.l18. 
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provisions dealing with deltas that change over time could potentially be applied.228 If New 
Zealand made an EEZ claim in the Ross Sea, a large part of it would under the ice for part 
ofthe year. 
The security aspects of the outstanding sovereignty issues have been dealt with in detail 
elsewhere.229 It is worth noting that traditional solutions for military security problems are 
not very relevant to the resolution of environmental security problems and these issues 
should not be confused. The modern era is one of growing interdependence, and the 
transnational dimensions of environmental problems mean that traditional concepts of 
security should be re-examined. While the problems of the environment do form a 
collective security risk, it is not a threat that the military can actually combat, different 
methods are required, such as multilateral diplomacy. 
Global Environmental Macro-Trends 
Before the 1970s environmental problems were often seen as relatively minor issues, but 
their importance had been growing as scientific understanding of the human impact on the 
biosphere improved. The intensity of modern resource exploitation has serious socio-
economic and human costs, and these problems can not be solved by unilateral actions 
from states. This has led to increased international cooperation over environmental issues. 
The 1972 UN Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm led to the Stockholm 
Declaration that symbolised the emergence of international environmental law. The 
emergence of global environmental politics is due to the rise of the transnational 
environmental movement, and the publicity accorded to global environmental threats such 
as the hole in the ozone layer over Antarctica. Since the 1992 UN Conference on the 
228 UNCLOS, Article 7 (2). "Where because of the presence ofa delta and other natural conditions the 
coastline is highly unstable, the appropriate points may be selected along the furthest seaward extent of the 
low-water line and, notwithstanding subsequent regression of the low-water line, the straight baselines shall 
remain effective until changed by the coastal State in accordance with this Convention." 
229 See Laurie Barber, "Keeping New Zealand's Back Door Closed", New Zealand International Review, 7 
(3), 1982, pp.l3-14, Dillon Burke, The Possibility of Conflict in Antarctica: The 1990s and Beyond, MA 
Thesis, University ofWaikato, 1997, and lV. Johnson, "An Examination of the Military Implications of 
Australia's Continued Claim to a Large Part of Antarctica", Australian Defence Force Journal, 99, 1993, 
pp.13-24. 
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Environment and Development (UNCED) at Rio, the environment IS now a central 
political issue ranking alongside the economic and security issues.23o 
Human population growth and the commensurate economic growth are two of the major 
gross physical changes driving global environmental problems. In 1999 the estimated 
world population passed the six billion mark,231 and one estimate of world population in 
2028 is that it will reach ~ eight billion, and be over nine billion by 2048.232 The current 
world population growth rate is 1.26%, although this is estimated to be reducing over time 
to 0.97% in 2015, and 0.78% in 2025?33 This population growth is occurring mostly in the 
developing countries. Increasing population has many flow on effects such as intensive 
farming causing soil degradation, deforestation from logging and subsistence farming, and 
urbanisation?34 
Another key change has been the increase in energy consumption, as much as four and half 
times from 1950-1985.235 As the economies of developing countries continue to grow so 
will energy use. Carbon emissions could increase the 'greenhouse effect' leading to a 
possible temperature rise of between 1.5°-4.5° C by 2030?36 The rising temperature may 
already be having an effect on the ice shelves of Antarctica.237 Emissions of sulfur dioxide 
have caused 'acid rain' and waldsterben (forest death). The emission of 
chlorofluorocarbons into the upper atmosphere has caused a 2% loss of Ozone per decade 
outside the tropical regions since the 1970s. This hole in the Ozone layer has been most 
noticeable in the Antarctic. 
Important as these issues are they lie beyond the scope of this work, which will concentrate 
more on endangered resources and the 'Tragedy of the Commons' ?38 One other significant 
global macro-trend has been the rising role of Non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in 
230 After Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, Global Environmental Politics, 2nd edition, Westview Press: 
Boulder, Colorado, 1996, pp.l-2. 
231 US Census Bureau, http://www.census.gov/cgi-binlipc/popclockw, site visited on 9 February, 2000. The 
UN 6 Billion Day was on 12 October 1999. http://www.unfpa.org!modules/6billionlenlindex.htm. site 
visited on 9 February, 2000. 
232 http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/worldpop.html, (site visited on 9 January, 2001) 
233 http://www.census.gov/ipc!www/worldpop.html, (site visited on 9 January, 2001) 
234 Gareth Porter and Janet Welsh Brown, op. cit., pp.4-5 and p12. 
235 ibid., p.6. 
236 ibid., p.7. 
237 http://www.asoc.org!currentpress/0407nsidc.htm. site visited on 9 February, 2000. 
238 Garrett Hardin, "The Tragedy of the Commons", Science, 162, 1968, pp.1243-1248. 
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environmental affairs. This growth in activity and prominence has been mirrored within 
the ATS. 
Global fisheries 
One great area of stress on the global environment is from overfishing. In the 1950s and 
1960s, total world marine fisheries production increased on average by as much as 6 
percent per year, doubling from 17 million tonnes in 1950 to 34.9 million tonnes in 1961, 
and doubling again in the following two decades to reach 68.3 million tonnes by 1983. 
During 1995-96 total world fish production reached 121 million tonnes. In 1996 94.6 
million tonnes of this was from marine capture fisheries, the other 26.38 million tonnes 
was from aquaculture.239 Fisheries have generally levelled out or declined. The main 
fishing areas in the Eastern Pacific and Atlantic Oceans appear to have reached their 
maximum potential as "wild fisheries are reaching their natural limits". 240 Distant water 
fisheries have declined with the collapse of the Soviet Union, Japan is the most active in 
this area, taking 668,000 tonnes in 1996. 
A significant component of the fishing problem is the over-capacity in the world fishing 
fleet. This situation has resulted from investors purchasing more fishing vessels to increase 
their returns, even after an optimal size is reached for their fishing fleet. Government 
subsidies supporting the purchase of new vessels and the rehabilitation of old vessels also 
playa role, although this may be a declining trend.241 
Fishers have recently spent nearly $124 billion to catch $70 billion worth of fish. 
Governments financed the difference of $54 billion largely with low interest loans 
and direct subsidies for boats and operations - an expenditure that encouraged 
fi h· 242 over- IS mg. 
This threatens the sustainability of fishing stocks. As local stocks collapse one possible 
effect is that this capacity is displaced to parts of the world which have not been 
239 FAO, The State o/World Fisheries and Aquaculture 1998, Part 1, World Review of Fisheries and 
Aquaculture, 1998. http://www.fao.org/docrep/w9900e/w9900eOO.htm (site visited 9 January 2001). 
240 Stan Crothers Deputy Director, Ministry of Fisheries "Trends and Discontinuities in Fisheries", in 
Antarctic 2010; a notebook: Proceedings o/the Antarctic Futures Workshop 28-30 April 1998. Graeme 
Tetley (editor) Christchurch: Antarctica New Zealand, 1998, (Antarctica New Zealand miscellaneous series 
no.3.), p.14. 
241 F AO, op. cit. 
242 Stan Crothers, op. cit., p.16. 
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overfished, such as the Indian Ocean, Western Pacific Ocean, and now the Southern 
Ocean. Another possible effect is economic retrenchment, for example "Almost 50,000 
Canadian fishers were laid off in 1992 and 1993 due to vanishing cod stocks in North 
Atlantic waters". 243 After almost 500 years of fishing, Canadian Cod had become 
commercially extinct, economically unviable even if not biologically extinct. 244 
Attempting to control fishing capacity is difficult. Accurately measunng the fishing 
capacity of vessels requires careful evaluation. Reducing capacity in one fishing stock may 
displace vessels to another fishery, so efforts must be made to reduce aggregate fishlng 
capacity. In the late 1990s the expansion of fishing fleets appears to be slowing down. 
China is a significant contributor to the expansion, increasing its fleet from ~ 60,000 to 
460,000 decked fishing vessels between 1980 and 1997, and without this the size of the 
world fishing fleet would have remained stable?45 Technological change can drastically 
affect fishing capacity and needs to be carefully monitored. For example, the shift from 
shore based whaling stations to factory ship (or pelagic) whaling in the 1920s increased 
whale harvests, and reduced the ability of coastal states to control and regulate the whaling 
industry. 
International agreements and the high seas 
The open access areas of the high seas create further difficulties. The UNCLOS regime 
deals with matters relating to the law of the sea. It was signed 10 December 1982 after 
more than fourteen years work involving 150 countries, and it was finally ratified 16 
November 1994. Although it deals with a vast variety of issues, such as limiting the 
breadth of the territorial sea to twelve nautical miles,246 UNCLOS largely ignores the issue 
of fishing capacity, being more concerned with the prospect of mining the international 
seabed for mineral resources. Part VII, Section II Articles 116 to 120 cover the right to fish 
the high seas and the duty of states to adopt and comply with conservation measures. These 
duties are not elaborated in any great detail. The protection and preservation of the marine 
environment is also covered in Part XII but this is mostly concerned with pollution. 
243 ibid., p.14. 
244 Mark Kurlansky, Cod: A Biography a/the Fish That Changed the World, Cox & Wyman Ltd: Reading, 
1999, p.186. 
245 F AO, op. cit. 
246 UNCLOS, Article 3. 
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The UNCLOS regime endorses the principle of flag state jurisdiction over vessels on the 
high seas. A related principle is slowly evolving, that "the exclusive jurisdiction over high 
seas fishing vessels enjoyed by flag States necessarily implies a corresponding duty.,,247 
One example of this is the 1993 FAO Agreement to Promote Compliance with 
International Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High 
Seas (F AO Compliance Agreement). It is the legally binding part of the Code of Conduct 
for Responsible Fisheries, which elaborates a set of specific duties for flag states to ensure 
that their vessels do not undermine conservation rules. 
A subsidiary agreement to UNCLOS, the UN Agreement for the Conservation and 
Management of Straddling Fish Stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (UNIA) , was 
signed 4 December 1995 but is not yet in force.248 "The objective of this Agreement is to 
ensure the long-term conservation and sustainable use of straddling fish stocks and highly 
migratory fish stocks".249 The area of application is both within and beyond the area of 
national jurisdiction, subject to the existence of other legal regimes.25o It did introduce 
more fully such concepts such as precautionary management into the UNCLOS regime.251 
UNIA is only a partial step towards attempting to regulate the high seas as it does not 
cover species that exist completely beyond national jurisdiction. If UNIA enters into force, 
then there will be a review conference after four years to "review and assess the adequacy 
of the provisions of this Agreement and, if necessary, propose means of strengthening the 
substance and methods of implementation of those provisions".252 The procedure used in 
negotiating would probably be one where consensus was sought, and voting resorted to 
only if consensus could not be achieved.253 
Compliance with UNIA is dependent mostly on the actions of the flag state of a vessel, but 
some attention is also given to the role that port states can play?54 UNIA Article 18 and 19 
247 David Balton, Dealing With the 'Bad Actors' of Ocean Fisheries, Address at Conference on Fisheries 
Management, Norway Graduate School of Economics, Bergen, Norway, May 20, 1999, 
http://www.state.gov/www/policYJemarksI1999/990520_balton_fisheries.htmI(site visited II October 
2000). 
248 There are 59 signatories so far to UNIA but only 27 ratifications. 30 ratifications are required for UNIA 
to enter into force. See http://www.un.orgiDepts/los/losI64st.htm (site visited 22 March 2001). 
249 UNIA, Article 2. The full text of the convention can be found at 
gopher:llgopher.un.orgiOO/LOS/CONF164/164_37.TXT (site visited 11 February, 2000). 
250 UNIA, Article 3 (1). 
251 UNIA, Annex 2. 
252 UNIA, Article 36 (2). 
253 UNIA, Article 45 (2). 
254 UNIA, Articles 19-23. 
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is similar to the F AO Compliance Agreement, but goes a step further. In Article 8 (3) and 
(4) states whose vessels fish in an area regulated by a regional agreement should either join 
the organisation or apply the organisation's restrictions to their flag vessels. Secondly, 
regional organisations shall have open membership to all interested states. Finally, only 
Member states shall have access to the regulated fishery. Article 17 notes that states which 
do not join or apply restrictions are not discharged from their obligation to cooperate with 
other states, and in particular they must not authorise their vessels to fish for regulated 
stocks. Articles 21 and 22 allow states to board and inspect vessels, and to take limited 
enforcement action to prevent violations of agreed fishing restrictions. 
UNIA retains the principle that no other state can take action against a fishing vessel on the 
high seas without the consent of the flag state, but such consent can now be given in 
advance by becoming a party to UNIA. This gives other responsible states limited 
enforcement authority. This has been negotiated in some smaller scale agreements 
previously. For example, the 1994 Convention on the Conservation and Management of 
Pollock Resources in the Central Bering Sea, (or the 'Donut Hole' agreement).255 One 
problem is that many states are still willing to flag vessels over which they exercise no 
practical control?56 'Soft law' is still developing here, for example the following UN 
General Assembly Resolution 54/32 was adopted by consensus on 24 November 1999 and 
in part: 
6. Calls upon all States to ensure that their vessels comply with the conservation 
and management measures in accordance with the [UNIA] agreement that have 
been adopted by sub-regional and regional fisheries management organizations and 
arrangements; 
7. Calls upon States not to permit vessels flying their flag to engage in fishing on 
the high seas without having effective control over their activities and to take 
specific measures to control fishing operations by vessels flying their flag;257 
David Balton commented that "If flag states do not fulfil these responsibilities, the 
international community will have no choice but to look for other ways to control 
255 See Lawrence Juda, International Law and Ocean Use Management, Routledge: London and New York, 
1996, pp.261-267. 
256 David Bahan, Making the New Rules Work: Implementation of the Global Fisheries Instruments, Remarks 
Delivered at the Conference on Current Fisheries Issues and the Food and Agriculture Organization of the 
United Nations, Rome, Italy, March 16-17, 2000, http://www.state.gov/www/policYJemarks/2000/ (site 
visited 11 October 2000). 
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inesponsible fishing vessels on the high seas. The exclusive jurisdiction that flag states 
enjoy over such vessels will be injeopardy.,,258 
Both UNCLOS and UNIA make reference to regional treaties and organisations. UNCLOS 
does "not alter the rights and obligations of States Parties which arise from other 
agreements,,259 and state parties to UNCLOS can conclude new agreements that suspend or 
modify parts of UNCLOS that are not incompatible with the basic principles, object and 
purpose ofUNCLOS.26o The application ofUNIA is subject to "the different legal regimes 
that apply within areas under national jurisdiction and in areas beyond national 
jurisdiction,,?61 CCAMLR is acceptable as an example of a regional organisation under 
UNCLOS. This means that the Commission remains the main forum for decision-making 
concerning the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR has invited observers from other regional 
fishing organisations to attend its meetings.262 This builds links between different 
organisations and facilitates the exchange of information and ideas. 
The FAO is attempting to develop an International Plan of Action (IPOA) on IUD. The 
first technical meeting to prepare a draft IPOA was held in October 2000 in Rome. The 
IUU IPOA might be finalised in 2001. Another IPOA is being developed to address the 
problem of over-capacity. The 1980s saw the depletion of key fish stocks around the globe. 
In the 1990s the international community has responded by negotiating a series of forward 
looking instruments and a variety of regional regimes. In 2000 the era of big negotiations is 
over and it is time to implement the agreements?63 There is a need to place a cap on 
oceanic harvesting, and to reduce over-capacity. One source of over-capacity and 
overfishing is government subsidies of marine fishing fleets. There is a need to examine 
the policies of the World Bank and other institutions that in the past have focused on 
strengthening economies, they now need to be concerned with conservation and 
sustainabili ty ?64 
257 The full resolution can be found at http://www.un.orgiDepts/los/r54_32e.htm (site visited 26 February, 
2001). 
258 David Balton, op. cit. 
259 UNCLOS, Article 311 (2). 
260 UNCLOS, Article 311 (3). 
261 UNIA, Article 3 (1). 
262 For example at CCAMLR XVII in 1998 observers from the Commission for the Conservation of Southern 
Bluefin Tuna (CCSBT) and the IWC attended the meeting. 
263 David Balton, op. cit. 
264 Frank E. Loy, Keynote Address at the Conference on Current Fisheries Issues, Co-hosted by the Centre 
for Oceans Law and policy, University a/Virginia School of Law and the Food and Agriculture Organization 
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Marine Exploitation in the Southern Ocean 
The main exploitation of resources in the Southern Ocean has been of the marine life. The 
prospect of harvesting icebergs for their fresh water has attracted some attention, but this is 
yet to eventuate. Although whales and seals are no longer being exploited their historical 
boom-bust cycle has been repeated by the modern fishing industry in the Southern Ocean, 
both before and after CCAMLR entered into force. Seals will not be covered, because seal 
exploitation is not currently a major issue. Whaling will be covered briefly as although it is 
a current international issue, its problems fall outside the ambit of CCAMLR. Finfish 
exploitation will be covered, but the history of the exploitation of the Patagonian toothfish 
will be left to Chapter 4. 
Whaling in the Southern Ocean 
Issues involving the harvesting of whales have largely been kept outside th0iJecause 
whaling was covered by an existing agreement when the Antarctic Treaty was signed.265 
This agreement was the 193111946 International Convention for the Regulation of 
Whaling?66 This gap in the environmental protection of the Southern Ocean provided by 
the ATS has continued to the present day. The Agreed Measures on Flora and Fauna 
expressly excluded whales from its definition of "native animal,,?67 Attempts at regulating 
the whaling industry after the Second World War by the International Whaling 
Commission (IWC) failed. There were too many ships chasing an ever decreasing number 
of whales?68 
Whales are an important part of the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. This has meant that 
CCAMLR has taken some responsibility for the conservation of whales. This duplication is 
accommodated by recognition of the rights and obligations of contracting parties under the 
a/the United Nations, Rome, Italy, March 16,2000. http://www.state.gov/www/policYJemarks/2000/ (site 
visited 11 October 2000). 
265 See also Chapter 3, pp.61-62. 
266 States that are currently members of the IWC include: Antigua and Barbuda, India, Russian Federation, 
Argentina, Ireland,. Saint Kitts and Nevis, Australia, Italy, Saint Lucia, Austria, Japan, Saint Vincent and The 
Grenadines, Brazil, Kenya, Senegal, Chile, Republic of Korea, Solomon Islands, People's Republic of China, 
Mexico, South Africa, Costa Rica, Monaco, Spain, Denmark, Netherlands, Sweden, Dominica, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, Finland, Norway, UK, France, Oman, USA, Germany, Peru, Venezuela, and Grenada. 
267 Agreed Measures on Flora and Fauna, Article II (a). 
268 See Chapter 3, note 30, p.62. 
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International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling. 269 The Commission and Scientific 
Committee are required to cooperate with the IWC?70 For some time it was thought that 
the decline of baleen whales in the Southern Ocean would result in a surplus of krill for 
harvesting, but as scientific understanding of the Southern Ocean ecosystem has improved 
this 'krill surplus hypothesis' has evaporated.271 Whales are now included under the 
Madrid Protocol in the,;gps:l£!te(LyeI~ionoJJhe Agreed Measures.272 
Whaling in the Southern Ocean continues today under the guise of taking whales for the 
purpose of scientific research. The IWC has declined·Japanese proposals for minke whales 
to be taken by coastal-community whaling and has passed a resolution calling on the 
Japanese government to refrain from issuing permits to continue their scientific 
programme.273 The issuance of these permits is a sovereign right under the Whaling 
Convention and Japan has taken nearly 5,000 whales in the last twelve years.274 Whaling is 
also permitted for aboriginal subsistence, but this is unlikely to prove to be an issue in the 
Southern Ocean and no catch limits for this purpose exist there. 
Whaling in the Southern Ocean sanctuary is strongly opposed by environmental groups. In 
2000 the New Zealand government was prompted to complain officially to Tokyo in 
response to the aggressive tactics of the whalers responding to the Greenpeace activists 
shadowing their ship in the Southern ocean.275 The anti-whaling opinion was strongly 
expressed by the New Zealand Prime Minister Helen Clark: 
The New Zealand government does not accept Japan's contention that it is whaling 
for scientific purposes. It is well known that meat from the whales slaughtered 
under the so-called Japanese Whaling Research programme ends up for commercial 
sale in Japan itselr,276 
269 Christoper C. Joyner, Governing the Frozen Commons: The Antarctic Regime and Environmental 
Protection, University of South Carolina Press: Columbia, South Carolina, 1998, n69, p.318. See also 
Appendix II, Articles VI and XXII. 
270 Appendix II, Article XXIII (3). 
271 Christoper C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.143-144. ..... . 
272 Madrid Protocol, Annex II, Alticle 1 defines native mammal in a way that in(;l~Q~.s~w'h~les,(However) 
Article 7 reaffirms that "Nothing in this Annex shall derogate from the rights and obligations ofPaniesunder 
the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling." 
273 Final Press Release, 1999 IWC Meeting, St George's, Granada, 28 May 1999, 
http://ourworld.compuserve.com/homepages/iwcoffice/Press99.htm (site visited 14 February, 2000). 
274 "Clark Supports Greenpeace: Japan Whaling 'Deplorable", The Press, Christchurch, 20 January, 2000, 
p.8. 
275 "Whaling Damages Japan", The Press, Christchurch, January 17,2000, pA. 
276 "Clark SUPPOltS Greenpeace: Japan Whaling 'Deplorable", The Press, Christchurch, 20 January, 2000, 
p.8. 
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Greenpeace has argued that the whaling is in violation of UNCLOS Articles 117-120, 
which require contracting parties to abide by regional fisheries codes - in this case the 
IWC Southern Ocean Sanctuary. There is a possible legal case to test this based on the 
precedent of bluefin Tuna,277 however this might not work because the Whaling 
Convention does permit a catch for scientific study.278 
Fishing in the Southern Ocean before CCAMLR 
Extensive exploratory fishing for finfish and laill in the Southern Ocean was not conducted 
lmtil the mid-1960s?79 The main reason for the initiation of harvesting was that long-range 
fishing fleets from the then Eastern Bloc countries were being displaced from waters 
elsewhere as a result of the developing Law of the Sea negotiations.28o These fishing fleets 
were largely independent of port facilities and their activities were also subsidised by their 
governments. This facilitated fishing in waters that were at that time uneconomic for 
vessels from countries with market economies.281 Until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1990 they were responsible for the greater proportion of fishing operations in the Southern 
Ocean. Although laill remained the dominant harvested species, several other species of 
marine life in the Southern ocean were exploited from the 1969/70 split year onwards. 
Other important commercial species included lanternfish (myctophids including Electrona 
carlsbergi), mackerel or Antarctic icefish (Champsocephalus gunnari), marbled rockcod 
(Notothenia rossii), Patagonian rockcod (Patagonotothen guntheri) and Patagonian 
tooth£1sh (Dissostichus eleginoides)?82 The smaller fish, such as Gunther's notothenia and 
lanternfish, were used for fish meal while larger species used for direct human 
. 283 
consumptIOn. 
277 Australia and New Zealand filed a request with the International Tribunal for the Law ofthe Sea July 30 
1999 seeking provisional measures for the Southern Bluefin Tuna, asking for an injunction against Japan's 
experimental fishing of Southern Bluefish Tuna. The Tribunal ordered that the three parties should refrain 
from conducting experimental fishing without the approval of all three parties. 
For the Tribunal's Order see http://www.un.org/Depts/los/ITLOS/Order-tuna34.htm and also the Press 
Release http://www.un.org/Depts!los/Press/ITLOS/ITLOS_28.htm (both sites visited 18 February, 2000). 
278 "Whaling damages Japan", The Press, Christchurch, January 17,2000, pA. 
279 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., p.3. 
280 ibid. 
281 ibid. 
282 There is a third toothfish species Gvozdarus svetovidovi, but it is very rare. 
283 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., pA. 
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CCAMLR had its origins as a krill treaty, when there appeared to be the possibility of a 
krill surplus that could be as much as double the world fish supply?84 This krill surplus has 
not eventuated. The gap in the ecosystem that was previously filled by whales before their 
population was reduced by over-harvesting have been filled by other predators?85 Krill is 
central to the food chain in the Southern Ocean, and its circumpolar standing stock is 
generally estimated at around 500 million tonnes, although there remains a large 
uncertainty over the production estimates for krill. Krill fisheries are closely monitored 
because vessels target krill aggregations on the shelf or at the shelf break, in many cases 
close to the breeding sites ofland-based krill predators such as penguins. Concern has been 
expressed within CCAMLR that krill catches in those areas may affect predators by locally 
depleting their food source. The interaction between krill fisheries and land-based krill 
predators is being researched under the CCAMLR Ecosystem Monitoring Program 
(CEMP). Krill is the foundation of the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean, as such anything 
that effects the krill will impact on the rest of the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. 
The commercial harvest of krill began in 1972, and annual catches exceeded 300 000 
tonnes in most years from 1980 to 1992, then decreased to between 80 000 and 100 000 
tonnes.286 Krill also turned out to be difficult to harvest, process, and market. Krill had to 
be processed quickly to prevent fluoride in the chitin from contaminating the flesh. The 
lack of a consumer market for krill saw a large proportion of the harvests being used for 
animal mea1.287 Catches peaked at 425 870 tonnes in 1985/86 when the fishery contributed 
approximately 13% of the global annual catch of crustaceans, and the recent low catches 
reflect a decrease in the worldwide demand for krill rather than overfishing. The decline in 
krill catches following 1992 was attributed to economic factors, a shift in fishing effort 
from krill fisheries to finfish fisheries, and the break-up of the Soviet Union which until 
then had dominated the fishery; the decline was not due to overfishing. The fishery has 
284 P. J. Beck, The International Politics of Antarctica, Croom Helm Ltd: London, 1986, p.214. Japan and 
Russia started harvesting krill in the 1960s, with other countries joining in the 1970s. 
285 For some of the ecological responses to commercial exploitation see Karl-Hermann Kock, "Present 
Knowledge of Antarctic Marine Living Resources and Means of Ensuring the Compliance with Protective 
measures", in Wolfrum, Rudiger (ed), Klaus Bockslaff and Ingrid 1. Jahn (asst. eds), Antarctic Challenge II: 
Coriflicting Interests, Cooperation, Environmental Protection, Economic Development: Proceedings of an 
Interdisciplinary Symposium September 17th_2Ft 1985, Duncker & Humblot: Berlin, 1986, pp.57-58. 
286 Karl-Hermann Kock, Understanding CCAMLR 's Approach to Management, May 2000, p.6. 
287 Dietrich Sahrhage, "Fisheries Overview", in Lewis M. Alexander, and Lynne Carter Hanson (eds), 
Antarctic Politics and Marine Resources: Critical Choices for the 1980s: Proceedings from the Eighth 
Annual Conference Held June 17-20, 1984 Centre for Ocean Management Studies University of Rhode 
Island, Kingston Rhode Island: Centre for Ocean Management Studies, 1985, pp.lO 1-112. 
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operated mainly in the South Atlantic, around the South. Shetland Islands and South 
Orlmey Islands in summer, and adjacent to South Georgia in winter. Recent advances in 
harvesting and processing technology, and the development of pharmaceutical products 
based on krill, may lead to a resurgence of the krill fisheries. In 1999 the United States 
indicated that it might participate in the krill fishery for the first time and there is a rising 
number of states participating in krill harvesting. 288 
The Soviet Union commenced large-scale harvesting of fin-fish in the 1969170 season, and 
was joined in the mid-70s by Poland, the German Democratic Republic (GDR) , and 
Bulgaria. At the end of the 1971172 season three species were being harvested, N rossii, 
Notothenia squamifrons (the scaled notothenia), and C. gunnari (the Antarctic icefish).289 
Reported catches in the fishery for marbled rockcod peaked at 399,700 tonnes in 1969170, 
then declined to 101 560 tonnes in 1970171, and 2,740 tonnes in 1971172 as the stock was 
overfished and the fishery collapsed. Directed fishing on rockcods has been prohibited 
since 1985, and the recovery of stocks which were overfished in the late 1960s and early 
1970s is being monitored. Midwater trawling for mackerel icefish started in the early 
1970s, and this fishery was characterised by peaks of intense fishing followed by periods 
of low catches and possible localised depletion from the mid-1970s to the late 1980s. 
Stocks of icefish are believed to undergo large natural variations in their abundance, and 
commercial fishing for this species is restricted to peaks in ablmdance.29o 
Fishery grounds yielded good catches for a few years, but the catches declined rapidly in 
the early 1980s.291 "Finfishing paralleled the history of whaling in the Southern Ocean, but 
on a much shorter time scale, with successive discovery, exploitation, and depletion of 
each new stock.,,292 Large-scale exploitation and depletion of many fish stocks preceded 
CCAMLR.293 The depletion of Finfish stocks paralleled whaling, but on a much shorter 
time scale, the lanternfish fishery ceased 1991192?94 The only viable fishery remaining 
288 CCAMLR-XVur, 4.4, p.7. 
289 Matthew Howard, op. cit., at pp.109-11O. 
290 After CCAMLR, information from the Scientific Committee's Fisheries Monitoring section at the 
CCAMLR web page, www.ccamlr.org, (site visited 22 March 2001). 
291 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., p.4. 
292 ibid., p.5. 
293 ibid., p.3. 
294 ibid., p.5. 
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from those undertaken prior to CCAMLR is that for mackerel icefish.295 CCAMLR 
inherited a situation where finfish stocks were already depleted and exploitation of the 
remaining stocks was continuing. Krill was being exploited, but not at levels that were a 
cause for immediate concern. In the 1980s fishing had to be subsidised to be a viable 
industry. In the 1990s economic difficulties have meant that the subsidised fishing is no 
longer viable in the Southern Oceans. In the 1990191 season Chile started long-lining for 
Patagonian toothfish.296 
Summary 
The Southern Ocean was the last major ocean to be explored and exploited. Whale, seal, 
and some finfish stocks were severely affected before the entry into force of the CCAMLR 
regime. The achievements of the IGY and the negotiations leading to Antarctic Treaty and 
the subsequent establishment of the ATS have established a set of principles, norms and 
values that remain important today. The much vaunted "spirit of cooperation" conceals the 
political reality of constant compromise that is required to maintain the ATS. When 
CCAMLR was established it was hoped that its ecosystem approach and precautionary 
principle would allow it to develop into an effective regime before the ecosystem could be 
further damaged by unregulated exploitation. The next two chapters will explore how 
successful CCAMLR was in achieving this goal. 
295 A. 1. Constable, W.K. de la Mare, D.J. Agnew, 1. Everson and D. Miller, "Managing Fisheries to 
Conserve the Antarctic Marine Ecosystem: Practical Implementation of the Convention on the Conservation 
of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)", Paper presented to ICES/SCaR Symposium on 
'Ecosystem Effects of Fishing', 15-19 March, 1999, Montpellier, France, SC-CAMLR-XVIIIIBG/26, 23 
October 1999. 
296 Karl-Hermann Kock., op. cit., p.5. 
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Chapter 4 
Establishing the Framework of the Convention: Dealing with Uncertainty 
Fishing is no longer something that can be considered a recent development in the history 
of the exploitation of living resources in the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR has now been in 
force since 1982. This chapter will cover the development of the CCAMLR Regime and 
the groups important to its development up into the early 1990s. The consensus system and 
the decision-making procedures will be closely analysed. Three key areas of development 
will then be discussed: the development of the relationship between the Commission and 
the Scientific Committee; the development of a framework of conservation measures, and 
the development of a system of observation and inspection. An assessment of CCAMLR in 
the early period will be presented with conclusions as to how successful it was in 
implementing the Convention. 
The CCAMLR Negotiations: Impact on Implementation 
The outcomes of the negotiations leading to CCAMLR had a deep and fundamental impact 
on the operation of the CCAMLR regime. 1 The negotiations for CCAMLR were carried 
out secretly by the ATCPs, and largely excluded input from third-party states, fishing 
operators, or non-governmental organisations.2 Despite this many commentators, such as 
Fernando Zegers, considered the regime achieved an effective one in part because it was 
acceptable to all of the Consultative Parties as well as the international community.3 The 
problem of participation in CCAMLR was one that would occur in different shapes, as the 
Contracting Parties considered how best to include the European Community, non-
governmental organisations such as ASOC and Greenpeace, and how to involve third-party 
states.4 
1 See Chapter 3, pp.72-77 for more background on the CCAMLR negotiations. 
2 The secrecy of the CCAMLR negotiations makes it difficult to speculate on exactly what role was played 
by the fishing industry. During the negotiations arguments favouring fishing were presented by states already 
involved in Southern Ocean fishing, notably Japan and the USSR, while arguments favouring conservation 
were led by the United States. James N. Barnes, op. cit., passim. 
3 Fernando Zegers, "The Canberra Convention: Objectives and Political Aspects of its Negotiation", in 
Vicuna, Francisco Orrego, Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal, and Political Issues, Cambridge 
University Press: Cambridge, 1983, p.153. 
4 See Chapter 4, pp.1l3-1l5, and pp.l17-122. 
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CCAMLR contained several important compromises, such as the ambiguity of coastal state 
jurisdiction, but what was left out of the Convention was in many ways as important as 
what was left in the Convention. The Convention did not deal explicitly with such things, 
inter alia, as economic use of resources, the granting of fishing permits, and the 
jurisdiction of coastal states. These issues would have to be dealt with by CCAMLR at a 
later date before the Convention could begin effectively dealing with the problems of the 
Southern Ocean. One notable gap in the initial framework was the lack of a system for 
observation and inspection. 5 
Although the CCAMLR approach was hailed as innovative it was still built on ideas and 
institutions that had already been developed. The solutions to many of the problems facing 
the negotiators were adapted from the Antarctic Treaty. The problem for CCAMLR was 
going to be in implementing the framework required to meet this ecosystem objective. A 
crucial element was going to be the role of the Scientific Committee and its provision of 
scientific advice to the CCAMLR Commission. The successful CCAMLR negotiations set 
precedents that encouraged the CRAMRA negotiations. Those negotiations ultimately 
failed and the A TCPs developed a different approach to mineral resource exploitation with 
the Madrid Protoco1.6 A consequences of that failure has been to leave CCAMLR as the 
main element of the ATS regime dealing with the exploitation of resources. The issue of 
cooperation with other elements of the ATS and other intergovernmental organisations is 
one which would grow in the 1990s. 
The boundary area of the Convention 
CCAMLR is a regional fisheries agreement with an imperfect boundary delineating its area 
of application. The area of geographic application for the CCAMLR regime is described as 
including the waters south of the Antarctic convergence. The convergence is considered to 
the boundary of the area in which the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean is to be found. In 
practice some compromises were made on the area of application. The exact boundaries of 
the convergence, as measured by salinity and temperature, change periodically.7 This 
means that it changes seasonally and it would have been difficult to encompass the 
5 See Chapter 4, pp.152-156 for details on the development of the system of observation and inspection. 
6 See Chapter 3, pp.77-82. 
7 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.261. 
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maximum possible extent of the convergence within the boundary of the Convention Area. 
Fortunately the Convention Area was not circumscribed at 60° South latitude as that would 
have been "practical and biological nonsense.,,8 
The boundary does not include some waters that ought to fall within the Convention Area. 
Argentina protected its interests in the Drake Passage area by insisting during the 
CCAMLR negotiations that the convergence boundary line be farther away from Argentine 
territory.9 In addition to this the question of coastal state jurisdiction has the potential to 
create a sovereignty dispute in attempting to resolve resource problems. The French 
statement to the CCAMLR Convention allows the possibility that a significant amount of 
the Convention Area could be closed to the CCAMLR Commission's jurisdiction. IO The 
Kerguelen and Crozet Islands are to the north of 600 South latitude and outside the area of 
the Antarctic Treaty. "France has unambiguously indicated that it is prepared to prevent 
Convention conservation measures applying within the EEZ of its Sub-Antarctic islands, 
thus considerably reducing the ambit of the ecosystem approach."ll This affects more than 
just the French possessions, as Australia, Norway, South Africa, and the UK also have 
Sub-Antarctic island dependencies in the Southern Ocean. 
Some species can be found both inside and outside the Convention Area. These straddling 
stocks cause problems to the application of conservation measures by CCAMLR. Article 
XI partially addresses this issue by outlining the desirability of harmonised conservation 
measures. The Antarctic Treaty itself is ambiguous on its application to the high seas 
requiring that "nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, 
or the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high 
seas within that area.,,12 CCAMLR has to cooperate with states that exercise maritime 
jurisdiction in its area, and with those IOOs that exercise management responsibilities 
adjacent to the Convention Area. The issue of cooperation with other regional 
organisations that operate to the north of the Convention Area was one that increased in 
importance on the CCAMLR agenda in the late 1990s. For example, incidental mortality in 
8 John A. Heap, "Has CCAMLR Worked? Management Policies and Ecological Needs", in Arnfinn 
J0rgensen-Dahl and Willy 0streng, The Antarctic Treaty System In World Politics, FridtjofNansen Institute: 
London, 1991, p.46. 
9 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.262. 
10 ibid., p.257. 
11 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.222. 
12 Appendix I, Article VI. 
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the tuna longlining fisheries north of the Convention Area affected seabirds that live inside 
the Convention Area leading to exchanges of information between CCAMLR and the 
International Commission for the Conservation of Atlantic Tunas (ICCAT) and the 
CCSBT. 
A map was designed in 1983 to help implement CCAMLR's conservation system.13 It was 
divided into seventeen subareas, and further divisions, on scientific grounds, following 
lines developed by the F AO in 1970s in part to facilitate the reporting of catch statistics. In 
1987 statistical subareas were created around the McDonald and Heard Islands, allowing 
differentiation of where catches have been harvested. 14 Six statistical subareas have been 
deemed most critical for finfish conservation attention. These are statistical areas 48.1 
(around South Georgia), 48.2 (around South Orkneys), 48.3 (around the South Shetlands 
and offshore the Antarctic Peninsula), 58.5.1 (around the Kerguelen Islands), 58.4.2 (off 
Prydz Bay), and 58.41 (in the Eastern Indian Ocean sector). Less critical are the areas 48.5 
(Weddell Sea), 48.6 (South-East Atlantic), 58.4.4 (Ob and Lena Banks), 58.4.3 (mid-
Western Indian Ocean), 58.7 (around Prince Edward Island), and all of 88 (Pacific Ocean, 
and Ross Sea).15 
The assessment of CCAMLR before it entered into force 
As a significant regional resource and conservation agreement, as well as being an 
extension of the ATS, CCAMLR attracted comment from observers as to its merits and 
flaws as it was signed and proceeded to enter into force. Views ranged from the pessimistic 
to the optimistic. Two common points of comparison were with CCAS and IWC, the 
previous Conventions dealing with resource exploitation in the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR 
was usually deemed as better than CCAS, but the praise was limited. As Watts put it: 
"These various references to environmental considerations are in marked contrast to the 
absence of any such references in the Seals Convention. Nevertheless, while demonstrating 
that their relevance is accepted, they remain essentially peripheral to the substantive 
content of the convention.,,16 
13 An updated version of this map is on p.ix. 
14 SC-CAMLR-VI, 5.76-5.78, p.37. 
15 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.135-138. 
16 Arthur Watts, op. cit., p.263. 
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The assessments comparing CCAMLR and the IWC were more mixed. CCAS is yet to be 
put into operation, while IWC has had to deal with the problems of whaling. CCAMLR 
was to some extent designed with the flaws of the IWC in mind. The lack of scientific 
information was resolved with the creation of a Scientific Committee. One school of 
thought was that CCAMLR had addressed the participation problem of IWC by restricting 
membership to states active in research andlor harvesting of the resources, thus preventing 
the problems in the IWC when many conservation minded states joined without expending 
any effort in research or harvesting of whales. I? Others felt that the CCAMLR negotiators 
had not learnt from IWC: "From the viewpoint of conservation, it would appear that the 
draftsmen took one of the most criticised features of the Whaling Convention and then 
made attainment of the objective even more difficult by adding the Antarctic Treaty 
practice of unanimity.,,18 The ambit of CCAMLR includes whales but it has chosen to 
leave the management role to the IWC, while cooperating in the information analysis 
required for understanding the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. 
Environmental NGO criticism noted among other things the lack of flag state enforcement 
measures, or of an obligatory dispute resolution mechanism. Auburn criticised CCAMLR 
for the lack of any national allocations - considering single unallocated quotas useless, and 
for the lack of any reference to the possibility of a moratorium. 19 Auburn predicted that 
research funding would tend to favour species being harvested, or with that potential,20 and 
that "In practice the Convention will become a fisheries management treaty dominated by 
the interests of the harvesting states.,,21 Beck, making a wider appreciation of the ATS 
search for consensus, was more optimistic in his assessment: "predictions of discord may 
prove both premature and unduly pessimistic.,,22 
The future of CCAMLR would depend on the interaction of fishing and conservationist 
interests, plus the contribution of marine research. Auburn's view was that if "the 
Convention is to be more than a traditional fisheries regime, the central issue will be the 
17 J. A. Gulland, "The Antarctic Treaty System as a Resource Management Mechanism - Living Resources", 
in Polar Research Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, National Research 
Council, Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment, National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 1986, 
pp.224-226, and p.230. 
18 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.227. 
19 ibid., p.228. 
20 ibid., p.229. 
21 ibid., p.240. 
22 P. J. Beck, op. cit, p.231. 
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extent to which the conservation principles can be translated into effective decisions of the 
Commission.,,23 Many doubts were expressed at the ability of the regime to do this against 
the interests of fishing nations. "Any clash between harvesting interests and 
conservationists seeking implementation of the ecosystem principles with respect to an 
issue seen to be important to the fishing nations is likely to be decided in favour of the 
harvesters.,,24 As Edwards and Heap observed: 
The primary difficulty in designing institutions to fulfil the objectives of a 
conservation convention such as this is to provide adequately for situations where 
there is legitimate room for doubt as to the course of action which would more 
properly serve the purposes of the Convention.25 
If CCAMLR was not designed in a manner that could overcome this problem easily, then it 
would have to adapt itself to the situation as time progressed and the problems became 
apparent. CCAMLR had the capacity to evolve into an effective regime, the salient 
question was whether or not this would be the case in the 1980s. The underlying desire 
once CCAMLR was signed was to implement it as quickly as possible, and a meeting was 
held in 1981 to establish the institutional framework even though the Convention was yet 
to enter into force. When CCAMLR was signed the extent of the marine resources of the 
Southern Ocean remained highly speculative, which was just one more indication of the 
size of the task that faced the fledgling organisation. John Rowland observed of CCAMLR 
that it was "an agreement which may not be perfect but is usually considered a good deal 
better than nothing".26 
Fishing in the Southern Oceans During the Early Years of CCAMLR 
The CCAMLR negotiations took place after some Southern Ocean finfish species stocks 
had already been depleted?7 They might not have been so depleted if EEZ had not been 
established by coastal states elsewhere.28 When CCAMLR entered into force the fisheries 
23 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.238. 
24 ibid., p.239. 
25 David M. Edwards and John A. Heap, "Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources: A Commentary", Polar Record, 20 (127), 1981, p.356. 
26 Stuart Harris (ed), Australia's Antarctic Policy Options, Centre for Resource and Environmental Studies, 
Australian National University, 1984, p.357. 
27 See Chapter 3, pp.98-l01. 
28 Peter D. Oelofsen, Alexandre Kiss, James Barnes, and Yoon Kyung Oh, "Panel Discussion on Living 
Resources", in Polar Research Board, Commission on Physical Sciences, Mathematics, and Resources, 
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it was dealing with were limited to krill and finfish. Seals were not being exploited and 
were covered under CCAS, and the issue of whaling was being dealt with by the IWC. The 
new fisheries that were developed after CCAMLR entered into force for crabs, squid, and 
the Patagonian toothfish will be examined in chapter 5.z9 Although krill was considered 
important, much of the early attention of CCAMLR was given over to the state of the 
depleted finfish stocks. This lack of progress with krill attracted some criticism. 
Finfish harvesting in the Southern Ocean 
There were a dozen or so finfish species with commercial potential in the Southern Ocean. 
Exploitation was hampered by distance, climate, and the lack of dense, commercially 
exploitable, shoals of fish. These species were vulnerable to exploitation due to their low 
fecundity, slow growth and longevity.3o In 1983 it was noted that a BIOMASS working 
group had indicated "that fish stocks have been substantially affected by exploitation.,,31 At 
this stage very little was known about the Dissostichus spp. 
Until 1990 fishing operations in the Southern Ocean were conducted almost entirely by 
Eastern Bloc countries.32 The initial management approach taken by CCAMLR in the 
1980s was reactionary - it only tried to remedy situations that were obviously bad. In the 
case of the species that had been exploited before CCAMLR entered into force this was too 
little, too late. Cessation of lanternfish fishery occurred after the 1991/92 season due to 
economic considerations. The N rossii stock in Subarea 48.3 which had been heavily 
exploited before the Convention entered into force was still at a very low level in 1990.33 
The third meeting of the Scientific Committee began the identification of fish stocks in 
need of Conservation Measures: Notothenia rossii marmorata; notothenia gibberifrons; 
Champsocephalus gunnari; and Dissostichus eleginoides were considered the most 
affected. For N rossii around South Georgia "all available evidence was consistent with 
indicating that this stock is very severely affected by fishing, and that the present biomass 
National Research Council, Antarctic Treaty System: An Assessment: Proceedings of a Workshop Held at 
Beardmore South Field Camp, Antarctica, January 7-13, 1985, National Academy Press: Washington, D.C., 
1986, p.241. 
29 See Chapter 5, pp.164-170. 
30 Peter 1. Beck, op. cit., p.216. 
31 SC-CAMLR-II, 49, p.lO. 
32 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., pp.4-5. 
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is less than 10% of the initial biomass when the fishery started. ,,34 Measures proposed to 
deal with this included closure of the South Georgia fishery, individual species TACs, or 
global TACs with by-catch provisions?5 At that time Poland, GDR, and USSR delegations 
felt that there was not sufficient scientific evidence proving the necessity of application of 
such measures.36 
The process of obtaining consensus on the need to adopt more rigorous conservation 
measures was a slow one. "Fishing countries used traditional arguments - as they have 
done in almost all regional fishery commissions - that the scientific advice was uncertain 
due to the lack of adequate information, information that often could be provided only by 
fishing nations themselves.,,37 Conservation minded members preferred to establish a more 
precautionary approach in the absence of more detailed data, but CCAMLR was unable to 
strike a balance between the different positions. It was not until 1991 that the depleted 
species started to be seen to be recovering due to the conservation measures implemented 
by CCAMLR.38 Individual efforts rather than collective efforts organised through 
CCAMLR were producing better results. For example, French management measures 
played a role in halting the decline of N rossii around the Kerguelen Islands.39 CCAMLR 
failed by the end of the 1980s to act to ensure the recovery of finfish stocks that were 
depleted before it entered into force. 
Krill harvesting in the Southern Ocean 
Some of the early estimates of the krill biomass placed it at 180 million to 200 million 
tons, with one optimistic figure derived by the Soviet Union estimating as much as 1,350 
million tons.40 There was a popular conception in the 1970s that owing to the decline in 
baleen whale stocks there was a surplus of krill, perhaps as much as 60 million tons per 
year. In 1980 wide variances existed in the estimates of how much krill could be harvested, 
33 SC-CAMLR-IX, 3.27, p.21. 
34 SC-CAMLR-III, 7.11, p.15. 
35 SC-CAMLR-III, 7.31, pp.l8-l9. 
36 SC-CAMLR-III, 7.32, p.l9. 
37 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., p.ll. 
38 CCAMLR-X, 1.7, p.l 
39 SC-CAMLR-V, 4.39, p.14. 
40 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.207. 
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ranging from 5 million to 150 million tonnes per year.41 The krill surplus was supposedly 
responsible for the steady increase in population of other krill predators.42 In 1984 the 
Scientific Committee acknowledged that there was no direct evidence that this was the 
case.43 As understanding of krill biology and the southern ocean ecology has improved 
"the notion of a krill surplus has evaporated.,,44 In 1992 the Scientific Committee agreed 
that work on the concept of a krill surplus should be a low priority.45 Krill harvesting 
depends on several variables: competition from other fisheries; economic factors; vessel 
availability; technological developments; and environmental conditions such as seasonal 
ice cover.46 In the 1980s most krill harvesting was carried out by Japan, Korea, and the 
USSR. Chile, Germany, and Poland were also involved. 
Table 1 
Krill catch figures in tonnes 1989/90 to 1999/0047 
Year Euphausia superba Year Euphausia superba 
1989/90 374,775 1995/96 101,714 
1990/91 357,538 1996/97 82,508 
1991/92 302,961 1997/98 80,875 
1992/93 88,847 1998/99 103,318 
1993/94 83,891 1999/00 101,286 
1994/95 118,715 - -
Krill was not dealt with formally through conservation measures by CCAMLR until 1991 
when Conservation Measures 32IX and 45IXI were adopted. Stephen Nicol observed the 
lack of comment in the published reports of the Scientific Committee and the Commission 
about krill. Nicol found this surprising considering that the CCAMLR convention has been 
nicknamed the 'krill' Convention: "there is no evidence from the reports that CCAMLR 
41 Takesi Nagata, "The Implementation ofthe Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources: Needs and Problems", in Francisco Orrego Vicufia, Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal, 
and Political Issues, Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1983, p.l25. 
42 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.143-144. 
43 SC-CAMLR-III, 9.7, p.30. 
44 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.l44. 
45 SC-CAMLR-XI, 6.9, p.60. 
46 SC-CAMLR-VU, 2.9, p.7. 
47 CCAMLR2000, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 12 (1989-1999), CCAMLR: Hobart, Australia, p.l9, and 
CCAMLR, CCAMLR Newsletter, 22, January 2001. 
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was striving to tackle this problem as a priority".48 One reason given for the Commission 
not focusing on krill was that because some stocks of finfish had declined catastrophically 
in abundance, and other stocks were in danger of overexploitation, attention was being 
focused on that problem. Although there was a commercial catch for krill, estimates of the 
krill stock were around two orders of magnitude greater than the catches from 1982 to 
1985, and it was not perceived as a pressing problem at that time. This lack of urgency 
may explain why it took so long to convene a working group for krill. 
Graph 1 
Euphausia superba catch in CCAMLR Statistical Subareas 1990-199949 
I 0 481 [J 482 11483 III 58* m 88* I 
250000 
200000 
150000 
100000 
50000 
In 1988 the Commission agreed to establish a permanent Working Group on Krill (WG-
Krill).50 The following year the problem of uncertainty was discussed. 51 The issue at that 
time was whether the krill catch should be restricted to current levels. Some members 
expressed reservations that this action would be premature at this stage. Other members 
thought that a general policy of setting T ACs in some areas would minimise exploitation. 
The focus of this discussion was Subarea 48.3, where the krill fishing was at that time 
48 Stephen Nicol, "Management of the Krill Fishery: Was CCAMLR Slow to Act?", Polar Record, 28 (165), 
1992, p.155. 
49 CCAMLR 2000, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 12 (1989-1999), CCAMLR: Hobmt, Australia, p.1 09. 
50 CCAMLR-VII, 55, p.14. 
51 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 2.29, p.lO. 
112 
focused, due to the concentrations of krill which can be harvested there. 52 In 1990 WG-
krill was unable to estimate krill biomass in 48.3 and therefore unable to estimate potential 
yield. 53 The following advice was given: 
In the light of the uncertainties outlined above, and in the absence of any reliable 
estimate of potential yield of krill in Subarea 48.3, the Scientific Committee 
recommended that the Commission consider imposing precautionary measures for 
limiting krill fishing in Subarea 48.3. 54 
Japan, USSR and Korea did not think this course of action was justifiable yet.55 There was 
still no management advice, and opinions differed as to whether or not regulation should 
begin. 56 The argument here was on what action was most appropriate when there was a 
lack of information to base decisions on. Some members felt that catch limits were needed 
to limit the uncontrolled expansion of a fishery. Catch limits had been used in other 
organisations, such as the Northwest Atlantic Fisheries Organisation (NAFO).57 The 
fishing states opposed this, arguing that the krill fishery had stayed at the same level since 
1986. Australia and New Zealand expressed their strong disappointment: 
Krill was by far the largest fishery in the Convention Area and its development had 
been a key factor prompting the negotiation of the Convention. It was therefore a 
matter of deep concern that in its nine annual meetings since the Commission 
commenced operation, it had not been possible to secure the cooperation of the 
maj or fishing members for the adoption of any measure directed at the conservation 
of krill. 58 
The following year the "Commission endorsed the advice of the Scientific Committee that 
reactive management - the practice of taking management action when the need for it has 
become apparent - is not a viable long-term strategy for the krill fishery.,,59 
Summary 
Passing any conservation measures in the 1980s was difficult for CCAMLR due to the 
requirement for consensus combined with the fact that "anything proposed has to pass the 
52 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 2.48, p.14. 
53 SC-CAMLR-IX, 2.73-2.74, pp.16-17. 
54 SC-CAMLR-IX, 2.76, p.17. Emphasis in the original. 
55 CCAMLR-IX, 8.3 and 8.7, p.28. 
56 CCAMLR-IX, 4.14-4.16, p.8. 
57 CCAMLR-IX, 8.8, pp.28-29. 
58 CCAMLR-IX, 8.12, p.29. 
59 CCAMLR-X, 6.13, p.16. 
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closest scrutiny by Members with fishing interests, who tend to have a traditional 
resistance to the imposition of any restrictions.,,6o Fortunately CCAMLR was established 
before the krill fishery was in a position to affect the sustainable yield. In the long term 
krill will be of more concern than finfish stocks because krill plays a more central part in 
the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. "The Commission will ultimately be judged on its 
ability to manage its largest and most basic resource - krill - and in this regard it must act 
promptly.,,61 Fishing nations asserted that krill management should be based on 
scientifically formulated assessments and rejected the use of historical catch levels as a 
basis for setting current and future limits as unscientific.62 This reveals how important the 
role of science was in shaping what conservation measures were possible within the 
CCAMLR decision-making process. As scientific understanding improved the chances of 
precautionary measures being implemented increased. However, in the 1980s the 
conservation provisions made by CCAMLR were not tested by real pressure. 
Participation in the CCAMLR Regime 
The issue of participation in the CCAMLR regime IS an important one. Externally 
CCAMLR seeks both recognition as the legitimate authority, and compliance with that 
authority. The issue of participation was important during the negotiations of CCAMLR, 
the accession of the Economic Community, and the slow acceptance of NGO observers at 
the meetings. 
CCAMLR negotiations and the need for external recognition 
Participation was a spur to the development of CCAMLR, when interest from the United 
Nations Environment Program (UNEP) , the FAO, and non-ATS members grew in the 
Southern Oceans and in a sense threatened the control of the ATCPs over Antarctica.63 In 
order for the ATCPs to retain their dominance of Antarctic affairs they had to secure 
external recognition for their new Convention. The provisions for limited active 
60 J. P. Croxall, I. Everson, and D. G. M. Miller, "Management of the Antarctic Krill Fishery", Polar Record, 
28 (164), 1992, p.64. 
61 Stephen Nicol, "CCAMLR and its Approaches to Management of the Krill Fishery", Polar Record, 27 
(162), 1991, p.236. 
62 J. P. Croxall, I. Everson, and D. G. M. Miller, op. cit., p.65. 
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participation, combined with the secret and closed CCAMLR negotiations, caused some 
criticism: "the Consultative Parties appeared guilty of assuming a somewhat arrogant 
attitude when dealing with a subject possessing significant implications for the wider 
world.,,64 
James Barnes thought that the Convention might be unacceptable to some non-ATCPs 
"primarily because it essentially requires acceding nations to accept the de facto control of 
the Antarctic Treaty Parties over many decisions concerning the Antarctic continent and 
surrounding waters.,,65 Matthew Howard thought that CCAMLR might strengthen the 
claim that the ATS members are looking after Antarctica for everyone, but: "Such a claim 
is sustainable only if the CCAMLR Regime is seen to be working properly and affording 
the environment adequate protection. ,,66 
When CCAMLR was negotiated it was unusual for fishery conservation agreements to 
include as members states that were not interested in exploiting the resource. All of the 
original participants of the IWC were actually engaged in whaling, even if many of them 
later came to adopt a conservationist stance. Edwards and Heap observed that "For a state 
whose interest is restricted to conservation, to be a member of such organizations is 
exceptional.,,67 This is no longer the case today and participation by conservation minded 
states is no longer exceptional in multi -lateral agreements dealing with resources and the 
environment. The Antarctic sovereignty claims issue meant that there were non-fishing 
states involved in the negotiations, which made the creation of CCAMLR in the shape it 
eventually took more probable. This was because the Convention was a way of 
strengthening the protection that the Antarctic Treaty gave to sovereignty claims. This may 
also have strengthened the conservationist nature of CCAMLR.68 While there has been 
criticism of the advantage gained by the initial CCAMLR members it should be 
remembered that the fishing states have agreed to restrict their rights to exploiting the 
resources. As for the conservationist member states: "the Convention requires it to embark 
on the morally dangerous path of being its brother's keeper - and to pay for the 
63 Matthew Howard, op. cit., p.III. 
64 P. J. Beck, op. cit., p.229. 
65 James N. Barnes, op. cit., pp.239-240. 
66 Matthew Howard, op. cit., p.l05. 
67 David M. Edwards and John A. Heap, op. cit., p.359. Emphasis in the original. 
68 J. A. Heap, "Antarctic Sovereignty: A Source of Stress", in R.A. Hall, H.R. Hall, and M.G. Haward, 
Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change?, Tasmanian Government Printer: Hobart, 1990, p.l85. 
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privilege.,,69 Other states that want to take part may be inclined to join in order to avoid 
irregularities and friction developing between them and the CCAMLR members. 
CCAMLR was generally successful in gaining early external recognition and is considered 
to be in conformity with UNCLOS as a regional fisheries agreement.70 The ecosystem 
approach "is part of the basis for the F AO' s recognition of the Consultative Parties' legal 
authority regarding protection of the Antarctic ecosystem.,,71 This forestalled the F AO 
becoming more significantly involved in the region. This was counted as a success for the 
ATS regime and its effectiveness. The F AO eighteenth annual conference made an express 
statement of recognition, and the F AO fisheries committee desisted from pursuing a 
parallel effort.72 CCAMLR invited the F AO to attend meetings as an observer, which has 
happened on an irregular basis. 
In 1984 the Commission Chairman stated that "we would hope that countries and bodies 
which are not yet associated with CCAMLR will recognise the merits of the Convention 
and the desirability of supporting the regime it will establish. We must continue to 
encourage participation in our work by all countries which are active or interested in 
Antarctic marine resources.,,73 The CCAMLR members know that the eyes of the world 
have remained on them since then. In 1985 the Scientific Committee Chairman noted that 
"the international community was watching the Scientific Committee critically for further 
positive steps towards conservation in support of the Convention by providing sound 
advice to the Chairman.,,74 For the most part CCAMLR has been successful over the years 
that followed. In 1992 Ambassador Penny Wensley noted that UNCED was deferring to 
the ATS in relation to Antarctica and that CCAMLR had anticipated by twelve years the 
principles of sustainable development. 75 In 1993 the IUCN said it was planning a 
resolution stressing the importance of CCAMLR. 76 
69 David M. Edwards and John A. Heap, op. cit. 
70 P. J. Beck, op. cit., p.233. 
71 Fernando Zegers, op. cit., p.151. 
72 ibid., p.152. 
73 CCAMLR-III, Chairmans Report, Annex C, 7, p.32. 
74 SC-CAMLR-IV, 3.9, pA. 
75 CCAMLR-XI, 1.9-1.10, p.2. 
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Funding issues of the CCAMLR regime 
During negotiations for the Convention there was a difference of view as to who should 
bear the weight of paying for the Commission: 
The harvesters argued that if non-harvesters were to be afforded a say in regulating 
the harvesting activities then they should pay substantially for the privilege. The 
non-harvesters argued that if the resource was worth harvesting then the harvesters 
should pay substantially for the privilege. 77 
This difference of view was not resolved in the Convention which stated in Article XIX (3) 
that for the first five years the contribution required from each member would be equal. 
After that point the contribution would depend on the amount harvested and an equal share 
from among all the Commission members. The exact proportion was to be determined by 
consensus. The Standing Committee on Administration and Finance (SCAF) was 
established at the second meeting of the Commission.78 The initial funding agreement was 
to expire 7 April 1987. In 1986 the Commission began working out the new formula for 
calculating the contribution required of each member. The harvesting members paid: 
USSR $A40,000, Japan $A9,000, Poland $A1,000, plus an equal share of the remainder 
from all members. 79 The funding formula was revised again in 1990, and the maximum 
possible contribution that a harvesting state could pay was fixed at 25%.80 In 1995 a 
consensus was not obtained on a new funding formula, with Japan reiterating its position 
that any new formula should not require excessive burdens on the contribution made by 
fishing nations.81 
In 1997 there was a Management Review of the secretariat. New Zealand noted that some 
key recommendations, including strategic planning and staff performance assessments had 
not been implemented.82 Spain reaffirmed its continued opposition to the issue of 
76 SC-CAMLR-XII, 12.26, p.74. 
77 Edwards, David M. and John A. Heap, op. cit., p.356. 
78 CCAMLR-II, 12-14, pp.2-4. 
79 CCAMLR-V, 33, p.7. 
80 CCAMLR-IX, 3.9-3.10, ppA-5. 
81 CCAMLR-XIV, 3.30, p.7. 
82 "It was disappointing ... to fmd that while many of the recommendations had been accepted and were 
being put into practice, the impression was created that the Executive Secretary had resiled from central 
proposals concerning strategic planning and staff management." Commission/or the Convention/or the 
Conservation 0/ Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR XVII: Hobart, 26 October - 6 November 
1998, Report o/the New Zealand Delegation, Antarctic Policy Unit: Wellington, November 1998, p.15. 
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performance criteria for the Executive Secretary.83 Germany made it clear that it normally 
pursues the objective of a nominal zero growth of budget in all international organisations, 
but was willing to accept change in the budget due to the importance of the Catch 
Documentation scheme.84 The current budget of the Commission is approximately $A 
2,000,000.85 
On the whole the funding issue has not been crucial to the performance of CCAMLR. The 
budget has been kept at a level that allows the Secretariat to function effectively at its 
present level of commitments, without the member governments complaining about the 
cost. At times CCAMLR appears to have operated off a financial surplus produced by 
contributions from new members, however the number of new members has declined since 
the 1980s. The contribution requirement may be a deterrent to further expansion of 
membership, but this requirement was needed for the fishing members to feel comfortable 
that their IWC experience would not be repeated. There were financial difficulties in 1999 
due to the timing of payment of Members' contributions.86 The contribution formula was 
carried forward to 2000 and further development was left to intersessional 
correspondence.87 An increasing workload potentially leads to increasing costs, it has been 
recognised however that for maintaining centralised databases, information repositories, 
and data management that the CCAMLR Secretariat is more efficient than having the 
services maintained by individual members. 88 
European Community participation in the CCAMLR regime 
The European Economic Community (EEC), now the European Union (EU), was treated 
as a member of the Commission at the first meeting of the Commission, although some 
questions were raised at the time.89 Article XXIX of the Convention allows regional 
economic integration organisations which include among its state members one or more 
members of the Commission which have transferred competence in the matters covered by 
83 CCAMLR-XVIII, 3.15-3.16, p.5. 
84 CCAMLR-XVIII, 3.21, p.6. 
85 The 1999 budget was for $A 2,002,200, of which translation costs were $A 277,900, CCAMLR-XVII, 
SCAF Report Appendix II, "Review of the 1998 Budget, Budget for 1999, and Forecast Budget for 2000", 
pp.8-9. 
86 CCAMLR-XVIII, 3.5-3.12, ppA-5. 
87 CCAMLR-XVIII, 3.13, p.5. 
88 CCAMLR-XIV, 4.25, pp.12-13. 
89 CCAMLR-I, 8-11, p.2. See also, Chapter 3, p.73. 
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the Convention. The EEC was involved because of the common fishing policy (CFP) 
which its members had developed. The EEC participated in CCAMLR because it was seen 
as an international fishing agreement. At the time CCAMLR was signed the transfer of 
legal authority with regard to environmental protection to the EEC from its member states 
was not complete.9o The mechanics of its participation were left vague.91 The role played 
by the EEC in the Commission has become more salient over time. 92 
NGO Observers 
The level of access e~oyed by observers at CCAMLR meetings differs from that of 
members. At the end of each meeting the Commission extends an invitation for attendance 
to the next meeting. This invitation is not always taken up, for example the IUCN has not 
attended every meeting. Some observers are invited to improve the quality of the scientific 
information available to the Scientific Committee and the Commission. While CCAMLR 
has readily accepted observers from other international organisations from its very first 
meeting, and has invited states to participate as observers, it took time for some 
environmental NGOs to gain admittance. Some disappointment was expressed over the 
rules on observers at the first meeting. 93 
ASOC and Greenpeace first applied to the Commission for observer status in 1983. The 
Commission was hesitant about including these groups as observers, unsure of their 
commitment to the Convention.94 The Commission preferred to work with the umbrella 
organisation of ASOC rather than individual organisation like Greenpeace. In 1984 the 
Commission preferred "to entertain further only ASOC's request for observer status on the 
grounds that it purported to be a representative organization composed of a number of 
component bodies. ,,95 The Commission noted that "ASOC was not able to predict the 
90 Josyane Couratier, "Regime for the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources", in Francisco 
Orrego Vicuna, Antarctic Resources Policy: Scientific, Legal, and Political Issues, Cambridge University 
Press: Cambridge, 1983, p.148. 
91 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.256. 
92 See Chapter 5, pp.217-220 for detail about the role of the European Commission in the late 1990s. 
93 CCAMLR-I, 16, p.3. 
94 CCAMLR-II, 43, p.14. "It was agreed that the Executive Secretary write to both organisations requesting 
information as to their ability to contribute to the objectives of the Commission." 
95 CCAMLR-III, 55, p.13. In 1985 the Commission did not take up on a new request from Greenpeace 
International for observer status. CCAMLR-IV, 51, p.17. In 1988 Another request was received from 
Greenpeace International but the Commission was not prepared to grant it observer status at this time. 
CCAMLR-VII, 160, p.43. Another Greenpeace application was rejected on the grounds Greenpeace was part 
of ASOC. SC-CAMLR-IX, 9.16-9.17, p.60. Some members accepted that this could change in the future, 
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contribution it could make to the work of CCAMLR. ,,96 Questions arose as "the 
Commission would not wish to conclude an agreement to accord observer status to an 
organization which was not willing to accord the same degree of support for the principles 
and objectives of the Convention as is inherent in membership of the Commission or 
accession to the Convention.,,97 While acknowledging that ASOC could be a good channel 
of communication, ASOC was asked for its unequivocal support for the principles of the 
Convention. 
Without making any commitment the Commission began formulating the conditions that 
would apply to ASOC if they were granted observer status.98 The Commission still had 
reservations about "the adherence of the member organizations of ASOC to the principles 
and purposes of the Convention ... its durability as an organisation ... [and] how 
communication between the Commission and the member organisations of ASOC would 
work in practice. ,,99 In 1986 the request from ASOC was considered again. While there 
was widespread support for establishing an agreement with ASOC a consensus could not 
be reached. IOO The possibility of the question of ASOC attendance at the sixth meeting 
being decided on an ad hoc basis between meetings was agreed. lOl No consensus was 
forthcoming in 1987 and several delegations expressed their regret and belief that ASOC 
would be of assistance. 102 
In 1988 ASOC was admitted an observer to that meeting of the Commission, but not the 
Scientific Committee. I03 One of the conditions was that "ASOC will at all times respect the 
confidentiality of the discussions at private sessions of the Commission and will not make 
them public."lo4 In 1989 ASOC requested to be allowed to observe the Scientific 
Committee, and the Scientific Committee referred the matter to the Commission, which 
then referred the matter back to the Committee. lOS In 1990 Japan would not accept ASOC 
but one delegation pointed out that Greenpeace had acted outside the law. CCAMLR-IX, 15.3-15.9, ppA6-
47. In 1998 Greenpeace was at least able to access the margins of the meeting through ASOC, and hosted its 
own dinner trip around the Hobart harbour for delegates (personal notes). 
96 CCAMLR-III, 56, p.14. 
97 CCAMLR-III, 58, p.14. 
98 CCAMLR-IV, 49, pp.16-17. 
99 CCAMLR-IV, 48, p.16. 
100 CCAMLR-V, 80, p.30. 
101 CCAMLR-V, 81-84, p.30. 
102 CCAMLR-VI, 126-127, pp.32-33. 
103 CCAMLR-VII, 153-156, ppAI-42. 
104 CCAMLR-VII, 153, pAl. See Chapter 5, pp.181-182 for details of problem in this area in 1998. 
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at the Scientific Committee on the grounds that the rules of procedure were inadequate, 
that it could undermine the confidentiality of data, and "as ASOC is a 'movement', the 
Scientific Committee would not benefit from the presence of an ASOC observer at the 
Committee.,,106 In 1991 Japan accepted ASOC as an observer at the plenary meetings of 
the Scientific Committee and ASOC agreed to the conditions set. 107 
In 1994 there was an extensive review of arrangements for inviting observers to CCAMLR 
meetings. lOS Rules were amended to differentiate between observers from acceding states 
and other observers. In 2000 an ASOC observer was allowed access to the Standing 
Committee on Observation and Inspection (SCOI) meeting. In general the NGOs improve 
the transparency of CCAMLR and its public accountability as the regime responsible for 
managing the Southern Ocean. There are limits to how far the transparency process can go, 
as the decisions that are made behind closed doors can be moved to other venues, perhaps 
switching from SCOI to the Heads of Delegation meeting. 109 
Membership growth 
At the first meeting the following states were members of the Commission: Argentina, 
Australia, Chile, France, German Democratic Republic, Federal Republic of Germany, 
Japan, New Zealand, South Africa, United Kingdom, United States, and the USSR. The 
EEC became a member of the Commission at the first meeting. Norway and Belgium, both 
original signatories, started attending at the second meeting. Poland became a Commission 
member by the 1984 meeting. Spain and Sweden acceded in 1984. India and the Republic 
of Korea acceded in 1985. Brazil, India, and the Republic of Korea joined the Commission 
as members, and Uruguay acceded in 1986. Spain became a Commission member in 1987. 
Canada acceded in 1988. Finland, Italy, and Peru acceded in 1989. Sweden and Italy 
became Commission members in 1990, the Netherlands acceded and GDR and FRG 
became Germany. In 1992 Ulaaine left the USSR and became an acceding member, while 
the Russian Federation replaced the USSR as Commission member. Bulgaria was present 
106 SC-CAMLR-IX, 9.10 p.59, and 9.15, p.60. 
107 SC-CAMLR-X, 1.9-1.11, pp.2-3. 
108 CCAMLR-XIII, 13.1-13.14, pp.57-60. 
109 Interview with Alan Hemmings, 22 November, 2000. 
121 
as an acceding state in 1992Yo In 1996 Uruguay became a member. Ukraine became a 
member of the Commission before the XIV Meeting. l11 Some ATCPs are not Members of 
CCAMLR, notably China and Ecuador. More commonly many NCPs are not Members of 
CCAMLR, such as Switzerland, Colombia, and Turkey. In the late 1990s the Commission 
began to actively invite third-party states to join in reaction to their involvement in IUU 
fishing, the first result being the accession of Namibia in 2000.112 
Third-party activity 
The lack of jurisdiction that CCAMLR has over the high seas has meant that the presence 
of third-party, or non-member states, always had the potential to create problems for the 
enforcement of CCAMLR conservation measures as the Convention is not legally 
enforceable on third-parties. Article XXII of the Convention allows for inconsistent 
activities to be discouraged but such efforts have to be within the United Nations Charter. 
Article XII requires members to notify the Commission of any activity contrary to the 
objectives of the Convention. Article X requires the Commission to inform the appropriate 
state of these activities. "By providing that activities which are contrary to that objective 
must, when they become known, be brought out into the open it goes far towards ensuring 
that pressure, if only of international public opinion, can be brought to bear on the 
miscreants.,,113 This watch-dog role gives the Commission some authority when it comes 
to enforcing the obligations of the Convention. 
As late as 1994 Karl-Hermann Kock was able to write that "No threat to the conservation 
of Antarctic marine living resources is currently posed by fishing operations of non-
Contracting parties or vessels reflagged to flags of convenience". 114 By 1997 the problem 
of flags of convenience was all too real. 115 Third-party states are less of a problem if the 
CCAMLR members, and the rest of the ATCPs, are united over the issue of IUU fishing. 
In this case the actions of CCAMLR member nationals are of great concern as they reduce 
the moral authority of the ATS. 
110 CCAMLR-XVII, 11.3, p.81. Bulgaria has fulfilled the requirements, but has not chosen to become a 
member of the Commission. 
III CCAMLR-XIV, 1.5, p.l. 
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The issue of participation is one that is affected by the 'Common Heritage of Mankind' 
arguments against the exclusive nature of the ATS 'club' of member states. These 
complaints were not targeted against CCAMLR in particular, but more the ATS as a 
whole. Although CCAMLR is responsible for resource exploitation, the marine fisheries of 
the Southern Ocean have attracted less attention than the hydrocarbon potential did when 
CRAMRA was being negotiated. His Excellency General Sir Phillip Bennet, Governor of 
Tasmania, in his opening address in 1990, commented on how CCAMLR was the only 
ATS component with resource responsibility. "Its success, therefore, in this area was of 
fundamental importance in convincing the world that the Treaty System was the only 
appropriate vehicle at present through which the region can be administered.,,116 
The current problem is one of dealing with third-party IUU fishing and gaining assistance 
from non-members, such as Namibia and Mauritius, to deal with that problem. Some ATPs 
are not members of CCAMLR. This has the potential to generate friction within the ATS if 
IUU harvested fish are transported through markets in ATPs that are not members of 
CCAMLR. External pressure on the ATS may also resurge if CCAMLR continues to 
ineffectively resolve the IUU and incidental mortality issues, but so far the consensus 
within the UN is holding. 
The Consensus System and the Decision-Making Procedures of CCAMLR 
The key principle on which the decision-making procedures of CCAMLR are based is the 
consensus system. The consensus system was required as a political safeguard due to the 
sovereignty claims issue in Antarctica. A key point here is that the "claimants were 
actually or potentially renouncing to the implementation of the Exclusive Economic Zone 
in Antarctica in order to join a scheme of joint jurisdiction to be managed through 
CCAMLR institutions.,,117 Other alternatives for decision-making were discussed, but 
unanimity could not be reached on the objections of some ATCPs. According to Barnes, 
Japan and the USSR accepted the move away from the MSY concept in part because they 
could control how the ecosystem standard was going to be implemented in the new 
116 CCAMLR-IX, 1.7, p.l 
117 Francisco Orrego Vicufia, "The Effectiveness of the Decision-Making Machinery ofCCAMLR: An 
Assessment", in Arnfinn J0rgensen-Dahl and Willy 0streng, The Antarctic Treaty System In World Politics, 
FridtjofNansen Institute: London, 1991, p.27. 
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regime. 1l8 The consensus rule accommodated the positions of the claimants and "it was 
also a procedure which coincided with the interests of fishing nations wishing to retain 
much of the discretion that they had e~oyed in the absence of the regime.,,119 While a 
majority rule based system might have been more effective in adopting conservation 
measures, it was not a system that was acceptable to the fishing nations, and would be 
potentially weaker in implementation than the consensus system. 
What consensus decision-making means 
There was confusion at the first meeting of the Commission about what consensus actually 
meant. 120 The Convention calls for consensus on substantive matters, not procedural ones. 
Consensus, unanimity, and veto have sometimes been used as interchangeable terms when 
discussing CCAMLR and its decision-making process. The Convention provides for 
consensus, not veto power as some have considered it. This derives from practice at the 
United Nations and during the UNCLOS negotiations. It involves an obligation of all 
parties to attempt to arrive at an agreement by all possible means, acting in good faith, 
seeking a compromise, and making every effort necessary to achieve that goal: "it entails a 
positive obligation, whereas veto power is only a negative right or power to oppose a 
settlement without stating one's reasons.,,121 If all negotiations to reach agreement have 
failed then the dissenting parties have to draw up a formal objection that states the grounds 
for that objection. Normally more than one state must be in opposition, when this does not 
occur the mechanism of entering reservations is applied, and the state will make an explicit 
reservation at the Commission as to how it will not be bound by the measure. 
Withholding consensus over a trivial matter would not be a lightly undertaken action. 
According to Felicity Wong: "New Zealand would have difficulty in practice vetoing a 
conservation measure for South Georgia. If we tried to, the other negotiators would tell us 
to go away and have a cup of tea.,,122 More serious consideration might be given to New 
Zealand if it was determined to block a conservation measure that applied to the Ross Sea. 
118 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.262. 
119 W. M. Bush, "The Antarctic Treaty System: A Framework for Evolution, The Concept of a system" in 
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While a harvesting state can withhold consensus in order to veto a conservation measure, 
or could prevent the conservation measure from applying to itself, there is a weak form of 
accountability provided by the fact that these actions will eventually become publicly 
known. The threat of a veto is likely to be more useful in the preliminary negotiations than 
its actual use at a late stage of the deliberations. 
Concern over sovereignty has diminished slightly over time, allowing the consensus 
system to take on a more technical role. 123 Consensus does not seem to have been a great 
problem in developing conservation measures for krill. Once discussion of management for 
krill started at the eighth meeting of the CCAMLR Commission in 1989 it was only three 
years before management action was taken. 124 However the 'absence of information' 
argument still had a lot of influence at CCAMLR meetings. 125 Sovereignty is still a major 
source of concern, especially with respect to the difficulties encountered over the 
assumption of coastal state jurisdiction by the UK. 126 
How consensus decision-making works in practice 
A special process has evolved for Commission meetings, which usually last for two weeks. 
This is usually the only time that all the Members are together to discuss the issues. 
Although membership in the Antarctic Treaty overlaps, it does not exactly match and the 
ATCM prefers to avoid discussion of CCAMLR business where possible. In 1997 the IUU 
fishing in the Southern Ocean was widely reported in the media during the XXI ATCM in 
Christchurch, but discussion of the IUU problem was restricted to the margins of the 
meeting. Meetings can also occur between interested Members at other times. The 
Commission has made use of ad hoc intersessional working groups when a difficult issue 
is not resolved at a CCAMLR meeting and the need for speed is felt. In general the bulk of 
the CCAMLR decision-making takes place at the annual Commission meetings, even if 
preliminary work takes place in other venues. 
123 Francisco Orrego Vicufia, op. cit., p.29. 
124 Stephen Nicol, "Management of the Krill Fishery: Was CCAMLR Slow to Act?", Polar Record, 28 (165), 
1992, p.156. 
125 Stephen Nicol, "CCAMLR and its Approaches to Management of the Krill Fishery", Polar Record, 27 
(162), 1991, p.235. 
126 See Chapter 5, note 376, p.221 for an example of this. 
125 
The Commission initially convenes in a plenary session to open the meeting, then goes into 
recess. During the recess SCAF, SCOI, and the Scientific Committee convene separately to 
discuss, debate, and finalise reports to be presented to the Commission. The Heads of 
Delegations generally attend the SCOI meeting, an indication of its level of importance. As 
is the case with such international meetings much significant discussion takes place in the 
'margins' of the meetings. In the second week the Commission reconvenes in plenary 
session to consider reports from the committees. The plenary session is also an opportunity 
for some delegations to make significant statements about the problems facing the 
Commission - in the late 1990s these statements largely concerned IUU fishing and 
sovereignty issues. The reports are discussed, proposed measures are considered, and the 
Commission takes action. 
Conservation measures are usually adopted in the following manner. First, the need for a 
measure is identified, often from a national background paper, an NGO, or the work of the 
Scientific Committee. Inspiration for new conservation measures usually originates in one 
or several delegations, which draft measures they think merit approval. In the situations 
where more than one delegation circulates a similar measure the best ideas from each are 
usually combined into one measure. Conversely, unpractical ideas are eliminated, or 
directed to intersessional work. The sponsoring delegation drafts a formal proposal and 
circulates it informally to other delegations to solicit unofficial reactions. This process 
allows a sponsoring delegation to get a sense of whether their measure might be approved 
or be abandoned. Timing is an important consideration in getting a measure to be the main 
draft text under discussion. 
If an unofficial measure is responded to well by the other delegations, then the measure 
goes to the Commission plenary for discussion. Comments are made on the proposal and 
the language may be redrafted. Anything official requires translation into the four official 
languages of CCAMLR: English, Spanish, French, and Russian. This takes time to carry 
out, and the late arrival of reports required from the delegations can hamper the work of 
the Scientific Committee or the Commission.127 Delegations have been known to insist on 
waiting for a translation in their language before allowing discussion or decision-making 
127 Comments were made about this problem at the Fourth Meeting, SC-CAMLR-IV, 3.6, p.3, and at 8.l7, 
p.43. 
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on a measure to proceed any further. 128 Even the punctuation of a measure may be subject 
to negotiation and amendment. Once a measure reaches the Commission it has usually 
secured informal approval from all delegations and achieved the consensus necessary for 
adoption. 
If objections are voiced against a measure then it may be implemented as a resolution,129 
left for further consideration until the next meeting, or established as an objective for 
active consideration through intersessional work and meetings. The Scientific Committee 
utilises many ad hoc or Standing Working Groups that meet on a regular intersessional 
basis. All members are able to nominate experts to such groups, because the members 
interested in fishing did not want to be vulnerable to an adverse report from a working 
group.130 Working groups are a factor in the effectiveness of the Scientific Committee and 
the Chairs of these groups can be quite influential. Some ad hoc groups become 
established as standing working groups if it becomes apparent that their work is ongoing, 
others are disestablished when their work is completed. 
Summary 
The consensus system made CCAMLR possible; without it there would be no CCAMLR 
and no conservation measures covering the bulk of the Southern Ocean ecosystem. 131 It is 
difficult to measure the performance of the CCAMLR regime by counting the number of 
conservation measures that have been adopted, despite the difficulties of the consensus 
decision-making procedure. While only a small number of conservation measures were 
adopted in the first ten years of CCAMLR, compared with the larger number of 
conservation measures adopted since 1991, it is difficult to determine exactly how many 
measures have been stillborn before reaching the Commission. The consensus system has 
worked reasonably well for the ATS to date, but CCAMLR has had the additional 
stumbling block of resource exploitation and commercial interest, something the Antarctic 
Treaty is now facing with the growth of Antarctic tourism. The increase in the number of 
conservation measures is partially due to the external pressure caused by IUU fishing, and 
128 SC-CAMLR-IV, 17.2-17.4, pp.53-54. In 1985 problems were encountered with translating technical 
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the internal resolution of institutional organisation problems, rather than any change in 
how the consensus system is interpreted by the Parties. 
The Role of Scientific Advice: The Relationship Between the Commission and the 
Scientific Committee 
The Commission and the Scientific Committee were the first permanent bodies established 
by the ATS regime (SCAR having preceded the Antarctic Treaty), and the development of 
the relationship between the two bodies of the Convention was a long and involved one. 
Problems were encountered in establishing this relationship in the early meetings, with 
ongoing difficulties in data submissions, and finding a way of incorporating scientific 
advice into the decision-making of the Commission. The basic test of the relationship 
between the Commission and Scientific Committee as formulated by James Barnes was: 
(1) whether it facilitates the best possible advice in terms of scope, relevance, 
precision, timeliness and impartiality, (2) whether it makes use of all sources of 
data and scientific expertise, and (3) whether it provides for good communication 
between the management body, the scientific advisers, and the public. 132 
Early assessment of the relationship 
Barnes was pessimistic in his assessment of CCAMLR at the time it was negotiated for a 
variety of reasons. The Scientific Committee lacked the appropriate power for sound 
decision-making about harvesting levels, there was no agreement on how 
recommendations would be adopted, the Committee lacked the power to undertake its own 
research, and the Commission could control the budget through consensus. Research is 
based on national research programs, not the CCAMLR secretariat. "No delegation was 
willing to expend political capital to assure that the Scientific Committee had the power, 
staff, funding, and independence that arguably would be required to furnish advice 
grounded in fact and risk assessment, instead of economics and politics."l33 Barnes 
believed that the Convention was adequate on opening data to the public and gIVIng 
pUblicity to the Scientific Committee's recommendations. 134 
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A different set of views were presented by Edwards and Heap. They argued that the degree 
of independence between the Commission and the Scientific Committee was not such that 
the Commission can disregard the advice of the Committee. The Commission has to take 
"full account" of advice and recommendations and to publish the advice given and 
conservation measures adopted. The Scientific Committee does have some degree of 
independence from the Commission. Article XIII (6) allows the Commission to establish 
subsidiary bodies - which is useful if the Scientific Committee is to deal with technical 
problems. 135 
Takesi Nagata identified five major problems that CCAMLR, and the Scientific 
Committee, had to solve in order to implement the Convention. These were: 
(1) Inventory of activities and information. 
(2) Review of the state of the ecosystem and modelling of Antarctic ecosystem. 
(3) Identification of research needs and gaps in present knowledge. 
(4) Management goals. 
(5) CCAMLR data base. 136 
Successfully implementing effective management goals requires the resolution of the other 
problems. CCAMLR made use of information developed by programs that were under way 
before CCAMLR, such as the BIOMASS research program, which was implemented by 
SCAR. A great deal of work remained to be done, and some crucial elements were yet to 
be completed twenty years later. There were no easy answers due to the harsh conditions in 
the Southern Ocean region and the limitations of scientific methods. 
Reports - problems of the early meetings 
At the early CCAMLR meetings there was a deadlock about the role of the Scientific 
Committee. "The manner in which these institutional arrangements worked out in practice 
during the early period of the implementation of CCAMLR was disastrous.,,137 Some 
Commission members viewed the Scientific Committee as a political body, an 
interpretation which would mean that there was no independent scientific advice and that 
the entire regime would respond to national interests. 138 One issue at the first meeting was 
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the difficulty experienced in the election of the chair and vice-chair of the meeting. The 
other issue regarded the decision-making of the Scientific Committee. 139 Rule 17 of the 
Temporary Rules of Procedure was replaced with "Decisions should be taken according to 
the Convention.,,140 Because of these diversions the amount of discussion on the program 
of work was limited to calling for an inventory of existing data and programs, and an 
inventory of existing logbooks and proposals for a common format. 141 
CCAMLR Article XVI refers to "minority reports" which implies the adoption of 
"majority reports" without the use of the consensus decision-making procedure. The USSR 
insisted on a consensus based decision-making procedure, and this was finally accepted as 
a requirement for the adoption of reports in the Scientific Committee. Howard explained 
the motivation for this: "Member States which supported consensus voting for the 
Scientific Committee seem to have been fearful that they would be left vulnerable if they 
did not have an effective veto.,,142 However, this does not prevent non-consensus scientific 
views from being aired as all the views expressed at the Scientific Committee are included 
in the final report. 143 
No unanimous agreement was reached on the rules of procedure in intersessional work 
between the first and second meetings of the Commission. They were subsequently 
adopted at the second meeting after Rule 17 was amended and the following was added to 
Rule 21 "The Commission shall take full account of the Reports of the Scientific 
Committee.,,144 At the second meeting of the Scientific Committee the "urgent need to 
provide timely scientific advice to the Commission was emphasised by many members.,,145 
The main areas of discussion were: information and data, research requirements, 
management goals, and other matters. 146 The formation of ad hoc intersessional working 
139 ibid., pp.117-122. 
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groups was considered. One decision reached here was that "all members could nominate 
experts to attend the meeting,,147 of any working group - the members interested in fishing 
were again making sure they had input at all stages of discussion. Working groups were 
considered for: fish stocks, krill, dependent and related species, data collection, and 
ecosystem management. No krill working group was considered necessary at that time due 
to the existing BIOMASS program. 148 There was a general sense of caution towards 
establishing permanent subsidiary bodies in case they duplicated work already being done 
by the Scientific Committee, or the CCAMLR Secretariat. 149 
The institutional relationship between the Scientific Committee and the Commission did 
change and this had a direct connection to changing attitudes about conservation 
measures.
I50 This was in part due to a change in the use of consensus. In the Scientific 
Committee consensus began to be used as a technical device to harmonise views on the 
scientific conclusions. "This is a context in which consensus operates very differently from 
the paralysing effects that a simple veto could have had.,,151 The relationship between the 
Commission and the Scientific Committee was slowly built up. In 1987 the Scientific 
Committee requested guidance from the Commission about management policy: "The 
Committee has difficulty in providing advice in the absence of clear decisions over the 
policy the Commission wishes to pursue".152 A range of possible measures were outlined: 
general policies; specific policies; strategies and tactics. 153 The Commission response was 
to begin taking on the decision-making role in "recognition that the Scientific Committee 
could not come up with a single, absolute scientific truth adopted by consensus but only 
with reasonably justified scientific alternatives.,,154 However, much work remained to be 
done on the relationship, and there was no great development in, or proliferation of, the 
conservation measures adopted by the Commission. 
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Data submission problems 
Article XX of the Convention obligates CCAMLR members to supply information to the 
Commission and Scientific Committee. The use of commercial data is an important 
consideration in this. Commercial data is kept in confidence when used in the various 
working groups of the Scientific Committee, even though the results derived from that data 
will be made public. Commercial data is often more readily available than scientific data as 
it is: "collected incidentally to an activity which is paying for itself.,,155 The problem is that 
with: "commercial data the CCAMLR Regime receives what the fishing members are 
prepared to supply.,,156 Any imbalance can be avoided by concentrating scientific research 
on those areas that will not be covered by commercial operations. Research is not a direct 
function of the Scientific Committee unless directed to by the Commission.157 The 
Commission has carried out its own research programs in the past, such as the krill 
synoptic survey conducted January-February 2000. 
Previous fishing statistics were gathered by the Scientific Committee, but not without some 
difficulty, as the information was often incomplete or in a non-standard form, such as 
being recorded in calendar years rather than the split seasons appropriate for the Southern 
Ocean summer fishing season.158 Howard noted that "the fishing nations have resisted 
vigorously the imposition upon them of information collection responsibilities.,,159 The 
fishing members preferred to submit a summary of their data, rather than the entirety of the 
raw data. In 1986 there were still gaps in the recent and historical records, with catches 
being reported as unidentified. One suggestion was that the inclusion of scientific 
observers on commercial vessels would help ensure correct identification. 160 
One debate in the Scientific Committee in the mid-1980s was over the need for 'fine-scale 
data'. Japan said that fine data was not necessary for the moment, while the USSR thought 
that processing the volume of data involved would be a burden for the Secretariat. 161 The 
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scale was then agreed at 0.5 0 latitude by 1.00 longitude over ten days.162 There were still 
problems in the supply of fine scale data in 1985, and the need for future data to be in fine 
scale was re-emphasised as it was difficult to determine conservation measure 
effectiveness without it. 163 The response from Japan was that "ifthere were deficiencies in 
the supply of data, the proper course would be to postpone decisions to encourage data 
submission.,,164 Based on the experience in Subarea 48.3 there were few difficulties in 
collecting fine date, and it should be collected in all statistical subareas. 165 Japan informed 
the Scientific Committee that domestic legislation meant that it could not submit such 
haul-by-haul data. 166 Other members were concerned that data submission requirements 
were being avoided because of domestic legal requirements. Some members stated that the 
obligations of Parties to the Convention took precedence over domestic law. 167 Despite 
these data submission problems WG-krill continued to make significant progress. The 
Scientific Committee agreed that the principles of management under uncertainty were 
being incorporated into the management approach for krill. 168 One problem revealed by the 
early data was that the krill fishery harvests krill in the same areas every year. 
A constant problem with data submissions is their late arrival for use by the working 
groups of the Scientific Committee.169 In 1986 only five of the member reports were 
submitted on time, eleven were late, and two were yet to arrive at the start of the 
meeting. 17o In 1987 ten reports were received on time, with a further seven being received 
before the start of the meeting. 171 Only papers received by the Secretariat before the start of 
the meeting would be considered. l72 Delegates were reminded that the deadline is when 
data should be received by, not when it needs to be mailed by. In 1988 the "Committee 
encouraged the Secretariat to enforce the deadlines for submission of documents for future 
meetings.,,173 This was still a problem in 1989.174 This is something which has become 
technically easier with the advent of improved access to electronic communication. 
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In 1987 the Chairman of the Scientific Committee noted that the workload of the Scientific 
Committee was continually increasing, and that close cooperation was required between 
members for efficient meetings. 175 In 1989 it was noted that the lack of a secretariat for the 
Antarctic Treaty made communication with the ATCM more difficult, and the need for 
more formal links was noted. 176 In 1987 the review of the long term program of work 
noted the apparent lack of effort to integrate national programs into the future framework 
of Scientific Committee activity. 177 
Decision-making problems 
In 1989 a review of data submission found that problems were still occurring with data 
submission, and that this was dividing the Scientific Committee as to what advice should 
be given to the Commission even though most members supported some form of protective 
measures. 178 This review was followed up in 1990 with a WG-FSA report on the topic of 
living with uncertainty and improving management advice for CCAMLR fish stocks. 179 
The lack of information that should have been provided in accordance with Article XX of 
the Convention had led to the adoption of Conservation Measures that were not sufficient 
to ensure stock recovery. "This has led to a lowering of the credibility of CCAMLR in the 
eyes of the public and a strong polarization of opinions inside CCAMLR.,,180 The 
requirements to submit data were not being fully complied with, and there were serious 
questions about the quality of the some of the data submitted. i8i Many delegations were 
concerned about this, especially for finfish. "One delegation pointed out that in 
implementing the Convention, the Commission had not achieved results commensurate 
with the level of effort and resources that had been applied both directly through 
CCAMLR activities and in national research programs in support of CCAMLR.,,182 
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The standard of certainty in the data being required by the fishing members before advice 
could be given to the Commission, was such as to indefinitely delay or block the 
implementation of effective conservation measures in the Convention Area. As the fishing 
nations were in a position to withhold the data required for certainty, advice was unlikely 
to be given if this data standard was maintained. "While increased scientific effort can 
reduce the uncertainty to some extent, particularly over a long time-scale, all the 
uncertainty cannot be eliminated, and in most practical considerations it is likely to remain 
considerable.,,183 Unless this impasse could be resolved CCAMLR was not going to 
develop into an effective regime. Denzil Millar made the point in relation to disagreements 
over ecosystem monitoring "that it is inadequate to offer reservations alone. What must 
also be provided is alternative, and presumably better, assumptions or indications of the 
extent to which the original assumptions may be in error.,,184 
CCAMLR-IX was the crucial meeting where this data issue was resolved. The 
conservation minded states brought pressure to bear on the fishing states by arguing how 
the lack of data should be dealt with and how the lack of advice from the Scientific 
Committee should be responded to. Several members believed that the lack of data causing 
uncertainty in scientific advice left no alternative but to act conservatively in adopting 
Conservation Measures. 185 
It was noted that the Commission is still obliged to make management decisions 
when the Scientific Committee has insufficient information to formulate advice. 
The Commission endorsed the principle that the absence of essential data should be 
taken into account when determining catch limits: in the absence of data, very 
conservative catch limits should be set. 186 
The decision-making at the Commission also attracted comment from the Scientific 
Committee because it appeared that the Commission was prepared to bypass the Scientific 
Committee entirely when making decisions about the management of the Southern Ocean: 
Dr Everson informed the Commission of deep concern expressed by members of 
the Scientific Committee regarding decisions taken by the Commission at the last 
meeting based on anecdotal evidence which was contrary to the advice provided by 
the Scientific Committee. 187 
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An exceptional personal statement was made by the WG-FAS convener Dr Karl-Hermann 
Kock: 
3. In previous years and in particular this year, however, we were increasingly 
faced with the situation that our advice was discredited or even ignored during 
informal discussions among Members of the Commission by simply stating that 
there was not enough scientific evidence for a particular advice without, however, 
qualifying other scientific information nor indicating what level of certainty is 
necessary for a particular advice to support this opinion. 
4. As convenor of the [WG-FSA], I would like to express my deep concern about 
that development taking place. I further think that I should protect my colleagues in 
the Working Group against what I feel are unsubstantiated statements. I would be 
glad to see these statements discussed in the Working Group or the Scientific 
Committee. I cannot accept, however, the present dislocation of the discussion into 
the Commission and I would like to draw the attention of the Commission to that. It 
puts not only unnecessary constraints on our work but has considerable implication 
for the credibility of the whole CCAMLR system. 188 
The problem with scientific advice not always being unequivocal was resolved when: "The 
Commission endorsed the view that it should regard the Scientific Committee as the source 
of the best scientific evidence available.,,189 The following year the Commission found that 
the: "Lack of data and the consequent uncertainty in the scientific advice leaves the 
Commission with no alternative but to act conservatively in adopting conservation 
measures.,,190 The UK opinion was that the fisheries should be closed until the data 
appears. At the Commission the fishing nations supported precautionary catch limits in 
principle but opposed them in practice due to lack of scientific justification. Nicol observed 
that "this latter day commitment to precautionary limits by the fishing nations seems a 
trifle duplicitous.,,19l 
Summary of the Commission - Scientific Committee relationship 
In 1983 Darry Powell referred to the two channels of advice, science and economics, and 
observed that the: "ecosystem and the fishing industry will to some extent be in 
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competition.,,192 There is no formal and explicit process in the Convention for the 
provision of economic advice, but delegations often include 'advisers'. For example, the 
New Zealand delegation in the late 1990s usually included two observers, one from an 
environmental group, the other from a fishing company. Scientific advice itself can not be 
relied on too strongly.193 Scientific consensus often takes time to achieve, and this 
consensus in itself does not prevent over-exploitation and the destruction of living 
resources. Advice can evolve over time as scientific standards change, such as the 
abandonment of the MSY harvesting strategy for new harvesting strategies. 194 "If the rate 
of development of the fishery is slow, then the urgency of gathering information and taking 
decisions will not be so great. If the rate increases, there will be a pressing need for 
information." 195 Without accurate information and models CCAMLR is placed in a 
reactive management system. Reports of the Commission, the Scientific Committee, and 
the various working groups, all had a common theme about the need for more research: 
"the provision of scientific advice and, in particular, firm recommendations, have been 
limited by the state oflmowledge of Antarctic marine living resources."l96 
Karl-Hermann Kock, in 1994, wrote that while it was "undeniable that scientific advice has 
carried much more weight in recent years ... what is not lmown is how much it has 
influenced the behaviour of the fishing nations.,,197 At the same time as an increase in the 
strength of scientific arguments there were dramatic changes in the Eastern Bloc, a 
substantial decline in catches of target species, and new economic constraints such as the 
removal of government subsidies that reduced some fishing efforts. With the benefit of 
hindsight, and in light of the rise of IUU fishing in the 1990s, it can be seen that while the 
scientific argument is stronger, the economic argument is still the stronger one. In 1994 
Elliott argued that the "Convention is a flawed conservation agreement. The Convention 
permits fishing activity unless it can be shown on the basis of scientific data that it should 
be controlled.,,198 Environmental NGOs have argued that this should be reversed, but 
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despite some progress the burden of proof still lies with those seeking to implement 
conservation measures, and the Commission members continue to reserve the right to 
ignore the Scientific Committee's advice. 199 
The Development of the CCAMLR Approach to Ecosystem Management 
There are two vital concepts to CCAMLR ecosystem management: the precautionary 
principle; and the ecosystem approach. A precautionary approach is where decisions 
should be taken that have a low risk of long-term adverse affects. This is important when 
working with uncertainty of information. An ecosystem approach attempts to minimise the 
risk of fisheries adversely affecting dependent and related species. Due to the difficulty of 
regulating a large and complex marine environment, the CCAMLR ecosystem approach is 
to regulate human activities, such as fishing, so that deleterious changes in the ecosystems 
are avoided?OO 
The ecosystem objective was an ambitious one?Ol Implementation of the ecosystem 
standard was always going to require a commitment to support scientific research 
politically and financially, while exercising restraint over harvesting.202 This has not 
always happened, and some criticism of CCAMLR has been severe in this respect.203 
CCAMLR members have not always been eager to part with the data gathered by their 
fishing fleets. Inaccurate or incomplete information affects the quality of advice that can be 
given by the Scientific Committee. A difficulty with this objective is that there is no 
199 CCAMLR-XV, 8.26, p.37. In 1996 New Zealand observed that it "would continue to place the greatest 
importance on the advice of the Scientific Committee, but there would be occasions when the Commission 
wished to signal a message that would require a considered and careful look at what the Scientific Committee 
had proposed. This was in the context of a wholehearted, collective commitment to finding fair, responsible, 
timely and innovative answers to difficult and evolving situations." At the time New Zealand was accepting a 
reduction in the figure proposed by the Scientific Committee for a fishery TAC in Subarea 88.1188.2 from the 
Commission. 
200 Karl-Hermann Kock (ed), Understanding CCAMLR's Approach to Management, May 2000, 
http://www.ccamlr.org/EngJish/eyubs/e_app_to_manag/TEXT_finaLpdf, (site visited March 19,2001), 
p.9. 
201 Appendix II, Article II encapsulates the ecosystem approach. 
202 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.263. 
203 Mahinda Harischandra Parera, op. cit., p.217. "The emphasis placed on the ecosystem principle was 
largely a means to enhance the international image or prestige of ATCPs." 
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unambiguous interpretation of its key terms,204 what do terms like 'rational use' mean? 
Article II refers to time periods of two to three decades for a species to recover. Recovery 
periods are relative, and recovery may not be at all possible for some populations which 
are short-lived and annual species, like some finfish and squid with a highly variable 
recruitment rate (the rate at which new fish are added to the exploitable part of the 
population). If krill is harvested at the 'greatest annual net increment' then this may impact 
on the predator species, which implies that a lower level of harvesting krill should be an 
option. Another ecosystem consideration is the non-living factors, such as the nutrient 
cycle and energy flow of the system. The ecosystem approach is complex and different 
from single species approaches, involving a vast array of factors and their relationship to 
each other?05 
Serious discussion of management approaches started in 1984. "It was agreed that there 
was a need to consider Article II of the Convention in its entirety.,,206 The option 
considered most appropriate was: "to allow rationalise utilization of resources that have not 
been over-exploited, within levels which will ensure that any potential detrimental effects 
are reversible over two or three decades.,,207 In 1985 the Ad Hoc Working Group on 
Ecosystem Monitoring defined the objective of ecosystem monitoring as: 
To detect and record significant changes in critical components of the ecosystem, to 
serve as the basis for the conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. The 
monitoring system should be designed to distinguish between changes due to the 
harvesting of commercial species and changes due to environmental variability, 
both physical and biologica1.208 
In 1985 six indicator species were chosen as being the most useful indicators of food 
variability and three more were added in 1986?09 A permanent working group for the 
CEMP was to be established?lO Three areas were chosen for monitoring were, Prydz Bay, 
204 Marinelle Basson and John R. Beddington, "CCAMLR: The Practical Implications of an Eco-System 
Approach", in Arnfinn Jorgensen-Dahl and Willy 0streng, The Antarctic Treaty System In World Politics, 
FridtjofNansen Institute: London, 1991, p.55. 
205 Matthew Howard, op. cit., p.115. 
206 SC-CAMLR-III, 9.2, p.29. Emphasis in the original. 
207 SC-CAMLR-III, 9.10, p.32. 
208 SC-CAMLR-IV, 7.2, p.34. 
209 SC-CAMLR-IV, 7.4, p.35. Crabeater seal, Adelie penguin, Chinstrap penguin, Macaroni penguin, 
Antarctic fur seal, Minke whale. SC-CAMLR-V, 6.4, pp.30-31. Antarctic petrel, Black-browed albatross, and 
Euphausia crystallorophias. 
210 SC-CAMLR-IV, 7.17, p.39. 
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the Antarctic Peninsula, and South Georgia?l1 The predator parameters required enough 
sensitivity to detect changes, at least in the medium term of five to ten years.212 Prey 
monitoring focused mostly on Antarctic krill. The need for CEMP land sites to have 
protection was noted,213 and in 1990, Conservation Measure 18/IX 'Procedure for 
According Protection to CEMP' sites was adopted?14 By 1991 WG-CEMP had largely 
completed the structure and context of the system for acquiring and reporting data 
information on predators to the Secretariat.215 In 1994 WG-CEMP and WG-Krill were 
replaced by a new Working Group on Ecosystem Monitoring and Management (WG-
EMM)?16 
The key considerations of CEMP are whether a predator is affecting the availability of a 
prey species, and whether change in a predator's population is related to the availability of 
a fishery. This is done by monitoring selected species of seals and seabirds that are 
sensitive to changes in the environmental factors. The greatest focus is on krill as the 
principal food source of fish, seabirds, seals, and whales in the ecosystem of the Antarctic 
and Southern Ocean region. Currently scientists can tell what individual species are doing, 
but are still yet to discover the exact ecological links between different species. 
CEMP uses 'feedback management' approach to assess and adjust levels of harvesting so 
that desired conditions in the ecosystem can be maintained. This approach was considered 
more desirable by the Scientific Committee than a reactive management procedure?17 
Feedback management involves the continuous adjustment of conservation measures. In 
the interim while the feedback management system is being developed, a precautionary 
approach is desirable, and precautionary catch limits should be considered.218 Data gained 
by CEMP is used by the Scientific Committee to advise the Commission on how 
harvesting will affect the ecosystem. A more pragmatic reason for using CEMP data is that 
it justifies the resources invested in the program. Although CCAMLR is attempting to be a 
multi-species approach, in the past it has often been little more than an approach combined 
211 SC-CAMLR-V, 6.5, p.31. 
212 SC-CAMLR-VI, 7.5, p.42. 
213 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 5.44, p.39. 
214 CCAMLR-IX, 6.4, p.20. 
215 SC-CAMLR-X, 6.22, pp.47-48. 
216 CCAMLR-XIII, 3.15, p.8. 
217 SC-CAMLR-X, 3.56, p.14. "The Scientific Committee agreed that reactive management does not 
constitute a viable long-term strategy for management of the krill fishery and that the development of a 
feedback management procedure for krill should be a long term aim." 
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of single-species. By 1999 the Krill Yield Model (KYM) still needed further refinement. 
Establishing useful and precise parameter values is difficult. The Generalised Yield Model 
(GYM) has been applied to some finfish fisheries. 
Figure 3 
Simplified trophic relationships in the Southern Ocean219 
The management problem of the krill fishery would be resolved by successfully answering 
the question "how much krill can man annually catch in the Southern Ocean without 
disturbing the marine ecosystem there?,,22o An answer to the question depends on how the 
degree of disturbance caused by fishing activities is defined. A pure conservation 
definition would prohibit any fishing activities, which is not In keeping with the 
conservation objective ofCCAMLR to include 'rational use' of the resource. The degree of 
what is permissible depends on the "politicians and administrators who are responsible for 
the world economy.,,221 Most conventions adopt effective measures and research after a 
resource has been exploited, and the measures are implemented as damage control. There 
218 SC-CAMLR-X, 3.103, p.23. 
219 Karl-Hermann Kock (ed), op. cit., p.48. 
220 Takesi Nagata, op. cit., p.123. 
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is still some chance to avoid this with krill. "The critical indicator of CEMP's influence, 
however, will be in how much the program's findings influence decisions within the 
Commission - a consideration that ultimately depends on how much individual 
governments appreciate the validity of those findings. ,,222 
The Development of Conservation Measures 
This section covers the slow development of the conservation measure framework in the 
1980s. Rather than exhaustively listing all of the conservation measures it concentrates on 
key measures, general trends, and new developments. Early on the CCAMLR regime had 
great difficulty in establishing conservation measures, but by the early 1990s some of the 
obstacles had been overcome and a large number of conservation measures were being 
adopted . 
. Background: the structure of the Convention 
The structure within the Convention that can be used to develop and enforce conservation 
measures is deliberately ambiguous. Few formal prescriptions exist in the Convention. 
Article X (2) of the Convention spells out some of the possible measures that could be 
employed, but the range of sanctions in the Convention for ensuring compliance is meagre. 
Article XI (2) of the Convention requires the Commission to draw the attention of all 
parties to any activity of a Contracting Party that affects regime objectives, or compliance 
with regime obligations. Auburn argued that: "This, the only mechanism established by the 
Convention for dealing with infringements, cannot be seen as an effective sanction.,,223 
CCAMLR relies on voluntary compliance with conservation measures. Members are 
responsible for the legal aspects of enforcement, such as the imposition of penalties. As 
Kock observed: "the structure of CCAMLR is quite weak when it comes to the 
enforcement of its conservation measures. ,,224 The deliberate ambiguity in the enforcement 
provisions of the Convention was employed to avoid the potential conflicts over 
222 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.l29-130. 
223 F. M. Auburn, op. cit., p.232. 
224 Karl-Hermann Kock, "Fishing and Conservation in Southern Waters", Polar Record, 30 (172), 1994, 
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sovereignty?25 According to Watts it "is the underlying territorial, and thus jurisdictional, 
difference which explains the judgemental flexibility inherent in the requirement to take 
'appropriate' measures, and, even more so, the knowingly ambiguous phrase requiring the 
State to be acting 'within its competence. ,,226 
There is a time delay for Conservation Measures to enter into force. CCAMLR Article IX 
(6) allows ninety days for objections, and then the Conservation Measures become binding 
on all CCAMLR members after 180 days. Barnes felt that Article IX (6) was superfluous 
given the consensus voting requirement for the acceptance of conservation measures.227 
Edwards and Heap had a different opinion concerning the objection procedure: "Its 
necessary purpose is to enable governments to review the arrangements which their 
representatives have negotiated to see whether they are acceptable.,,228 There is a risk that 
governments could use this as an escape route to avoid unwanted conservation measures. 
This does not seem to have occurred so far during the operation of CCAMLR. If it ever did 
it would probably be easier for the objection procedure to be used again in the future: 
"Frequent use tends to undermine the conservation objectives of conventions which 
include this sort ofprocedure.,,229 
"The only point that is crystal clear is that no decision making procedure can, of itself, 
force a state to accept a conservation measure which it deems to be contrary to its vital 
interests.,,23o A decision reached by consensus is less likely to result in the objection 
provisions being invoked. Since 1988 conservation measures around South Georgia have 
been binding immediately, and individual members can choose to apply conservation 
measures immediately after theil.: adoption. The objection procedure, and the consent 
required to apply conservation measures in EEZ, have been criticised as a double or even 
triple veto. The objection procedure is related to the conservation-harvesting issue, while 
the EEZ application is a result of the undisputed sovereignty that is acknowledged for 
some Sub-Antarctic Islands?3! 
225 Matthew Howard, op. cit., pp.139-140. 
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France, and the other states claiming coastal state jurisdiction in the Convention Area, have 
taken care when exercising their rights under the convention not to appear to be eroding or 
otherwise weakening the effect of a conservation measure. France has stated that it 
reserves the right to impose conservation measures in its maritime zones that are stricter 
than those required by CCAMLR. The area where this has the most potential to cause 
trouble is around the disputed territory in the South Atlantic.z32 
The first conservation measures 
In 1984 at the third CCAMLR meeting the first two conservation measures were approved. 
These were Conservation Measure lIIII 'Closure of Waters Adjacent to South Georgia', 
and Conservation Measure 2/II1 'Mesh Size,.233 In 1985 Conservation Measure 3/IV 
'Prohibition of Directed Fishery on Notothenia rossii around South Georgia (Statistical 
Subarea 48.3)' was adopted. This was the first species specific measure. 
At the 1985 meeting three resolutions were also adopted for the protection of Notothenia 
rossii around South Georgia, the Peninsula and South Orkneys, and the Kerguelen 
Islands.234 The crucial difference between a resolution and a conservation measure is that 
the latter becomes binding on all CCAMLR members, unless they exercise the objection 
clause or express a reservation relating to sovereignty. Resolutions are not mentioned in 
the Convention. The adoption of a conservation measure or a resolution requires 
consensus, but because the resolution is not binding it can be easier to acquire consensus 
on a resolution than it is on a conservation measure. These resolutions generally request 
member states to take, or not take, an action. A resolution may also be adopted as part of 
ongoing discussions leading towards the eventual adoption of a conservation measure at a 
future meeting. 
In 1986 it was agreed that Conservation Measures lillI, 2/III, and 3/IV were to remain in 
force. 235 A feature of the early CCAMLR system was that conservation measures were 
usually renewed at each subsequent meeting. This was criticised on the grounds that it 
could reduce the effectiveness of conservation measures. In 1989 no consensus could be 
232 See Chapter 5, pp.220-222. 
233 CCAMLR-III, 47-49, pp.11-12. 
234 CCAMLR-IV, pp.10-11. 
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reached on the retention of Conservation Measure lIIII so it was not renewed?36 There was 
also no consensus on whether or not a review of mesh size (Conservation Measure 2/III) 
was needed?3? A counterpoint to this criticism is that it forces the Commission to review 
the measures in light of new information each year. The Commission does not appear to 
have reversed the implementation of any conservation measure once it has been 
implemented, without good reason. They have generally been reviewed and revised, or 
replaced and subsumed within a new measure. In 1992 it "was noted that conservation 
measures in force with no time limit are understood to be in force until revoked by the 
Commission.,,238 The system of referencing conservation measures was also noted as 
becoming unwieldy in 1992,239 but no change in the referencing has yet taken place. When 
amending or revising a conservation measure the amended measure has the convention 
meeting where it was amended replace the meeting code at which it was first adopted. 
Conservation Measure 7N 'Regulation of Fishing Around South Georgia (Statistical 
Subarea 48.3)' was an important measure because it demonstrated that the CCAMLR 
Members could adopt measures in a manner which was more effective than allowed by the 
strict requirements of the Convention. This measure allowed further conservation measures 
for Area 48.3 to be adopted and implemented immediately rather than waiting for the 180 
day period required for objections.24o One timing problem here is that fishing can take 
place around South Georgia in August and September, before any CCAMLR meeting can 
promulgate new measures. However, the Commission is able to apply some measures in 
retrospect, as happened with Conservation Measure 8/VI 'Limitation of the Total Catch of 
Champsocephalus gunnari in Statistical Subarea 48.3' which was deemed effective from 1 
July 1987 rather than from after the meeting. A different approach was adopted for the 
Peninsula area with a resolution being adopted which covered the interval until 
Conservation Measures 5N and 6N entered into force. 241 
The first precautionary conservation measures began to occur in the mid-late 1980s. In 
1987 Conservation Measure 8/VI applied a TAC of 35,000 tonnes in the 1987/88 season to 
236 CCAMLR-VIII, 76, p.21. 
237 CCAMLR-VIII, S2, p.23. The measure remained in force. 
238 CCAMLR-XI, 9.5, p.2l. 
239 CCAMLR-XI, 15.1, p.49. 
240 CCAMLR-V, 4S, p.1S. 
241 CCAMLR-V, 4S, p.1S. Resolution 4IV Protection ofNotothenia rossii in the Peninsula Area (Statistical 
Subarea 4S.l) and Around South Georgia (Statistical Subarea 4S.2). 
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C. gunnari in Area 48.3. This was significant for being the first catch limitation measure 
adopted by the Commission. Another precautionary approach was to prohibit fishing for 
part of a future season, which was done with Conservation Measure 10NI 'Prohibition of 
Directed Fishery on Champsocephalus gunnari in Statistical Subarea 48.3 from 1 April 
until 1 October 1988'. Conservation Measure 9NI 'Catch Reporting for Champsocephalus 
gunnari in Statistical Subarea 48.3', was to help the ability of the Scientific Committee to 
determine the future catch limits for that species by increasing the requirements for data 
submission. In accordance with Conservation Measure 7 N these measures became 
effective immediately. One of the earliest indications of the potential effectiveness of 
conservation measures was in 1987 when it was noted that "a far greater quantity [of C. 
gunnari] could have been landed if restrictions had not been placed on the fleets in line 
with last year's undertaking.,,242 Some consideration of the interests of the ecosystem 
rather than those of the fishing industry was shown with the 1989 Resolution 5NIII 
'Protection of Seabirds from Incidental Mortality Arising from Longline Fishing' 
encouraged the development of techniques to minimise incidental mortality. 
An era of expansion of conservation measures 
The 1990 meeting adopted ten new conservation measures and the 1991 meeting adopted 
fifteen new conservation measures. This signified that CCAMLR had entered a period in 
which its processes were capable of adopting a number of conservation measures, breaking 
the deadlocks that had existed in the 1980s?43 A large number of conservation measures 
were passed that expanded the range of measures taken by CCAMLR. Conservation 
Measure 27/IX was a complete prohibition of directed fishing for finfish in Statistical 
Subareas 48.1 and 48.2 for the 1990/91 Season. Conservation Measure 291X for the 
minimisation of the incidental mortality of seabirds in the course of longline fishing or 
longline research in the Convention Area introduced many requirements for fishing 
vessels, such as sinking hooks, no trash dumping at sea, and placing streamer lines. 
Conservation Measure 301X prohibited net monitor cables from the 1994/95 Season. 
Conservation Measure 311X requires notification that Members are considering initiating a 
242 CCAMLR-VI, 47, p.13. 
243 Francisco Orrego Vicuna, "The Regime of Antarctic Marine Living Resources", in Francesco Francioni, 
and Tullio Scovazzi (Eds), International Law for Antarctica, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1996, 
p.141 "This evolution evidences that the problem did not lie with voting arrangements per se, but with the 
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146 
new fishery. Conservation Measure 351X placed a catch limit of 3,500 tonnes on D. 
eleginoides in Statistical Subarea 48.3 for the 1991/92 Season. Conservation Measure 371X 
required an effort and biological data reporting system for D. eleginoides in Statistical 
Subarea 48.3 for the 1991/92 Season, and a failure to provide the data would see the 
fishery closed, although this would take a month to implement. 
The 1991 Resolution 81X 'Protection of the Seal Islands CEMP Site' was followed up in 
1992 with Conservation Measure 62IXI 'Protection of the Seal Islands CEMP Site'. 
Resolution 10IXII in 1993 responded to concerns about the harvesting of straddling stocks, 
which is important as the Patagonian toothfish is a straddling stock near the Prince 
Edward, and Crozet islands, and krill around the Kerguelen Islands. Despite a new global 
agreement the problem with straddling stocks being caught on the high seas remains a 
concern.244 
In 1998 the Commission addressed the issue of the timing of the CCAMLR year. The 
requirement for Members to license vessels to fish in the Convention Area was resulting in 
a period immediately following the Commission meeting when fishing could not take place 
due to the need for licenses to be issued consistently with domestic legal requirements. The 
Commission endorsed a new CCAMLR fishing year, beginning on 1 December of a year 
and ending on 30 November of the following year, except for a transition year from 7 
November 1998 to 30 November 1999?45 
215 conservation measures were adopted by the Commission in the period from 1982 to 
2000. The number of conservation measures in force in 2000/2001 was sixty-one. Twenty-
five of these measures are in force indefinitely. Eleven of the measures are indefinite but 
with a trigger for review by the Commission. Three of the other measures will expire by 
the end of 2001, with the remaining twenty-two measures expiring by the end of 2001 and 
but they can also be triggered to expire earlier if for example a by-catch or TAC level is 
reached. In the same period sixteen resolutions have been adopted by the Commission and 
there are six resolutions in force indefinitely. A significant proportion of these measures 
244 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.143. 
245 CCAMLR-XVII, 9.1-9.2, p.35. 
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and resolutions were directed at resolving the problems of IUU fishing and incidental 
mortality of seabirds?46 
Development of a quota system for CCAMLR 
The quota issue is one that is linked to the risk of overcapitalisation of a fishery leading to 
an excess capacity for harvesting. The over-capacity in modern fishing fleets is a 
significant problem due to the tragedy of the commons problem?47 Quota allocations are a 
fundamental measure for conservation, and they were deliberately excluded from 
CCAMLR because of the sovereignty issue. This has been criticised by Sahurie: "The 
Commission is empowered to designate the quantity of any species which may be 
harvested, and this is fundamental in an effective conservation program, but senseless in 
the absence of provisions on quota allocation. ,,248 Quotas were not included in the 
illustrative list of possible conservation measures in Article VIII. However, the list is not 
all inclusive, so the CCAMLR Commission has the power to pass national quotas. One 
problem here with single allocation quotas is that it would be easy for another member 
state to withhold consensus on. Quotas in different sectors of the CCAMLR area will be of 
interest to the claimants in that area. Writing in 1989, Howard thought it would be 
interesting to see if catch limitations would only be employed in relation to non-viable 
fishing areas?49 Fortunately this did not prove to be the case. 
Two of the methods used to control the degree of fishing mortality are to limit the amount 
of fishing effort or to establish a TAC.25o Limiting fishing effort requires detailed 
information about fishing vessels and their operations that is not generally available?51 
Establishing a TAC requires estimates of the current biomass and the strength of incoming 
recruitment.252 The first TAC, for C. gunnari was established in 1987 as Conservation 
Measure 8NI. A TAC limit can be applied immediately, and can be made retrospective.253 
This deals with the problem that fishing for a species which starts before the annual 
246 See Chapter 5, pp.210-216 for more details about the CCAMLR response to incidental mortality caused 
by IUU fishing. 
247 See Chapter 3, pp.90-92. 
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CCAMLR meeting, and the 180 day delay that otherwise affects all Conservation 
Measures. For a TAC to have the appropriate management effect it is essential to avoid any 
by-catch of the species for which the TAC has been set in the course of other fishing 
operations in that area.254 An effective TAC measure also requires an appropriate reporting 
system, such as was put in place with Conservation Measure 9NI for C. gunnari?55 
The actual setting of the TAC level is a problematic exercise that continues to vex 
decision-making in the Scientific Committee and the Commission. In theory it should be 
made on the basis of the best scientific advice from the Scientific Committee, but in 
practice it has often been the subject of bargaining. The fishing members initially favoured 
a precautionary catch based on historical catches, but other members expressed the view 
that historical catch figures did not constitute a scientific basis for determining 
precautionary catch limits?56 In 1991 Conservation Measure 32IX 'Precautionary Catch 
Limit for Euphausia superba in Statistical Subarea 48.3' was adopted by the Commission 
with a laill TAC of 620,000 tonnes. This figure was calculated on the average of biomass 
estimate, plus historical catch limit, plus five percent as a practical interim precautionary 
measure.257 This calculation looks like a compromise designed to appease the fishing 
nations. In general a TAC quota is less likely to attract consensus problems. It can still be a 
problem for the territorial claimants, for example New Zealand companies have been 
conducting exploratory fishing in the Ross Sea to establish whether a fishery for Antarctic 
toothfish is viable, and the possibility of fishing boats from Chile, South Africa, and 
Uruguay was not welcomed by New Zealand. 
Another problem with TACs is that some fish species have a greatly variable recruitment 
from year to year, so that the available population for harvesting can peak one year and 
decline sharply the next. It is difficult for the Scientific Committee to give advice on TACs 
in the absence of information, or when there is conflicting information. When the 
information is missing the available options are to either close the fishery, or to allow some 
directed fishery operations to continue.258 Indirect methods of stock assessment take a long 
time, and achieving accuracy can be difficult. "However, the rate of exploitation does have 
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255 CCAMLR-VI, 74, p.18. 
256 SC-CAMLR-X, 3.106, p.23, and 3.109, p.24. 
257 SC-CAMLR-XI, 2.112, p.2l. 
258 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 3,41, p.22. 
149 
to be a reasonable fraction of MSY to produce a great enough effect on the stock to be 
detected, but if the exploitation rate is too high, an excessive stock decline will be likely 
before any unambiguous signs of overfishing appear.,,259 In 1990 a range of possible TACs 
were suggested for C. gunnari, 44,000 - 64,000 tonnes. Most members of the Scientific 
Committee felt that a range of TACs was not appropriate as a basis for management 
advice, although the USSR disagreed. Most members would prefer a conservative TAC to 
be adopted and it was pointed out that the by-catch for other species could be exceeded.26o 
TACs can cause problems due to the fact that fishery closure changes the economIC 
incentives of the fishery. A competitive TAC without national quotas results in a "race for 
fish" mentality amongst fishers, which can contribute to overcapacity with consequent 
effects on the environment and for compliance with regulations?61 This could happen 
without TACs as well. Heap commented on the Soviet fishing fleet - "In a situation where 
there was no control on the fishery, their economic interest dictated that they should make 
the most of it before any other fishing nations got in on the act.,,262 The highest value fish 
were taken first, just like in whaling. 
The development of new and exploratory fisheries under CCAMLR 
In the mid-1980s some concern was expressed about the definition of 'experimental 
fishery' and the need for experimental fisheries to be subject to CCAMLR regulations?63 
This was important for the establishment of sustainable management procedures for newly 
exploited species: "exploratory fishing should not be allowed to expand faster than the 
acquisition of information necessary to ensure that the fishery can and will be conducted in 
accordance with the principles set forth in Article II of the Convention". 264 In the 1990s the 
Commission did not always apply a precautionary principle to the new fisheries, and 
opened them to exploitation. This was in part due to domestic pressure from fishermen in 
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CCAMLR Member states and in part due to a lack of a framework for CCAMLR to deal 
with the process of establishing a sustainable fishery. Since 1991 the Commission must be 
notified in advance of initiating a new fishery. Conservation Measure 311X 'Notification 
that Members are Considering Initiating a New Fishery' recognised that fisheries had been 
initiated in the past before information was available for management advice, making it 
difficult for the Commission to fulfil its Article IX requirements. 
In the late 1990s substantial progress was made in this area: reporting was improved; 
research was required; and the TACs were set at low levels. The need for fisheries to be 
managed from the outset was becoming recognised and the procedures for doing so were 
being developed. A new fishery is now designated as an exploratory fishery after its first 
year.265 Conservation Measure 651X1I 'Exploratory Fisheries' recognised that in the past 
fisheries had been initiated and subsequently expanded faster than the acquisition of the 
information needed for the fishery to be conducted in accordance with Article II. 
Exploratory fishing requires data collection, and a precautionary catch limit to limit fishing 
capacity and effort. More uniform criteria have also been developed to deal with 'closed' 
fisheries, which have been formally closed by conservation measures, and 'lapsed' 
fisheries, where fishing has ceased for some time. 
Summary of trends in conservation measures 
The initial procedural problems in the Scientific Committee, and subsequent problems with 
data submission and interpretation of the evidence, meant that initial proposals for stronger 
conservation measures were rejected. In 1989, Howard felt that Conservation Measures 
had "been used sparingly by the Commission and they have contributed little to the 
protection of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. ,,266 This was because the measures adopted 
dealt with species that were so depleted as to not attract economic exploitation, or "they 
have been adopted with the knowledge that they will not be effective.,,267 One reason why 
non-fishing members would support the passing of a measure that is not going to be 
effective is the hope that further measures can be passed in the future that will be more 
265 Karl-Hermann Kock (ed), Understanding CCAMLR's Approach to Management, May 2000, 
http://www.ccamlr.orglEnglish/eyubs/e_app_to_manag/TEXT_finaLpdf, (site visited March 19,2001), 
p.28. 
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effective at dealing with the problem. This is another reason why efforts are made to secure 
agreements to the non-binding resolutions. 
The trend in this period, after initial difficulties, was for more and stronger conservation 
measures to be adopted by CCAMLR. In 1991 Vicuna found that "CCAMLR seems to 
have completed this initial difficult stage and is now entering the phase where productive 
policies can be pursued with greater ease. ,,268 With hindsight this now appears rather 
optimistic, without even considering the problem of third-parties, the difficulties in the 
mid -1990s of enforcing conservation measures with the nationals of Contracting Parties 
was a major problem for CCAMLR. Even at the time they were deemed insufficient by 
environmentalists.269 
Compliance and enforcement of conservation measures 
In 1987 the procedure to be followed for matters covered by Article X of the Convention 
was discussed. In such circumstances the Contracting party transmits the relevant 
information to the Chairman of the Commission, who would in turn transmit such 
information to the other state involved for comment.270 In 1988 it was decided that 
compliance and Article X would be considered at the next meeting of the Commission, and 
the matter was referred to SCOL A failure to comply with Conservation Measure 9NI was 
noted?71 In 1989 some consideration was given to the establishment of a Standing 
Committee on Conservation Measures.272 This has not been adopted and the discussion of 
conservation measures occurs in SCOI, the Scientific Committee, and in the Commission. 
In 1990 the USSR reported violations of Conservation Measure 2/111, and action was taken 
under Soviet law?73 The Commission decided that that future violations of conservation 
measures should follow a procedure where the flag state was to report infractions, the 
action taken, and any sanctions imposed in detail to the Commission.274 
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Enforcement of the CCAMLR rules relies on the good faith of governments, as the 
Convention does not provide for sanctions or penalties against parties unwilling or unable 
to impose sanctions on their nationals and companies. This obviously has the potential to 
be abused. "This deficiency in CCAMLR's structure weakens the efficacy of the 
Commission's conservation measures.,,275 In the late 1980s there were few conservation 
measures that required any degree of significant compliance from the CCAMLR members. 
At this stage CCAMLR was still developing the system of inspection and observation 
required by the convention. 
Development of the System of Inspection and Observation 
In order for enforcement to be possible an incidence of non-compliance must first be 
detected. A system of observation and inspection was not created during the CCAMLR 
negotiations, although its development was called for in Article XXIV of the Convention. 
The development of a system of observation and inspection was quite important to the 
potential effectiveness of CCAMLR, given the difficulty in passing conservation measures 
and the weakness of enforcement allowed under the Convention. An effective system of 
inspection would assist with compliance and enforcement, while an effective system of 
observation would help with acquiring the data necessary for management and 
conservation measures?76 The Antarctic Treaty is concerned with inspections on land 
while CCAMLR is concerned with inspections at sea. Sudden inspections can cause 
logistic problems for bases on land. Inspections at sea face even greater practical 
difficulties and can be prevented by environmental conditions. The details of the inspection 
system were left to the Commission to develop and it was expected to take some time. In 
the interim Members were to make their own arrangements.277 
In 1984 it was noted that it would be helpful in the future to draw a distinction between "a 
system of observation which would relate to the promotion of the objectives of the 
Convention and ... a system of inspection which would relate to ensuring the observance 
of the provisions of the Convention.,,278 Steps were taken to gather information on existing 
275 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.141. 
276 CCAMLR-X, 7.5, p.19. 
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international practice, and to ask advice from the Scientific Committee. In 1985 the United 
Kingdom introduced a proposal to encourage the placement of scientific observers on 
commercial fishing vessels?79 "A clear distinction should be made between scientific 
observers and inspectors. The scientific observers would not have any role as fisheries 
inspectors; their role would be solely scientific. ,,280 This was to be initially established on a 
voluntary and bilateral basis; although the fishing members preferred a reciprocal basis to 
the system. The Commission considered whether voluntary arrangements could be 
considered a fulfilment of the requirements of Article XXIV of the Convention, and 
preferred to treat them as part of Article XV.281 In 1986 there was little further progress, 
with more work expected in the intersessional period, and the concept of voluntary, 
bilateral arrangements was recalled and re-endorsed?82 In 1987 a Working Group 
convened by the United States elaborated a set of provisions for a scheme.283 France stated 
that these provisions would not apply in the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet.284 
Further discussion of the costs of the scheme was needed.285 
The system of inspection 
In 1988 the Commission finally established SCOI, and a set of provisions was adopted to 
verify compliance with conservation measures in effect under the Convention.286 Reports 
on observation and inspection activities are provided to the state that designated an 
observer, which in tum reports to the Commission.287 The system was first trialed during 
the 1989/90 fishing season. In 1990 after some discussion it was agreed that participation 
in the deliberations of SCOI was for full members of the Commission only?88 In 1991 it 
was noted that the system of inspection does not preclude national inspections conducted 
by Contracting Parties on their flag vessels. 
France and South Africa reserved their positions on the application of the inspection 
scheme around their islands, their objective being to arrange direct bilateral agreements for 
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these areas, not to avoid the observation and inspection systems requirements.289 In the 
1995/96 season thirty-two inspectors were designated, and five inspections were carried 
OUt.290 In general compliance with conservation measures was observed, but with some 
infringements?91 Inspections did uncover IUU fishing activities. For example, in 1996 the 
UK and South Africa discovered illegal fishing activities around South Georgia and Prince 
Edward Island respectively. While non-compliance is disturbing, the fact that it was 
detected is good for the system. From 1995, Inspectors can board vessels presumed to have 
been engaged in fishing, not just those caught in the act.292 "For some time CCAMLR has 
been aware that effective enforcement of its conservation measures is essential but that this 
is extremely difficult given the size of the Southern Ocean and the costs involved in 
patrolling it. ,,293 
The system of observation 
Consensus was not reached on the observation system until the 1992/93 season because of 
difficulties in defining the tasks of scientific observers?94 In the interim the Commission 
continued bilateral exchanges.295 The purpose of the scheme is to gather information on 
fishing activities in the convention area. Observers have to be nationals of the member that 
designates them, and the scheme has to operate on the basis of bilateral agreements. The 
presence of observers does not discharge the members from their obligations under Article 
XX to report information about their fisheries on a regular basis. Article XXIV (2) ( c) 
observers report to their own governments, who make representations to the CCAMLR 
Commission. The first placement of a scientific observer was in the 1992/93 season 
between Chile and the UK on the Chilean longliner Frio Sur V in the South Sandwich 
Island area.296 
In 1997 the Commission decided that when vessels are charted under a joint venture with a 
non-member flag state, the member flag state assumes responsibility for compliance and 
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reporting data?97 Joint ventures between members can reach their own agreement as to 
where responsibility lies.298 The scheme of international scientific observation was noted 
as having a significant role. The possibility was raised that observers could provide 
information on vessels fishing in the Convention Area in contravention of CCAMLR 
conservation measures. One difficulty here is that observers are not supposed to become 
involved in inspection or compliance related functions?99 Kock noted that "some members 
have been concerned that scientific observers, who usually stay onboard a vessel for an 
entire cruise, could easily become de facto inspectors.,,30o 
In the 1997/98 season data from observers improved in quality and timeliness.30 ! The 
Commission agreed that scientific observers should report factual data sightings of fishing 
vessels in the Convention Area, however the independence and integrity of scientific 
observers should not be compromised and their activities should be confined to gathering 
information and data in support of the Scientific Committee. This data would be submitted 
at the end of a voyage, not in real time.302 
Assessment of the system of observation and inspection 
The lack of a system at the conclusion of negotiations was a source of some criticism. A 
system of inspection for the CCAMLR regime was not implemented until 1989/90 despite 
obligations in the CCAMLR convention, and an observation scheme took until 1992/93 to 
implement. One reason for the difference in speed of implementation was the greater 
difficulty in establishing arrangements for observation. While an inspection may only take 
a few hours observers have to remain with a vessel for the duration of its voyage.303 Some 
commentators argued that the system is flawed in that it does not allow for independent 
monitoring, as the inspectors are appointed by the member states, from their own nationals, 
and not by the Commission. Joyner argued that "monitoring may be prejudicial in favor of 
fishermen.,,304 Despite these misgivings the system of observation has provided crucial 
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information to CCAMLR concerning the effectiveness of its conservation measures as well 
as providing more accurate information on the Southern Ocean to the Scientific 
Committee. 
The inspection system relies on opportunity as the means for its action, so inspections are 
done haphazardly. Remoteness from the fishing grounds, logistical difficulties, and the 
high costs of maintaining inspection vessels mean that "the implementation of such a 
system involves logistics and costs that are almost prohibitive unless there is a backing of 
strong national interests.,,305 Joyner found that "such national commitment is often found 
wanting.,,306 Inspection does not affect non-CCAMLR members operating on the high 
seas. The use of remote sensing methods, such as a Vessel Monitoring System (VMS), 
while not as effective a deterrent as field inspections, offers a potentially cheaper, and 
wider tracking scope for surveillance. This is not a new idea, being suggested at least as 
early as 1987.307 The number of issues being dealt with by SCOI grew over time as SCOI 
become a clearing house for discussion of key new conservation measures. "If managed 
sensitively and effectively the system should provide an important source of information 
on the overall impact of fishing and research activities in the Antarctic in addition to 
monitoring compliance with measures in force.,,308 
The Assessment of CCAMLR in the Early Period 
Assessments of CCAMLR have varied over the years. Assessments following the 
negotiations for the Convention were mixed. Pessimism continued to a large extent as 
CCAMLR struggled to establish a framework of conservation measures, and to establish 
the relationship between the Scientific Committee and the Commission. A degree of 
optimism returned in the early 1990s as CCAMLR overcame many of its initial difficulties. 
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Assessment at the conclusion of negotiations 
CCAMLR received strong initial support from many quarters because it appeared to be an 
effective mechanism for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources, and on 
political grounds, because it has dealt effectively with opposing positions on national 
claims.309 The question that most writers attempted to answer about CCAMLR when it was 
negotiated was whether it was a fishing or a conservation convention: "the issue of 
conservation strategies versus harvesting goals has been underlying all discussions on the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR.,,310 This basic split in views is reflected throughout the articles 
ofthe Convention, and in all ensuing political arguments. The balance of the views are that 
the Convention favoured the fishing interests over those of conservation. Early after the 
CCAMLR negotiations were concluded, Barnes reached the conclusion that the 
Convention: "is a limited-purpose effort that leaves resolution ofthe critical juridical issues 
to the future, and that creates serious problems from the standpoint of sound environmental 
controls and decisions.,,311 
However, not everyone was so pessimistic. Josyane Couratier wrote that "some sectors 
have been inclined to regard the Canberra Convention [CCAMLR] as a text designed to 
protect the Antarctic environment rather than as a fishing convention. ,,312 As the Hon. 
Michael Hodgman put it at the opening ceremony address of the first meeting of the 
Commission: 
the opportunity that now presents itself requires a commitment to conservation 
needs of a kind not previously encountered .... a unique chance to show that 
control mechanisms can be devised, and put in place, before harvesting reaches a 
point where it could raise risks for the harvesting of krill and dependent species.313 
In an open-access situation few measures are likely to be acceptable without unanimous 
agreement. Measures need to be introduced quickly, before excess capacity is built up. As 
Gulland put it: "the aim should be to have to do little more than put the brakes on 
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development as the optimum harvesting rate is approached rather than to have to cut back 
on overcapacity, with all the economic and social problems this is likely to bring about.,,314 
Assessment while CCAMLR struggled to establish its framework 
As the years unfolded and meetings continued, new assessments began to be written about 
the performance of CCAMLR. Assessments from within CCAMLR focused on the 
difficult nature of the tasks required for implementation, such as this part of the opening 
statement in 1983: "It would perhaps have been optimistic to expect to introduce a 
management system unlike any already in existence without a long and arduous process of 
preparation.",315 and from the Chairman in 1984: "we are now commencing a phase in 
which principles may be established and machinery put in place to achieve the objectives 
of the Convention.,,316 The caveat mentioned the year before by the Chairman was that: 
"The credibility of the Convention will, in large measure, depend on the speed and 
effectiveness with which it is implemented.,,317 In this respect visible progress was slow, 
but as Gulland put it: 
Conservation interests may well believe that the commission is working slowly, 
and the measures so far taken and contemplated ... are more cosmetic than real. 
However, the commission is moving toward more effective measures and toward 
the collection of data that would enable these measures to be soundly based. This is 
clearly preferable to the only likely alternatives, which would be the absence of any 
commission, or a commission dominated by conservation interests but ignored by 
the fishing nations? 18 
The first three meetings produced limited results and its achievements fell short of the aims 
of the CCAMLR.319 The slow pace in implementation could have potentially discredited 
CCAMLR. However, the 'noise' in the Scientific Committee and the Commission about 
the data problems, and the still typical secrecy of the ATS regime at that time, obscured 
any lack of political will for pressing forward with conservation measures. As CCAMLR 
was still acquiring information that was not yet considered sound enough for scientific 
judgement by all the Commission members, any immediate decision could set a bad 
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precedent.32o What was achieved in only eight meetings from 1982-1990, was considered a 
remarkable record given that "the Scientific Committee very nearly did not start at all.,,321 
The frustrating early difficulties were part of the process of establishing communication. 
The level of cooperation depended on the issue "and on most issues there is a distinct 
difference of attitude from the fishing Members and the non-fishing Members.,,322 
Criticism of inadequate conservation measures was to a large extent placed on the 
decision-making machinery and procedures of CCAMLR, with reference to the consensus 
procedure, and the weak arrangements that were made for observation, inspection, and 
enforcement. 323 
Jean-Pierre Puissochet argued that the consensus based decision making process is one 
which still sees the opinion of the Scientific Committee rejected, and conservation 
measures rejected or watered down?24 Because the regime permits activity unless 
prohibited the consensus based system is biased against those that wish to regulate an 
activity. In 1990 Bush wrote that "The point is illustrated by the current difficulties of the 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources Commission in reaching agreement on conservation 
measures that the great majority of the members are willing to accept.,,325 However, 
linking the success or failure of CCAMLR to voting evades reality. CCAMLR attempts to 
avoid conflict through scientific effort that will allow the adoption of enlightened 
decisions. As Sahurie noted: "Paradoxically, a great achievement is that in the Antarctic 
Treaty System all the instruments have been negotiated by consensus.,,326 
CCAMLR was initially greeted with relief, expectation, and scepticism. The scepticism 
was based on performance of other international conservation conventions and "from those 
who believed the Convention to be fundamentally flawed in its requirement for consensus 
decision-making.,,327 Progress has been made and expectations remain steady. In 1990 
Powell believed that "It is too early to say if CCAMLR will go the way of the others.,,328 
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And that "no instance comes readily to mind, in the seven years of operation, where the 
consensus method has impeded the work of the Commission, whereas it is easy to recall 
decisions which might not have withstood the objection process under a voting system.,,329 
Has the principle of consensus decision-making been too costly? Some writers have 
thought so. "Decision-making by consensus demonstrated that cost by paralyzing the 
Commission for more than half a decade.,,33o However, a majority vote system proved 
unacceptable to the fishing states involved in the CCAMLR negotiations. Vicufia saw the 
key issue as the "integration of science and technical knowledge into the decision-making 
process".331 These efforts were ongoing and incremental, and a true test of the CCAMLR 
system would only be possible after considerable evolution of the institution. However, as 
the experience of the IUU fishing problem in the 1990s demonstrated the decision-making 
system was still capable of preventing a rapid response to a clear problem. The test posed 
by this problem may allow a more meaningful assessment of the costs and benefits of the 
consensus system after nearly two decades of operation. 
Assessment of the established framework 
In 1991 Vicufia felt that CCAMLR was moving towards the demanding standards of 
effectiveness that had been laid down by Barnes in 1982?32 At the same time Heap wrote 
that there was no simple answer to the question "Has CCAMLR worked?,,333 In part it 
depends on where you stand on the issues of conservation and harvesting. Scientists, 
environmentalists, fishers, and government officials from different states all have a 
different perspective on the problems. Heap stressed the importance of dealing with 
potential problems before capital was invested and economic exploitation takes place,334 
and noted that it was possible to conclude that CCAMLR has worked for krill "so far", but 
this was not related to CCAMLR conservation measures but to other factors. 335 In 1992 
Nicol noted that "the Commission can act with alacrity when its members perceive that the 
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need is there .... CCAMLR is now in a position to begin realising its potential.,,336 The 
ecosystem approach was being handled by breaking it down into tractable portions. This 
was a realistic approach to the problem, but it has the risk of the Commission developing 
strategies of only managing individual species rather than trying to manage the ecosystem 
as a whole. 
In 1994 Karl-Hermann Kock wrote that the practical and political problems that might 
affect the implementation of CCAMLR's principles, "have thus far affected the 
performance of CCAMLR less than might have been envisaged. ,,337 The issue of managing 
the ecosystem as a whole had been circumvented by dividing the problem into tractable 
portions, managing individual parts of the ecosystem. "The practical and political problems 
may become increasingly important when more sophisticated ecosystem models and 
strategies are developed.,,338 The krill catch had remained low compared with initial 
predictions of its potential yield.339 In 1996 Rothwell found that many of the institutional 
problems seem to have been resolved and this "demonstrates that over time the strength 
and ambit of Conservation Measures have continually been expanded and strengthened.,,340 
At that time there were no concerns over the potential of overfishing in the Southern Ocean 
resulting in substantial damage to the ecosystem. CCAMLR appeared to have been a 
success.
341 Vicuna found the CCAMLR results impressive despite early difficulties, the 
right approaches were being taken even ifthere was a lot of work to do.342 
The views of two groups are well represented in CCAMLR; the harvesting and non-
harvesting states. As Heap phrased it: "The harvesters see the non-harvesters as being out 
to frustrate their legitimate economic interests. The non-harvesters see the harvesters as 
being out to rape the resource. ,,343 Science is supposed to harmonise the different views, 
but this can make science itself contentious as happened during the development of 
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CCAMLR. Harvesting states tried to maximise their access to the resources with the 
minimum amount of regulation. The TAC limit set on krill in 1991 was considered by 
Joyner in 1998 to be an important step towards achieving precautionary management in an 
uncertain biological environment: "the reactive management policies of the 1980s are now 
viewed by Commission members as unduly capricious. Such reactive policies might be 
sufficient to remedy a declining situation, but they are unable to deal adequately with 
severe threats to the Antarctic marine ecosystem.,,344 However, Joyner felt that overall 
CCAMLR was a successful conservation instrument because of its coverage in the 
Southern Ocean and its strong efforts to decrease incidental mortality rates.345 The 
consensus system serves to promote negotiated compromise. The mechanics of the 
inspection system affect CCAMLR effectiveness.346 Writing just before IUU fishing 
became a very public problem Joyner made the assessment that: "For the foreseeable 
future, exploiting Antarctic fisheries is apt to be viewed more as commercial risk than a 
lucrative economic opportunity.,,347 
Heap wrote "all that can be said is that CCAMLR is working and that its effectiveness is 
improving.,,348 Bearing in mind the proviso that: "The convention will only be as effective 
as member states want it to be.,,349 As Barnes pointed out, CCAMLR "will work only if all 
parties exercise restraint and common sense. ,,350 Restraint was more or less exercised in the 
early period if you are willing to discount, as many writers have, the exploitation that 
occurred before CCAMLR entered into force. Conflicting economic and conservation 
interests in the 1980s hampered the initial effectiveness of CCAMLR. In the early 1990s 
these tensions appeared to have abated as a wave of conservation measures were adopted 
and with the lack of fishing CCAMLR appeared to be effective. A lack of urgency attended 
the development of measures for squid, crabs, and krill. This was due in part to the low 
commercial values of the species being harvested at the time, something which changed 
with the development of IUU fishing for toothfish. The problem of IUU fishing has 
reintroduced the tension between economic and conservationist interests and highlighted 
the problem of significant third-party involvement in the Southern Oceans. 
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CHAPTERS 
CCAMLR And The Limits Of' Rational Use' 
New fisheries have developed under CCAMLR management in the 1990s, but in tandem 
with the increasing legitimate fishery has come the rise of IUU fishing and the associated 
problem of incidental mortality among seabirds in the Southern Ocean. CCAMLR has 
pressed the limits of the concept of 'rational use' of the resources in the Southern Ocean by 
continuing to authorise expanded fishing activities while some of the living resources 
involved were being pushed to the brink of extinction. Maintaining a legal fishery, despite 
calls from environmental groups for a moratorium on harvesting toothfish, is making it 
difficult for the goal of precautionary management of the ecosystem to be achieved. 
The concept of rational use is contained within Article II of the Convention: "1. The 
objective of this Convention is the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. 2. 
For the purpose of this Convention, the term 'conservation' includes rational use." Exactly 
what 'rational use' means is not explicitly covered in the Convention, although the 
principles in which harvesting activities are supposed to be conducted in accordance with 
give some indication of what was expected. 1 The phrase was included to help secure the 
agreement of the fishing states to the Convention. At the 1987 CCAMLR meeting it was 
noted that there was a need for a common understanding of the term rational use and that: 
"this term would require progressive refinement as knowledge and understanding of the 
Antarctic marine ecosystem developed.,,2 In 1988 the following definition for rational use 
was derived: "that harvesting on a sustainable basis means that harvesting activities are so 
conducted as to ensure that the potential for achieving the highest possible long-term yield 
is preserved, subject to the principles of conservation above".3 
The members of CCAMLR with an interest in fishing have taken care to preserve their 
interpretation of the objectives of the Convention. For example, in 1995 Japan expressed 
its belief that Article II should not be interpreted so as to place the needs of predators over 
1 Appendix II, Article II (3). 
2 CCAMLR-VI, 113, p.29. 
3 CCAMLR-VII, 139, p.38. 
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the interests of fisheries.4 The tension between the conservation and economic goals of the 
CCAMLR regime created by the ambiguity of Article II of the Convention requires a 
difficult balancing act under the consensus decision-making procedures of CCAMLR if 
both goals are to be achieved. During the early period of CCAMLR the Commission 
favoured rational use of the resources rather than rational use. It now appears that 
harvesting activities are actually being conducted to an extent such that the highest 
possible long-term yield is being reduced, and that it is reasonable to question whether this 
harvesting is sustainable, either for the species targeted or the dependent species in the 
ecosystem. It may now be the case that in order to preserve the goal of rational use 
CCAMLR must act so as to attain the conservation goals first. This chapter will attempt to 
demonstrate how CCAMLR has reached the limits of its historical usage of the rational use 
objective. 
The New Fisheries in the Southern Ocean 
In the 1990s the Southern Oceans began attracting commercial interest in developing 
fisheries for crab and squid. The Patagonian toothfish which had previously been harvested 
as by-catch in earlier finfish fisheries also began to attract a high level of interest in its own 
right. 
The crab fishery 
The first expression of interest in harvesting stone crabs (Lithodidae) was when the United 
States issued a permit for MV Marlin for the 1990/91 Season in Statistical Subareas 48.1, 
48.2, and 48.3 with a 1,000 tonne limit. Concern was expressed at the 1990 CCAMLR 
meeting over the issuing of this permit and size of the take, which if taken in one area, had 
the potential to cause localised extinctions.5 The following year an experimental crab 
fishery for the 1991192 season, with a 400 tonne catch limit, of which no more than 80 
tonnes was to be caught per canyon, was approved for the United States.6 During the 
1992/93 season 299 tonnes of crabs were caught around South Georgia and the Shag 
4 CCAMLR-XIV, 4.32, p.14. The UK also noted in 4.32 that Article II does not give primacy to either 
dependent or harvested species, but does require precautionary provisions to protect dependent species. 
5 SC-CAMLR-IX, 15.7-15.8, pp.64-65. 
6 SC-CAMLR-X, 5.6-5.9, pp.42-43. 
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Rocks.7 The crab fishery has continued sporadically since then, 479 tonnes were harvested 
in the 1994/95 and 1995/96 seasons combined, but the vessel involved surrendered its 
permit as its managing company did not consider the fishery to be economically viable.8 
Despite a catch limit for the 1998/99 season set at 1,600 tonnes,9 no harvesting was 
conducted. Some limited fishing of four tonnes occurred in Subarea 48.3 in September 
1999.10 It appears that greater profits can still be made elsewhere at the moment. 
The squid fishery 
Squid is difficult to catch but holds potential as a fishery in the Southern Ocean. 
Substantial squid fisheries exist elsewhere in the world. Squid is an important predator 
species in the Southern Ocean. Squid do not appear to have been significantly exploited in 
the Southern Ocean before CCAMLR entered into force. In 1984 the Scientific Committee 
felt that more research on squid was needed. 11 In 1988 it was noted that no commercial 
catch had been reported in CCAMLR waters since a GDR vessel caught two tonnes in 
Subarea 48.1 in 1979. 12 At the same meeting the UK reported possible squid fishing near 
South Georgia by a ship not reported by an CCAMLR member - possibly from a non-
member country.13 In February 1989, exploratory fishing took place with two Japanese 
squid jigging vessels in Subarea 48.3. A total of 8.23 tonnes of Martialia hyadesi was 
caught, but the fishery was thought unlikely to expand due to the limited market potential 
of M hyadesi.14 A Taiwanese vessel may have been doing some fishing and there was 
some discussion of the need for some kind of mechanism to get data from non-member 
nations,15 and the Secretariat was to look at ways of doing this. 16 No members reported 
squid fishing in 1990, although the UK reported sighting seven squid-jigs around South 
Georgia in January 1990.17 In 1995/96 fifty-two tonnes of M hyadesi was caught in an 
experimental fishery in Subarea 48.3, and this was considered the first significant catch in 
7 SC-CAMLR-XII, 4.1, p.36. 
8 CCAMLR-XV, 8.69, ppA3-44. 
9 CCAMLR-XVII, 9.38, pAO. 
10 CCAMLR-XVIII, 4.6, p.8. 
11 SC-CAMLR-III, 9.9, p.3l. 
12 SC-CAMLR-VII, 4.1, p.2l. 
13 SC-CAMLR-VII, 4.2, p.2l. 
14 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 4.1, 4.2, and 404, p.29. 
15 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 4.3, p.29 and 4.6, p.30. 
16 CCAMLR-VIII, 54, p.14. In 1990 the Secretariat reported back that it would first determine the vessel flag, 
and then attempt to contact the appropriate authority. CCAMLR-IX, 10.1, p.3l. 
17 SC-CAMLR-IX, 4.1-4.2, pp.33-34. 
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the Convention Area. I8 The UK and Korea proposed an exploratory fishery for M hyadesi 
in Subarea 48.3 at CCAMLR-XVII.I9 One problem with squid fisheries is the high annual 
recruitment rate, which makes TAC allocation difficult as the squid biomass can vary 
significantly between different seasons. Like the crab fishery, interest in squid has been 
sporadic and the potential of the fishery is yet to be realised. If there has been unregulated 
fishing for squid, then the impact has so far been minor. 
The toothfish fishery 
There are two species of toothfish in the Southern Ocean that have been targeted for 
harvesting. The Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus eleginoides, or D. eleginoides) is 
widely distributed around Antarctica up to Sub-Antarctic waters and can be found as deep 
as 2,500 to 3,000 metres. Older specimens can reach two metres in length and weigh over 
100 kg.20 It reaches sexual maturity between six to nine years when it is around seventy to 
ninety-five centimetres long. Unlike the crab and quid fisheries it has proven commercially 
viable to harvest toothfish and its value has been likened to "bars of gold,,?I The Antarctic 
toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni, or D. mawsoni) is confined to the waters around the 
Antarctic continent at depths of up to 800 metres. Like the Patagonian toothfish, it feeds on 
a variety of other fish, octopods, squid, and crustaceans?2 Antarctic toothfish have been 
the subject of new and exploratory fisheries since 1996/97, while harvesting of the 
Patagonian toothfish started as incidental catch in trawling fisheries directed against other 
finfish species in the 1970s. In 1984 the reported catches of Patagonian toothfish were very 
small as there was no directed fishery and the catch was primarily of juveniles.23 Most of 
this catch was taken in Subarea 48.3.24 Longlining for Patagonian toothfish in the 
18 CCAMLR, CCAMLR Newsletter, 18, December, 1996, p.l. 
19 CCAMLR-XVII, 7.12, p.30. 
20 Karl-Hermann Kock (ed), Understanding CCAMLR's Approach to Management, May 2000, 
http://www.ccamlr.org/English/e-pubs/e_app_to_manag/TEXTJrnaLpdf, (site visited March 19,2001), 
p.33. 
21 Stan Crothers, "Trends and Discontinuities in Fisheries" in Graeme Tetley (editor) Antarctic 2010; a 
Notebook: Proceedings o/the Antarctic Futures Workshop 28-30 April 1998, Christchurch: Antarctica New 
Zealand, (Antarctica New Zealand Miscellaneous Series no.3.), 1998, p.16. 
22 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit. 
23 SC-CAMLR-III, Annex 8 Report of Ad Hoc Working Group in Fish Stock Assessment, 6-7 September, 
1984, p.205. 
24 SC-CAMLR-VII, Annex 5, Report of the Fish Stock Assessment Working Group, table 2, p.97. D. 
eleginoides catches reported in Subarea 48.3 (South Georgia) 1976/77441, 1977/78635, 1978/7970, 
1979/80255,1980/81239,1981/82324,1982/83 116,1983/84109,1984/85285,1985/86564,1986/87 
1,199, 1987/88 1,809 tonnes. 
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Convention Area definitely started no later than the 1988/89 season,25 when the Soviet 
Union began the first longline fishery in the Southern Ocean, targeting Patagonian 
toothfish in the South Georgia area?6 Some experimentallonglining may have occurred as 
early as 1985/86 but by 1989 it was no longer an exploratory fishery but a developing 
commercial fishery?7 In 1988/89 almost all the catches were by longline?8 The exception 
was the trawl based fishery around McDonald Island. 
Table 2 
Reported toothfish catch in tonnes 1989/90 to 1999/0029 
Year Dissostichus eleginoides Dissostichus mawsoni 
1999/00 13,689 751 
1998/99 17,278 296 
1997/98 11,170 42 
1996/97 10,371 -
1995/96 8,740 -
1994/95 8,911 -
1993/94 5,648 -
1992/93 5,788 -
1991/92 12,497 
-
1990/91 5,613 0 
1989/90 9,380 1 
Conservation measures for toothfish developed slowly. No consideration was given to 
management action for Patagonian toothfish in 1985.30 In 1988 the WG-FSA suggested 
conservation measures were needed for toothfish.31 In 1989 the WG-FSA expressed 
concern about the quality of the USSR reports for D. eleginoides in Subarea 48.3, and a 
new data format was developed that could account for longline fisheries. 32 At the same 
meeting there was concern about the catch levels in Subarea 48.3 increasing by a factor of 
four over two years, when the WG-FSA was unable to assess the status of the stock.33 It 
25 See CCAMLR-VIII, 24, p.5. 
26 Janet Dalziell and Maj De Poorter, "Seabird Mortality in Longline Fisheries Around South Georgia", Polar 
Record, 29, (169),1993, p.143. 
27 SC-CAMLR-V, 4.38, p.14. 
28 SC-CAMLR-IX, Annex V, 155, p.l80. 
29 CCAMLR 2000, Statistical Bulletin, Vol. 12 (1989-1999), CCAMLR: Hobart, Australia, and CCAMLR, 
CCAMLRNewsletter, 22, January 2001. 
30 SC-CAMLR-IV, 4.17, p.9. 
31 SC-CAMLR-VII, 109, p.136. 
32 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 3.10-3.12, p.16. 
33 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 3.42, p.23. 
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was also noted that: "Experience in other fisheries outside the CCAMLR Convention Area 
indicates that assessment of longline fisheries is difficult with little indication of 
overfishing becoming apparent until the stock is near to collapse." 34 The USSR did not 
agree that a TAC for D. eleginoides was necessary in Subarea 48.3 in the 1989/90 fishing 
season as they were only planning on using six to eight vessels?5 In the following season 
the USSR used only six to eight vessels; yet this did not stop the catch doubling to 8,311 
tonnes.36 There was some discussion of the utility of effort controls, and it was considered 
that further expansion of the number of vessels taking part would not be appropriate. 37 
There were some limited successes in establishing a conservation framework, overcoming 
some research and information gathering problems. In 1990 essential monitoring 
information was not provided, and it was considered a high priority to get scientific 
observers onto commercial fishing vessels.38 By 1992 data reporting from Subarea 48.3 
about D. eleginoides, after Conservation Measure 36/X and Conservation Measure 37/X 
were adopted in 1991 had been prompt and comprehensive.39 Every vessel had an observer 
on board, and this was providing a high quality and quantity of data. The entry of the 
Chilean fleet led to a shortened fishing season in 1990/91, and with a TAC of 3,500 tonnes 
the total catch was 3,703 tonnes. This included 133 tonnes caught on research vessels.40 
The research cruise occurred after the fishery was closed in accordance with Conservation 
Measure 35/X, prompting clarification of research exemptions.41 Research fishing, while 
essential, can interfere with conservation efforts ifnot carefully regulated.42 
Difficulties were encountered in attempting to set TACs for toothfish. A TAC range of 
1,200 to 8,000 tonnes was suggested, with most members supporting a TAC in the lower 
part of the range, with the USSR preferring a TAC in the middle of the range.43 It was 
noted that fishing had continued since the end of June 1990, and that the level of fishing 
34 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 9, p.184. 
35 CCAMLR-VIII, 106, pp.27-28. 
36 CCAMLR-IX, 13.30, p.37. 
37 SC-CAMLR-XI, 3.14-3.16, p.25., and 3.80, p.36. 
38 SC-CAMLR-IX, 3.55-3.66, pp.25-27, and SC-CAMLR-XI, 3.9, p.24. 
39 CCAMLR-XI, 4.3, p.7. 
40 SC-CAMLR-XI, 3.3, p.23. 
41 SC-CAMLR-XI, 3.27-3.30, pp.27-28. 
42 CCAMLR-XI, 9.9, p.22. 
43 SC-CAMLR-IX, 3.58-3.60., p.26. "This was challenged by the USSR on the basis that this fishery only 
takes senescent fish (CCAMLR-VIII, paragraph 106), an assertion now known to be incorrect (SC-CAMLR-
IX, paragraph 3.56), and no TAC was set." CCAMLR-IX, 13.29, p.34. 
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before the meeting had the potential to pre-empt any TAC that might be set - an 
unacceptable situation.44 It was reported that from 1 July 1990 to 15 October 1990 the 
USSR had caught 1,440 tonnes of D. eleginoides in Subarea 48.3. This catch was greater 
than a possible TAC and "such a catch rate, in comparison with that prevailing last year, 
suggests that the stock may already be significantly depleted. ,,45 There was no estimate of 
the total biomass, in part because the mature fish is semi-pelagic.46 Samples of USSR 
harvested longline fish were found developing towards a spawning condition, which meant 
that: "the assertion that the longline fishery takes senescent fish (CCAMLR-VIII, 
paragraph 106) is almost certainly in error.,,47 A UK proposal for a catch limit on D. 
eleginoides failed, and no consensus could be reached on whether the decision could be 
made by correspondence.48 In 1992 the EEC noted that the TAC had been exceeded, and 
that conservation measure infractions may have occurred, and there was a potential 
problem of increased effort. The EEC wanted a TAC of 3,000 tonnes while Chile said it 
wanted a higher TAC. Russia wanted the TAC to be divided among fishing states because 
its geographical distance meant that Russian vessels had a long way to sail to reach a 
fishery when it opened. This idea was opposed by Chile, Argentina, and the EEC. They 
finally compromised by spreading the TAC allocation over three time bands.49 
As the Patagonian toothfish fishery developed interest in the other finfish fisheries waned. 
In the 1992/93 season the only reported finfish catches were for 3,049 tonnes of D. 
eleginoides from Subarea 48.3, 39 tonnes from Subarea 48.4, and 2,722 tonnes from 
Division 58.5.1.50 In the 1995/96 season the reported finfish catch was 8,826 tonnes and 
99% of this was toothfish - despite there being catch limits available for other finfish 
species. In the 1996/97 season of 10,562 tonnes reported finfish catch, 97% of this catch 
was toothfish.51 These figures do not take into account the unreported fishing. The number 
of members participating in the fishery also started increasing. In 1991 Chile announced its 
intention to longline in Subarea 48.3,52 and its geographical proximity is one the reasons 
why Russia was displaced as a leading harvester of toothfish. At the twelfth CCAMLR 
44 CCAMLR-IX, 13.32-13.33, p.37. and SC-CAMLR-IX, 3.62, p.26. 
45 CCAMLR-IX, 13.34-13.35, pp.37-38. 
46 SC-CAMLR-IX, Annex V, 160, p.18l. 
47 SC-CAMLR-IX, Annex V, 161, p.18l. 
48 CCAMLR-IX, 2.3, p.2. 
49 CCAMLR-XI, 9.27-9.34, pp.24-26. 
50 SC-CAMLR-XII, 3.1, p.2l. 
51 CCAMLR-XVI, 4.7, p.5. 
52 SC-CAMLR-X, 4.60, p.32. 
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meeting Russia, Poland, Chile, Korea, Ukraine, and France all expected vessels to possibly 
fish for toothfish in the 1993/94 season. 53 In 1995 the Commission noted the increasing 
interest in D. eleginoides.54 By this time extensive IUU fishing had begun to develop in the 
Southern Ocean. 
The Rise of IUU Fishing in the Southern Ocean 
Despite attempts by CCAMLR to regulate the toothfish fishery, harvesting activities in the 
Southern Ocean outran the ability of the Commission to control them during the 1990s. 
Three phases can be identified in the development of IUU fishing. In the first phase the 
IUU fishing was largely restricted to South American operators. In the second phase IUU 
fishing expanded to involve European operators from the 1994/95 season. In the third 
phase the IUU fishing attracted public attention in 1997 as it expanded eastward across the 
Indian Ocean. 
The first phase of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean 
In 1990 Dr Kock expressed concern about a fishery developing on a banle west of Shag 
Rock - outside the Convention Area, because the same stock as in the Shag Rock and 
South Georgia area may be being exploited. 55 In 1991 there were three reported violations 
with documentation requirements on Soviet vessels, and fines were imposed. 56 Where non-
compliance with conservation measures was reported legal action was often taken by the 
governments of the flag state of the vessels concerned, but at the CCAMLR Meeting in 
1991 it was suggested in an unofficial paper that "in the 1980s an unknown (but possibly 
large) proportion of violations with respect to finfishing and incidental mortality may not 
have been reported to CCAMLR". 57 
53 SC-CAMLR-XII, 3.3-3.9, pp.21-22. 
54 CCAMLR-XIV, 4.5, p.8. 
55 SC-CAMLR-IX, 3.61, p.26. 
56 CCAMLR-X, 8.2, p.20. 
57 Karl-Hermann Kock, "Fishing and Conservation in Southern Waters", Polar Record, 30 (172), 1994, p.l4. 
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In 1992 some Chilean companies began fishing illegally for Patagonian toothfish.58 This 
was initially confined to Chilean waters but spread to adjacent Argentine and CCAMLR 
waters. As the edge of the continental shelf is located outside of the Argentine EEZ a 
genuine 'high seas' fishery exists in a limited area. This has been a problem for all 
attempts by CCAMLR to regulate and manage the toothfish fishery as catch which is 
declared as being taken from the high seas area falls outside of most CCAMLR 
conservation measures. The Scientific Committee was concerned at the rapid expansion in 
Division 58.5.1.59 Chile experienced difficulty in controlling its flagged vessels: "The 
intention of Chilean authorities is to intensify the control of this fleet. This control could 
include no permission for fishing in the Convention Area during the 1993/94 season unless 
vessels comply with all legal requirements ... However the current Chilean legislation does 
not allow such legal action. ,,60 The impact of Chile making greater efforts to regulate its 
flagged vessels was to increase the number of vessels reflagging to non-CCAMLR member 
flags. 
The overall submission of data from previous fishing seasons was disappointing for the 
Scientific Committee. 61 Doubts were expressed that all the catches reported from the 
western and northern grounds were actually taken outside the Convention Area. 62 
Unilateral actions by other CCAMLR members also began to occur. In August 1994 the 
UK declared and began enforcing a 200 mile EEZ around South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands. In 1994 the Commission approved a SCOI recommendation to express 
deep concern over the indications of large-scale fishing in contravention of conservation 
measures in the Convention Area.63 The Commission also expressed concern over the 
evidence of fishing by non-member countries in the Convention Area. 64 SCOI encouraged 
members to make more extensive use of the system of inspection. More active 
participation with inspections was required in light of the illegal fishing operations.65 At 
this stage the issue had not attracted public attention. 
58ISOFISH, Occasional Report No 2: The Chilean Fishing Industry: its Involvement in and Connections to 
the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Exploitation ofPatagonian toothfish in the Southern Ocean, 31 
March 1999, p.18. http://www.isofish.org.au/news/reports.htm. (site visited 16 January 2001). 
59 SC-CAMLR-XI, 3.90, p.38. 
60 SC-CAMLR-XII, 3.5, p.21. 
61 SC-CAMLR-XII, 3.14, p.22. 
62 SC-CAMLR-XII, 3.31, p.25. 
63 CCAMLR-XIII, 5.13, p.16. 
64 CCAMLR-XIII, 5.16, p.17. 
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The second phase of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean 
The second phase of IUU fishing was marked by the involvement of European companies 
and vessels, and a growing degree of alarm within CCAMLR about the challenge posed to 
its credibility. The degree of challenge posed by IUU fishing was initially questioned and 
the response from CCAMLR was neither rapid nor comprehensive. IUU fishing also began 
to expand beyond the South Atlantic into the Indian Ocean sectors of the Convention Area. 
There was an increasing availability of information about the growing scale of the problem 
as estimates of IUU activity were made, and increasing concern from the environmental 
NGOs about the effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime in achieving its conservation 
objectives. 
During the 1994/95 season UK inspections found one longliner illegally fishing in Subarea 
48.3, and ten vessels registered with CCAMLR members presumed to be infringing 
conservation measures were sighted in the same area.66 In 1995 Norwegian operators 
become involved in IUU fishing. 67 "SCOI noted with deep concern that the reported 
sightings indicated that a high level of illegal fishing activity was taking place in Subarea 
48.3. Some delegates said that the credibility of CCAMLR was at stake and it faced a 
considerable challenge in bringing this illegal fishing under control.,,68 1995 was the first 
time that WG-FSA made estimates for the unreported catch in the Convention Area and 
from adjacent banks.69 For 1994/95 the estimate was 2,870 tonnes of unreported catch for 
Subarea 48.3.70 
Reaction to the IUU problem in the 1995 Commission meeting was mixed and 
unconducive to progress. Norway expressed concern about evidence of increasing illegal 
fishing in the Convention Area.7! However, Chile argued that the matter was being taken 
out of proportion and context, and that while illegal fishing was important, it was not the 
65 CCAMLR-XIII, Annex 5, 1.29, pp.106-107. 
66 CCAMLR-XIV, Annex 5, 1.15-1.21, pp.121-122. 
67 ISOFISH, op. cit., p.18. 
68 CCAMLR-XIV, Annex 5, 1.37, p.124. 
69 CCAMLR-XIV, 4.16, p.11. "The unreported catch was either of the same order or higher than the reported 
catch. It was acknowledged that although the estimates of unreported catches had been possible this year, 
such estimates would not necessarily be possible in the future. Australia pointed out that where similar 
estimations have been performed in other fisheries the sources of information on unreported catch have often 
disappeared or become less reliable." 
70 SC-CAMLR-XIV, 4.40, Table 3, p.30. 
71 CCAMLR-XIV, 7.3, p.2l. 
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main problem in the operation of CCAMLR and was being exaggerated.72 Chile and 
Argentina felt that the main problem was the simultaneous operation in the Convention 
Area of two sets of rules - national and those adopted by CCAMLR.73 An extensive 
discussion on these matters occurred under 'other business'. Australia, France and the UK 
opposed some of the points made by Argentina and Chile. The issue was whether or not 
coastal states should exercise jurisdiction only after the CCAMLR consensus system had 
failed. Brazil commented that: "Situations of a contentious nature should be seen as 
striking at the heart of the Antarctic system - a system whose very basis was built on 
international cooperation. By remaining passive or even condoning such situations, the 
Commission takes upon itself the responsibility for any serious consequences for the future 
of the system.,,74 Brazil and South Africa emphasised the need to bring differences out into 
the open where discussion in the spirit of the Convention might overcome obstacles. The 
result of this was the inclusion of a discussion of the implementation of the objective of the 
convention for the 1996 meeting. Brazil welcomed this: "Since its establishment, the world 
has changed, issues and concerns have changed. Antarctica may be frozen, but CCAMLR 
should not.,,75 
This decision to have a discussion was going to have no impact on IUU fishing. ASOC 
expressed concern about CCAMLR's progress in practice, and the IUCN Observer 
commented that illegal fishing would threaten CCAMLR's status as a model fisheries 
agreement.76 Chile and Argentina both: "expressed their disappointment and concern that 
some observers had exceeded their role and were interfering in political matters under 
discussion in the Commission.,,77 Chile expressed a reservation about IUCN participation 
as an observer at the 1996 meeting. 78 Japan noted its belief that information papers from 
NGOs "should be matters of substance or science and not opinions.,,79 Despite the progress 
that had been made in getting acceptance of environmental NGO participation as observers 
in the CCAMLR decision-making process, the members still found criticism from the 
NGOs unwelcome. 
72 CCAMLR-XIV, 7.8-7.9, p.22. 
73 CCAMLR-XIV, 7.10-7.13, p.23. 
74 CCAMLR-XIV, 7.16, p.24. 
75 CCAMLR-XIV, 15.13, p.75. 
76 CCAMLR-XIV, 11.8-11.9, pp.64-64. 
77 CCAMLR-XIV, 11.11, p.64. 
78 CCAMLR-XIV, 14.2, p.67. The mCN was however present as an observer at the CCAMLR-XV meeting. 
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Governments did take legal action against activities that contravened conservation 
measures. This had the effect of forcing companies and individuals involved to conceal 
their activities and to move away from patrolled waters. In the 1995/96 season some 
Chilean longliners had begun poaching in the Indian Ocean.80 This eastward migration 
may have included up to fifty vessels. Many of the vessels were reflagged, and Belize, 
Panama, Vanuatu, and Portugal flagged vessels were believed to be fishing in the 
Convention Area. 81 Some of the vessels lived a double life, fishing legally for part of the 
year, and illegally for the other part of the year. Operating in the Indian Ocean made 
transshipping to refrigerated freighters (or 'reefers') necessary.82 This occurred at sea, or in 
ports close to the Indian Ocean. South Africa found four vessels fishing without permission 
near the Prince Edward Islands. 83 The UK noted that illegal fishing in Subarea 48.3 had 
decreased and presumed that they had shifted elsewhere.84 A high level of unreported 
fishing took place in the previously unfished Subareas 58.6 and 58.7 in 1995/1996.85 
The Commission noted the considerable interest expressed by fishing companies in fishing 
for D. eleginoides. 86 SCOI indicated the problem of reflagged vessels which originally 
belonged to a Member of the Commission.87 The Commission expressed its deep concern 
about reports of fishing by non-Members. 88 The Chairman was requested to write to 
governments of flag states involved and "convey a firm message that such activities 
undermine the effectiveness of the CCAMLR conservation approach and to invite such 
Flag states to consider joining CCAMLR.,,89 ASOC made a major statement in the 
Commission on IUU, expressing a tone of concern but making no specific proposals. 9o 
79 CCAMLR-XIV, 14.3, pp.67-68. 
80 ISOFISH, op. cit., p.19. 
81 CCAMLR-XV, Annex 5,1.53, p.141. 
82 ISOFISH, op. cit., p.52. 
83 CCAMLR-XV, Annex 5, 1.40, p.139. 
84 CCAMLR-XV, Annex 5,1.46, p.139. 
85 SC-CAMLR-XV, 2.9, p.7. "During 1995/96 a high level of fishing took place in previously unfished 
Subareas 58.6 and 58.7. The unreported catches in these divisions may have been as large as, or even larger 
than the total catch declared to CCAMLR." 
86 CCAMLR-XV, 4.4, p.7. 
87 CCAMLR-XV, 7.15, p.25. 
88 CCAMLR-XV, 7.17, p.26. 
89 CCAMLR, CCAMLR Newsletter, 18, December, 1996, p.3. 
90 CCAMLR-XV, 11.6, p.74. 
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The third phase of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean 
If the developments in 1995 and 1996 were a shock to the CCAMLR regime, then the 
years from 1997 to 2000 have seen a sustained impact that has not abated. This third phase 
of IUU fishing has seen a continued expansion of both regulated and unregulated fishing. 
The issue has also gained the attention of the ATCPs at ATCMs. Public concern has grown 
with the IUU fishing being widely reported in the media. The time taken up by the IUU 
issue at CCAMLR meetings has grown and occupied much of the attention of the 
Commission. 
In 1997 the XXI ATCM was held in Christchurch, New Zealand. The local press carried 
many articles in relation to IUU fishing. The issue was raised in the speeches of the New 
Zealand Ministers Simon Upton, and Jim Bolger, and discussed in the margins of the 
ATCM.91 Information was exchanged between the concerned parties92 and referred back to 
CCAMLR. At the time of the ATCM rumours circulated of a Chinese fishing fleet, 
estimated at 200 vessels, under construction by Chinese companies that would operate in 
the Convention Area.93 This was a cause of concern because although China was an ATCP, 
it was not a member of CCAMLR. 
At the 1997 Commission meeting the IUU issue was an agenda item in its own right and 
attracted attention in the opening statements of the meeting. The Chairman noted that 
"[CCAMLR] conservation measures were exemplary and its pioneering precautionary 
approach had become a model for other organisations. Unfortunately ... these progressive 
measures had little effect if they were not effectively implemented. ,,94 His Excellency the 
Honourable Sir Guy Green, Governor of Tasmania "believed that it was necessary for the 
Commission to resolve this problem in order not only to ensure the effectiveness of the 
91 "some delegations (notably Germany and Japan) fussed about the propriety of discussing CCAMLR 
matters in Christchurch" in "Toothfish Plunder Threatens Southern Oceans", Antarctic: The Journal o/the 
New Zealand Antarctic Society, 15 (2), 1997, p.30. Several nations went as far as actually veto the 
discussion. "Pirate Fisherman Debate Vetoed at Antarctic Meeting", The Gisborne Herald, Saturday, May 
31, 1997. 
92 Antarctic Treaty Consultative Meeting: ATCMXXI, Christchurch, New Zealand, 19-30 May 1997, New 
Zealand Delegation Report, Antarctic Policy Unit: Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade, p.24. 
93 "China Talks on Antarctic Pact", Evening Post, Wellington, 31 May 1997. 
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Convention but also to maintain the organisation's prestige and credibility in the wider 
communities of the world. ,,95 
More information was available to the meeting about the scale of the problem. The total 
reported catch of toothfish from EEZ outside the CCAMLR Convention Area, and from 
inside the CCAMLR Convention Area, was 32,991 tonnes. The unreported catch derived 
from landings in ports of southern Africa and Mauritius was estimated to be 74,000 to 
82,200 tonnes. The total catch was estimated to be 107,000 to 115,000 tonnes, with around 
130,000 tonnes of toothfish available on the world market.96 Australia estimated the total 
wholesale value of the IUU catch of toothfish to be in the order of half a billion Australian 
dollars, and that it was likely that over 100 vessels were involved in the illegal fishing 
activities.97 
Individual members of the Commission made extensive statements about the problem. 
These extensive statements are unusual in CCAMLR documents, and are some of the 
lengthiest political statements made in the CCAMLR Commission Report after the 
problems of the Scientific Committee's relationship in the late 1980s. Norway expressed 
its concern that: "Overfishing, illegal, unregulated and unreported at this moment 
constitutes a most serious challenge to the reputation and credibility of CCAMLR as an 
intergovernmental organisation for rational management of living marine resources on a 
sustainable basis.,,98 The European Community stated that: "The progress accomplished by 
the organisation over the last fifteen years is consequently at risk, not only of being 
undermined, but irreparably damaged by these activities.,,99 Australia had committed itself 
to expensive national action by apprehending vessels caught in the Australian EEZ around 
the Heard and McDonald Islands but pointed out "that such action can result in the 
displacement of illegal fishing to other CCAMLR areas and that the combating of illegal 
fishing can only be fully effective through the action and cooperation of all Members."lOO 
The UK welcomed the various conservation measures "but their effectiveness will depend 
upon the good faith of each Member to implement them in full."lOl New Zealand 
95 CCAMLR-XVI, 1.10, p.l. 
96 CCAMLR-XVI, 4.10, p.5. 
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98 CCAMLR-XVI, 5.5, p.9. 
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commented "that CCAMLR faced the most serious challenge in its existence ... It noted 
there was a lot of other information available which added further detail to the picture by 
naming companies and individuals behind these operations. New Zealand knew who they 
were - but the information could not be tabled at the Commission.,,102 New Zealand also 
observed that "State Parties could ensure that no vessels flying their flags were involved in 
the toothfish fishery - but the stocks could still be cleaned out by non-Contracting Party 
vessels."I03 The CCAMLR members generally agreed that: 
(i) the evidence of large-scale illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the 
Convention Area advised by CCAMLR Members during 1996/97 and in the 
beginning of the 1997/98 season, has seriously undermined the work of 
CCAMLR on achieving the Convention's objective; 
(ii) the extent of existing illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing poses a 
serious threat to the conservation of stocks of Dissostichus spp. in the 
immediate future and also to the survival of several species of seabirds in 
the Southern Ocean taken as incidental by-catch in longline fishing 
operations. 
(iii) not only vessels of non-Contracting Parties to CCAMLR but also vessels of 
CCAMLR Contracting Parties were reported fishing in the Convention Area 
contrary to the CCAMLR conservation measures in force; 
(iv) all information received points to a blatant disregard by non-Contracting 
Parties of the CCAMLR conservation regime and of the sovereign rights of 
Coastal States in the Convention Area; and 
(v) the situation calls for collective efforts within CCAMLR, measures by Flag 
States and Coastal States and steps vis-a-vis non-Contracting Parties to 
enhance enforcement and compliance with conservation measures regarding 
living resources in the Convention Area. 104 
In 1998 the ATCM held in Troms0 agreed that concerted action was needed to support the 
Convention in matters of IUU fishing in the CCAMLR Convention Area.105 At the 
Commission meeting the UK pointed out that CCAMLR: "being not only a fisheries 
organisation but also an environmental organisation, has a crucially important role within 
the Antarctic Treaty System. Any weakness in the operation of CCAMLR reflects on the 
Antarctic Treaty System as a whole. ,,106 The Chairman noted that "the conservation 
measures adopted each year are exemplary, but that these measures will have little impact 
102 CCAMLR-XVI, 5.12, p.9. 
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if they are not effectively controlled and implemented.,,107 The Governor of Tasmania 
"paid tribute to the way in which the Commission had converted that part of the Antarctic 
Treaty System with which it was concerned into an effective regime supported by equally 
effective institutional arrangements.,,108 
Namibia and Mauritius accepted the invitation to attend CCAMLR-XVII. This prompted 
some discussion about how such third-party observers should be handled, necessitating 
some minor changes to the rules of procedure. 109 "There was general agreement that 
invited observers had made a significant contribution to the meetings of CCAMLR, and 
that their participation enhanced the transparency of CCAMLR's decision-making 
process."l1O Australia was concerned by the proposal that the Commission resile from the 
invitations issued at CCAMLR-XVI, and "considered that any erosion of the openness and 
transparency of the Commission would diminish the strength of the Commission and its 
close relations with a wide range of observers."lll Namibia explained its position, how it 
had only gained independence in 1990 and had experienced massive problems with illegal 
fishing by foreign fleets in its EEZ. The Namibian government was working to amend its 
Sea Fisheries Act in order to conform to UNIA and the F AO Compliance Agreement. 
Namibia was opposed to the undermining of CCAMLR management measures. 112 
In 1998 there appeared to be a downturn in the scale of IUU fishing in the Convention 
Area for the 1997/98 season. This may have been due to a combination of market forces, 
enforcement by CCAMLR Members, and a decrease in catch rates. 1l3 The total catch of 
reported finfish from the Convention Area in 1997/98 was 11,419 tonnes. D. eleginoides 
accounted for 11,168 tonnes of this catch. The total reported catch of D. eleginoides from 
CCAMLR waters and EEZs outside the CCAMLR Convention Area was 27,908 tonnes. 
However the estimated unreported catch was 22,415 tonnes. 114 "The Scientific Committee 
noted that about 90% of D. eleginoides was exported to Japan and the US, and that at least 
60 518 tonnes of D. eleginoides were traded in the 1997/98 split-year. Less than 50% of 
106 CCAMLR-XVII, 11.2, p.81 
107 CCAMLR-XVII, 1.2, p.l. 
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this trade could be attributed to reported catches from CCAMLR waters and EEZs outside 
the Convention Area.,,115 Forty-five sightings of fishing vessels of non-Contracting Parties 
were made in 1997/98, some of the vessels being flagged to Seychelles, the Faroe Islands, 
and Belize. 116 The South African vessel Sudar Havid sank 6 June 1998, there were twenty-
one survivors, including a UK scientific observer, and seventeen dead.l17 
The 1998 meeting was addressed on behalf of Australia by Senator, the Honourable Robert 
Hill, the Australian Minister for the Environment and Heritage. 118 Senator Hill stressed the 
need for action to stop IUU fishing and urged the adoption of a range of effective measures 
to combat these illegal activities, including a catch certification scheme, and other trade 
related measures. "A failure to act on such proposals would mean that CCAMLR would be 
failing in its primary objective of conserving Antarctic marine living resources. It would 
also undermine the credibility of CCAMLR as an effective international organisation.,,119 
The Scientific Committee recommended that the Commission take the most stringent 
measures possible to combat IUU in the Convention Area. This recommendation was 
based on the conclusions that: 
(i) there is a distinct possibility that stocks of D. eleginoides will continue to be 
depleted to extremely low levels; 
(ii) the long-term yield of the targeted stocks of D. eleginoides is likely to be 
compromised in the future by ineffective control of illegal, unregulated and 
unreported fishing; and 
(iii) the potential levels of incidental mortality of several species of seabirds in 
longline fisheries were found to be unsustainable for the populations of 
these species. 120 
Extensive statements were again made in reaction to the IUU problem by the EC, Norway, 
New Zealand, Chile, and South Africa. The EC acknowledged the challenge and suggested 
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115 CCAMLR-XVII, 4.8, p.8. 
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that separate but inter-related measures were needed. 121 The Norwegian statement 
addressed similar concerns but also highlighted the potential limits to what could be 
expected from CCAMLR: 
In discussing new efficient measures and ways and means of their enforcement we 
are approaching complex questions of international law, the sacrosanct Flag-State 
principle and the principle of not giving laws extra-territorial application. These 
principles have ... been pillars of marine resource management both in CCAMLR 
and other international marine management organisations. In the Norwegian view, 
the Flag-State principle - i.e. that the responsibility resides with the Flag State -
should continue as the basis of regulatory measures. 122 
New Zealand compared IUD fishing: "to a cancer eating at the fibre of the Antarctic Treaty 
System.,,123 New Zealand observed that IUU fishing was being conducted mainly by 
companies and individuals originating from CCAMLR parties and that this was legal in the 
jurisdiction of such companies. The vessels involved appear to be flying third-party flags. 
Concerned that IUD fishing would move into the Ross Sea in the next summer season. 
New Zealand was wary of increasing the compliance costs of the legal fishing operators. 
"Until and unless CCAMLR Parties were prepared to take effective action against 
nationals and companies, the rest of the world would fail to see CCAMLR as an effective 
. . ,,124 
conservatIOn regIme. 
It was becoming obvious that existing conservation measures were inadequate. According 
to Chile: "despite the existence of more stringent conservation measures the levels of 
unregulated fishing continue to challenge the feasibility of the objectives of the 
Convention.,,125 South Africa noted that the "strong measures announced by South Africa 
at the Sixteenth Meeting, some of which were criticised for going too far, turned out not to 
have gone far enough.,,126 The United States view was that it was "time to move from 
reiterating the seriousness of the problem to dealing with it.,,127 The members were aware 
that it was difficult to expect that non-contracting parties would assist CCAMLR while 
CCAMLR members have not exerted the greatest possible efforts themselves. Most 
members were wary about adopting measures that might undermine the flag state principle, 
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remaining cautious in dealing with extra-territoriality issues, and wanted any trade-related 
measures to be in conformity with General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) and 
World Trade Organization (WTO) rules. 
In 1998 applications continued to be made to start new toothfish fisheries despite the IUU 
fishing problem. Australia applied for an exploratory trawl fishery in Divisions 58.4.1 and 
58.4.3. New Zealand applied for an exploratory longline fishery in Subarea 88.1. South 
Africa applied for a new longline fishery in Subarea 48.6 and Division 58.4.4 and 
exploratory fisheries in Subareas 58.6 and 58.7. Spain applied for an exploratory longline 
fishery in Division 58.4.4, and Uruguay applied for an new longline fishery in 58.4.4. 128 
Applications submitted after deadlines had passed were still a problem and the 
Commission stated that applications for new and exploratory fisheries had to be submitted 
on time to be fully evaluated. 129 The Scientific Committee was unable to provide estimates 
for mixed-gear fisheries (where longline and trawl techniques are both used) for 
1998/99.130 The United states expressed concern over the development of fisheries 
targeting Antarctic toothfish. Very little was known about the species and it was one of the 
few target species which occurred entirely within the Convention Area. 131 
A serious problem at the 1998 CCAMLR meeting was a breach of confidentiality. This 
was potentially a great setback for the environmental NGOs and for the transparency of 
CCAMLR. 
It came to the attention of the Commission that ISOFISH had recently placed on its 
website information which reported proceedings of a meeting of SCOI to which no 
observers from international organisations were invited. This action was in a clear 
breach of confidentiality of discussions held by SCOr.132 
CCAMLR received a letter of apology from ASOC and an assurance that such actions 
would not recur. The delegation of Uruguay was upset because the leaked information 
wrongly affirmed that an offending vessel was flying a Uruguay flag. 133 Norway warned 
that NGOs should not give the impression of representing CCAMLR. 134 Japan sought 
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resolution on the importance of maintaining confidentiality, but this was blocked by other 
members who felt it was inappropriate: "The Commission confirmed that while 
transparency in its operation is important, especially for the involvement of non-Member 
States and intergovernmental organisations, the Members continue to take seriously their 
responsibilities with respect to confidentiality.,,135 Without confidentiality commercial data 
will not be forthcoming, and without commercial data CCAMLR is unlikely to be 
effective. The rules of procedure were amended so that while observers could be restricted 
from attending sessions attended by the Members, they could also be invited. 136 
New Zealand hosted a 'Ministerial on Ice' from 25-28 January 1999 with representatives 
from twenty-three ATCPs meeting informally at Ross Island, Antarctica. Simon Upton, 
New Zealand Associate Minister of Foreign Affairs and Trade, made a statement about the 
Toothfish saga and how it threatened the credibility and integrity of the ATS: "The fact 
that this fishing may be made 'legal' through the use of flags of convenience or elaborate 
company arrangements does not make it morally right.,,137 A Ministerial Communique was 
issued which demonstrated the development of political will to solve problems: 
The Antarctic Treaty System is facing new challenges, including pressures from 
non-sustainable use of resources. Representatives expressed in particular their 
grave concern at the threat posed by continuing illegal, unregulated and unreported 
fishing for toothfish. Representatives pledged themselves to work to meet these 
new challenges and to maintain the integrity of the Antarctic Treaty System. 138 
This kind of statement would have been difficult to make at an ATCM, where the agenda 
is already crowded and because some ATCPs would rather leave the issue to CCAMLR. 
New Zealand also dispatched HMNZS Te Kaha to the Ross Sea, a patrol effort that is 
illustrative of the difficulties of enforcement in the Southern Ocean. A robust display of 
sovereignty, but it only just got to 600 South latitude at the edge of the fishing grounds. 
HMNZS Te Kaha patrolled 60-640 South latitude, encountering waves of 14 metres, wind 
speeds of 50-60 knots/90-110 kmh, with peaks of 20m and 75 knots/139 kmhY9 Anchor 
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machinery was swept away, and a hole in the deck created by rogue 20-meter waves. 140 
Airborne P3 Orions were also patrolling between 60 and 74° South latitude. From 60-65° 
South latitude they are able to spend five hours on station, at 70° South latitude three hours 
on station, and at 74° South latitude just one hour. 141 Although it was difficult to tell 
whether any IUU fishing occurred in the Ross Sea, New Zealand had grounds for its 
efforts. According to Stuart Prior: "We had credible information about groups of pirate 
vessels looking at heading into the Ross Sea and we also had information from fishing 
industry sources which suggested that people were already confident enough to be offering 
Ross Sea toothfish for sale and seeking buyers on the European market.,,142 Although many 
rumours circulated that boats were preparing to make the trip, neither the legal fishers nor 
the maritime surveillance found anything definite, just some lines of fioats. 143 Access to 
the Ross Sea is very difficult due to the ice conditions, and legal fishing vessels rely on an 
informal agreement with Italian icebreakers. Because of the high seas status of the area 
patrolled, the approach taken differed from EEZ patrols, where the Royal New Zealand 
Navy attempts to surprise IUU fishers and arrest them. Instead, they aimed for the 
maximum deterrent effect by publicising the patrols widely. In the event of IUU fishing 
being discovered, the response would have been to take photographs and distribute them 
immediately through the international media. 144 
In April 2000, growing world attention was highlighted when ISOFISH activities featured 
strongly in a joint TVE, UNEP, and WWF television news video called 'White Gold'. 
Among other things, this showed how ISOFISH had helped facilitate cooperation between 
Greenpeace and the French Navy. At the start of CCAMLR-XVIII, the Governor of 
Tasmania suggested that: "the Commission should feel encouraged by the knowledge that 
what it is doing was fundamentally right and sensible, and that its endeavours had 
substantial popular support.,,145 The Chairman noted that it was an important meeting, with 
complex issues to be resolved, with "a broad range of expectations, not only from within 
the organisation but also from outside: from the media, from non-governmental 
organisations and from individuals concerned with the living resources of Antarctica. ,,146 
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The total reported catch of finfish from the Convention Area in 1998/99 was 18,006 
tonnes, of which D. eleginoides accounted for 17,435 tonnes. I47 Despite the measures 
adopted in 1997 and 1998, IUU fishing continued. Members reported sightings of sixteen 
vessels in the Convention Area, with three vessels flags being identified: Argentina, 
Belize, and Panama. France reported that four vessels, two from Chile, and one each from 
Argentina and Belize, found engaged in IUU fishing in the Kerguelen EEZ were subject to 
legal and administrative action, and another two had been sighted. I48 The IUU fishing 
effort appeared to be concentrated in the Indian Ocean in Area 58. The estimated IUU 
catch in 1998/99 was 10,773 tonnes, but the "Scientific Committee also advised that 
although estimates of IUU Dissostichus spp. catches have decreased ... the difficulties in 
estimating such catches have increased.,,149 
Fishing took place in only one of the new and four of the exploratory fisheries in 1998/99 
season.
I50 There was still a paucity of fishery information on toothfish in a number of 
subareas and divisions, something of concern given the substantial IUU fishing believed to 
have occurred in these areas. 151 Serious difficulties were encountered in trying to calculate 
precautionary catch levels that took account of the potential impact of IUU fishing, with 
calculated yield levels far in excess of possible precautionary catch levels. This was taken 
to indicate that the methods should not be used for Dissostichus spp. while information on 
stock status and recruitment was absent, 152 The Commission agreed that with the high level 
of IUU fishing, it was unrealistic to regard fisheries for Dissostichus spp. as new, and all 
the 1999/2000 toothfish fisheries would be considered exploratory. There was a need to 
conduct fisheries-independent surveys to estimate recruitment,I53 
New Zealand referred to the focussing of world attention on illegal fishing in the Southern 
Ocean and noted that "information had been received which indicated that vessels flagged 
by Contracting Parties may be involved in illegal fishing. In other cases, New Zealand 
noted that nationals and companies from Contracting Parties were involved and using 'flag 
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state responsibility' as a shield. This was unacceptable.,,154 CCAMLR was not just a 
fisheries agency. The ATS had to be responsible to the wider concerns of civil society. 
South Africa commented on how the high levels of IUU fishing in the Indian Ocean have 
caused permanent damage, with catch rates around the Prince Edward Islands falling to 
10% of their initial levels, which "bears testimony to CCAMLR's collective inability to 
effectively address this serious problem, both as individual States and as a Commission .... 
The Commission's best effort may in retrospect appear to be a case of too little too late.,,155 
South Africa believed that there were new trends in IUU fishing, such as transhipment at 
sea, new landing sites in Mozambican ports, and growing exports to new markets in non-
Contracting Parties such as China. 156 More could be done to identify fishing vessels. Brazil 
felt that the Commission "should take care not to be seen as an organisation which accepts 
IUU fishing by a few countries while others look on passively. It is high time that fishing 
states and importing nations assume their responsibilities".157 Chile commented that: 
"assuming that the illegal fishery may be seen as the main challenge to the objective of the 
Convention, some inherent weakness in the CCAMLR system had allowed such a 
challenge to develop. But even if the IUU was finally defeated, implementation of the 
objective could remain an unfinished task.,,158 
The development of an action plan to enhance cooperation between CCAMLR and non-
Contracting Parties and ensure the effectiveness of conservation measures was 
discussed. 159 This would encourage non-Contracting Parties to attend as observers, and to 
accede to the Convention. Information about the Catch Documentation Scheme (CDS) was 
to be provided along with a request for participation. Help was also to be requested for 
dealing with flag vessels in the Convention Area. 160 Namibia and Vanuatu were planning 
to accede to the Convention and Namibia intended to apply for membership of the 
Commission. 161 The observer from Denmark explained that while the Faroe Islands was 
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not in a position to consider membership of CCAMLR, they were ready to fully respect the 
principles laid down in the Convention.162 
The IUCN Observer made several comments: both effective port control and trade 
measures are required; non-Contracting Parties should be encouraged to accede to 
CCAMLR; regional tuna commissions should be encouraged to investigate seabird by-
catch in longline fisheries; adopt national plans in support of the F AO IPOA for Seabirds; 
support the nomination of seven at-risk species of petrel to Appendix II of the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora (CITES); and 
consider the adoption of Marine Protected Areas (MP As). 163 The ASOC observer signalled 
a significant change in the stance taken by ASOC: "ASOC considered that the creation of a 
sufficiently severe enforcement regime is urgently required. It believed, reluctantly, that a 
crucial step towards ending IUU fishing is for CCAMLR to place a moratorium on legal 
fisheries for Dissostichus Spp.,,164 This would require concomitant sanctions under CITES. 
A moratorium should be maintained until all IUU fishing has been eliminated, all 
Dissostichus spp. stock parameters are available, a trade system for the verification of 
catch origin is in place and incidental seabird catch is eliminated. 165 The Republic of Korea 
did not believe that further interaction with CITES would be appropriate. 166 
Interaction with other organisations was increasingly prevalent and important and needed 
to be considered further. Of these organisations, the most important one in organising 
attempts to deal with the problems posed by IUU fishing has been the F AO. There was a 
meeting of F AO and non-F AO Regional Fisheries Bodies in Rome, Italy, in February 
1999, at which CCAMLR was represented by Italy. Several important conclusions were 
reached regarding the use of 'flags of convenience' and the application of the ecosystem 
approach to management. 167 The meeting agreed that F AO should act as a communication 
channel among regional fisheries bodies. 168 
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The CDS entered into effect in May 2000, and was generally welcomed. One significant 
problem in its implementation was that China initially refused to participate. While an 
ATCP, China is not a member of CCAMLR, and is not therefore required to participate. 169 
ISOFISH believed that IUU fish was now being imported into Japan from China, although 
Mauritius still remained the largest source. 170 France has been putting pressure on 
Mauritius to take stronger action. l71 It is interesting to note that despite Mauritius being 
involved with CCAMLR since 1998, IUU activities could continue to be based in and 
operate out of Port Louis. On October 10, 2000, the FV Amur sanle in the French EEZ off 
the Kerguelen Islands with the loss of fourteen lives. l72 This may have spurred Mauritius 
to greater cooperation against IUU activities. 173 Attempts were made to pressure Mauritius 
to conform with CCAMLR,174 and in 2000 Mauritius agreed to cooperate with the CDS. 175 
In the ASOC report to CCAMLR XIX, concerns were expressed about the CDS: "we are 
concerned that its structual limitations, and incomplete implementation, especially by 
monitoring and enforcement of management measures.", http://www.fao.org/fi/meetings/rfb/r597e.asp, (site 
visited 27 March, 2001). 
168 CCAMLR-XVIII, 12.5, p,47. 
169 The Antarctica Project, "China Opens Ports to Pirate Fishers", Washington DC, 28 June 2000. 
http://www.asoc.org/currentpress/0628pr.htm(sitevisited27March2001).In 2000 China was invited to 
attend the CCAMLR-XIX meeting as an observer because of its interest in the toothfish trade, but did not 
attend. A further invitation was extended for 2001. CCAMLR-XIX, 1.6, p.5, and 16.3, p.73. In 2001 China 
confirmed its involvement in the scheme, http://www.traffic.org/toothfish/tooth3.html, (site visited 11 
February, 2002). 
170 ISOFISH, "Japanese Toothfish Import Data Reveal Trade Routes for Stolen Fish", September 2000, 
http://www.isofish.org.aulnews/index.htm (site visited 27 March 2001). 
171 ISO FISH, "France Forces Mauritius Authorities to Stop Toothfish Poachers Unloading in Port Louis" 
August 2000, and "Local Toothfish Traders Allowed to Keep Handling Pirated Toothfish" 28 July 2000, 
http://www.isofish.org.aulnews/index.htm (site visited 27 March 2001). 
172 ECO, 2, 26 October 2000, CCAMLR-XIX, Hobart Tasmania, http://www.asoc.orgJEC02.htm (site visited 
27 March 2001). Although flagged to Sao Tome, the Amur was probably connected to Spanish fishing 
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cooperate with the French rescue effort and fled the scene. ECO, 3, 30 October 2000, CCAMLR-XIX, 
Hobart Tasmania, http://www.asoc.org/eco3.htm(site visited 27 March 2001). Working conditions on 
vessels involved in IUD fishing are often substandard and can involve the exploitation of crews from 
developing countries. The International Transportworkers Federation has a campaign against flag of 
convenience vessels for this reason. See ITF Fisheries, Troubled Waters: Fishing, Pollution, and FOes, 
http://www.itf.org.uk/SECTIONSlfisheries/troubledwaters/twindex.htm (site visited 19 March, 2001). 
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Minister for Agriculture and Fisheries", 2 November 2000, 
http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/env/2000/mr2nov200.html (site visited 27 March 2001). 
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notes, Alistair Graham Lecture, 22 June 2000. 
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CCAMLR Parties, has limited its ability to stop the trade of IUU toothfish.,,176 ASOC 
believed that commercial interests had negated the CCAMLR approach and that the IUU 
catch still exceeded the legal catch. Calls were repeated for a moratorium until IUU fishing 
could be brought under control and the stocks assessed. ASOC made it clear that there 
would be renewed pressure for a CITES listing at the next CITES meeting in 2002. ASOC 
made a number of suggestions: increased use of vessels and aircraft in the Convention 
Area needs to be made, as well as the use satellites. Krill vessels require VMS and 
observers, because the fishery has the potential to expand rapidly. ASOC argued that if 
CCAMLR is unable to bring IUU fishing under control then: "it may be time to place 
management of fisheries in other parts of the Antarctic Treaty System - before the entire 
ATS is irredeemably damaged by the failure."l77 If CCAMLR fails it also undermines the 
Madrid Protocol, and the political compromises that led to that agreement. A statement 
similar to the one given at CCAMLR-XVIII was made: 
"At the beginning of the Century, 21 years on from the establishment of the 
management regime that was supposed to safeguard the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem, commercial greed, political weakness and institutional ineptitude 
present us with the same old situation - chronic and essentially unregulated 
overfishing of target species, and massive incidental catch of other species" .178 
Why did IUU fishing occur? 
IUU fishing occurred in the Southern Ocean due to a variety of factors: economlC 
incentives encouraged it; technically it was feasible; and many individuals and companies 
were willing to take the risks. While there has been money to be made with little fear of 
detection, the 'bad actors' have had little reason not to engage in IUU fishing. Operating 
in the Southern Ocean is difficult and expensive. A modern large, long-range, refrigerated, 
self-contained fishing vessel can cost $AI0-30 million, with daily operating costs of 
$A20,000-40,000.179 The fact that toothfish could be harvested in large quantities, 
combined with its ability to be substituted into existing high-value fish markets meant that 
significant profits could be made. IUU fishing started against a backdrop of growing global 
176 Report of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) to the XIX Meeting of the Convention on 
the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Hobart, 2000.http://www.asoc.orgiASOCreport.htm 
(site visited 27 March 2001). 
177 ibid. 
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demand for marine protein, and an existing over-capacity in the fleets that harvest that 
potential. 180 In the Southern Ocean there was initial access to an undeveloped toothfish 
fishery in Argentine waters with no quota limits, followed by abundant and locatable 
stocks around Sub-Antarctic islands. There was an appreciation of the low risk of 
apprehension because of weak coastal state controls in these distant waters, and the low 
financial costs of apprehension because of the use of older 'rust bucket' vessels which cost 
little to write off. Improving control over home waters and increasing associated costs of 
compliance with regulations also favoured fishing in the high seas. 181 
IUU occurred in part because it was possible for it to occur. In a technical sense, evading 
CCAMLR requirements was not exceptionally difficult in the early 1990s. It was, and 
remains, a relatively simple task to reflag a vessel, to establish shelf companies, and 
perform other tricks that obscure the legal trail. 182 A few phone calls are all it takes for an 
established operator to acquire a vessel and establish a shelf company. 183 The penalties for 
being caught involved in IUU fishing are largely financial. Jail terms are uncommon, 184 
although there may be some loss of freedom while waiting for court cases to be resolved. 
Fishers are willing to take that kind of risk and the phenomenon of 'captains of 
convenience', people employed to take responsibility for a boat engaged in IUU fishing, 
has been encountered. 185 Ultimately, the individuals and companies that have enjoyed the 
greatest profits from IUU fishing have borne very little risk. 
179 Martin Exel, "Exploitation of Southern Ocean Fisheries: An Industry Perspective", in Bateman, Sam., and 
Donald R. Rothwell, editors, Southern Ocean Fishing: Policy Challenges/or Australia, Wollongong Paper 
on Maritime Policy No.7, Centre for Maritime Policy, University ofWollongong: Wollongong, 1998, p.l05. 
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the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Exploitation o/Patagonian toothfish in the Southern Ocean, 31 
March 1999, p.l8. http://www.isofish.org.au/news/reports.htm. (site visited 16 January 2001), p.20. 
181 Martin Exel, op. cit., p.108. The cost of complying with government regulations has an effect on the 
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182 The ISOFISH organisation has spent considerable effort in tracking attempts by IUD fishing operators to 
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Who is involved in IUU fishing? 
Identifying those involved in IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean is difficult. Governments 
are hampered by the requirement of having to work to an evidential standard. NGOs are 
less restricted, but have to be careful to avoid defamation, or the opprobrium that goes with 
'crying wolf' .186 Information about who is responsible for IUU fishing is difficult to extract 
from CCAMLR. While it is acknowledged that a major part of the IUU problem is caused 
by nationals and companies of CCAMLR members, the exact nationalities responsible are 
not identified in CCAMLR publications. ISOFISH has not shown that reluctance and in a 
series of reports has detailed the companies and individuals involved in IUU fishing. The 
labelling of IUU operators by the NGOs does not rest comfortably with CCAMLR 
members and in 1998 Chile, Norway, Japan, and Argentina expressed an opinion about 
background papers provided by ASOC that although they contained information relevant 
to CCAMLR, "the language used in these papers is often inappropriate and should be 
avoided III communications between governmental and non-governmental 
organisations. ,,187 
ISOFISH called the Norwegian companies and individuals involved 'vikings', identifying 
three principle groups: Magne Hisdal and the Glacial group, Oddvar Vea and the Cindy 
Fishing Co.; and Jan Sjaastad and Norse Seafood Ltd. 188 Denmark's autonomous region, 
the Faeroe Islands, was also suspected by ISOFISH of being involved with the 'vikings'. In 
Chile ISOFISH identified Roberto Verdugo, a former Under-Secretary of Fisheries for an 
earlier Chilean government, as the 'pirate king' controlling the Verdugo group of 
companies. 189 The 'spanish armada' is the term used for "a host of Spanish, Chilean and 
185 ISOFISH, op. cit., p.60. "It is said that, customarily, on the Spanish vessels, effective control of fishing 
operations rests with the fishing master, who is usually Spanish, not the skipper, who is usually Argentinian 
or Chilean." 
186 ISOFISH has made at least one apology for an incorrect identification in Occasional Report No 1: The 
Involvement of Mauritius in Patagonian Toothfishfrom Illegal and Unregulated Longline Fishing in the 
Southern Ocean, and What Might be Done About it, August 1998, page i, 
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Argentinan boats which sweep across the Southern Ocean from southern South America, 
pillaging sub-Antarctic EEZs as they gO.,,190 Spanish vessels tend to be rust buckets 
compared to the 'vikings' more modern vessels, with plate freezers rather than the modern 
blast freezers which allow a higher quality product that will fetch higher prices. The 
involvement of Spanish nationals and companies in IUU has been widely reported: "it's 
blatantly obvious to all except the Spanish government, it seems.,,191 IUU fishing has been 
conducted by 'cowboys' (operators with one to two vessels), as well as by companies that 
operate many vessels. 
It is not just a question of involvement in the poaching operation itself in the Southern 
Ocean, but also the landing, shipping, and marketing of the fish. At the XIX CCAMLR 
meeting in 2000, ASOC named names, pointing out specific instances where CCAMLR 
Member states were failing in their responsibilities. Spanish nationals continued to be 
responsible for the bulk of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean, operating under flags of 
convenience. Uruguay still allowed Montevideo Port to be used by illegal fishers, 
responding only to specific complaints. Chile had not stopped factories processing illegal 
fish, or companies from exporting it. Japan still allowed IUD fish to be imported and 
traded in its markets. Canada had refused to implement CDS, allowing illegal toothfish 
from Chile to be re-exported into the United States. l92 Third-party states are also involved 
such, as the transshipping that occurred in Port Louis in Mauritius. 
While many of the companies and top individuals involved in IUU fishing are Europeans, 
many of the ordinary crew of the vessels engaged in IUD fishing come from developing 
states. Conditions are difficult in the legal fishing industry, where there are long voyages, 
in cramped conditions, not being allowed to land on islands where conservation concerns 
190 ISOFISH, Occasional Report No 1: The Involvement of Mauritius in Patagonian Toothfishfrom Illegal 
and Unregulated Longline Fishing in the Southern Ocean, and What Might be Done About it, August 1998, 
http://www.isofish.org.aulnews/reports.htm. (site visited 27 March, 2001), p.9. 
191 ECO, 2, 26 October 2000, CCAMLR-XIX, Hobart Tasmania, http://www.asoc.org/EC02.htm (site visited 
27 March, 2001). See also 'White Gold', a television news video jointly released by TVE, UNEP, and 
WWF, April 19, 2000. ISOFISH, "Rogues Gallery", http://www.isofish.org.au/rogues/index.htm (site visited 
27 March, 2001). Sr Mora of the Spanish company Morabal "felt quite comfortable in revealing and 
confirming his involvement in toothfish poaching in CCAMLR waters because he is breaking no laws in 
Spain - despite Spain being a signatory to CAMLR. His longliners and the companies which own them are 
all registered in countries of convenience which are not members of CAMLR - and are thus not bound by its 
rules. While Spain may be embarrassed by his behaviour, she has not yet seen fit to take responsibility for 
him despite his: being a Spanish citizen; living and working on Spanish soil; and being the director of several 
Spanish companies." 
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exist. 193 In the unregulated fishery, the labour conditions of working in the Southern 
Ocean, one of the most difficult oceans to work in, often in old rust bucket vessels, are 
even more difficult. 194 "When at sea, the crew habitually work long shifts of 14 to 16 hours 
a day and reports of officers resorting to physical violence, psychological pressure, 
withholding pay are common.,,195 The Mar del Sur I was arrested by the French authorities 
on Reunion Island after it was denounced by its Chilean crewmembers for unsafe 
navigation conditions and serious engine failures. 196 
The Attempt by CCAMLR to Stop IUU Fishing 
Because the existing framework of conservation measures proved inadequate to deal with 
IUU fishing, in the mid-1990s CCAMLR began to consider a wide variety of proposals to 
extend its regulatory framework and programmatic activities. In this section the 
development of conservation measures and their effectiveness in dealing with problems of 
third-party states, flag state enforcement, trade related measures, cooperation between 
members and IGOs, and VMS proposals will be discussed. 
The problem of third-party states 
CCAMLR had to some extent proceeded on the assumption that states interested in 
harvesting and conservation activities in the Southern Ocean would join CCAMLR, or at 
least respect its authority. However, not all states are created equal and some states lack the 
capacity or political will to be involved in CCAMLR. The problems are those of reflagging 
of CCAMLR member vessels, and fishing by flag vessels of non-member states. Two 
general approaches have been taken by the Commission to deal with these problems. The 
192 ASOC, "Time for a Toothfish Moratorium", Hobart, October 23,2000, 
http://www.asoc.org/pressreleasel.htm (site visited 27 March, 2001). 
193 Martin Exel, op. cit., p.107. Unexpected problems can also arise: "The oil content of tooth fish created 
significant problems once the vessel began processing offal, with much of the initial meal having to be 
dumped back into the sea as it was rapidly gaining an internal temperature that could have created, 
effectively, internal combustion of the product kept on the vessel." 
194 See Chapter 5, note 172, p.187. 
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the Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated Exploitation of Patagonian tooth fish in the Southern Ocean, 31 
March 1999, http://www.isofish.org.au/news/reports.htm. (site visited 27 March, 2001), p.61. 
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first has been to contact third-party states involved with IUU fishing to persuade them to 
join CCAMLR or take action to halt the activities that are undermining the CCAMLR 
regime. The second has been to pass a series of conservation measures aimed at improving 
compliance with CCAMLR rules by third-party states and their flagged vessels. 
In 1996, Namibia said it wished to be involved with the Commission and would take steps 
to ensure compliance from Namibian vessels. 197 CCAMLR has taken steps to amend the 
System of Inspection to address the actions of non-contracting parties, and has invited 
observers from non-Member states involved in the IUU fishing. Mauritius and Namibia 
were invited to the 1998 meeting. 198 They both attended in 1998 and 1999. For the 1999 
CCAMLR meeting, Belize, Denmark (in respect of the Faroe Islands), Panama, Portugal, 
the Seychelles and Vanuatu were also invited. Of these states, only Denmark was 
represented at the meeting. 199 A large proportion of diplomatic discussions regarding 
accession have involved Australia as the depositary to the Convention?OO 
In 1997 the Commission adopted Conservation Measure 1181XVI, 'Scheme to Promote 
Compliance by non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation Measures'. 
Non-contracting party vessels engaged in fishing activities in the Convention Area, or 
transhipment activities, are now presumed to be undermining the effectiveness of the 
CCAMLR conservation measures. The Secretariat, all contracting parties, and the flag state 
of the vessel are to be informed when this activity is detected. If the vessel enters the port 
of a contracting party it is to be inspected and the landing or transhipment of all fish is 
prohibited unless it is established that they were caught outside the Convention Area or in 
compliance with conservation measures. This may have the effect of displacing catch 
landings away from member state ports. The measure was amended the following year and 
adopted as Conservation Measure 118IXVII with the addition of a reference to including 
information from VMS. One example of the effect of this conservation measure occurred 
in March 2000 when the Belize registered vessels Cisne Raja and Cisne Azul were unable 
197 CCAMLR-XV, 17.3, p.90. 
198 CCAMLR-XVI, 5.36-5.37, p.12, the text of the letter can be found in Annex 6, p.152. 
199 CCAMLR-XVIII, 1.5, p.l. 
200 In 1999/2000 Australia undertook discussions with Mauritius, Namibia, Vanuatu, and Portugal concerning 
accession. Australia, Report of Members Activities in the Convention Area for the Year to 30 June 2000, pA. 
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to prove that they had not been fishing in contravention of CCAMLR requirements, and 
withdrew a request for port access to Fremantle, Western Australia.201 
Victoria Hallum suggested using a regional blacklist like the South Pacific Forum Fisheries 
Agency (FF A) has used, but recognised that the sovereignty problems would probably rule 
this OUt.202 The developing international environmental law and law of the sea is still 'soft' 
in this area, and it really requires domestic implementation for success. Port state controls 
can be used by CCAMLR members on vessels flagged to non-members, but this does not 
stop vessels from using non-member country ports. Market-end controls in CCAMLR 
member nations may be more effective, possibly based on the ICCAT mode1.203 
At the 2000 meeting the Commission adopted Resolution 13IXIX, 'Flagging and Licensing 
of Non-Contracting Party Vessels'. This recognised the situation that had been known for 
some time and, inspired by the F AO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International 
Conservation and Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, it urged the 
Contracting Parties to avoid flagging or licensing vessels to fish in waters under their 
jurisdiction if the vessel had a history of engagement in IUU fishing in the Convention 
Area. This resolution also touches on flag state enforcement measures, and international 
cooperation. Mauritius appears to have decided to cooperate with the CDS, following 
pressure from France, Australia, New Zealand, United States and South Africa?04 
Mauritius may have found that it was in its long term interests to continue to be the subject 
of bad publicity in the local and international press. This does not automatically close Port 
Louis to poachers and the test of the commitment to the CDS will be the manner in which 
Mauritius attempts to verify whether the toothfish has been caught outside the Convention 
Area or in accordance with CCAMLR conservation measures. 
201 Australia, op. cit., pp.13-14. 
202 Victoria Hallum, The Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, LLM 
Research Paper International Law of the Sea (LAWS 536), Victoria University Wellington: Law Faculty, 
1997 pp.51-52. 
203 ibid., pp.59-61. 
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Flag state enforcement measures 
In 1997, Conservation Measure 119IXVI 'Requirement for Contracting Parties to Licence 
their Flag Vessels in the Convention Area' was adopted. This requires the contracting 
parties to prohibit fishing by their flag vessels in the Convention Area unless they have a 
licence or permit. A licence may only be issued to a vessel flying the flag of the 
contracting party and the vessel must be capable of fulfilling the requirements of the 
various conservation measures. The following year, Chile and the EC tabled draft measures 
based on Conservation Measure 1191XVI, the difference lying in the language used in 
respect of the licensing regime required. This became adopted as Conservation Measure 
119IXVII 'Licensing and Inspection Obligations of Contracting Parties with regard to their 
Flag Vessels Operating in the Convention Area'. 205 This added the requirement that 
licenses to fish for flag vessels were only to be granted if the contracting party was 
satisfied that it had the ability to exercise its responsibilities. Verification procedures were 
improved and information reporting required. 
In 1998 Conservation Measure 146IXVII 'Marking of Fishing Vessels and Fishing Gear' 
was adopted. This required contracting parties to ensure that their licensed fishing vessels 
are marked in such a way that they can be readily identified in accordance with 
internationally recognised standards. Marker buoys and similar floating objects should be 
clearly marked as to which ship they belong to?06 The growing amount of referencing 
between conservation measures is an indication of the growing complexity of 
arrangements to deal with the problems facing CCAMLR. 
There was a proposal from Australia in 1998 that contracting parties provide a general 
description of their vessels to the Secretariat in addition to the information being currently 
supplied. This would create a CCAMLR Vessel Register. The Commission noted that there 
may be benefits to providing information about vessels to non-contracting parties and 
204 "Fishing for Patagonian Toothfish. Mauritius Adopts the Catch Documentation Scheme", 
http://www.isofish.org.aulnews/OO/news.12.Nov.00.MauritiusAdoptsCDScheme.htm (site visited 27 March 
2001). 
205 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.42-5.47, p.20. 
206 CCAMLR-XVII, p.46. 
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Namibia and Mauritius were to be allowed to access this information. Further development 
ofa CCAMLR Vessel Register was left for intersessional work.207 
At SCOI in 1998, New Zealand tabled a proposal to consider the application of national 
jurisdiction by CCAMLR parties to their nationals and companies in respect of fishing 
activities in the Convention Area. The EC and other members held that 'nationals' refers to 
'vessels' and that only the flag state can exercise jurisdiction on the high seas?08 New 
J 
Zealand's position was "that Parties to CCAMLR must take responsibility for their 
companies and nationals in Antarctic waters ... In that regard, New Zealand will hold 
Parties accountable for the activities of their nationals that undermine the objective of the 
Commission.,,209 New Zealand was prepared to act if any IUU activities occurred in the 
Ross Sea, an area associated with the sovereignty claim made by New Zealand to the Ross 
Dependency. 
In 1999 Norway thought it important that the CDS be built on the principle of flag state 
responsibility?10 This would strengthen the signal sent to poachers. Norway described an 
approach that it had developed that implies the denial of licenses to vessels that have 
participated in IUD fishing even when the vessel is operated by people who have not 
themselves been involved in IUU fishing. 
Vessels which previously have taken part in an unregulated fishery in the northeast 
Atlantic have been denied a licence in Norwegian waters even after being flagged 
to another State. It should be noted that such vessels would also not be allowed to 
fly the Norwegian flag. The Norwegian experience so far is that these new 
measures have led to vessel owners thinking more than twice before engaging in 
unregulated fisheries on the high seas?ll 
The second-hand value of these vessels is greatly reduced. A similar example is presented 
by Japanese licensing of Japanese citizens for tuna fishing regardless of the nationality of 
their vessel.212 
207 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.55-5.58, p.21. 
208 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.62-5.64, p.22. 
209 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.63, p.22. 
210 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.18, pp.l4-15. 
2ll CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.18, p.15. 
212 "Japan Takes Steps on Fishing Under Flags of Convenience", 2 October, 1998, 
http://www.isofish.org.auinews/98/news.2oct98.japan.f1agsofconvenience.htm (site visited on 27 March, 
2001). 
197 
CCAMLR might contribute positively to this trend of negotiating limited authority over 
flag state vessels if the members can agree it might help solve the problems of IUU in the 
high seas parts of the Convention Area. On the balance of discussion in the Commission to 
date it appears that measures that work against the flag state principle are unlikely to be 
adopted. NGOs continue to advocate measures that build on UNIA and the F AO 
Compliance Agreement. "All this talk about the sacrosanct nature of flag state 
responsibility is a red herring; flag state actions alone will not eradicate illegal and 
unregulated fishing.,,213 The differing views prevent full use being made of innovative flag 
state measures. Resolution 13IXIX on 'Flagging and Licensing of Non-Contracting Party 
Vessels' may be a tentative step towards progress in this area. 
Trade related measures 
In 1997, consideration of trade-related measures led to the adoption of a recommendation 
calling for members to collect information related to trade of toothfish in order to 
understand where it is landed, transshipped, and imported, and the names it is sold under, 
and to provide this to the Secretariat for distribution to the members.214 It was also agreed 
that an exchange of information should be established by CCAMLR on all vessels known 
to have fished in contravention of CCAMLR conservation measures.21S One problem in 
tracking the trade flows for Dissostichus spp. is that there is a wide variety of common and 
market names in use for them. One example of this occurred when it was renamed Chilean 
sea bass to capitalise on existing demand for sea bass. This variety of names complicates 
the basic collection of statistics. The United States required the use of specific harmonised 
system codes on all documentation accompanying the import of D. eleginoides from 1 
January 1998, a practice that the Commission recommended other members should 
adopt.216 
In 1998, at CCAMLR XVII, the United States tabled two draft conservation measures 
based in part on the statistical documentation scheme of ICCAT, and Australia made a 
similar proposal. These were revised and combined together to form the basis of a Catch 
213 "Time to Get Real", ECG, Volume CXXXVIII No.4, 5 November, 1998, Hobart, Australia. 
214 CCAMLR-XVI, 8.11, p.26. 
215 CCAMLR-XVI, 8.12, p.26. 
216 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.26-5.30, p.18. 
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Certification Scheme.217 The basic principles of the draft were that the catch certificate 
system should be based on flag state responsibilities and that it must be consistent with 
international trade agreements such as WTO?18 One measure would establish a framework 
for tracking the landings and trade flows of toothfish, and the second measure would 
provide for contracting parties to deny their markets to imports of toothfish caught by IUU 
fishing. 219 Although many members supported the scheme, consensus could not be reached 
by the Commission due to concerns that several members had over the applicability of the 
scheme to catch taken outside the Convention Area, or within the EEZ of coastal states?20 
The Commission did agree that the proposal was urgent and important and it was agreed 
that an intersessional meeting should be held early in 1999 to develop the catch 
certification scheme so that it could be adopted at CCAMLR-XVIII.221 
In 1999 the Catch Certification Scheme changed and become referenced to as the Catch 
Documentation Scheme. Work on it continued at an ad hoc meeting of CCAMLR members 
held in Brussels, Belgium, in Apri11999. Japan objected to ASOC attending as an observer 
and ASOC lobbyists were cut off from approaching delegates.222 Further intersessional 
discussions resulted in a draft scheme sponsored by the United States, the EC, and 
Australia.223 The XXIII ATCM was held in Lima, Peru on 24 May - 4 June 1999, and its 
third resolution represented an unprecedented intervention by the ATCPs in the 
management of the CCAMLR regime. The ATCPs: 
Recommend that Consultative Parties which are Members of CCAMLR take action 
within their competence to support strongly the CCAMLR Commission in its 
efforts to deal with the problem of illegal, unreported and unregulated fishing in the 
Convention Area, including adoption of a catch documentation scheme at the 
Commission's XVIII meeting in Hobart, 1999, and to consider further measures 
consistent with the obligations each Contracting Party has under CCAMLR.224 
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At the CCAMLR XVIII meeting, Senator Hill "stressed that failure to deal promptly and 
effectively with the IUU fishing issue by the adoption of an effective Catch Documentation 
Scheme would not only have serious conservation consequences but would also damage 
the reputation of CCAMLR as an effective international conservation body,,?25 The EC 
stated that a pre-requisite to successful implementation is the introduction of separate 
classification codes in trade statistics, and that the scheme "will not be a panacea for all the 
current problems relating to IUU fisheries.,,226 Japan's position was that the CDS should 
not be a trade restriction measure, that implementation should not discriminate against 
non-contracting parties to CCAMLR, or be problematic to member states.227 
In 1999, Conservation Measure 170/xVIII 'Catch Documentation for Dissostichus spp' 
was adopted. Domestic measures to implement the CDS were to come into force by 4 May 
2000. Members were urged to implement as quickly as possible. Information was to be 
communicated to all interested states, and non-Contracting Parties were invited to 
participate in the scheme. Careful handling was required of the commercially sensitive 
data. Chile, New Zealand, and South Africa voluntarily agreed to extend the application of 
the CDS conservation measure to waters within their own EEZ.228 Argentina reserved its 
sovereignty rights over disputed territory.229 A significant factor in the adoption of the 
CDS was leadership at a high political level. This can be seen in the political involvement 
of Ministers, such as Senator Hill addressing CCAMLR, and the New Zealand Ministerial 
on Ice. The ATCM resolution in Lima was also very important in demonstrating the 
political will that existed for the CDS. The United States also played a leadership role and 
it was considering proposing a CITES listing if regulatory measures were not adopted.23o 
In May 2000 ISOFISH reported that poachers were changing vessel names in an attempt to 
make it more difficult for the CDS to identify toothfish caught in IUU fishing. 231 It is 
toothfish or who are involved in the trade of tooth fish, implement the CCAMLR Catch Documentation 
Scheme for Dissostichus spp." 
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possible to track name changes through Lloyds Register of Shipping. ISOFISH urged that 
the unique number assigned by Lloyds to vessels be required on the catch documentation 
form. The use of 'front' or 'dummy' companies also serves to insulate vessel owners from 
responsibility and liability. ISOFISH claimed that both vessels and companies involved in 
IUU fishing are almost all now registered in 'flag of convenience' countries. Greenpeace 
was concerned that Spanish operators might switch to Brazil as Panama began 
discouraging the use of their shipping register?32 The first visible success of the CDS 
occurred when the New Zealand flagged vessel Polar Viking was denied entry into 
Uruguay in June 2000, where it had attempted to land twenty-nine tonnes of toothfish in 
Montevideo.233 The vessel was later denied entry into the United States, but was reported 
as reflagging to St Vincent and the Granadines?34 
The ASOC assessment of CDS was that it was inadequate, unsuccessful, and not 
completely implemented by members?35 It is difficult to expect non-members to cooperate 
when the members have not taken the necessary administrative and legal steps. The EU 
was one such slow-moving member, although Spain had unilaterally provisionally 
implemented the CDS?36 Greenpeace was also critical of the CDS: "It requires the broader 
membership and established implementation mechanisms of an international trade 
monitoring and regulatory body, which CCAMLR does not have.,,237 The CDS does not 
require CCAMLR members to refuse entry to toothfish catches from the Convention Area 
that were caught by non-parties. Refusal only occurs if the documentation has not been 
filled in correctly. One area of concern was that IUU catch can be declared as 'high seas' 
catch as the CDS lacks verification mechanisms, and CCAMLR can not rely on IUU 
vessels to correctly report their position. There is also concern that the IUU operators will 
attempt to develop markets in non-CCAMLR member states, such as China. "Japan is not 
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willing to comply even with the weakened version of the CDS, as it says it will not prevent 
imports even if the fish were caught in the CCAMLR area in contravention of CCAMLR 
Conservation Measures, so long as the catch document has been filled in correctly.,,238 
In 2000 the CDS was amended and adopted as Conservation Measure 1701XIX. The 
changes were relatively minor, improving the administration of the scheme, notably with a 
reference to using rapid electronic means when sending copies of catch documents to the 
CCAMLR Secretariat. Resolution 14IXIX 'Catch Documentation Scheme: Implementation 
by Acceding States and Non-Contracting Parties' was also adopted. The Commission was 
conscious that the effectiveness of CDS depended on implementation by acceding states as 
well as non-contracting parties, and was especially concerned by the failure of acceding 
states to meet their obligations under Article XXII of the Convention. The effect of this 
resolution will probably be that diplomatic pressure will be exerted by the members of the 
Commission to improve compliance from the acceding states. The matter will be revisited 
at CCAMLR-XX in 2001. A second CDS related Resolution, 15IXIX 'Use of Ports not 
Implementing the Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp.', was also adopted. 
This urged the Contracting Parties to discourage their flag vessels from using ports in 
states which were not implementing the CDS. A third resolution, 16IXIX 'Application of 
VMS in the Catch Documentation Scheme', was adopted. This was an agreement on a 
voluntary basis for states participating in CDS to ensure their vessels involved in fishing or 
transhipping Dissostichus spp. used VMS. 
Cooperation between members and cooperation with other IGOs 
The issue of participation with the Convention seems to have changed over the years to 
becoming an issue of cooperation with the Convention. Cooperation requires working with 
other elements of the ATS, third-party states, and other international organisations. The 
ATS has been extended since CCAMLR entered force, and many new international 
organisations have been created. Although the CCAMLR members might prefer that other 
states accede to the treaty, they have had to deal with the fact that not all states are willing 
or able to do so. 
238 ibid. 
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There are several reasons for CCAMLR to look to other organisations and regimes for 
assistance in dealing with the IUU fishing problem. Other regimes are potential sources for 
new ideas for conservation measures. Some problems are such that one regime is unable to 
address them effectively by itself. This can lead to increased cooperation with other 
regional regimes dealing with the problem, with global regimes dealing with that issue, or 
the creation and promotion of new regimes to cover the regional or global gaps. Argentina 
observed in 1997 that "the issue is complex and could only be resolved if CCAMLR takes 
a global approach. ,,239 Some measures in 1997 were drawn from experience with NAFO 
and ICCAT, others took into account regime development elsewhere, such as the 1995 UN 
Straddling Stocks Agreement and the 1993 F AO Compliance Agreement. 240 The 1990s 
was a period when many big conventions were negotiated to deal with the problems of the 
marine fisheries of the globe. 
In 1994, a general policy on the designation of CCAMLR observers to other International 
conferences or meetings was established.241 In 1995, the ATCM requested an opinion from 
CCAMLR on some points relating to Article 2 of the draft Annex on Liability to the 
Madrid Protoco1.242 In 1996, the relevance of UNIA to CCAMLR was discussed?43 
Australia saw UNIA and CCAMLR as complementary and mutually reinforcing. 
CCAMLR parties were requested to consider the implications of UNIA for themselves and 
CCAMLR, and to consider becoming parties. In 1998 some members expressed their 
regret that the FAO observer was unable to contribute to discussions in SCOl.244 
A need for closer collaboration between CCAMLR, CCAS and IWC has been raised 
before, and Kock also suggested merging the largely inactive CCAS into CCAMLR to 
avoid duplication of work,245 Coordination between CCAMLR and the IWC can result in 
some friction. In 1987 the Japanese were proposing at the IWC to take minke and sperm 
whales for research and it was deemed "inappropriate for the CCAMLR Scientific 
Committee to comment further on this topic at present.,,246 In 1990 efforts at a joint 
239 CCAMLR-XVI, 5.38, p.13. 
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245 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., p.16. 
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workshop on baleen whales seemed to go awry when the IWC called it off without 
explaining why it thought the original terms of reference were inappropriate. The Scientific 
Committee did not think the proposed replacement, a joint workshop on all krill predators, 
was appropriate?47 
The objective of the draft measure tabled by the EC that became 'Conservation Measure 
147IXVII 'Cooperation between Contracting Parties to ensure Compliance with CCAMLR 
Conservation Measures with Regard to their Vessels' was to ensure the cooperation of 
contracting parties, especially when vessels of one contracting party entered the port of 
another contracting party. Japan expressed reservations about the feasibility of complying 
due to the limited number of inspectors available in its ports.248 South Africa, the United 
States, and Chile made statements as to their understanding on how this affected Article IV 
of the CCAMLR Convention?49 These measures refer to a 'spirit of cooperation' to take 
appropriate action when investigating infringements. The measures was amended the 
following year and adopted as Conservation Measure 1471XVIII. This measure was more 
focused on Dissostichus spp. In 2000 the measure was amended again and adopted as 
Conservation Measure 1471XIX. This added a requirement for contracting parties to advise 
the Secretariat when any vessel was denied entry to a port or permission to land or tranship 
Dissostichus spp. Vessels seeking to enter a port were required to make a written 
declaration that they had not engaged in or supported IUU fishing in the Convention Area. 
In 1998 Australia tabled a draft action policy that proposed a comprehensive approach for 
the elimination of IUU fishing in the Convention Area?50 This proposal included, inter 
alia, harmonising conservation efforts with recent developments in international law, 
examining approaches consistent with the Convention for areas adjacent to the Convention 
Area, and approaches for cooperation with non-Contracting Parties. The proposed action 
plan was not well received by many of the members. Further development of an action 
plan was left for the intersessional period. 
The relationship between CCAMLR and the Madrid Protocol is one where friction might 
arise if CCAMLR is unable to fulfil its conservation objective. There is a possible 
247 SC-CAMLR-IX, 5.50-5.52, p.44. 
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jurisdictional problem as Annex V of the Madrid Protocol includes the concept of MPA.251 
A proposal has been taken to CCAMLR by New Zealand for a MP A around the Balleny 
Islands in the Ross Sea.252 This initiative is supported by ASOC, and the IUCN in 1996 
believed it was timely for CCAMLR to consider establishing a system of MP As "in order 
to ensure the preservation of representative areas of the principal habitats and biodiversity 
of the Antarctic region. ,,253. Potentially this could protect sea birds and vulnerable fish 
stocks from regulated exploitation, but not IUU fishing. No progress was made at ATCM 
XXIII or CCAMLR-XIX. Given the time that the proposal has been discussed, for it seems 
likely that some ATCPs and CCAMLR members are opposed to the concept of MP As in 
the Southern Ocean. One reason for this may be that fishing states are interested in 
preserving access to fisheries. Another may be that some non-claimants are reluctant to 
appear to reinforce New Zealand's sovereignty claim in the Ross Dependency. The real 
loss is the stifling of innovation, as also happened with the Norwegian proposals on flag 
state enforcement. 254 
Many issues in the Southern Ocean can only be tackled through collaboration with other 
organisations responsible for conservation and management at the global level, and in the 
areas adjacent to the Convention Area. Seeking closer collaboration will have a high 
priority for CCAMLR in the future. 255 Increasingly the CCAMLR regime is forging links 
to other organisations. Members report information from other meetings they attend; 
facilitating the exchange of ideas and information. In coming up with solutions to problems 
of enforcement CCAMLR does not appear as innovative as it once was. The ICCAT 
Bluefin Action Plan Resolution of 1994 is similar to the CDS in that it bans the import of 
Tuna not caught in accordance with regulations. The NAFO restrict landings of fish caught 
by non-members, but the compact high seas area it is responsible for allows close 
251 Madrid Protocol, Annex V, Article 3, (1) "Any area, including any marine area, may be designated as an 
Antarctic Specially Protected Area". 
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monitoring, and an effective moratorium. CCAMLR may be more of a leader when it 
comes to seabird by-catch solutions. 
Vessel monitoring system 
There are some general limits on satellite surveillance in the Southern Ocean, as it is too 
far south for some satellite orbits, and weather problems can prevent observation. VMS 
relies on different principles - tracking signals emitted by the vessels carrying a 
transponder. VMS allows an indication to be made when a vessel enters the Convention 
Area or any particular reporting area. Inferences can be made about fishing effort from the 
time spent in fishing grounds?56 As Bailey and Muehlhausen put it: "The eve of the 21 st 
century is certainly the time for the international community to acknowledge that the 
traditional method of vessel recognition, flying a flag off the vessel's stern, is hardly more 
than a quaint custom with little relevance to a world whose future may depend on rational 
management of food from the seas.,,257 
The Secretariat began investigating the use of Transponders following the 1993 meeting,258 
and in 1994 the use of VMS was considered by SCOl.259 Poland and Japan were of the 
opinion that VMS was not required for krill fishing due to its current low level and lack of 
closed areas or seasons?60 In 1995, Norway, Australia, and the UK were disappointed that 
a consensus on the introduction of an automated VMS had not been reached?61 Chile and 
Argentina argued that they were taking appropriate measures as flag states but they did not 
want to establish a system they saw as incompatible with rights under the Law of the Sea 
Convention.262 The UK and the United States argued that there was nothing in international 
law preventing the implementation of mandatory vessel notification or VMS?63 The IUCN 
Observer expressed concern that some members considered CCAMLR to not be a regional 
fisheries agreement. Their view was "that CCAMLR is very much a fisheries agreement -
256 James E. Bailey and Laurel A. Muehlhausen, "Marine Boundary Enforcement from Space: Satellite 
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albeit a special one, but not an exceptional one.,,264 Other differences existed in relation to 
the practical, administrative, and financial aspects of implementing a VMS?65 Many 
members saw VMS as offering a good option for dealing with the problem of illegal 
fishing?66 In 1996 a number of CCAMLR Members had already implemented VMS in 
waters under national jurisdiction. Japan and Poland reminded the Committee that the 1994 
meeting had not seen any need to introduce VMS for the krill fishery,267 which seems a 
little disingenuous given their opposition to the proposal in 1994. 
In 1997 the Commission adopted Resolution 12/XVI in response to IUU harvesting of 
toothfish. Members were encouraged to establish automated VMS to monitor their flag 
vessel positions in waters adjacent to the Convention as wel1.268 There was an attempt to 
implement a Conservation Measure on VMS, with proposals coming from Chile and the 
European Community, but a draft measure recommended by SCOI was not agreed on by 
the Commission?69 The Republic of Korea stated that it needed more time to complete the 
domestic arrangements needed, and that it believed that it was premature to apply VMS to 
the squid fishery?70 This resolution prompted a round of demonstrations between the UK 
and Argentina over their positions on the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. Argentina reserved its 
position in respect of Subareas 48.3 and 48.4, as it does not recognise the UK as a coastal 
state in the Convention Area. The UK saw no need for a reservation as the Resolution was 
not binding on Parties to the Convention and asked for a reasoned explanation of the 
reservation, without which the UK was of the view that the reservation could have no 
effect. 271 
In 1998 a draft conservation measure was tabled by the EC and its basic approach was that 
all fishing vessels should be covered by VMS. A number of countries; including Poland, 
Russia, Ulaaine, and the Republic of Korea, held to their view that laill fishing vessels 
should be exempt for the time being from any VMS requirement. This was a view that the 
EC was willing to accommodate in the interim, however the proposed system was not 
practicable for several members, with Korea viewing itself unlikely to introduce VMS 
264 CCAMLR-XIV, 11.10, p.64. 
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earlier than 1 January 2000?72 A number of members supported the view expressed by 
New Zealand that the introduction of VMS was a positive step, but that it was regrettable 
that not all countries were able to immediately introduce VMS and that krill vessels were 
excluded?73 Each contracting party was to establish a VMS by 1 March 1999 to monitor 
the position of any vessel that it might license to harvest marine living resources in the 
Convention Area for which restrictions have been set by conservation measures. A 
contracting party unable to establish a VMS by 1 March 1999 should establish one no later 
than 31 December 2000. The VMS technical requirements were specified, the possibility 
of technical failure covered, and the action required if a VMS ceased to operate. A draft 
resolution was presented by Australia in SCOI on making a wider use of VMS, but there 
was no agreement within SCOL Parties were encouraged to consider requiring the use of 
VMS in areas adjacent to the Convention Area if they were not already doing SO.274 The 
EC reiterated its proposal that VMS apply to all krill fishing vessels. Japan and some other 
members were not willing to accept the proposal at that time?75 
The continued resistance by the fishing nations to any restrictions that VMS might place on 
their freedom to fish is an interesting indicator as to their lack of commitment to the 
objective of conservation and compliance with CCAMLR measures. It is difficult to see 
why a state committed to rational use of the resource with its requirement of sustainable 
use can continue to object to improving the ability of the CCAMLR regime to monitor 
what is actually occurring in the fisheries it is responsible for managing. In 2000 there was 
an interesting development when Resolution 16IXIX was adopted calling for the voluntary 
establishment of VMS in all flag vessels authorised to fish or tranship Dissostichus spp. on 
the high seas. 
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The By-catch and Incidental Mortality Issue 
The definition of by-catch used by CCAMLR is: "The catch in numbers or in weight of 
non-target species taken in a directed fishery.,,276 Incidental mortality is a related concept 
that was first introduced to CCAMLR in 1984?77 In 1985 the problem of by-catch in the 
krill fishery was noted as "might potentially cause a management problem",278 but it was 
"not, at the present, a management problem. ,,279 At this time the Commission restricted 
itself to asking for reports of incidental catches and a review of gill net operations?80 In 
1986 information provided by members suggested that incidental mortality was not an 
immediate problem in the Convention Area, but incidental mortality could interfere with 
efforts to achieve the objective of the Convention.281 At this stage the Commission decided 
to build up more information on marine debris and asked for members to report on birds 
and mammals taken as incidental catch.282 In 1992 there was a division of work, where the 
Scientific Committee would work on the ecological impact of the incidental mortality of 
marine mammals and birds, while the Commission would deal with general issues such as 
marine debris, dumping waste at sea, and pollution.283 
Impacts of fishing on the seabed 
Most finfishing in the Southern Ocean used to be conducted with bottom trawls. The 
benthic fauna of the Southern Ocean is largely long-lived and slow-growing and the effects 
of bottom trawling are presumed to be long-lasting. Bottom trawling "affects the 
environment by scraping and ploughing of the seabed, sediment resuspension, and the 
destruction of benthos". 284 The potential impact has been minimised by measures 
prohibiting directed fishing for some dermesal species.285 Because the expanslOn m 
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fisheries in the Convention Area has mainly involved longlines, the effects of trawling on 
the seabed are not a major problem for CCAMLR at this time. 
Entanglement of marine mammals in marine debris 
Trawling can produce 'ghost nets'; fragments of lost and discarded fishing nets can 
entangle seals and other species. In 1987 members were encouraged to sign Annex V of 
MARPOL.286 Annex V of MARPOL entered into force December 31 1988. MARPOL 
Annex V prohibits at-sea disposal of all plastics and places restrictions on garbage 
dumping. The ATCM-XV meeting made recommendations about waste disposa1.287 In 
1988 some members reported marine debris and seal entanglements?88 
Driftnet fishing was discussed by the Scientific Committee in 1990. Only Japan could not 
endorse a ban on driftnet fishing.289 ASOC addressed the Commission on the subject of 
Driftnet fishing. The Commission noted that UNGA 44/225 would cause a moratorium on 
driftnet fishing to take place from 30 June 1992. Resolution 71X 'Driftnet Fishing in the 
Convention Area' endorsed UNGA 44/225 "there will be no expansion of large-scale 
pelagic driftnet fishing into the high seas of the Convention Area. ,,290 
In 1998 the Commission remained working on the problems associated with marine debris. 
Debris picked up on beaches often reflected local fishing activities, even illegal activity?91 
The Commission was concerned by the continuing presence of packaging bands in the 
Convention Area. This was not necessarily due to a failure by CCAMLR member vessels 
to comply with Conservation Measure 63IXV 'Regulation of the Use and Disposal of 
Plastic Packaging Bands on Fishing Vessels', as the bands could be the result of IUU 
fishing?92 
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Problems with marine debris pollution, mainly originating from fishing vessel activities, 
were persisting in 1999?93 New Zealand and South Africa reported that their fishing 
vessels were returning non-biodegradable waste back to port for disposa1.294 This 
behaviour is now required under MARPOL Annex V, and Annex IV to the Protocol on 
Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty and the Commission urged all CCAMLR 
flag states to comply.295 Entanglement in packaging bands has decreased, but entanglement 
is now occurring in longlines. Monitoring shows that debris has not decreased and there is 
much room for improvement. 296 
Incidental mortality of fishing on seabirds 
Incidental mortality of seabirds has not always been considered a significant problem by 
CCAMLR. Fisheries can provide a considerable amount of additional food for albatrosses 
and other sea birds through feeding on the discards from vessels. At one stage it was 
thought that this might increase the chick rearing success?97 In 1998 no decrease in the 
seabird population could "be linked at present with commercial harvesting in Antarctic 
waters.,,298 However, by 1989 it was considered possible by the Commission "that there is 
substantial incidental mortality which is not being reported. ,,299 Decline was being 
observed in the numbers of southern elephant seals and the wandering albatross, the latter 
being attributed to longlining for tuna outside the Convention Area.300 Concern was 
expressed because "similar fisheries elsewhere in the world had posed conservation 
problems which were difficult to detect from catch and effort statistics alone. In addition, 
there had been significant incidental mortality, particularly of albatrosses and large 
petrels".301 
In 1989 CCAMLR passed Resolution 5NIII concerned with incidental mortality and 
called on the parties involved in longlining to investigate and minimise incidental 
293 CCAMLR-XVIII, 6.4, p.22. 
294 CCAMLR-XVIII, 6.6, p.22. New Zealand vessels lost 38,000 feet oflongline. Personal Notes, Felicity 
Wong, GCAS Lecture, 13 January 2000. 
295 CCAMLR-XVIII, 6.8-6.9, p.23. 
296 Karl-Hermann Kock, op. cit., p.26. 
297 Karl-Hermann Kock, "Fishing and Conservation in Southern Waters", Polar Record, 30 (172), 1994, 
pp.6-7. 
298 SC-CAMLR-VII, 6.4, p.38. 
299 CCAMLR-VIII, 23, p.5. 
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mortality.302 Greenpeace was concerned with the incidental mortality issue very early on. 
In 1991 the Greenpeace polar vessel Gondwana observed Soviet longliners fishing for 
Patagonian toothfish around South Georgia. One boat was setting lines in daylight, and 
another boat was not using bird scaring devices during setting operations, despite the 
resolution from CCAMLR. 303 In 1990 the Commission agreed that longlines should be 
regulated to minimise mortality?04 In 1991 these measures became obligatory with 
Conservation Measure 29/X. In 1992 it was pointed out that streamer lines need to be used 
during all daylight operations, including 'nautical twilight'. 305 The Russians developed the 
'shori', or 'blinker' rather than use tori lines.306 A major international campaign to reduce 
longline mortality was under way.307 At this time the use of net monitor cables was being 
discontinued.308 One technical development was that of a 'BIO bait box' that disintegrates 
if lost at sea.309 
In 1990, Tuna longlining in the Sub-Antarctic was killing an estimated 44,000 albatrosses 
per year, "sufficiently high to substantiate claims that serious declines in albatross 
populations within the Convention area are due to this type of fishing activity.,,310 
Professor Lubimova pointed out that the D. eleginoides fishery is a bottom longline 
fishery, different from Tuna, with no reported by-catch in the Soviet longline fishery.311 Dr 
Croxall pointed out that without full data it is difficult to tell if there is a difference 
between bottom and pelagic fishing, and that no reports of Tuna longlining by-catch were 
received until observers were on board.312 At the 1993 meeting, it was reported that 
without streamer" lines up to six albatrosses per set could be killed, potentially 2,346 birds 
killed in Subarea 48.3 in 1992/93.3l3 There was a clear trend that the black-browed 
301 SC-CAMLR-VIII, 3.13, p.16. 
302 CCAMLR-VIII, 129-130, pp.33-34. 
303 Janet Dalziell, and Maj De Poorter, op. cit., pp.143-144. 
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306 SC-CAMLR-XI, 8.15, p.69. 
307 SC-CAMLR-XI, 8.19, p.70. 
308 SC-CAMLR-XI, 8.26, p.7l. 
309 SC-CAMLR-XI, 8.35, p.73. 
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albatross had declined in population since 1988.314 It was noted that birds can become 
habituated to streamer lines, which reduces their effectiveness.315 
The Scientific Committee recognised that incidental mortality, particularly from longline 
fishing, was an increasingly important part of its deliberations. There was too much 
information being collected for the Committee to review and give advice on it, so an ad 
hoc Working Group on Incidental Mortality Associated with Longline Fishing (WG-
IMALF) was established?16 WG-IMALF reported back that "the removal of bait by 
seabirds can reduce the catch of fishing significantly and that fishers themselves would 
benefit from helping to resolve the problem.,,317 Cooperation efforts with other 
organisations were increasing.318 WG-IMALF continued to meet as part ofWG-FSA. 
In 1994, Conservation Measure 29IXIII 'Minimisation of the Incidental Mortality of 
Seabirds in the Course of Longline Fishing or Longline Fishing Research in the 
Convention Area', was adopted. Baited hooks to sink quickly; lines to be set at night only; 
trash and offal not to be dumped while lines are set; release caught birds alive; streamer 
lines to discourage birds.319 There was a general decrease in the rate of birds caught in the 
legitimate longline fishery. This was due to a combination of factors: night setting, 
streamers, and a later start to the fishing season after breeding had finished. "Many vessels, 
however, either did not use streamer lines or used them ineffectively, and increased 
compliance with this part of the conservation measures is required to further decrease 
seabird mortality.,,32o The vessels should discharge offal off the side of the vessel away 
from where lines are being set.321 
In 1995, CCAMLR had no evidence that vessels involved in illegal operations were using 
techniques to reduce mortality.322 Conservation Measure 29IXIII was amended and 
314 SC-CAMLR-XII, 10.8, p.63. 
315 SC-CAMLR-XII, 1O.l4, p.64. 
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adopted as Conservation Measure 291XIV.323 In 1996 it was amended agam as the 
definition of 'nautical twilight' was clarified, and adopted as Conservation Measure 
291XV. An educational book was published by CCAMLR in 1996, Fish the Sea Not the 
Sky, demonstrating ways of minimising incidental mortality while fishing. In 1997 the 
Commission endorsed the idea that copies of the book should be sent to companies 
believed to be engaged in longline fishing in the Convention Area and adjacent regions.324 
Estimated 1995/96 seabird mortality from longline fisheries was 1,600 in Subarea 48.3.325 
In 1997 there was general agreement among CCAMLR members that IUU fishing posed a 
serious threat to the survival of several species of seabirds in the Southern Ocean taken as 
incidental by-catch in longline fishing operations.326 The estimated total of seabird 
mortality in the regulated fishery was 6,634, mostly albatrosses and white-chinned 
petrels.327 Compliance in 1996/97 with Conservation Measure 29IXV was poor.328 The 
Scientific Committee tried to estimate the incidental mortality in the unregulated fisheries 
in the Convention Area. "They expressed great concern that, even at a conservative 
estimate of 16 500 to 26 800 seabirds, the level of seabird by-catch in the unregulated 
fishery for D. eleginoides in Subareas 58.6/58.7 (and probably also in Divisions 58.5.1 and 
58.5.2) in the 1996/97 split year was at least 20-times greater than that for the regulated 
fishery.,,329 These values assume a by-catch rate in the unregulated fishery is the same as in 
the regulated fishery, a conservative assumption. Alternate calculations that assume the by-
catch in the unregulated fishery is at the highest observed rate gave estimates of by-catch 
of 66,000 to 107,000 seabirds.330 The impact on white-chinned petrels and albatrosses was 
considered entirely unsustainable.33 ! 
In 1998 the Scientific Committee advised the Commission that there had been a substantial 
reduction in seabird by-catch in the regulated fisheries in the Convention Area in 1997/98. 
This was in part attributable to greater compliance with Conservation Measure 291XVl,332 
323 CCAMLR-XIV, pp.38-39. 
324 CCAMLR-XVI, 6.34, p.l? This does not seem to have had much impact on the companies involved with 
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Chile noted that for conservation measures to be effective their implementation requires 
cost-effective strategies?33 Estimates for seabird by-catch from unregulated fishing in the 
Convention Area remained similar to 1997, about 50,000 to 89,000 seabirds. These levels 
of by-catch are about two orders of magnitude greater than in the regulated fishery and are 
unsustainable for the albatross, giant petrel, and white-chinned petrel populations 
concerned?34 SCOI noted that IUU vessels often set aside their fishing gear to avoid 
sighting or detection, which can result in ghost fishing and seabird mortality.335 
Conservation Measure 29IXVI was retained, but varied for New Zealand fisheries in 
Subarea 88.1 south of 65°South latitude?36 This was done because night setting was not 
possible at that latitude, and because it was believed at that time that observations had 
shown that there were no birds present in the area.337 The strategic advice from the 
Scientific Committee was that sustained development of underwater setting offered the 
most likely medium to long-term solution to the problem. In the short-term work on line 
weighting regimes to ensure fast sink rates is best. 338 Other advice concerned training and 
education, and the development of national and international plans of action.339 New 
Zealand expected to have a seabird identification guide ready early in 1999. Brazil had 
translated the CCAMLR booklet Fish the Sea Not the Sky into Portuguese. 
In 1999, it was noted that with the prohibition of net monitor cables in the Convention 
Area after Conservation Measure 301X, very few cases of incidental mortality have been 
reported from trawl fisheries. 340 Advice from the Scientific Committee was that 
compliance with some elements of Conservation Measure 29IXVI remained very low, 
especially line weighting.341 The Scientific Committee concluded that there were 
substantial reductions in seabird by-catch in the longline fishery. The trend has been 
333 CCAMLR-XVII, 6.21, p.27. 
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evident for three years and is directly attributable to improved compliance with 
Conservation Measure 29IXVI. The Commission concluded: 
that significant progress had been achieved by CCAMLR Members in the reduction 
of seabird by-catch during longline fishing in the Convention Area. If IUU fishing 
in the Convention Area were to be eliminated, seabird by-catch in longline fisheries 
in CCAMLR waters would practically stop.342 
The problem of by-catch might persist in the waters north of the Convention Area, where 
some vulnerable seabirds range.343 This requires a concentrated international effort, and 
continued experimenting with underwater line-setting devices. CCAMLR and the National 
Museum of New Zealand had published a book, Identification of Seabirds of the Southern 
Ocean: A Guide for Scientific Observers Aboard Fishing Vessels, to help observers. 
In 2000, IMALF reported that estimates of seabird mortality due to longlining have 
increased slightly, despite the combined efforts of CCAMLR members, industry, and 
NGOs.344 A report suggested that between 237,000 and 333,000 birds had died within the 
last four years on longline hooks.345 Australian scientists and fishers have been working on 
developing a new chute for delivering baited longline hooks sufficiently deep underwater 
so as to be undetectable and unreachable by diving seabirds.346 If successful this device 
would be attractive to the fishing industry as it allows daylight line setting, combining 
environmental benefits with efficiency gains. Conservation Measure 29IXVI was amended 
and adopted as Conservation Measure 291XIX, and a different option for line weighting 
was introduced. Vessels that lack the capacity to retain offal on board, or to discharge it on 
the side opposite to where longlines are hauled, are now not to be authorised to fish in the 
Convention Area. 
Incidental mortality summary 
While CCAMLR has enjoyed moderate success in reducing some of the effects of by-
catch, the effect of IUU fishing activities on by-catch mean that it remains a serious issue. 
342 CCAMLR-XVIII, 6.14, p.23. 
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Incidental mortality tests the concept of rational use through the damage caused by fishing 
activities to non-targeted species. CCAMLR has enjoyed a measure of success in reducing 
incidental mortality within the fishing operations conducted by the portion of the industry 
complying with CCAMLR regulations. This has been possible in part because technical 
solutions to the problem, such as changing the kind of equipment used on the fishing 
vessels, have been relatively effective and acceptable to the fishing operators. The 
albatross may have captured the limelight of the by-catch issue, but the Commission has 
also worked quietly to deal with the by-catch problems of other marine species. As Kock 
put it: "CCAMLR's prompt action in developing and implementing methods to reduce 
albatross mortality, coupled with the willingness of many fishing masters to cooperate with 
scientific observers, has done much to alleviate the problem within the regulated fishery 
until even more effective long-term solutions ... can be tested and implemented".347 At the 
moment however the seabirds being saved by CCAMLR measures may only survive to fall 
victim to the IUU fishing vessels that make no attempt to reduce incidental mortality. The 
key to reducing incidental mortality to acceptable levels that are sustainable for the 
affected species will be for CCAMLR to gain effective control over the fishing in the 
Southern Ocean. 
Problems Preventing Effective Conservation Measures in the Southern Ocean 
Three themes emerge from an analysis of the material available about recent CCAMLR 
meetings and why they have been unable to implement effective conservation measures to 
deal with the problem of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. Predictably one of these 
themes involves the ongoing problems with sovereignty disputes. A second theme is the 
difficult balancing act the Commission is attempting in allowing a legal fishing industry to 
continue operating, despite calls for a moratorium. What has been surprising is the role 
played by the EC in blocking effective conservation measures that would deal with the 
problem of fishing by nationals of CCAMLR members. 
346 "Albatross-Safe Longline Closer to Reality", 4 July 2000, 
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The problem posed by the European Community 
From the mid-1990s the role of the European Community (EC) in CCAMLR has favoured 
fishing interests over conservation. This can be seen in part through the changes to the 
composition of the EC delegation. From 1996 the EC delegation at the meeting of the 
CCAMLR Commission has been headed by a representative from Directorate-General 
(DG) XIV (Fisheries) of the European Commission, and the advisers have largely been 
drawn from fisheries and agricultural organisations in the European Union (EU). At earlier 
meetings the then European Economic Community (EEC) delegates were drawn more 
from scientific organisations or the delegation to Australia and New Zealand. The other 
part of the change has been a noticeable increase in the advocacy of fishing interests by the 
EC delegation, sometimes at the expense of the conservation objectives of the Convention. 
The European Commission is present at CCAMLR because members of the EU have 
delegated their competency in fishing policy to it. 
In 1998 New Zealand found that "the role of the EC as a 'bloc' or caucus within the 
Commission continued to cause concern. It appeared that representatives from EU parties 
were prevented from intervening in discussions which went beyond matters falling within 
the competence of the Community.,,348 The EC also stalled for time when it appeared to 
have difficulties reaching an agreed position. France and the UK have not delegated 
competency on fisheries issues to the EC for their sub-Antarctic islands, and they were not 
prevented from making statements in the Commission. The crux of the matter is that an EU 
member can block progress in CCAMLR for more effective conservation measures by 
dominating the European Commission policy agenda. The opinions of those members who 
support conservation is then stifled by the need for the EU to present a united common 
policy at the Commission meeting. It also means that an EU member that opposes 
conservation measures does not have to openly identify its opposition to the measure, it 
can do so behind closed doors. This subverts the consensus decision-making procedure that 
CCAMLR should use.349 Alan Hemmings, the ASOC representative in SCOI at 
348 Commission/or the Convention/or the Conservation 0/ Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR 
XVII: Hobart, 26 October - 6 November 1998, Report o/the New Zealand Delegation, Antarctic Policy Unit: 
Wellington, November 1998, p.19. 
349 See Chapter 4, pp.l22-127. 
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CCAMLR-XIX found that it was: "not edifying to see the ED subverting liberal principles 
to support large fishing companies.,,35o 
At CCAMLR XIX the ED blocked the proposal from Norway to strengthen Conservation 
Measure 118IXVII (Scheme to promote compliance by non-contracting party vessels). 
ECO reported that the proposal would have added language that would deny the right to fly 
the flag of Contracting Parties or to be given a license to fish in areas under members' 
fisheries jurisdiction, if the vessel involved had been prohibited from landing or 
transhipping fish. 351 This proposal was in line with the unilateral action taken by Norway 
that involves blacklisting IDD vessels from ever fishing again in Norwegian waters -
irrespective of who currently owns the vesse1.352 The EC Representative complained about 
this revelation, deploying the term "transparency" to characterise the opposite, but as ECO 
pointed out "The ED has not denied the substance of the article - it could hardly do that 
given common knowledge in Brussels and the corridors here in Hobart that it is so.,,353 
One complication here is that the European Commission represents states that are not 
members of CCAMLR, such as Portugal, that have been active in the Southern Ocean. In 
1999 the EC reminded the Commission that ED member states had transferred to the 
European Commission their competence on fisheries, entitling and obliging the European 
Commission to regulate the internal or external fishing activities of its members.354 As a 
consequence of this all member states of the ED are bound by CCAMLR conservation 
measures, irrespective of whether or not they are Members of CCAMLR.355 However, "the 
majority of the Members of the Commission took the position that any fishing by a 
Portuguese-flagged vessel would be in contravention of the Convention unless Portugal 
had acceded to the Convention prior to the initiation of such activities. ,,356 The EC "fully 
reserved" its rights under the Convention in relation to EC vessels.357 Argentina, New 
Zealand, Chile, Australia, Russia, and South Africa all expressed their reservations.358 
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351 "European Community Blocks Norwegian Proposal", ECO, 2, 26 October 2000, CCAMLR-XIX, Hobart 
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Chile made the statement that "Only Flag States can take on these obligations in the legal 
and political context of the Antarctic Treaty System and all obligations pertaining to 
CCAMLR that" are not within the scope of the fisheries and the environment.,,359 The 
Commission called on Portugal to consider early accession to the Convention.36o Portugal 
had not joined CCAMLR by 2000 and had also not ceded competency to the EU for 
flagging vessels. "The EU was thus found to be in the extraordinary position of 
encouraging a Portuguese vessel to engage in IUU fishing in CCAMLR waters. ,,361 
The problem is that the European Commission is currently biased towards exploitation 
over conservation in this issue area. A New Zealand report noted that the "EC experience 
appeared also to reflect some of the tensions that have emerged in the relationship between 
the Antarctic Treaty System and CCAMLR when the latter is treated principally as a 
fisheries management regime unconnected to the Treaty regime from which it sprang.,,362 
As with the ATCPs finding it important to maintain consensus when dealing with criticism 
of the ATS from third parties, the members of the EU also find it important to maintain 
their common policy in an issue area. Mark Kurlansky's opinion of the European common 
fishing policy (CFP) was that "Politics and nationalism often play far greater roles than 
conservation in the decision-making process.,,363 The CFP has included the concepts of the 
ecosystem and precautionary approaches since 1997.364 However DG-XIV appears to play 
the main role in the formulation of policy for the European Commission in respect of 
CCAMLR, without much consultation to the Environment DG. 
The problem posed by the European Commission behaviour in the CCAMLR Commission 
is not one that the other members of the Convention can do much about to directly 
influence the EU. For change to occur here there will first have to be change in the 
domestic institutions of the EU and the EU members. In this respect the actions of 
environmental NGOs may have a positive contribution to make about awareness of the 
environmental problems of Antarctica and the Southern Ocean in the northern hemisphere. 
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Public pressure can influence the 'horse-trading' that is a feature of negotiations within the 
EU over policy. It would be interesting to see what stance the EC would take at CCAMLR 
if the representatives in its delegation included members of the Environment DG. 
Proposals originating from the EU that would reduce the transparency of the actions of its 
members, such as grouping the catch data of EC members into one category, are probably 
best opposed by the other members. 
The problem of sovereignty disputes and conservation measures 
Despite the compromIses in the Antarctic Treaty and the Convention in relation to 
territorial disputes, sovereignty issues remain in the background of every political debate 
within the ATS.365 The issue of compatibility and harmonisation between national 
measures in EEZ jurisdiction, and CCAMLR measures for the entire Convention Area, has 
constantly proven a divisive issue within the Commission. Discussion on new conservation 
measures is often interrupted as different members attempt to preserve their different 
positions on outstanding sovereignty issues, such as coastal state, flag state, and port state 
responsibilities. IUU fishing complicates this stress point through jurisdictional Issues 
relating to EEZ, especially in Subarea 48.3 between Argentina and the UK. 
In 1996 consideration of the implementation of the objective of the Convention caused an 
extensive discussion of sovereignty issues.366 Chile found the "spirit of cooperation is no 
longer evident, as the national interest appears to dominate, thus obstructing the work of 
the Commission.,,367 The United States pointed out that "CCAMLR is currently dealing 
with issues not anticipated when the Convention was negotiated.,,368 Argentina outlined an 
interpretation of the Chairman's Statement of 1980 that it would only apply where state 
sovereignty exists and is recognised by all contracting parties?69 Argentina believed that 
cooperation was at risk due to unilateral actions by the UK in South Georgia and the South 
Sandwich Islands (Subareas 48.3 and 48.4). The UK rejected this interpretation of the 
364 http://europa.eu.intlcomm/fisheries/doc_et..J)ubllfactsheets/facts/en/pcp8 _l.htm (site visited 27 March 
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Chairman's Statement.370 The Commission recognised that it was not the most appropriate 
forum to resolve these differences, and encouraged Argentina and the UK to continue 
bilateral discussions, and the hope was expressed that the dispute will not affect CCAMLR 
cooperation.37 ! In 1997 the arguments about this difference in interpretation emerged again 
in consideration of VMS.372 In 1998 the UK and Argentina reiterated their reservations 
from CCAMLR-XVI.373 
In 1999 there was an argument of whether or not regulatory action by the UK to help deal 
with the IUU problem was in accordance with the objectives ofthe Convention. The use of 
unilateral measures by the UK, which could be seen to reinforce its claims, was upsetting 
to Argentina and Chile. There was an extensive argument over a footnote in a Chilean 
paper concerning South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. 374 While Chile 
acknowledged UK 'control' over the territory, it does not recognise UK 'sovereignty'. The 
UK was concerned that the footnote challenged the applicability of the 1980 Chairman's 
Statement to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. The UK made several points, 
inter alia: that the territory concerned was not a dependency of the Falkland Islands; that 
the 200 mile Maritime Zone around South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands extends 
south of 60° South latitude, but the fishery legislation for the Zone does not; and their 
efforts are in the 'spirit' of the Convention as they contribute towards a sustainable fishery. 
Argentina rejected the points made by the UK. This was frustrating for the other delegates 
as discussion of the Falkland/Malvinas Island problems are unlikely to be conducive to the 
work of CCAMLR.375 One practical impact of this dispute is that the UK finds it difficult 
to carry out inspections on Argentine vessels in the Convention Area.376 
Elsewhere in the Southern Ocean where territorial sovereignty has been undisputed there 
have been fewer problems and more flexibility demonstrated on the parts of the CCAMLR 
Members with jurisdiction in the Southern Ocean. Australia sought assistance in informing 
370 CCAMLR-XV, 13.16, p.84. 
371 CCAMLR-XV, 13.41, p.88. 
372 CCAMLR-XVI, 9.59-9.66, pp.35-36. See also p.206 above. 
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people about the controls implemented in the Australian EEZ and Heard and MacDonald 
Islands. Australian legislation had been amended to increase penalties for illegal fishing, 
including the immediate forfeiture of foreign vessels found engaged in illegal fishing?77 
South Africa indicated its willingness to include its EEZ around the Prince Edward Islands 
in CCALR measures to regulate new fisheries there.378 What the unresolved sovereignty 
problems mean for the future effectiveness of CCAMLR is that while the compromises 
that prevent conflict there can not be changed, it is also more difficult to change the other 
original assumptions, principles, and norms of the CCAMLR regime. Not a lot can be done 
about territorial sovereignty without revisiting the original compromises in the Antarctic 
Treaty, something that most ATCPs will be reluctant to do. The best hope is for improved 
long term relations between the CCAMLR members with overlapping and disputed claims. 
The problem of maintaining a legal fishery 
The continuation of a legal fishery for toothfish has been an issue rising up the 
environmental agenda since 1997. Rational use of the resources of the Southern Ocean 
strongly implies that a fishing industry should be permitted in CCAMLR waters, and the 
traditional interpretation has been to permit fishing to continue until after it has been 
demonstrated that the conservation goal is not being met. This has been criticised by the 
environmental NGOs and they have adopted a policy calling for a moratorium on the 
continuation of fishing for toothfish. This highlights the tension that the concept of rational 
use has between the exploitation and conservation objectives of the Convention. 
One argument made in favour of continued legal fishing is that it will help to deter IUU 
fishing. In 1997 South Africa expressed a view that "the presence of responsible and 
regulated fisheries would serve the conservative objectives of the Convention, not only by 
acting as a source of essential information, but also as a physical deterrent to unregulated 
fishing, particularly in the waters around the Prince Edward and Crozet Islands.,,379 This 
can happen because vessels tend to find each other at sea and gravitate together due to 
radio contact, the vagaries of weather, and fishing conditions.38o It would not be equitable 
377 CCAMLR-XVIII, 9.58, pAl. 
378 CCAMLR-XV, 8.18, p.35. 
379 CCAMLR-XVI, 7.21, p.23. 
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for the compliant fishers to be penalised for the actions of the IUU fishers. "New Zealand 
believed that the Commission must pay proper attention to the needs of legitimate fishing 
industry - those companies which were prepared to abide by the rules and conservation 
measures needed to be recognised.,,381 
Some members questioned this view on the grounds that extending legitimate fishing 
operations could increase the by-catch of sea-birds. Other members responded by pointing 
out that by-catch in the unregulated fishery was two orders magnitude greater than that in 
the regulated fishery.382 In 1998 some Members proposed that year-round longline fishing 
was required to effectively monitor unregulated fishing, but this was not accepted.383 
Another problem caused by IUU fishing is the interference in assigning precautionary 
limits. Catch limit recommendations for the regulated industry could be mistakenly based 
on the assumption that IUU activities would cease in the next season.384 The Scientific 
Committee has difficulty in reconciling decision rules where the indicators were in 
conflict.385 It does not help the situation that exploitation is occurring when there is a lack 
of reliable estimates for the biomass of the toothfish stocks in the different areas of the 
Southern Ocean. For example, in 1998 Norway asked how the Commission could reconcile 
the views of the Scientific Committee regarding the setting of catch limits and the grave 
threats brought about by IUU fishing.386 The 'catch-22' for CCAMLR is that it needs 
research information that can only be acquired by observers on fishing vessels. By 
continuing to explore for new fisheries, and then making that information public, 
CCAMLR is potentially giving the 'pirates' the information they need about where to go 
fishing next. At CCAMLR-XIX ECO observed that year-round fisheries do not seem to 
deter IUU fishing; only military coverage seems to do so.387 
At the same time large catch limits are being allocated for E. carlsbergi, for example 
Conservation Measure 155IXVII for the 1998/99 season with a TAC of 109,000 tonnes.388 
Yet this species is not being harvested, presumably because there is little money to be 
381 CCAMLR -XVI, 5.14, p.lO. This sentiment was supported by Australia, South Africa, France, Russia, 
Chile and Ukraine. CCAMLR -XVI, 5.26, p.ll. 
382 CCAMLR-XVI, 5.27, p.ll. 
383 CCAMLR-XVII, 9.10, p.36. 
384 CCAMLR-XVI, 7.16, p.23. 
385 CCAMLR-XVI, 4.14, p.5. 
386 CCAMLR-XVII, 7.22, p.3l. 
387 "Year-Round Bird By-Catch?", ECG, 3, 30 October 2000, CCAMLR-XIX, Hobart Tasmania, 
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made. Legitimate fishing companies want a sustainable fishing industry that they can 
participate in over the long term. In the short term they have to remain profitable as well. 
Given the doubts about the adequacy of the stock assessments for toothfish it seems 
doubtful that a precautionary approach has been applied in many areas in the Southern 
Ocean. While legal fishing continues it shrouds illegal fishing, and while the legal fishing 
continues it is difficult for trade based conservation measures to close markets to illegal 
fish. 389 
The moratorium proposal 
Environmental NGOs are now advocating for a moratorium on toothfish harvesting and 
have criticised the continued presence of legal fishing. In 1997 the ASOC Observer 
expressed concern: 
that economic pressures for increased quotas and burgeoning illegal and 
unregulated catch of D. eleginoides threaten the Southern Ocean ecosystem and 
more broadly the international credibility of CCAMLR. Until illegal and 
unregulated fishing is brought under control, ASOC believes that Members have no 
choice but to set zero TACs. It believes that it makes no sense at all to be 
conducting 'legal' fishing when the real catch is already so far above what 
CCAMLR estimates as a precautionary level, and allowing any fishing while this 
situation is out of control only compounds the depletion.39o 
A similar statement was made in 1998,391 and ASOC called for a 'zero' catch limit for 
Dissostichus Spp.392 A 'zero' catch limit was rejected by the Members on the grounds that: 
catch limits took into account the best available data; more stringent conservation measures 
would be passed at the meeting; and the implementation of these measures would tackle 
the IUU problem effectively without adversely affecting legitimate fishing. 393 
The calls for an actual moratorium began in 1999 and were linked with the call for a 
CITES listing in 2000. The proposed moratorium is not intended as a ban. Greenpeace 
believes that a moratorium should be declared and enforced: "until the IUU fishery has 
been driven out, the remaining Toothfish stocks assessed for their ecological ability to 
388 CCAMLR-XVII, 9.37, pAO. 
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391 CCAMLR-XVII, 12.17, p.84. 
392 CCAMLR-XVII, 12.18, p.84. 
393 CCAMLR-XVII, 12.18, p.84. 
225 
support a commercial fishery, and regulations are in place to adequately manage 'resumed' 
fisheries.,,394 In addition to this the NOOs believe that science, and not pressure from the 
fishing industry, should be the deciding factors in reopening the fishery. This stock 
assessment will require more funding for research, which will probably have to come from 
member governments rather than commercial sources. The NOOs would also like to see 
the moratorium supported with an international trade ban under CITES in 2002. Trade 
related measures are strengthened by the ban, as toothfish being landed can be presumed to 
have been caught in IUU fishing. Another NOO goal for when fishing does occur is that 
there should be a zero by-catch for seabirds. 
A variety of motives have prompted the call from the environmental NOOs for a 
moratorium. There is an expectation that the Patagonian toothfish will become 
commercially extinct in the near future. The high level of by-catch of seabirds in the IUU 
industry, combined with the ineffectiveness of current conservation measures to halt IUU, 
is another source of great concern. A moratorium may be the only way to curb the interest 
of the legitimate fishing industry in expanding the toothfish fisheries in the Southern 
Ocean. This is significant because of the growing commercial pressure on member states to 
open new and exploratory fisheries, and to retain access to existing fisheries. The 
interpretation placed on rational use by the environmental NOOs places much greater 
weight on the conservation objectives of the CCAMLR regime, than the exploitation 
expectations of fishing nations. Part of the ASOC approach has been a values based 
argument that the Southern Ocean should be treated differently: 
It is not fair that the legal fishery also has to pay the price of illegal fishing in the 
Southern Ocean. But Antarctica and its surrounding ocean is a rare and special 
place, one that the member countries of the Antarctic Treaty System promised the 
international community it would strive to protect. This is not just another fishery 
where commercial interests and officials can argue about access, ownership and 
certainty.395 
It was also argued that CCAMLR is not just another fisheries convention; it is a 
conservation agreement that is an integral part of the ATS. The core values of peace and 
cooperation were implicit in the precautionary management approach and are at risk from 
394 Greenpeace New Zealand, "Patagonian Toothfish", Greenpeace Briefing, 2000. 
395 "Precautionary Approach - Moratorium on Toothfish Fisheries the Only Option", ECO, 1, CCAMLR 
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the pressure of commercial imperatives.396 Environmental groups are deliberately using the 
'albatross factor' to gain political attention. This is because everyone understands that 
extinction is bad. It has also been argued that the Antarctic toothfish in the Ross Sea region 
can not be sustainably managed because they grow too slowly.397 
The calls for a moratorium are not supported by the fishing industry. One argument made 
against the call for a moratorium is that it will remove a potential source of surveillance of 
IUU fishing. As Alistair Macfarlane of the New Zealand Seafood Industry Council put it: 
"It's ironic that an environmental group is pushing for the moratorium lmowing full well it 
would be a green light for uncontrolled illegal fishing on a grand scale".398 In New Zealand 
the fishing industry has claimed that the toothfish stocks are good in the Ross Sea 
region,399 and that they can be sustainably managed.4oo If it could be scientifically 
demonstrated that fishing for Antarctic toothfish can not be done on a sustainable basis, 
then a moratorium would become a ban, as rational use of the resource can not be justified 
if it will cause an irreversible decline in the stock. For the moment however, the idea of 
rational use still supports the claims of the fishing industry for access to toothfish stocks. It 
is also questionable if a zero by-catch goal for seabirds is biologically necessary. The 
current "best practice" is the 'three strikes' policy for the Ross Sea required of New 
Zealand operators, where three sea-bird deaths result in the cessation of the fishery. 
The moratorium proposal reqUIres that a CCAMLR member adopt and advocate it, 
otherwise the routines of CCAMLR are unlikely to change. New Zealand announced in 
July 2000 that it would advocate for a global moratorium on fishing for toothfish if 
protection under the current licensed fishing programme proves inadequate.401 This 
followed intense domestic lobbying between environmental and fishing industry lobby 
396 "CCAMLR: Not Just Another Fisheries Convention", ECO, 1, CCAMLR XVIII, 25 October, 1999, 
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groups.402 At CCAMLR-XIX New Zealand gave notice that ifthe trend continued it would 
call for a global moratorium backed by international trade restrictions through CITES.403 A 
unilateral moratorium by New Zealand government is unlikely to be effective as vessels 
from other nations could apply to fish in the Ross Sea. Despite this policy shift New 
Zealand can be seen as ambivalent rather than primarily conservationist in its policy -
because its Ross Sea lobbying is linked to the territorial interest that it has in Antarctica. 
The United States has been a source of conservationist leadership within CCAMLR in the 
past, but if the United States fishing industry becomes involved in Southern Ocean fishing 
then its leadership role could change.404 
The great weakness of the moratorium proposal, is that just like CCAMLR conservation 
measures, it requires compliance from all those participating in the toothfish industry to be 
successful. CCAMLR can only regulate its own members, so the third-party and high seas 
problems would remain. A moratorium might strengthen the reputational effects and social 
opprobrium of continuing in the toothfish trade, but as long as the economic incentives 
remain high the IUU trade may persist. The environmental groups realise that a 
moratorium by itself is not a complete answer to the IUU problem.405 To complement the 
moratorium they are also calling for mandatory VMS implementation to allow 
governments to track illegal vessels, and denial of non-emergency port access to fishing 
vessels without VMS and proof of legal fishing. 406 
A repeat of CRAMRA, where a resource exploitation regime is replaced by a stricter 
conservation regime, is unlikely.407 When CRAMRA was being negotiated exploitation 
had not occurred and it was discarded before it could enter into force. CCAMLR has 
already been negotiated and ratified, and the living resources of the Southern Ocean are 
being exploited. The pressures for commercial exploitation are going to increase, not abate 
402 "Wake-up Call Over Toothsome Fish", The New Zealand Herald Online, 14 July 2000. 
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in the future. The way in which domestic politics unfolds over this issue in the member 
states will be crucial as to whether or not CCAMLR will redefine 'rational use' so that it 
includes a greater willingness avoid abuse the living marine resources of the Southern 
Ocean. At CCAMLR-XIX the members appear to have accepted that the deterrent effect of 
legal fishing vessels is minimal and that only military vessels are an effective deterrent.408 
This appears to undermine one element of the arguments used by the legitimate fishing 
operators to maintain their access to the fisheries of the Southern Ocean. 
Assessment of CCAMLR and the IUU Fishing Problems 
CCAMLR should not just be assessed as a conservation-fisheries regime. It should also be 
assessed as a conservation-fisheries regime operating within the ATS regime. CCAMLR 
has in many ways been a strategic success for the ATS. In the 1980s it helped preserve the 
authority of the ATCPs over Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. The negotiation and entry 
into force of the Convention was a successful expansion of the ATS that reduced the 
chances of commercial exploitation of living marine resources putting too much stress on 
the sovereignty compromise of the Antarctic Treaty. The cautious assessment by Zegers in 
1983 found that the Convention was important, but "these positive effects could be 
reversed if the Convention does not prove to be effective.,,409 If CCAMLR is an 
operational failure as far as conservation goals are concerned, then eventually the fishing 
goals will be compromised as well. If CCAMLR is ineffective and breaks down then there 
could be a reduction in the strength of the ATS, and a resurgence of territorial sovereignty 
issues. This possibility has been present since the start of the Convention because 
CCAMLR members were unwilling to yield sovereignty or real control over the Southern 
Ocean, as Barnes put it: "the limited scope of the Convention fosters the strong possibility 
of an unstable situation in the future, which could jeopardize the Convention and put 
additional pressure on the Antarctic Treaty itself.,,410 
In looking at how effective CCAMLR has been in achieving its conservation goals, one 
question is whether or not CCAMLR is managing the Southern Ocean as an ecosystem, or 
408 Personal correspondence from Felicity Wong, 18 December 2000. See Chapter 5, note 387, p.223. 
409 Fernando Zegers, op. cit., p.l56. 
410 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.274. 
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if it is still taking a piecemeal species-by-species approaches. Howard in 1989 thought that 
after five years of operation that the CCAMLR regime could be evaluated for its degree of 
success in implementing the ecosystem approach.411 At that time some of the members 
were dissatisfied with the progress made towards implementing conservation measures and 
a drift away from an ecosystem approach to a single species approach. Papers containing 
strong statements were progressively weakened in an attempt to gain consensus.412 Howard 
did not think that the blame could be placed on the requirement for consensus voting as 
there were areas in which conservation leadership could have been exercised 
independently, such as research, ecosystem monitoring, and ad hoc observation. What was 
required was a greater commitment to the conservation objective by the members of 
CCAMLR.413 
If the early writings about CCAMLR are a mixture of optimism and pessimism in the 
assessments of its effectiveness, by the early 1990s most such assessments were more 
optimistic. "The Convention seems to have protected the fish population of the Antarctic 
from spiralling overexploitation.,,414 The conclusions of most writers on CCAMLR echo 
the same themes, that despite the early problems there has been a steady if slow 
improvement in the regime, and that it is now better positioned to deal with problems in 
the future. In 1994 Kock wrote that "economic considerations and market demands will be 
the primary determinants of the future development of fisheries in the southern waters. ,,415 
The three fisheries that appeared economically viable to Kock at that time were the 
longline fishery on the Patagonian toothfish, part of the krill fishery, and the trawl fishery 
on mackerel icefish. Since then the toothfish fishery has developed out of the control of 
CCAMLR as a result of the IUU fishing activities. Other finfish fisheries have not seen a 
renewed interest in exploitation yet, and interest in the krill fishery has remained relatively 
constant, but with some signs of increasing interest from new operators. Long term trends 
in the wider context of world fisheries may affect the economics of the situation as well, 
411 Matthew Howard, p.135. 
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but at the moment there is a continued demand for toothfish, giving it a high market value 
that continues to attract poaching. 
In the wake of the IUU fishing shock and the associated problem of sea-bird by-catch a 
new assessment of the performance of the CCAMLR regime can now be drawn. While 
there has been an improvement in the regime in relation to these issues it has come at a 
slow pace. As a response mechanism to overexploitation of the living resources in the 
Southern Ocean this has proved too slow. As the CCAMLR regime approaches the end of 
its second decade of operation it appears incomplete and unable to prevent significant 
damage to the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean that it has assumed responsibility for. 
Heap and Edwards once wrote that "If it does not give effect to the 'objectives and 
principles' the Commission will be failing in its function.,,416 At some stage CCAMLR will 
have to attain the capacity to achieve its conservation objectives in the immediate present, 
rather than hoping to achieve them in the future, or else it will have to be judged a failure. 
The traditional delaying tactics of the fishing members may have worked against their own 
interests as well as those of the conservation objectives of the Convention. The slow 
response has meant that toothfish stocks have been rendered commercially extinct in some 
fishing grounds, rather than being developed for rational use. This can in part be attributed 
to a reluctance from the fishing states that precautionary measures should be placed on 
fisheries, or that enforcement measures were necessary, before the IUU problem 
manifested itself. Enforcement efforts in the Southern Ocean have increased, but IUU 
fishing persists. 1998 was perhaps the earliest opportunity for VMS and a CDS to be 
introduced by CCAMLR. So far the results of the 1999 CDS scheme leaves much to be 
desired, and the VMS does not apply to all the boats in the krill fishery. One development 
in 2000 may have been the creation of two markets for toothfish; one high value market for 
documented fish, and a lower value market for IUU fish. One side effect of increased 
enforcement and control has been the displacement of fishing operations into developing 
states. This actually reduces the ability of the CCAMLR members to control the problem 
and adds to the undermining of the credibility of CCAMLR, and consequently also 
undermining the credibility of the entire ATS regime. 
416 David M. Edwards and John A. Heap, op. cit., p.356. 
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Victoria Hallum assessed the CCAMLR reaction up to the end of 1997 as not being a 
comprehensive addressing ofthe problem and as being unlikely to stem the IUU fishing. 417 
The time line for developing market controls has been too slow due to a lack of political 
will. "The shadow that falls between the potency of CCAMLR and its existence is a lack of 
genuine commitment on the part of the Parties to implementing and enforcing its aims. 
Without this commitment the CCAMLR regime is merely a hollow shell.,,418 There is a 
lack of capacity among some states. "For other States however, the likely cause is more 
sinister. Those States do not actually want to see an improvement in compliance with the 
regime, because their vessels and their industries are benefiting hugely from the illegal and 
unregulated fishing.,,419 Felicity Wong observed that conservation measures were 
"negotiated down by the countries involved in the illegal fishing.,,42o 
Future trends for the CCAMLR regime 
CCAMLR will probably continue to leave the whaling issue with the IWC, and seals with 
CCAS. The current trend in whaling politics is that more pressure is being exerted by the 
conservationist states to halt scientific whaling in the Southern Ocean. A resumption of 
commercial whaling seems unlikely. The New Zealand and Australian initiative for a 
South Pacific whale sanctuary was defeated in 2000, but a resolution criticising 'scientific 
whaling' in the Southern Ocean was passed.421 t seems unlikely that there will be any 
resurgence of commercial interest in seals, so CCAS will remain a dormant regime without 
any real need for it to be merged with CCAMLR. A resumption of sealing would also be 
likely to draw protests from environmental NGOs. Fishing effort for crab and squid 
remains low, although exploratory efforts are continuing. The focus of commercial fishing 
in the immediate future will remain on finfish and krill. 
The recovery of the fishing stocks depleted before CCAMLR entered into force progresses 
slowly. It is probable that Patagonian toothfish stocks will become commercially extinct in 
more areas of the Southern Ocean, as has already happened around the Prince Edward and 
Marion Islands. Fishing for D. mawsoni has started on a low level, with no substantial 
417 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., p.63. 
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evidence of IUU fishing targeting the stock at the time of writing. New Zealand companies 
have been conducting exploratory fisheries in the Ross Sea and are now potentially being 
joined by vessels from other CCAMLR members. There are questions as to the commercial 
viability of the Antarctic toothfish,422 and the environmental NODs question whether the 
stock can ever be harvested on a sustainable basis. Unless a major shift in policy occurs 
CCAMLR appears likely to continue approving new and exploratory fisheries until all 
toothfish stocks have been discovered and exploited. 
Important as the IUU fishing of toothfish is, it pales into insignificance besides the 
potential impacts of large scale harvesting of laill. "The focus of future exploitation ... is 
laill, the primary food source of most higher organisms within the ecosystem.,,423 Who is 
likely to get involved in laill fishing in the future? Joyner suggested India and China, but 
pointed out their lack of a fishing fleet for Antarctic waters.424 There has been new 
commercial interest from North America,425 the EU, and existing interests from the old 
players in the laill industry: Russia; Korea; Japan. This means that the industry may be 
rapidly expanded with new and innovative technology, as well as a potential increase in 
catch effort from increasing the number of vessels involved. Any substantial increase in the 
laill harvest must have an impact on the ecosystem due to the biological connections 
between laill and other species and the techniques that will be used for laill harvesting. 
The fine mesh trawl nets will catch juvenile fish as well as laill, and have a 
disproportionate effect on the laill predator species. Some predator species, such as 
Antarctic fur seals, are close to pristine abundance, while others, such as the great baleen 
whales, are well below their original biomass levels.426 If laill is heavily exploited then 
these species are unlikely to recover. In 1996, before IUU fishing was a major problem, 
Rothwell wrote that: "Given the importance attached to CCAMLR management of krill, 
the future effectiveness of the regime will be judged against its ability to manage that 
421 "2000 IWC Meeting and the Southern Ocean", The Antarctic Project, 9 (2), August, 2000, 
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resource stock.,,427 However, CCAMLR will also be judged by how well it deals with 
current IUU and by-catch problems. In the future will CCAMLR be an effective 
conservation agreement; or will it remain a regime that fails to regulate fisheries? 
Developing a system that harvests the krill effectively after other management failures is at 
best a limited success. 
At the 2000 CCAMLR meeting, krill quotas have been increased despite the lack of data 
on how krill fishing affects localised predator species. CCAMLR does not expect to have a 
krill fishery management plan in place for another 5-10 years.428 A TAC of four million 
tonnes for Area 48 has been recommended by the Scientific Committee. Environmentalists 
at the meeting were concerned about this increase and argued for smaller management 
units, and for more scientific information on predator affects.429 While the krill fishery in 
the late 1990s has a wider range around the Southern Ocean, the bulk of the krill harvest is 
still taken in the areas of great historical activity. So far the actual catch is not increasing 
rapidly, but the possible catch has increased by several factors. If actually harvested it 
would be form a significant proportion of the global fishery, and possibly be the largest 
crustacean fishery in the world. ASOC and Greenpeace fear that concentrated krill 
harvesting will have a severe local impact on dependent species and that the time lag 
between detection of a problem and reaction to it will allow vested commercial interests to 
exploit it.43o 
A question that may be answered in the near future is how amenable krill is to IUU fishing; 
is it the 'pink gold' of the Southern Ocean, like the 'white gold' of toothfish has been? 
Modern processing techniques make human consumption of krill more possible, giving 
krill harvests a higher value than the 1970s-80s, and it can still be a low value animal meal 
product. Pink dye may be able to be extracted from the shells of the krill, which may be of 
high value in the Salmon farming industry.431 At the moment it seems clear that if there is 
money to be made, with a low risk of being caught, then there will be IUU fishing, and 
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CCAMLR will be slow to react. For krill the continued resistance of the fishing nations to 
the installation of VMS on krill vessels is an ominous sign. 
What more might CCAMLR do? 
Joyner in 1998 suggested that management policies are required for CCAMLR that: 
(1) restore and maintain the ecological balance between target, dependent, and 
related species; (2) foster rapid recovery of depleted whale and fish populations; (3) 
prevent wasteful use and depletion of dependent and associated populations, as well 
as target species; and (4) protect breeding areas and other habitats of biological 
importance to target, dependent, and related populations.432 
Restoring and maintaining the ecological balance. is going to be difficult while fishing 
continues with high incidental mortality, and while adequate models have not been 
developed. Recovery of depleted stocks requires a continued prohibition on their 
harvesting, and leaving a surplus in the ecosystem by not harvesting all of the krill 
'surplus'. The concept of a MP A is one which could help protect breeding areas and other 
important habitats. Increasing the effectiveness of existing CCAMLR conservation 
measures will require action in several different areas: increased cooperation with other 
IGOs; support for developing international environmental law associated with the new 
global fisheries regimes; enforcing regulations on nationals regardless of the flag they hide 
behind; and cooperation with third-party states. Many of these areas overlap and interact 
with each other. For example, it may be difficult to secure the cooperation of third-party 
states without being seen as enforcing regulations on member nationals; yet enforcing 
these regulations may also require the cooperation of the third-party states. 
Some progress of VMS and CDS has been made; but more is required for full effectiveness 
of these conservation measures. As in the past, progress in the future will depend on the 
timely provision of the best scientific advice. "Management and conservation of living 
resources in the Antarctic commons can only work as well as the weakest data assumptions 
that support such policies " . [the] Scientific Committee must be capable of predicting 
accurately the effects of harvest levels and strategies on target, dependent, and associated 
432 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., p.145. 
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species.,,433 SCOI lacks the secretarial support available to the Chair of the Scientific 
Committee and may need to be reorganised to increase its effectiveness. 434 
Conclusions: CCAMLR at the limits of rational use? 
This IUU issue is important because the ATS is founded on a spirit of cooperation, as well 
as a sense of pragmatic self-interest. If this reciprocity is not respected the consequences 
for the ATS could be dire. The external credibility of the ATS is threatened if its own 
members do not follow the rules. Why should third-party states comply with regulations, 
or even consider joining the ATS? Compared to early meetings of CCAMLR a huge 
number of conservation measures are being passed, which makes the regime appear to 
have resolved its internal problems. The actual effectiveness of the measures being passed 
is debatable. As far as the IUU fishing issue is concerned CCAMLR is still a reactive 
regime, due to the lack of information assembled before fishing began, and not the 
precautionary regime that was hoped for when it was negotiated. The commitment to 
conservation from many of the CCAMLR members is lacking. With the gradual global 
momentum towards high seas regulation CCAMLR risks being bypassed as the source of 
authority and innovation in the Southern Ocean. "CCAMLR talks about conservation but it 
is, in fact, a regime for exploitation. The exploitation is, of course, to be done 'rationally' -
but it is still exploitation. ,,435 
433 ibid. 
434 Commissionfor the Conventionfor the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, CCAMLR 
XVII: Hobart, 26 October - 6 November 1998, Report of the New Zealand Delegation, Antarctic Policy Unit: 
Wellington, November 1998, p.14. 
435 Keith Suter, Antarctica: Private Property or Public Heritage?, Pluto Press Australia: Leichhardt, 1991, 
pAO. 
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Chapter 6 
Analysis: Regime Theory and CCAMLR 
This analysis will be built on the theories outlined in chapter 2 as they can be applied to the 
context of the case study outlined in chapters 3-5. The aim here is consolidate and refine 
regime theory concerning the effectiveness of regimes, and to focus on theoretical issues 
relating to epistemic communities, and regime change. In the first section a natural 
experiment will be pursued through analysing the conservation measures adopted by the 
CCAMLR Commission and their evolution over time. The impact that these measures have 
had on the problem of IUU fishing and by-catch to date will be examined. In the second 
section counterfactual arguments will be explored in four areas: the idea of a world without 
the CCAMLR regime; the different possibilities of initial regime construction; different 
responses to the IUU problem; and what CCAMLR might have been like without IUU 
fishing. In the third section the determinants of effectiveness are used to analyse the 
effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime. In the fourth section the concept of the epistemic 
community will be investigated. Finally in the fifth section the different models of regime 
change will be applied to the case study. 
Natural Experiments: Conservation Measures 
The approach taken here is first to analyse the significant thematic areas of conservation 
measures developed by the Commission.1 The themes to be analysed include: VMS, CDS, 
flag state measures, cooperation with third-party states, cooperation between contracting 
parties, and incidental mortality. This will illustrate the impact on the problem of IUU 
fishing by the CCAMLR regime, and how the conservation measures have changed the 
behaviour of the CCAMLR members, or associated companies, NGOs, and individuals.2 
Then a collective analysis of the effectiveness of the conservation measures as a whole can 
be attempted. 
1 See Chapter 2, pp.44, for the methodology of natural experiments. 
2 "An institution is effective to the extent that its operation impels actors to behave differently than they 
would if the institution did not exist or if some other institutional arrangement were put in its place." Oran R. 
Young, 'The Effectiveness ofInternational Institutions: Hard Cases and Critical Variables' in James N. 
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Vessel monitoring system 
The monitoring of international fisheries is problematic due to the fragmented nature of the 
industry and because most actual harvesting occurs out of sight.3 If the monitoring of 
fisheries can be improved then the actors involved may be more willing to engage in 
mutual self-restraint, as it will be easier to put pressure on those who violate the rules. The 
new technology for monitoring uses the detection capabilities of satellites to make the 
activities conducted by fishing vessels equipped with VMS more transparent to a 
monitoring agency. CCAMLR has been taking steps to implement a VMS in the Southern 
Ocean, first with Resolution 12IXVI in 1997, and then followed by Conservation Measure 
148IXVII in 1998. However, a VMS was not required to be operational until 31 December 
2000, so it is difficult at this stage to fully assess the effectiveness of the VMS for 
CCAMLR. As more states implement the system it should become more effective. This 
implementation appears slow considering that proposals were first made in CCAMLR to 
investigate VMS in 1993 and that by 1996 individual members had started implementing 
VMS on a national leve1.4 The operation of VMS is feasible, and the cost is not too 
prohibitive. 5 
The compulsory use of VMS is not a replacement for the inspection system, but it 
complements and reinforces existing conservation measures. VMS is useful for 
conservation measures relating to the management of fishing effort and closed areas of 
fishing where discrete geographical boundaries can be drawn. It would also help identify 
IUU fishing vessels, as any vessel encountered by patrols not fitted with VMS can be 
presumed to be engaged in IUU fishing. 6 A centralised system coordinated through the 
CCAMLR secretariat would be best, otherwise there is a need to ensure that there are 
obligations for information sharing between the members. 7 
Rosenau & Ernst-Otto Czempiel, Governance Without Government: Order and Change in World Politics, 
Cambridge University Press: Cambridge, 1992, p.161. 
3 Marc A. Levy, Oran R. Young, and Michael Ztirn, op. cit. 
4 In 1997 Australia, Chile, New Zealand, and South Africa reported to SCOI on their efforts using VMS to 
monitor their vessels in the Convention Area. CCAMLR-XVI, Annex 5 Report of the Standing Committee 
on Observation and Inspection, 1.63, p.133. In 1995 it had been estimated that CCAMLR could implement a 
fully operation VMS in one and a half to two years. CCAMLR-XIV, 2.36, p.133. 
5 The VMS issue is also examined at Chapter 5, pp.205-207, and Chapter 6, pp.282-285. 
6 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., pp.38-40. See also the discussion on p.242 below in relation to Conservation 
Measure I 18/XVI. 
7 Conservation Measure 148/XVII is currently based on flag state monitoring of VMS on flagged vessels, 
with the CCAMLR secretariat being informed before the annual meeting of any flag vessels entering the 
CCAMLR area improperly. 
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The most important limitation on the effectiveness of the current VMS conservation 
measure is that it does not apply to the krill fishery. Considering the potential for the krill 
fishery to expand quickly between seasons, this is a significant defect in the potential 
effectiveness of the VMS scheme. It also provides a potential loophole for trawl fishing of 
finfish species, although the development of other conservation measures may restrict this 
defect. Most of the impact of VMS will be on the legitimate fishing operators, who will 
have to install and maintain the VMS on their vessels. Overcoming resistance from the 
fishing states to the inclusion of VMS in the krill fishery appears difficult. Their 
unwillingness to change their behaviour may indicate a desire to avoid any restrictions on 
fishing. The current approach from the conservationist states appears to be to embed the 
VMS scheme further into other measures developed by CCAMLR, expanding its use and 
acceptability. While VMS has evolved over time into a more effective measure it has gaps 
and is incomplete. 
Trade related measures 
It has been difficult to implement trade related measures under the CCAMLR regime 
because of resistance from some CCAMLR members. This is unfortunate as trade related 
measures offer some of the best opportunities for undermining the economic incentives 
that have encouraged the development and persistence of IUU fishing in the Southern 
Ocean. The trade measure being developed by CCAMLR is that of the CDS which was 
implemented in May 2000.8 The ATCM intervention in 1999 that assisted the adoption of 
the CDS conservation measure was a significant event, in that it demonstrates that the 
ATCPs are willing to prompt action from CCAMLR if it is not developing effective 
conservation measures in a timely fashion, an important example of linkage between parts 
of the ATS regime. The scheme was further developed the following year with three 
resolutions on the use of the scheme by third parties, VMS application to CDS, and port 
avoidance. This is an unusually large number of resolutions to be adopted on a similar 
conservation measure area at a single meeting of the Commission. This may indicate that 
the urgency of the situation is forcing some concessions from the fishing states to the 
conservationist states, but not to the extent that binding measures are agreed too. 
8 The CDS measures are discussed at Chapter 5, pp.l87-188 and 197-201, and Chapter 6 pp.285-286. 
239 
One reason for the slow development has been fears of inconsistency with the WTO. This 
is because market control measures are subject to review by a WTO dispute settlement 
process as market restrictions may conflict with WTO obligations to treat like products in 
the same way, regardless of their origin. There is some acceptance of the necessity for 
trade restrictions for environmental agreements. Restrictions would also have to be placed 
on CCAMLR member nationals if they are to be applied to third party states. One method 
of implementation could be to adapt the ICCAT system, a staged process that takes several 
years before sanctions can take full effect.9 CCAMLR could also consider the use of a 
regional register and blacklisting of violators, as has been used by the FF A, and individual 
members could exclude violators from their EEZs or vessel registries. 10 
Market end controls involve the closing of markets to fish that has not been caught in 
accordance with the CCAMLR conservation measures. One failing of the CDS is that it 
does not really use market controls, a result of it being watered down in negotiations from 
a certification scheme into a documentation scheme. Another wealmess is that Patagonian 
toothfish are a straddling stock, unlike Antarctic toothfish which are found only within the 
Convention Area, and this means IUU fishers can attempt to declare Patagonian toothfish 
as having been caught in the high seas. 11 At the moment CDS effectiveness has been 
affected by the transhipping of toothfish through China into Japan,12 and through Canada 
into the United States. 13 Even if those loopholes are tightened the effectiveness of the 
scheme is tied to the retention of the major toothfish markets within CCAMLR members. 
9 In 1999 ICCAT recommended that its contracting parties prohibit the import of Atlantic swordfish from 
Belize or Honduras, following a 1998 decision identifying Belize and Honduras as fishing in a manner that 
undermined ICCAT conservation measures, and after efforts to communicate with Belize and Honduras had 
proven unfruitful. See ICCAT Recommendation 99-8 'Recommendation by ICCAT Regarding Belize and 
Honduras Pursuant to the 1995 Swordfish Action Plan Resolution', http://www.iccat.es/(site visited January 
28,2002). 
10 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., pp.51-52. The adoption in 2000 of Resolution 13/XIX 'Flagging and Licensing of 
Non-Contracting Party Vessels' is a step in this direction. 
11 See Chapter 5, note 62, p.l71 for an example of past doubts about catch declarations. 
12 "China has emerged as a significant supplier ofPatagonian Toothfish products to the Japanese and US 
markets. These two markets imported over 3600 t ofPatagonian Tooth-fish from China in 2000, 
predominantly in the form of fillets (Table 6). Japan imported two-thirds of the fillets, reflecting the presence 
of a number of Japanese-owned processing plants in China. Since China is not a known catching country, it 
is believed that its involvement is by way of importing, processing and re-exporting Patagonian Toothfish.", 
M. Lack and G. Sant, Patagonian Tootlifish, Are Conservation And Trade Measures Working?, TRAFFIC, 
2001, http://www.traffic.org/toothfish/toothfish.pdf.(sitevisitedJanuary28.2002).pp.lI-13. 
13 ibid., p.12, "Canada, an Acceding State to CCAMLR, and an increasingly significant importer of 
Patagonian Toothfish, has yet to demonstrate any commitment to implementing the CDS. The EC's tardiness 
in implementing the Scheme and Canada's reluctance to do so indicate a lack of commitment to the 
elimination oflUU fishing for Patagonian Toothfish. By contrast, a positive development has been the recent 
confirmation that China is actively participating in the Scheme." 
240 
A lot of the political attention of CCAMLR was invested in the CDS and for the moment it 
is not clear if that investment will payoff and increase the effectiveness of the regime. If 
the CDS had not been adopted in 1999 the credibility of the ATS would have been 
undermined even further than it already has been by the IUU problem. 
Flag state enforcement measures 
A variety of measures are possible under the heading of flag state enforcement, including 
vessel licensing and marking requirements. I4 In 1997 CCAMLR adopted Conservation 
Measure 119IXVI requiring contracting parties to licence their flag vessels. In 1998 it was 
amended and adopted as Conservation Measure 119IXVII on licensing and inspection 
obligations for flag vessels. To this was added Conservation Measure 146IXVII on the 
marking of fishing vessels and gear. These do potentially increase the effectiveness of 
CCAMLR, but these requirements have been widely flouted. Vessels engaged in IUU 
fishing frequently conceal or alter their vessel markings. I5 Licensing restrictions and 
sanctions have been evaded through reflagging a vessel to a third-party state that is not 
bound by the conservation measures of CCAMLR. This reflagging has been one of the 
most serious non-compliance problem as IUU fishing has expanded as it increases the 
difficulty of identifying who is responsible for IUU fishing. 16 
Current international environmental law does not lend itself to an easy resolution of this 
issue. UNCLOS Article 91 on the Nationality of Ships has vaguely expressed rules that are 
difficult to test or enforce. The UNIA does provide a precedent for shared enforcement 
mechanisms. 17 The F AO Compliance agreement helped inspire CCAMLR Resolution 
l3IXIX 'Flagging and Licensing of Non-Contracting Party Vessels', but at the time of 
writing the F AO agreement is yet to enter into force itself. The reflagging problem is one 
that occurs in other settings, so opportunities should exist for CCAMLR to learn from the 
experience of other fishery management regimes. 
14 See Chapter 5, pp.194-197. 
15 See Chapter 5, p.189. 
16 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., pA2. "Although reflagged, the vessels still maintain significant links to their 
previous country of registration, most significantly the return of profits." 
17 UNIA, Articles 20-21. 
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The reliance on flag state measures and the traditional reluctance of flag states to cede 
authority over vessels to international organisations has retarded the adoption of collective 
enforcement methods and the development of new flag state measures. Collective 
enforcement faces the difficulty of the differing positions held by the CCAMLR members 
regarding territorial sovereignty in Antarctica and the Falkland/Malvinas Islands. On the 
whole the amount of time wasted on the preservation of existing positions in these sterile 
rituals is frustrating in its affect on negotiations for conservation measures. This problem 
requires improved relations between Argentina and the UK, but neither state appears likely 
to change its basic positions on the dispute at this time. 18 
The problems with collective enforcement do not mean that other innovations could not be 
made for flag state measures. The measures adopted and implemented by Norway appear 
to have been effective in reducing the involvement of Norwegian nationals and companies 
in IUU fishing. I9 However, Norway's attempt to make a positive contribution to the 
adoptions of similar flag state measures in CCAMLR has been blocked by the EC and 
other members?O If similar measures were applied by other problem states, such as Spain, 
they might be very effective. At the moment they are only likely to be implemented on a 
voluntary basis, which will lead to partial coverage. CCAMLR has been designed to leave 
the responsibility of enforcement largely to the flag states, so in order for it to be more 
effective in the future it will have to devise new methods for flag state enforcement that 
apply jurisdiction to nationals and companies that evade licensing and marking 
requirements through reflagging. Resolution 13IXIX may be a first step in that direction. 
Cooperation with third-party states 
CCAMLR does not appear to meet all of the criteria of an objective regime that would 
create rights and obligations for third party states.21 In an ideal world states with vessels 
that become involved in harvesting activities in the Southern Ocean would be expected to 
accede to the Convention and to eventually become members of the Commission. In 
18 See Chapter 5, pp.220-222, and Chapter 6, p.244-245. 
19 See Chapter 5, p.196. 
20 See Chapter 5, p.218. 
21 See discussion by Arthur Watts, op. cit., pp.160-163 and pp.295-298., Emilio J. Sahurie, op. cit., pp.130-
134, Bruno Simma, "The Antarctic Treaty as a Treaty Providing for an Objective Regime", Cornell 
International Law Journal, 19 (2), 1986, pp.189-209, and Jonathon I. Charney, "The Antarctic System and 
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practice there is a gap between the ideal and reality, and many states have lacked either the 
capacity or the foresight to join CCAMLR.22 Developments in international environmental 
law have increased the obligations of states. UNCLOS Articles 117 to 120 impose 
obligations to cooperate with respect to the conservation of living marine resources and 
Article 300 is a good faith clause. These principles have been expanded through UNIA. In 
theory the options that should be exercised by a third-party state are either to prohibit their 
flagged vessels from such activities or join CCAMLR, but in practice it is possible a state 
may choose to ignore these requirements or lack the capacity to react to events. However, 
these obligations of international law put CCAMLR members in a good position to put 
pressure on non-parties through political and diplomatic means.23 
The Commission has frequently contacted third-parties about the activities of their flagged 
vessels and nationals in the Convention Area. During the early period of CCAMLR this 
was not a significant problem, but with the reflagging of vessels that occurred during the 
expansion of IUU fishing in the early to mid-1990s it became a serious problem for 
CCAMLR that undermined the effectiveness of its conservation measures and the 
enforcement efforts of its members. In 1997 the Commission adopted Conservation 
Measure 118IXVI, in which there is a presumption that third-party flagged vessels in the 
Convention Area were undermining the conservation efforts of CCAMLR. In that year the 
Commission also adopted a communication policy to follow up on this conservation 
measure. One part of this policy was to inform states of the problem of IUU fishing and to 
ask them to consider acceding to the Convention. The second part was to ask states to 
consider sending observers to the Convention. In 1998 Conservation Measure 118IXVII 
was amended and updated to include a reference to VMS. 
The success of the communications policy has been mixed. The response from some of the 
states involved in reflagging, such as Belize, Portugal, and Panama, has been minimal. The 
policy appears to have been most effective with Namibia and Vanuatu, and to a lesser 
extent with Mauritius. Namibia and Mauritius and have attended the Commission meetings 
from 1998 to 2000. This has been followed by Namibia acceding to the Convention in 
2000, and Vanuatu acceding in 2001. Despite attending the CCAMLR meetings, Mauritius 
Customary International Law", in Francesco Francioni, and Tullio Scovazzi (Eds), International Law for 
Antarctica, Kluwer Law International: The Hague, 1996, pp.51-101. 
22 See also Chapter 4, pp.120-121, and Chapter 5, pp.192-194. 
23 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., pp.45-51. 
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has remained a centre of IUU operations in the Indian Ocean, and has only recently 
appeared to be taking greater steps to deal with the landing and transhipping of toothfish 
caught in IUU operations through its ports. This may have been in response to pressure 
from the UK, France and the environmental groups. 
Another area of difficulty in third-party cooperation has been with the implementation of 
the CDS. China, an ATCP, and Canada, an acceding state to CCAMLR, have both 
presented problems to the implementation of CDS and have diminished its initial and 
potential effectiveness as a measure against trade in Dissostichus spp. This resulted in the 
adoption of Resolution 14IXIX 'Catch Documentation Scheme: Implementation by 
Acceding States and Non-Contracting Parties'. It is too early to tell what the effectiveness 
of this resolution will be, but without cooperation from third-party states the CDS can be 
evaded through landing and shipping toothfish through third-party states into markets 
which may be in CCAMLR member states. 
The fact that measures against reflagging were considered necessary does indicate that the 
earlier efforts to enforce conservation measures on the vessels of CCAMLR members had 
some effect, even if that effect was not to increase compliance. Earlier detection of the 
flags of convenience problem may have been retarded by the slow development of a 
system of inspection and observation. Current detection would be assisted by 
implementation of VMS. The issue of cooperation with third-party states will be an on-
going one. One difficulty here is that dealing with 'cooperating' third-party states may 
potentially undermine the incentives that a state might have to actually become an 
acceding or contracting party to the Convention by blurring the boundary between 
compliant member state and a non-compliant third-party state?4 
Cooperation between contracting parties 
Cooperation between the CCAMLR members is essential for success as cooperation with 
third party states is, because unilateral action will not be effective on the high seas where 
multilateral actions are required.25 CCAMLR has taken some steps towards strengthening 
the enforcement obligations, but has encountered difficulty in developing an approach 
24 See Chapter 5, pp.218-219 for one example of this kind of friction involving Portugal and the EC. 
25 See Chapter 5, pp.201-205 for some examples ofCCAMLR interactions with other organisations. 
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common to all CCAMLR members, that also has flexibility for domestic implementation. 
Developments in international environmental law have assisted this. UNIA contains clear 
and specific implementation and enforcement obligations in Part V: Duties of Flag States, 
Article 18, and Part VI: Compliance and Enforcement, Article 19. Such 'soft law' hortative 
developments may be ameliorating opposition from fishing states as conservation measures 
from more fishing management regimes are interlaced together. 
In response to IUU fishing the main cooperative development has been Conservation 
Measure 147 /XVII, later amended and adopted as 147 /XVIII and then as 147 /XIX. This 
port state measure helps the Commission track the trade movements in Dissostichus spp. 
through inspections of the catch being landed or transhipped through a member's port. This 
builds on the precedent for port state measures in UNIA Article 23 and is most effective 
where the choice of ports is restricted by geography.26 Vessels often need to use port 
facilities going to and from the Convention Area and if the IUU vessels can be displaced 
further away from the fishing grounds their operating costs will increase, reducing profits 
and the incentive to poach. For example, the closest ports to the Ross Sea region are in 
New Zealand and Australia, both CCAMLR members. The significant change in 147 /XIX 
is that the Secretariat is to be informed of any ship denied port access or permission to land 
or tranship Dissostichus spp. Improved future effectiveness may require more coordination 
through the Secretariat, rather than a reliance on the traditional bilateral arrangements that 
predominated in the early period of CCAMLR. 
The harmonisation of conservation methods used by the Convention and by those members 
exercising coastal state sovereignty in the Southern Ocean could make conservation 
measures more effective. In recent years there has been a decline in reservations made by 
South Africa, Australia, and France about the application of CCAMLR measures within 
the jurisdiction of their sub-Antarctic islands. However, the relationship between Argentina 
and the UK, and to a lesser extent between the UK and Chile is a difficult one due to the 
overlapping territorial sovereignty claims in Antarctica and the Falklands/Malvinas Islands 
dispute. Attempts at harmonisation have often resulted in long disputes in the Commission 
meeting as the claimants hedge their bets on their claims.27 Unilateral implementation of 
port state and inspection measures by the claimants can also be divisive in the 
26 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., pp.52-53. 
27 See Chapter 5, pp.220-222. 
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Commission. This does not contribute towards the effectiveness of CCAMLR due to the 
time wasted. It is also a problem in that the area in dispute, including Subareas 48.3, 48.2, 
and 48.4, is one of the main fishing grounds in the Convention Area. 
Incidental mortality 
CCAMLR has been successful in some areas of incidental mortality but not in others.28 
The impact of fishing on the seabed has not been perceived as a significant problem so far. 
The entanglement of marine mammals in marine debris or fishing nets was a more serious 
issue. Resolution 71X on driftnet fishing, in combination with efforts at the UN and 
elsewhere, has meant that driftnet fishing is not currently a problem for CCAMLR and is 
unlikely to be so in the future. Efforts to develop fishing techniques that minimise marine 
mammal entanglement are ongoing. Marine debris does remain a problem, despite 
Conservation Measure 63/XV which addresses this issue. This is because compliance with 
the conservation measures from the IUU operators is minimal. 
Incidental mortality among seabirds has been the greatest by-catch problem for CCAMLR, 
drawing attention from the late 1980s onwards. Conservation Measure 301X banning net 
monitor cables has been very effective in reducing incidental mortality in trawl fisheries?9 
There has been a good level of compliance, and trawlers do not appear to be involved with 
IUU fishing to the same extent as longline vessels. In recent years the problem has been 
more with the longline fisheries, especially the IUU fisheries which do not comply with the 
efforts to reduce by-catch required by Conservation Measure 291X. These measures have 
been effective only in the legitimate industry, and even then there have been many small 
problems with compliance.3o This is an area where CCAMLR can be very effective, but 
first it has to gain control of the IUU fishing. One reason for this potential effectiveness is 
that technical solutions to the problem in longline fishing are possible, and the economic 
incentives favour the adoption of methods that minimise incidental mortality. Seabirds that 
can get at hooks and remove bait are reducing the chances of catching fish. Not catching 
seabirds is also good for marketing the fish to consumers. For the time being with the large 
numbers of seabirds killed and threatened species, CCAMLR is not effective in this area. 
28 See Chapter 5, pp.208-216. 
29 CCAMLR-XVIII, 6.10, p.23. 
30 CCAMLR-XVI, 6.42, p.18, CCAMLR-XVIII, 8.5, p.30. In the 1999/2000 split year compliance was good 
in some fishing areas, and poor in others. CCAMLR-XIX, 6.12, p.30. 
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Collective analysis of conservation measures 
The term conservation measure may at times be a misnomer, as many of the conservation 
measures adopted by CCAMLR have been those relating to the increase in legitimate 
fishing in the Southern Ocean. The number of conservation measures being adopted each 
year is higher than during the early period of CCAMLR, but the number of measures that 
relate to directly increasing the conservation of living resources remains small. 3 I The bulk 
of the conservation measures relate to the regulations for fishing. Since 1991 and 
Conservation Measure 311X a conservation measure has been required for notification of a 
new fishery. Since 1993 and Conservation Measure 65IXII a conservation measure has 
been required for exploratory fisheries.32 Other conservation measures are used to specify 
the TAC for a species in a particular fishing season.33 
Table 3 
Conservation Measures and Resolutions adopted 
by the CCAMLR Commission, 1982 - 200034 
Year Conservation Resolutions 
Measures Adopted 
Adopted 
2000 36 4 
1999 26 0 
1998 28 0 
1997 31 1 
1996 21 0 
1995 14 0 
1994 l3 1 
1993 16 2 
1992 20 1 
1991 15 0 
1990 11 1 
1989 5 2 
1988 2 0 
1987 3 0 
1986 4 1 
1985 1 3 
1984 2 0 
1983 0 0 
1982 0 0 
31 See Chapter 4, pp.l43-147 for more detail on the development of CCAMLR conservation measures. 
32 See Chapter 4, pp.l49-150 for more detail on the development of new and exploratory fisheries. 
33 See Chapter 4, pp.l47-149 for more detail on the development of the quota system. 
34 Table formulated based on information in various CCAMLR reports. 
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The figures in Table 3 are distorted by the fact that some measures remain in force 
indefinitely, while others must be renewed from year to year to remain in force. There is 
also the fact that many key conservation measures have been amended over the years and 
adopted again by the Commission. There does appear to be a trend of rising interest in new 
fisheries during the period from 1995 to 1999, which have now been developed into 
exploratory fisheries, although not all new fisheries are developed. 
Table 4 
CCAMLR New and Exploratory Fisheries, 1991-2000 
Year 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 
New 0 0 0 2 6 7 3 1 0 
Exp.* 1 1 1 1 1 5 5 9 12 
* Includes 1 measure for crabs in each year 
There is no 'magic bullet' to solve the problems of enforcement and compliance in the 
Southern Ocean. Individual conservation measures complement and reinforce previous 
efforts. The basic structure of the Convention was realised with the establishment of SCOI 
in 1988. If the new additions to the framework of conservation measures, such as VMS and 
CDS, prove ineffective then either further measures will be needed, or a crisis may require 
a rethink about the basic norms and principles of the regime. Of these norms and 
principles, that of rational use is more easily reinterpreted than those related to territorial 
sovereignty. The principle of ATCP dominance of Antarctic conservation has been 
undermined by the necessity of cooperation with states that are not part of the ATS regime. 
So far the assessment that can be made of the effectiveness of CCAMLR in attaining the 
objectives of the Convention is mixed. Despite a difficult start and some progress 
CCAMLR still has many problems to overcome before it can be considered fully effective. 
The impact of CCAMLR on the problem of IUD fishing in the Southern Ocean has been 
limited, and this has limited the impact that CCAMLR can make on incidental mortality. 
The VMS measures are limited by the lack of application to the laill fishery. The CDS is 
limited in its lack of ambition and potential to be undermined by a lack of cooperation. 
Flag state measures are promising, but appear to have been blocked by fishing interests. 
Cooperation with third party states is essential, but difficult to achieve in practice with 
states that lack the resources to fulfil their international obligations. Cooperation with 
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member states is also essential, but in practice has been difficult to achieve at times 
because of the sovereignty issue. The objectives of CCAMLR are still sound ones, but 
significant parts of the scientific basis for rational use and sustainable management of 
resources remain to be completed. In the meantime CCAMLR is progressing ahead with 
developing fisheries and expanding the potential krill catch when a more precautionary 
approach might be justified. 
Fishing states have accepted some limitations on their freedom to fish on the high seas, but 
progress has been slow and only partially effective. New legal rules can always be 
responded to with evasive behaviour. Given the examples of evasive non-compliance by 
CCAMLR members new rules need to target the right 'bad' actors involved in the 
problem. Something CCAMLR needs to discuss is whether it would be more effective to 
target individuals, companies, or the member states with new rules designed to target their 
market incentives in order to improve compliance. Compliance from nationals and 
companies from Norway has improved, while that of Spain remains poor. Cooperation 
with Namibia is now cemented with the accession of Namibia to the Convention, and 
cooperation with the Mauritius and Vanuatu may be improving. 
Economic factors over which the CCAMLR members can only exert influence with great 
difficulty are significant in determining whether fishing will occur. The low harvesting of 
krill in recent years has been due largely to its low value, which could change in the 
future. 35 If the value of toothfish changes due to market forces the scale of IUU fishing 
may change accordingly, with higher prices leading to more fishing, and vice versa. 
Another possibility is that the toothfish market may split into a high value legal market, 
and a lower value illegal market.36 Other trends in global fisheries, such as changes in 
global fishing catch capacity, developments in other fisheries regimes and new 
international agreements, will also affect the degree of compliance with CCAMLR 
conservation measures. 
Traditional methods of enforcement that rely on sea patrols, airborne surveillance, and 
inspection and observation schemes, are unlikely to be completely effective in the 
Southern Ocean due to the size of the waters in the Convention Area and the jurisdictional 
35 See Chapter 5, pp.231-234. 
36 See Chapter 5, p.230. 
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problems in the high seas. Even if more resources are allocated to enforcement by the 
CCAMLR member states the sheer size of the Southern Ocean will reduce the 
effectiveness of these methods. Some at sea vessel inspections are not made because of 
environmental conditions.37 CCAMLR needs to be innovative and develop new techniques 
that will be more effective at dealing with the problems of the Southern Ocean without 
requiring a large increase in resources. Improvements to the observation and inspection 
system can be made in two areas. First, if the members can allocate resources to allow 
more frequent inspections then that will have a greater deterrent effect. Second, the 
members could overcome the reluctance to have a more centralised inspection system.38 
Counterfactual Arguments 
Some of the critical junctures in the ATS regime involved the negotiation of the Antarctic 
Treaty in 1959 and the subsequent negotiation of further conventions within the framework 
of the ATS.39 Without the Antarctic Treaty the ATS regime would not exist in its current 
shape and the Antarctic region might not have been established as a place of peace and 
science. The other main critical juncture of the ATS regime was the negotiation of the 
CRAMRA treaty, followed by the decision to defect by France and Australia from 
ratification, and the subsequent negotiations that lead to the establishment of the Madrid 
Protocol. The focus of counterfactual arguments in this thesis will be on the critical 
junctures for the CCAMLR regime. These arguments may shed some light on the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR when compared with reasonable 'what if' situations that might 
otherwise have occurred. 
A world without CCAMLR: open slather or world park? 
CCAMLR was negotiated by the ATCPs in anticipation of significant interest in krill 
harvesting in the Southern Ocean.40 It was a logical extension of the Agreed Measures and 
CCAS, and a step towards the subsequent CRAMRA negotiations and the possibility of 
37 See Chapter 5 pp.182-183 for examples of the difficulties in patrolling the Southern Ocean. 
38 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., pp.37-38. 
39 See Chapter 3, pp.64-68 for background on the Antarctic Treaty, and pp.68-82 for the development of the 
ATS. 
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resource exploitation on the continent of Antarctica. If the ATCPs had ignored this interest 
in krill, say for example because of the value placed on the freedom of the high seas in the 
Antarctic Treaty and the desire to maintain the sovereignty compromise that allowed the 
continent to be reserved for peace and science, then the Southern Ocean would have been 
left with CCAS and the Agreed Measures to provide the bulk of the ATS protection for the 
environment, while the IWC would have covered whales. In this situation the fact that krill 
did not prove to be a high value fishery, and that the ability of the Soviet Union to 
subsidise operations in the Southern Ocean ended after the end of the Cold War, would 
have limited the impact on krill.41 If the value of the fishery had been higher then there 
probably would have been more extensive harvesting of the krill, with effects that probably 
would have been similar to the overharvesting of the finfish species that occurred before 
CCAMLR historically entered into force. If this had occurred then attention probably 
would have been given to developing a management regime, but the regime would have 
been a reactive attempt after damage had been done to the krill stocks and the dependent 
species. Attempting to negotiate a regime under significant commercial pressure could 
have possibly altered the regime more towards harvesting than conservation goals. 
If CCAMLR had not been negotiated in the early 1980s then the shape of environmental 
protection for the Southern Ocean might have been developed outside of the ATS. It is 
possible that the F AO may have become more extensively involved in the Southern Ocean 
and attempts to manage the fisheries there.42 With the exploitation that has occurred in the 
Southern Ocean in the 1990s, and the changes in global fisheries, some kind of 
management regime for Southern Ocean fisheries might have been negotiated and 
implemented sooner or later under the auspices of the F AO. The potential involvement of 
states outside the ATS would have significantly altered the governance of the Southern 
Ocean and Antarctica, and might have undermined the compromise on territorial 
sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty. It is also possible that more of the territorial claimants 
may have considered the option of establishing EEZ, or the potential for an EEZ, off their 
claim in a manner similar to that of the Australians. This might have resulted in more 
unilateral enforcement attempts and less collective work towards multilateral solutions to 
problems. 
40 See Chapter 3, pp.72-77, and Chapter 4, pp.102-103, and pp.113-118 for more detail on the CCAMLR 
negotiations. 
41 See Chapter 3, pp.99-101, and Chapter 4, pp.l09-112 for more detail on krill harvesting. 
42 See Chapter 4, pp.l13-1l5. 
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If a management regime to cover the Southern Ocean had been negotiated in the absence 
of CCAMLR and at a later date - such as the early 1990s - its characteristics would 
probably have differed greatly, reflecting the trends in the development of international 
environmental law. A regime negotiated in the post-UNCED environment would have 
been more likely to have included NGO observers from the outset. The strength of the 
conservation objective of the regime might have been stronger if more conservationist 
states from outside the ATS community were involved in the negotiations. Such a regime 
may have had a good framework for conservation adapted from other management 
regimes, but it would have lacked the database of information that CCAMLR had 
accumulated, and the models developed after years of collective work. The early 
effectiveness of any conservation measures would have been limited unless a rigid 
precautionary approach was adopted from the outset, where large scale fishing was 
prohibited until proven sustainable. 
Another area to consider is the idea that the success of CCAMLR was a contributing factor 
to the negotiations for CRAMRA. It has also been argued by ASOC that if CCAMLR had 
not existed, then when the CRAMRA negotiations collapsed and CRAMRA was replaced 
by the Madrid Protocol, it would have included within its boundary and scope the 
responsibilities that currently lie with CCAMLR. 43 Were the CRAMRA negotiations 
possible without the success of CCAMLR? If CRAMRA was not actually negotiated then 
the political impasse that led to the Madrid Protocol may not have occurred. Problems with 
pollution at scientific bases and the growth of tourism on the continent all could have been 
handled within the existing ATS framework. For example, Tourism can be handled 
through regulations based on nationality of the tourists or the tourist operators, or 
regulations concerned with the ports and airfields necessary for tourist operations III 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. However, actual exploitation of mineral resources 
would have been a point of friction that the ATS probably could not cope with in its 
existing structure because of the direct implications to territorial sovereignty. This would 
have made negotiations for CRAMRA likely even if the CCAMLR negotiations had been 
drawn out over a longer period of time, or if they had been unsuccessful. So the ASOC 
argument is not completely improbable. 
43 "The Madrid Protocol", ECO, Volume CXXXVIII, No.1, 26 October, 1998, Hobart, Australia. See also 
ASOC, Report of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), XXII ATCMlIP84, 1998, p.5. 
252 
CCAMLR has also been held up as an early example of the application of the ecosystem 
principle and the precautionary approach in conservation regimes. If CCAMLR had not 
been negotiated it would not have been able to serve as such an example, and this may 
have hindered the adoption of the ecosystem principle and the precautionary approach in 
the broader global setting. Because the ATCPs would have been unlikely to have 
implemented a moratorium on fishing a reactive fishing management system would 
probably have followed after abuse of the living marine resources of the Southern Ocean. 
On the whole it seems reasonable to conclude that if CCAMLR had not been negotiated 
then the environmental protection of the Southern Ocean would have been weaker than it is 
today. This is because conservation measures would have been developed later, on the 
basis of less data and scientific analysis, with a greater degree of friction over the 
sovereignty issues. 
A different CCAMLR 7 
Another critical juncture to consider is whether or not the CCAMLR regime could have 
been a more effective one than was actually negotiated. In this respect it is best to focus on 
the options that were considered during the negotiations, but were considered historically 
possible by some of the states involved, and that were either not adopted, or were left to be 
adopted or worked out after the Convention entered into force. Some of the areas that can 
be considered here are the decision-making rules of the Commission and the Scientific 
Committee, the system of observation and inspection, conservation measures, and the role 
of scientific advice. 
A majority or qualified majority-based decision-making system was an option considered 
in the CCAMLR negotiations.44 If it had been adopted then the early dispute over decision-
making in the Scientific Committee, a dispute that prevented significant work at the first 
CCAMLR meeting, would not have been a problem.45 However the presence of a majority 
system would have acted as a disincentive for fishing states to join the Convention if there 
was a majority of conservationist states in the Commission, which would have reduced the 
goal effectiveness of the regime, even if the process-effectiveness was higher. In the 1990s 
44 James N. Barnes, op. cit., p.251 and p.254, David M. Edwards and John A. Heap, op. cit., p.357, and 
Ronald F. Frank, op. cit., pp.309-31O. 
45 See Chapter 4, pp.128-130. 
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under a majority system some of the resolutions adopted by the Commission could have 
been adopted as conservation measures, and this may have made the Convention more 
effective in dealing with the IUU problem. VMS and CDS measures might have been in 
place a year earlier than was the case.46 
A system of observation and inspection was clearly seen as necessary to the effective 
implementation of the Convention, but the best that could be achieved in the negotiations 
was were Articles IX (1) (g) and XXIV, that required such a system to be implemented.47 
In the interim period bilateral arrangements were made between Members.48 This was not 
as effective due to the lack of centralised coordination or common standards. A more rapid 
implementation of the system could have lead to more effective inspections that may have 
detected the scale of the rise of IUU fishing a year or so before it became undeniable. An 
earlier implementation of observers would have improved the data collection of CCAMLR, 
and given much stronger evidence for the scale of incidental mortality in the fisheries of 
the Southern Ocean. As by-catch from longlines in the regulated industry was amenable to 
technical solutions it seems reasonable to assume that a measure similar to Conservation 
Measure 291X could have been adopted a year or so earlier than it was. 
Another area where the design of the CCAMLR regime could have been improved was in 
the way that scientific advice was to be used in making management decisions. It required 
a significant assertion of its prerogatives on the part of the Scientific Committee to get the 
Commission to rely on the advice of the Scientific Committee, rather than that of the 
fishing states, when making management decisions in the Commission.49 If this had been 
clearer in the Convention, or resolved sooner, then the development of the CCAMLR 
approach to management under conditions of uncertainty may have occurred in less time. 50 
This may have reduced disputes over TAC allocation or strengthened the adoption of the 
precautionary approach in conditions of uncertainty. 
While the early shape and implementation of the CCAMLR regime could have been more 
effective it seems unlikely that it would have developed a framework of conservation 
46 See Chapter 5, p.230. 
47 See Chapter 4, pp.152-156 for more detail on the development of the system of observation and inspection. 
48 Appendix II, Article XXIV (3). 
49 See discussion in Chapter 4, pp.127-137. 
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measures that would have anticipated the rise of IUU fishing in the 1990s and effectively 
dealt with the problem. This is because IUU fishing was not considered a major potential 
problem during the CCAMLR negotiations. It would be very difficult from the viewpoint 
of 1980 to imagine that in 2000 CCAMLR member nationals and companies would be 
going to elaborate lengths to evade compliance with CCAMLR regulations, establishing 
complex smuggling networks to ship the illicitly harvested fish to markets around the 
world. 
CCAMLR was the result of a compromise between those states interested in fishing and 
those interested in conservation. Negotiations conducted in the real world, with resource 
constraints, and deadlines, are often imperfect in their results. The ambiguity inherent in 
CCAMLR means that the extent of its application is a contestable concept that can be 
redefined over time. A more rigid, authoritative convention might not have lasted, or have 
gained the agreement of states involved in fishing activities. A majority based decision 
making may have made the process of CCAMLR more effective, leading to synergies 
throughout the regime that would have made it more comprehensively effective over a 
shorter time period - but this system was likely to have proved unacceptable to the fishing 
states. Without the data provided by the fishing states CCAMLR would not have been in a 
position to pass effective conservation measures, or to develop its scientific models. 
Different responses to IUU fishing by CCAMLR? 
For CCAMLR to have responded differently to IUU fishing the time when IUU was either 
detected, accepted as a problem, or reacted to effectively would have to change. This 
means exploring when attention was given to the problem, what was proposed and not 
adopted, or not adopted quickly enough, and to consider what else could have been 
adopted. Most conservation measures were adopted quickly enough after discussion at one 
CCAMLR meeting. Measures relating to VMS, CDS and flag state enforcement have not 
been so easily accepted. Would it have been reasonable for the CCAMLR members to 
have put aside their established political and economic interests in favour of the 
environment? However, it would almost be contrary to the norm of compromise in the 
ATS regime for the members to be so altruistic. 
50 See Chapter 4, pp.137-141 for more detail on the development of the CCAMLR approach to ecosystem 
management. 
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Recognition of the IUU problem could have occurred in 1995 but at that point it appears 
that Chile and Argentina were acting defensively in the Commission about IUU fishing 
operations based in their states and this may have delayed early conservation measures.51 A 
VMS conservation measure could probably have been adopted in 1997 and a CDS 
conservation measure in 1998, if the political will to support them had existed. 52 The 
coverage of the measures could also have been expanded so that there were fewer 
loopholes that could be exploited. The failure to extend VMS to vessels fishing for krill is 
difficult to understand in terms of conservation and except in terms of fishing operators 
seeking to avoid regulations of almost any kind on their commercial activities. For the 
CDS had been more stringent in its requirements, then it could have had a greater impact 
on the Japanese and United States markets. 53 The lack of flag state measures is 
disappointing given the success enjoyed by Norway in its unilateral actions against its own 
nationals and companies. 54 
It appears unlikely that the moratorium option could have been implemented by CCAMLR 
before the 2000/200 1 season, or even seriously considered unless the regime was in a state 
of crisis that had forced a revaluation of its basic principles and norms. 55 While that might 
occur if krill was over-exploited the commercial extinction of one finfish species and the 
associated incidental mortality among several hundred thousand seabirds has not been 
sufficient to generate that kind of pressure. Sea birds are not viewed as an economic 
resource, except perhaps indirectly for tourism, so arguments in favour of their 
conservation must rely more on the value ascribed to preserving the ecosystem than what 
might be contained in the principle of rational use. So far one of CCAMLR's main 
responses has been to continue expanding the fisheries rather than contracting them. In 
2000 New Zealand appeared to be the only member willing to conditionally support the 
moratorium policy. 56 It will be interesting to see at future CCAMLR meetings if pressure 
from environmental NGOs affects the position taken by other conservationist CCAMLR 
members. 
51 See Chapter 5, pp.172-173. 
52 See Chapter 5, pp.197-200 for detail on CDS negotiations, and pp.205-207 for VMS negotiations. 
53 See Chapter 5, pp.200-201 for an assessment by ASOC of weaknesses in the CDS. 
54 See Chapter 5, p.196. 
55 See Chapter 5, pp.224-228 for detail about the moratorium issue. 
56 See Chapter 5, pp.226-227. 
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The weight attached to the rational use objective can outweigh the weight attached to the 
conservation objective, the ecosystem principle, and the precautionary approach. The 
underlying assumption that fishing is permitted until proven harmful does not make 
acceptance of a moratorium an easy task. If the assumption underlying CCAMLR was that 
fishing is prohibited until proven sustainable, then a moratorium would be easy to 
implement as a response to IUU fishing. Conservation Measures 311X and 65IXII which 
require Commission approval before the initiation of new and exploratory fisheries are a 
step in this direction. However, it is in the setting of TAC for harvested species that the 
Commission can exert the greatest influence. CCAMLR is still allocating access to new 
and exploratory fisheries and setting TAC through political bargaining rather than on the 
basis of the best scientific advice provided by the Scientific Committee. When the 
scientific models are improved, possibly sometime in the next five to ten years,57 then the 
conservation measures may become more precautionary. 
It was not impossible for CCAMLR to have responded on a faster time scale to the IUU 
problem than has occurred, but it was unlikely. Given the presence of the fishing states in 
CCAMLR, it was unlikely that the political will to overcome obstructions and objections to 
more effective conservation measures could have been generated more quickly than it did. 
Unlike with the CRAMRA negotiations, the ability of the environmental NGOs to mobilise 
public support is low because the toothfish and sea bird species lack some of the public 
appeal found in other environmental issues. 
CCAMLR without IUU fishing? 
It is interesting to consider the judgements that might have been made about the 
effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime if IUU fishing for toothfish had not occurred in the 
19908. Without the unregulated fishing the incidental mortality figures would have been 
significantly reduced, as the amount of longlining would have been reduced, and longliners 
have been a major source of incidental mortality. 58 Krill fishing was yet to increase 
57 See Chapter 5, note 428, p.233. The problems and current state of the art in the CCAMLR models are 
discussed in Constable, A. J., W.K. de la Mare, D.J. Agnew,!. Everson and D. Miller, "Managing Fisheries 
to Conserve the Antarctic Marine Ecosystem: Practical Implementation of the Convention on the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (CCAMLR)", Paper presented to ICES/SCOR 
Symposium on 'Ecosystem Effects of Fishing', 15-19 March, 1999, Montpellier, France, SC-CAMLR-
XVIII/BG/26,23 October 1999. 
58 See Chapter 5, pp.210-216. 
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significantly on levels in the early 1990s and the crab and squid fisheries had not proved a 
great problem as their commercial viability in Antarctic waters is yet to be proven. 
Scientific models for dealing with uncertainty are being developed and have achieved 
some progress towards their goals. 59 Some of the finfish stocks that were over-exploited 
prior to the Convention entering into force have seen some limited recovery, and renewed 
exploitation was not considered likely. For example, interest in E. carlsbergi has been 
limited in recent seasons.60 These factors would have suggested that CCAMLR was 
capably managing the Southern Ocean and confidence would have been high that an 
increase in krill fishing would have been coped with by CCAMLR. This in turn would 
have reinforced the credibility of the ATS regime. 
However, in the absence of the stimulus provided by shock of IUU fishing it is difficult to 
imagine that many of the conservation measures put in place to deal with the IUU problem 
would have occurred independently. VMS had been considered a good idea for some time, 
but the fishing interests would have continued to oppose its implementation as an 
unnecessary burden, and the high level of political will required for the adoption of the 
CDS would not have happened. Cooperation efforts with third-party states would have 
been unlikely if they were not involved in fishing in the Southern Ocean. In this respect 
CCAMLR may have actually ended up in a worse position than it currently occupies to 
deal with a sudden rise in the harvesting of krill, especially if this involved IUU fishing. 
CCAMLR may have adopted some measures in response to learning from other IOOs and 
from national VMS schemes. CCAMLR has adopted some initiatives that were first used 
elsewhere in dealing with incidental mortality, but without IUU fishing the urgency would 
not have been in place for swift adoption. Support would also not have existed for the 
adoption of conservation measures that further expanded the basic framework of 
CCAMLR, away from simple limitations on catch and effort. 
Without the IUU fishing problems the environmental NOOs would remain concerned 
about incidental mortality and the general slow progress of CCAMLR in actualising the 
precautionary approach and developing its ecosystem models. However, there would have 
59 See Chapter 6, note 57, p.256. More background on CCAMLR scientific models can also be found in: 
Karl-Hermann Kock (ed), Understanding CCAMLR's Approach to Management, May 2000, 
http://www.ccamlr.org/English/e--pubs/e_app_to_manag/TEXTJmaLpdf, (site visited March 19,2001). 
60 Chapter 5, pp.223-224. 
258 
been little that could have been used as the basis for generating public interest in the 
problems of the Southern Ocean, and political pressure to solve those problems effectively. 
A moratorium would not have been a serious consideration for policy by any of the 
conservation minded states. Domestic pressure for any new and exploratory fisheries to be 
opened up for exploitation by the regulated fishing industry would have continued. 
The proposal that IUU fishing might not have occurred is based on assumptions made 
about changes in the global context of fisheries. For IUU fishing not to have occurred in 
the 1990s then, inter alia, the capacity of the global fishing fleet would need to have been 
lower, meaning that there was less capacity to be displaced to the southern ocean. Less 
exploitation of stocks elsewhere in the 1980s would have reduced incentives to expand 
fishing into the Southern Ocean, as in part the value of toothfish would have been lower if 
the traditional stocks, such as North Atlantic Cod, had remained plentiful. On the whole 
this seems to have been an unlikely possibility. Efforts are now being made to tackle 
capacity, by-catch, and IUU problems at the global level. 61 This may mean that the chances 
of new IUU fishing problems in the Southern Ocean is reduced. 
Summary 
The development of IUU fishing, although a shock to CCAMLR, was the probable 
outcome in light of global developments in fishing. All it took to trigger IUU fishing was 
the spread of knowledge about the existence of a previously largely unexploited species of 
fish. If CCAMLR had not existed, then effective response to the problem would likely be 
minimal outside of the coastal state jurisdiction around the sub-Antarctic islands and the 
slowly emerging global cooperation on fisheries issues. CCAMLR could have been 
designed to be more effective, but that was an unlikely outcome from the consensus 
bargaining that took place in the CCAMLR negotiations. The development of CCAMLR 
conservation measures could have been more effective. The response to IUU fishing could 
have been more effective. Of course this judgement of effectiveness is one that favours the 
primary conservation objective of the Convention over the exploitation objective. For a 
state interested in fishing in the Southern Ocean the burdens imposed by CCAMLR have 
been introduced at a slow pace while access to the new fisheries has not been greatly 
impeded. From this perspective CCAMLR is a mixed success. 
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The Determinants of Effectiveness 
Using the determinants of effectiveness from chapter 2, the CCAMLR regime will be 
critically assessed to find the extent to which the issue of IUU fishing has increased, or 
reduced, the effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime. This is done by conceptualising the 
issue as a shock that has required the attention of CCAMLR in order for it not to be 
undermined and rendered ineffective by the shock. 62 The way in which CCAMLR 
responds to the issue can be used in an attempt to reconfirm the importance of these 
determinants of effectiveness and to reveal points that were not well known before. 
Transparency as a determinant of effectiveness 
In the area of effectiveness-oriented transparency CCAMLR has made it clear that it has 
been struggling to achieve its conservation goals in the face of IUU fishing. 63 Apart from 
the Commission meeting in 1995 there has been little subsequent argument over whether 
or not the issue is a serious one for the regime.64 The knowledge of the extent of the 
damage to Dissostichus spp. stocks and sea bird species is inaccurate because of the nature 
of the issue area rather than any deliberate obscuration on the part of CCAMLR. It is 
limited in the area of compliance-oriented transparency in that at ATS meetings the 
identity of the member states involved in IUU fishing remains hidden. This is probably 
done in order to facilitate cooperation and bargaining within the regime and any 
reputational opprobrium has been indirect.65 
The environmental NGOs through the public media have been responsible for publicly 
identifying the CCAMLR members and third-party states who are involved in IUU fishing. 
There does not seem to be much pressure to develop greater compliance-oriented 
transparency within the Commission. The exception here was New Zealand, which has 
made it clear that it will identify any state involved in IUU fishing in the Ross Sea, but 
these efforts were made in relation to defending New Zealand interests in the Ross 
61 See Chapter 3, pp.92-95. 
62 This is based on Oran Young's 'hard case' concept, see Chapter 2, pp.41-42. 
63 See Chapter 2, pp.45-46 for theory about transparency and effectiveness. 
64 See Chapter 5, pp.172-173. 
65 See Chapter 5, pp.190-192, for how NGO actions have gone some way towards identifying those 
responsible. 
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Dependency.66 The publication ECO, a version of which is produced by environmentalists 
at CCAMLR meetings and ATCMs, is a source of information about some of the 
negotiations that occur. However, there is a limit to what the NGOs can do without risking 
their access, as the leak in 1998 demonstrated. 67 
The supply of information has been affected by the IUU shock in several respects. The 
systems of observation and inspection have been amended in several ways, such as 
collecting information from observers about vessel sightings,68 although the number of 
inspections carried out remains low. The CDS has the potential to increase the information 
available to the Commission about the trade in toothfish, where it is transhipped and what 
markets it ends up in. Through communicating directly with third-party states that have 
flag vessels in the Convention Area, information is being distributed about the problems of 
the Southern Ocean that was unlikely to happen before. The VMS also has the potential to 
increase the capacity for the regime to collect more information from legitimate fishing 
activities. These are all developments that would have been unlikely in the absence of the 
IUU shock, or that would have been implemented more slowly without it. Much of the 
information is still provided by self-reporting and there is a range in the amount of detail in 
the information provided in the reports to the Commission about members activities in the 
Convention Area. Other reporting has become more common with the presence of IUU 
vessels and their encounters with enforcement patrols, as the flag state is often unaware of 
the activities of their flagged vessels. 
A frustrating paradox for CCAMLR is that as greater efforts are exerted through 
enforcement to gain compliance, the information that it has on the IUU problem has 
become less accurate than it was when the problem first became salient in 1995.69 In this 
respect the CCAMLR regime is not producing accurate information about the problem. 
Another area where effectiveness can be improved is in sourcing and coordinating 
information. CCAMLR has been insistent on a high degree of accuracy of information in 
the past, up to an evidential standard. When dealing with a problem that involves nationals 
who are deliberately attempting to evade detection a lesser standard of evidence may be 
more useful for triggering intervention and action. CCAMLR may also have to become 
66 See Chapter 5, p.183 and 195. 
67 See Chapter 5, pp.181-182. 
68 See Chapter 4, p.155. 
69 See Chapter 5, p.184. 
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less reliant solely on the member states for provision of information, and centralised 
coordination of information through the CCAMLR Secretariat would improve the response 
to IUU fishing. Although the fishing states will be uncomfortable at the thought of relying 
more extensively on information sourced from NGOs this does seem a promising area to 
gain more information. ASOC has now been admitted to SCOI and the members could 
make better use of the ASOC observer and their information. 
Table 5 
Number of Inspections Made in the Convention Area, 1989-199970 
Year Inspections 
1998/1999 3 
1997/1998 3 
1996/1997 4 
1995/1996 5 
1994/1995 1 
1993/1994 3 
1992/1993 1 
199111992 2 
1990/1991 0 
1989/1990 1 
The IUU fishing shock does not appear to have made CCAMLR significantly more 
transparent that it was before the shock. There is more regime-relevant information 
available, but this has happened in large part due to the efforts of environmental NGOs, or 
through steps that the Commission would have taken regardless of the IUU shock. 71 The 
unreliability of statistics corrupted by IUU fishing also undermines the confidence in 
which CCAMLR T AC setting can be held. The regime and its decision-making procedures 
are more open to observers now that ASOC has access to SCOI, but some of the 
bargaining processes that occur within CCAMLR continue to be obscured in the margins 
of the meeting. An improvement in compliance-oriented transparency may increase the 
political pressure for flag state measures that could improve the effectiveness of 
CCAMLR. CCAMLR is still struggling to acquire enough information to coordinate its 
response to IUU fishing, and still lacks the level of information that would be required to 
initiate a sanctioning process. 
70 Table formulated based on information in the various SCOI reports. See also Chapter 4, pp.153-154. 
71 The establishment of a CCAMLR web page has increased the ease with which some information can be 
gained about the CCAMLR regime, notably conservation measures and the reports of the Commission and 
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Robustness as a determinant of effectiveness 
One dimension of effectiveness is that of robustness and fragility in terms of the regime 
issue area as it is affected by the IUU fishing problem.72 Here the question is whether the 
CCAMLR regime is stable and if the shock has made it more or less robust. The second 
dimension is that of robustness and brittleness in terms of adjustment to broader social 
changes without radical transformation. Here the question is how resilient the regime has 
proven in the face of the external challenges. Two areas that highlight both of these 
dimensions are membership and decision-making procedures. 
The changing membership over the years as the number of CCAMLR members has 
increased to twenty-four, along with seven acceding states, has not noticeably affected the 
stability of the CCAMLR regime. 73 If the decision-making mechanism was a majority 
system, then it would have been crucial how many states joined and whether their interests 
were weighted towards conservation or exploitation of the resources in the Southern 
Ocean, such as has happened with the IWC. With a consensus system each interest group 
can generally form a blocking coalition to prevent unpalatable measures from being 
adopted in the Commission. A majority system might allow too rapid a change for the 
comfort of states with preferences that are being outvoted. CCAMLR has usually been of 
more interest to states with fishing interests, as until the IUU problem there was little state 
or public pressure for immediate and effective action for conservation. This can be 
contrasted with the case of the IWC where considerable public pressure exists against a 
resumption in commercial whaling. 74 
The IUU issue has caused some membership problems. One difficulty with membership is 
the potential friction caused by EU members who are not members of the Commission. 
This caused problems when Portugal became interested in Southern Ocean fishing without 
first joining CCAMLR.75 Dealing with third-party state problems has seen an attempt to 
expand involvement with CCAMLR by previously uninterested states. There has not been 
a flood of new membership of CCAMLR and although Namibia, Mauritius, and Vanuatu 
Scientific Committee, but the bulk of the working papers are not transcribed for electronic publication. Some 
sections of the web page remain restricted to members only. 
72 See Chapter 2, p.47. 
73 See Chapter 3, note 131, pp.76 for a list of the CCAMLR member states and acceding states. 
74 See Chapter 3, pp.97-98. 
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have become involved with CCAMLR, other states remain uninvolved. No CCAMLR 
members have been so unsatisfied with the outcomes of CCAMLR to the point where they 
have considered resigning their membership, or exercising a formal objection to a 
conservation measure. Another aspect of the membership issue has been the participation 
of environmental NGOs in CCAMLR, an example of broad social change since the 
founding of the CCAMLR regime. 
Although the decision-making procedures of CCAMLR have attracted criticism in the 
past,76 the CCAMLR members are not advocating for change and the existing procedure is 
accepted and worked within. It is a system that can promulgate conservation measures, 
although this was difficult during the 1980s.77 The consensus system has not been changed, 
although it has expanded into the Scientific Committee and into the Working Groups at the 
insistence of the fishing states. A significant expansion in the conservation framework has 
come in response to the IUU fishing problem, but the extent of the change has limits, with 
most members being unwilling to accept a moratorium and a number of members continue 
to oppose the introduction ofVMS.78 The interpretation of the principle of rational use that 
favours resource exploitation continues to dominate decision-making, so that fisheries 
expand when a precautionary approach might be more useful for the conservation objective 
of the Convention. At this stage changing the consensus based social-choice mechanism 
seems unlikely as it would be too radical for the fishing states and the territorial claimants 
whose interests are protected and embedded within the current Convention. 
CCAMLR does not appear to be fragile or brittle at this stage, in that it has not been swept 
away by its problems, and has adapted in a limited way to deal with those problems. The 
IUU issue has not made the Commission less stable, nor has it caused all new conservation 
measures to be halted or old beliefs to be immediately discarded. Membership has 
expanded slightly in response to the issue. This gives CCAMLR the potential to be more 
effective in the future if it is able to evolve and increase its capacity to deal with the 
problems that it is facing. If CCAMLR fails to deal adequately with the IUU fishing 
problem, then its decision-making procedures may come under pressure to be changed, but 
this would occur too late to be of any use to the exploited species. In this instance criticism 
75 See Chapter 5, pp.218-219. 
76 See Chapter 4, p.l06 and pp.l58-160. 
77 See Chapter 4, pp.143-145 and pp.l50-151. 
78 See Chapter 5, pp.226-227 and p.207 respectively. 
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of proposals to expand the krill industry in light of what has occurred with finfish 
exploitation in the 1990s is ominous. A robust regime is not necessarily one that produces 
rapid results. 
Transformation rules as a determinant of effectiveness 
CCAMLR has no specific review mechanism, although that function might be filled by the 
ATCPs at an ATCM, or by the members of the Commission.79 For the most part CCAMLR 
has been left to evolve independently through its own decision-making procedures and 
awareness that it was a component of the ATS regime. These transformation rules were 
fairly clear-cut and stringent, once the decision-making in the Scientific Committee was 
clarified in the first few meetings. 8o CCAMLR appears to be an evolutionary regime with 
the capacity for change rather than a static organisation with a tendency to stagnate, 
although for a period in the 1980s it was very difficult for change to occur in CCAMLR.81 
However, the stringency of the consensus requirement does impede the efforts of those 
advocating alterations to the framework of conservation measures. This is important 
because many of the existing rules have been violated with ease by the IUU fishing 
operators, and the difficulty in introducing new rules delays an effective response to the 
IUU fishing problem. 
The shock posed by IUU fishing has not generated any pressure for change of the 
transformation rules. The closest the environmental NGOs have come is to offer the 
possibility that CCAMLR could import Madrid Protocol environmental protection 
initiatives,82 but this is still advocating for change within the system rather than change of 
the system. The possibility of a dramatic break from CCAMLR to a new regime at the 
moment appears low. One reason why the Madrid Protocol could displace the CRAMRA 
regime was that no one was actually mining in Antarctica. CCAMLR would be harder to 
displace as exploitation of marine resources has already happened and harvesting activities 
are ongoing. If CCAMLR fails to gain control of IUU fishing and its decision-making 
procedures become paralysed, then there might be initiatives for substantial change in the 
79 See Chapter 2, pp.47-48 for more detail on transformation rules. 
80 See Chapter 4, pp.l27-130. 
81 See Chapter 4, pp.133-135 for detail on the difficulty in getting members of the Commission to accept 
advice from the Scientific Committee. 
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transformation rules. If the krill resource is grossly mismanaged then external interest and 
pressure on CCAMLR might also lead to change. At this point expanding the coverage of 
the Madrid Protocol to the CCAMLR Area might be an easier solution than negotiating a 
new convention, but it is hardly one that will appeal to states whose primary interest is in 
harvesting operations. The Madrid Protocol would not act as panacea for the problems in 
the Southern Ocean, as it has had its own share of problems in implementation. So far 
however, the IUU issue is yet to substantially affect the transformation rules of CCAMLR 
and the ATS. 
Capacity of governments as a determinant of effectiveness 
The effectiveness of CCAMLR depends on the ability of its members to implement regime 
requirements, and this in turn depends on the capacity of individual member states to make 
and enforce rules.83 The members of CCAMLR have a broad range of individual capacity, 
from the super power United States to developing states. Capacity is not limited to power 
resources, it also affected by the attention that a government gives an issue, the alignment 
of domestic political interests,84 and its knowledge base. Lack of capacity means a state is 
less able to exercise leadership, one example of this within CCAMLR is Russia, which 
formerly as the USSR was a superpower that dominated Antarctic politics in conjunction 
with the United States, but now lacks the resources to play its old role. Some members 
contribute little towards CCAMLR's efforts at problem-solving despite possessing the 
capacity to do so. One example of this is India, which tends to be silent in the Commission 
on the IUU fishing issue. 
The military power resources allocated by CCAMLR members with sub-Antarctic EEZ to 
enforcement directed against illegal fishing have increased in recent years. This kind of 
enforcement is expensive and imperfect, limited by the environmental conditions and 
geographical distances involved. New conservation methods that do not require great 
expense to gain compliance are preferable to expensive enforcement efforts. One reason 
for the delay in VMS implementation has been the cost of implementing the system, even 
82 ASOC, Report of the Antarctic and Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC), XXII ATCM/IP84, 1998, p.5. See 
also p.250 above. 
83 See Chapter 2, pp.49-50 for more detail on government capacity, and Chapter 4 pp.113-122. 
266 
though a large part of this cost could be passed on to the fishing operators. CCAMLR 
would do well to implement measures that affect the financial outcomes of IUU fishing, 
such as market end measures, rather than relying legal sanctions that require enforcement 
action in the Southern Ocean. 
One cause of delay in implementing CCAMLR conservation measures is a lack of capacity 
to effectively implement new measures in a domestic framework, such as the time taken to 
implement legislation, increase budgets, train customs officials, and inform domestic 
actors. Having large numbers of low capacity states join CCAMLR, such as Namibia and 
Mauritius, may not necessarily lead to an improvement in the effectiveness of CCAMLR. 
CCAMLR is not a regime that is likely to engage in capacity building side-payments. The 
budget does not exist for such innovative measures, and any increase in the budget in terms 
of real growth will be resisted by some of the existing members, such as Germany.85 
However, some degree of capacity building will occur as regime-relevant information is 
more freely shared among CCAMLR members. The cost of joining CCAMLR as a 
member depends on whether the state is engaged in harvesting and the general level of 
harvesting activities. If no harvesting was occurring in the Convention Area the cost of 
membership to support the current budget would be approximately $A74,OOO.86 
Contributions from new members have in the past been used by the Commission to fund 
one-off projects, but in general there is little reserve financial capacity for innovation by 
the CCAMLR Secretariat. Early indications are that the CDS will require significant 
resources for successful implementation, and so far the political will exists among the 
CCAMLR members to meet this cost. In these respects the IUU shock has increased the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR. 
84 This can depend on factors relating to the states proximity to the Southern Ocean, the extent of its 
involvement in fishing activities, and the varying level of environmental awareness in the state's domestic 
arena. 
85 German policy is to aim for zero real growth in budgets because Germany has to fund a high proportion of 
the ED budget. See Chapter 4, note 84, p.117. 
86 Calculated by dividing the 1999 CCAMLR budget figure of $A2,OOO,200 by 23 - the number of members 
at that time. 
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Distribution of power as a determinant of effectiveness 
Where capacity is the ability to implement a desired action, power is often the ability to 
determine which course of action will be implemented in an issue area. 87 The distribution 
of power within CCAMLR is quite varied. The United States is the obvious superpower, 
but the EU is also powerful, and some members and acceding states are now drawn from 
developing states such as Uruguay, Namibia and Peru. One area in which power is 
important is in the resources that can be devoted to the production of scientific research in 
the ATS. A state that can back up its views with research is in a better position to influence 
a meetings outcomes, and may generate new ideas that lead to new conservation measures. 
The United States played a significant role in the development of the CDS. The draft 
conservation measures were developed and promoted by the United States, with Tucker 
Scully heading several late night sessions.88 Despite this role, the United States has not 
imposed its preferred solution to the problems on the other CCAMLR members. The 
United States is powerful, but unlike the EU it has not had a strong stake in the fishing 
operations in the Southern Ocean, apart from a limited role in the exploratory crab 
fishery.89 If this changes then in the future the United States may play less of a role in 
introducing conservation measures in CCAMLR as its domestic interests shift from being 
mainly conservation to more of a balance between conservation and commercial 
exploitation. The United States has announced its interest in participating in the krill 
fishery in the future. 9o 
The main application of material power in the Southern Ocean has been by SORS using 
enforcement methods in the areas of their jurisdiction. This application of power does 
influence the decision-making in CCAMLR, in part because of the care that went into 
designing CCAMLR so that it was compartmentalised separately from those sub-Antarctic 
Island areas where coastal state jurisdiction is undisputed. The application of conservation 
measures in these areas is not automatic.91 Material power is also possessed by states that 
87 See Chapter 2, pp.50-51. 
88 Scully was thanked by CCAMLR on at least two occasions. See CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.17, p.14, and 
CCAMLR-XVII, 18.1, p.91. 
89 See Chapter 5, pp.164-165. 
90 The United States participated in the 2000 Krill Synoptic Survey, and according to CCAMLR-XIX, 4.6, 
p.13,"The USA reported it will have one or two vessels ... fishing for krill." 
91 See Chapter 3, p.73. 
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dominate the markets where toothfish are sold or traded through, such as China and 
Canada. Intermediary port states where transhipping occurs are also in a position to use 
material power as are the 'gateway' states with ports used to access the Southern Ocean. 
The effectiveness of enforcement and conservation measure actions will depend in part on 
how this material power is used, and awareness of this may influence decision-making. 
The IUD shock has not really affected the distribution of material power in the CCAMLR 
regime, but it has made that distribution more salient. Despite the effects of the consensus 
system the regime is not a symmetrical one, but it is not so asymmetrical that one or a few 
members dominate the regime. The situation is also not one where the old original 
members of the ATS club continue to dominate over the newer members, because some of 
the newer members have joined CCAMLR due to their interest in fishing, such as Spain, 
Poland, and Korea. This gives the new members substantial leverage within the CCAMLR 
regime as they are in a position to control the activities of their nationals who are engaged 
in fishing activities, something that other states are unable to do to foreign flagged vessels 
on the high seas. Conditions at the moment do allow for leadership to be exercised in 
support of the conservation objective, but there is no guarantee that this will continue 
indefinitely. 
Interdependence as a determinant of effectiveness 
The ATS regime is founded in interdependence because the ATCPs were only able to 
achieve their goals through collective cooperation that minimised the negative externalities 
that unilateral actions in Antarctica could have.92 The impact of IUU fishing in this area is 
that it has made it clear that the activities of nationals of one CCAMLR member in the 
Convention Area can be prejudicial to the interests of other CCAMLR members. 
Reciprocity can be expressed in the CCAMLR system through the decision-making 
I 
procedures with the threat or use of withholding consensus over an issue, or by expressing 
a reservation or objection to a conservation measure. The complicated process whereby 
TAC are set and permits allocated to different members for fisheries contains a lot of 
potential for bargaining. 
92 See Chapter 2, pp.51-52. 
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There appears to be a balance of interests between conservationist and fishing states, 
conservation states can not demand too much change, and fishing states must usually 
concede a few points. There are limits to what can be attempted here as any actual use of a 
'veto' is inherently destabilising for the regime. Use of the objection procedure would also 
be destabilising if a delegation was pressured into making concessions that are not 
acceptable to their government. ATS regime reciprocity is centred around the 'spirit of 
cooperation', which is a regime norm that supports compromise between the members. 
Where compromise does not occur over intractable issues, such as the sovereignty dispute, 
then there is the risk of a breakdown in the system. The IUU shock may make CCAMLR 
less effective if it leads to a paralysis in the decision-making process between the 
conservationist and fishing interests. So far the Commission has avoided deadlock, and 
where meetings have ended without a particular measure being adopted there has usually 
been some kind of intersessional program of work on the measure. 93 
The trend towards interdependence is growing slowly in the ATS regime as new economic 
activities have developed in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. In the past the ATS 
regime has coped reasonably well with issues arising from sovereignty disputes, sealing, 
mining. However, tourism and illegal fishing pose management challenges to the ATS 
regime. Some linkages can be developed between these new issues, because if incidental 
mortality does make threatened species of sea birds extinct, then this may reduce the value 
of tourism in the Southern Ocean and Antarctica. The regulation of tourism requires 
careful attention to port state, vessel flag state, and tourist nationality, and this may lead to 
some linkages being made on similar CCAMLR regulations. CCAMLR members have 
made linkages with other issue areas in order to improve compliance with conservation 
measures by third-party states. For example, the UK has threatened to close its markets to 
Mauritius, while France offered to resolve sovereignty over a disputed island with 
Mauritius, in an attempt to get Mauritius to crack down on the presence of IUU fishing 
operators in its portS.94 Increased interdependence may make CCAMLR more effective, 
but this will not be automatic. 
93 See Chapter 5, p.196, pp.198-199, and p.203, for information about intersessional discussions on 
CCAMLR vessel register, the CDS, and an action plan, respectively. 
94 Personal Notes, Alistair Graham Lecture, 22 June, 2000. See also Chapter 5, note 171, p.l87. 
270 
Nature of the issue area as a determinant of effectiveness 
The origins of the ATS regime are quite important in determining its effectiveness.95 The 
IGY and the Antarctic Treaty were regarded as signal achievements in their day, and the 
record of cooperation between ATS members has continued to the present day. This 'spirit 
of cooperation' is a factor for effectiveness in the ATS and CCAMLR. The nature of the 
Antarctic Treaty and its ambiguous compromise on sovereignty also affects the entire ATS 
regime. Treaty ambiguity is an important source of non-compliance, although ambiguity 
can allow greater flexibility in finding solutions to problems. The bi-focalism of CCAMLR 
is not completely effective in resolving the sovereignty problem, as can be seen by the 
continued disputes between Argentina and the UK within the Commission.96 
The Southern Ocean is part of the problem, and its distance from the traditional fishing 
grounds is no longer sufficient protection. The sheer size of the waters in the Convention 
Area and the jurisdictional maze that overlies them impedes effective enforcement. 
Environmental factors can prevent inspections and impede surveillance. These are not 
factors that are likely to change in the future. An increased fishing effort in the Southern 
Ocean increases the chances of accidents occurring to fishing vessels in a region where 
liability issues are difficult to resolve. The basic legal structure and values of the ATS and 
CCAMLR regimes remain largely the same as they were when IUU fishing started to be a 
problem. 
The lack of ambiguity as to the seriousness of the issue has helped focus political attention 
on solving the problem of IUU fishing. It is now an established part of the Commission's 
agenda and gets the attention it requires. There was some debate in 1995 as to the 
seriousness of the IUU fishing issue but from 1996 onwards it has continued to be viewed 
as a threat to the credibility of the CCAMLR regime. 97 The language used in statements 
made by members in the Commission made it clear that they saw the issue as undermining 
the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures, and as having the potential to 
undermine the ATS - a point underlined by the ATCM resolution in 1999 on the issue. The 
inevitable time-lag in response makes early detection of a problem crucial to its effective 
95 See Chapter 2, p.52. 
96 See Chapter 5, pp.220-222. 
97 See the various statements made by CCAMLR members in the Commission in Chapter 5, pp.176-180. 
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resolution. In this respect CCAMLR may have been more effective in detecting the 
problem if the systems of observation and inspection had been implemented at an earlier 
date. CCAMLR can only speculate as to the extent of IUU fishing in the 1980s and the 
early 1990s. 
Summary 
Oran Young has suggested that the ATS regime can be considered effective, but that most 
fisheries regimes are ineffective. 98 However, the ATS regime includes a fisheries 
management regime, and some of the reasons that have made the ATS regime effective are 
not necessarily going to make the CCAMLR regime effective. While the consensus 
decision-making procedures have created a fisheries regime that is stable and robust 
enough to cope with changes in membership and the increased role played by 
environmental NGOs, the regime is more brittle and may lack the resilience required to 
deal effectively with new problems. It is especially concerning that the economic 
incentives are sufficient to encourage fishing operators to violate the CCAMLR rules with 
relative impunity. This is also highlighted by the lack of a review mechanic if the decision-
making procedures of CCAMLR ever does have a crisis that paralyses its response to a 
problem. This may act as an incentive for compromise, as members may wish to avoid the 
uncertainty that would result. Interdependence is an essential part of the norms supporting 
the role of compromise in the 'spirit of cooperation', and new linkage areas are possible, 
such as in the expanding Antarctic tourist industry. 
CCAMLR has some areas where it could increase its effectiveness, especially in the area 
of compliance-oriented transparency, where innovative use could be made of NGO 
information sources. This is important in keeping political attention focused on a distant 
area where material power is insufficient by itself to solve the problem of IUU fishing. 
CCAMLR needs more information about the state of the marine resources and the extent of 
the IUU fishing operations in order to increase its problem-solving effectiveness. 
CCAMLR effectiveness may be increased as its membership expands, although most of 
the new members possess little capacity for implementing CCAMLR requirements. While 
the SORS are influential in CCAMLR, it is the United States, Spain, Japan and the EU 
98 Oran Young, "The Effectiveness ofIntemational Environmental regimes: A Mid-Term Report", 
International Environmental Affairs, 1998, p.272. 
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which have the ability to make the greatest positive or negative contribution to CCAMLR 
effectiveness in the due to their influence over fishing effort and markets. 
The shock of IUU fishing had a mixed impact on the effectiveness of the CCAMLR 
regime. CCAMLR has had to adopt and implement new conservation measures that may 
reduce the impact of IUU fishing in the future. The shock has caused an improvement to 
the effectiveness of CCAMLR that has probably happened at a more rapid pace than would 
have otherwise occurred. However, this increase in effectiveness has not been sufficient to 
date to bring the problem of IUU fishing under control. It is interesting that much of this 
framework might have been put in place before IUU fishing occurred, if CCAMLR had 
been able to learn from the experience of other fisheries management regimes. However, 
the interests of fishing states blocked this learning until the scale of the IUU fishing 
problem made it impossible for the necessity of change to no longer be ignored. The initial 
response from CCAMLR from 1995 to 1998 was inadequate'to deal with the IUU fishing 
problem. This has contributed to an undermining of the regime's authority in the Southern 
Ocean, and perhaps a loss of goodwill and trust in the ability of CCAMLR to deal with this 
and future problems. This may affect the strength of the ATS regime in the future if the 
ATCPs continue to value stability over resilience. 
Because the decision-making in CCAMLR is supposed to be made on the basis of the best 
scientific advice provided by the Scientific Committee, a member that is capable of 
contributing new information and ideas to CCAMLR can be influential through the 
possession and use of 'epistemic power'. 
Epistemic Communities and CCAMLR 
In the past attention has focused on the role that epistemic communities have played in 
regime formation, and their ongoing role in the maintenance of a regime has attracted less 
attention. This thesis is interested in finding if an epistemic community has contributed to 
the effectiveness of CCAMLR in dealing with the IUU fishing problem, and whether or 
not any linkages can be drawn with the determinants of effectiveness. The following 
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sections overlap, in that it is difficult to demonstrate influence without tracing activities, 
and difficult to identify beliefs without identifying a group.99 
Identifying the epistemic community 
Identifying an epistemic community and its membership within CCAMLR is a difficult 
task. It has been suggested that a proliferation of epistemic communities claiming to 
provide advice is likely. 100 According to Adler and Haas epistemic communities tend to be 
small groups,lOl and this group may only be a subset of the people present at a meeting or 
otherwise involved in the issue area. Epistemic communities can also be very transient and 
short lived. This suggests that an epistemic community is subject to constant incremental 
change, so that the membership boundary of any epistemic community, will be fuzzy and 
indeterminate. This makes operationalisation at the micro-level extremely difficult. 102 
This research started by assuming that the Scientific Committee would form an identifiable 
epistemic community within the CCAMLR regime. It is a group of professionals with 
recognised expertise and competence in the domain of Southern Ocean science, and with 
an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge in that area. This followed the line 
taken by Elliott, who tried to apply the epistemic community framework to the ATS 
scientific community,103 and Parera, who viewed the role of SCAR in the early decades of 
ATS policy process as an epistemic community.l04 Study of the Scientific Committee 
reveals a more complicated picture which invalidated this initial assumption. Elliott found 
that the scientific committees have not acted as an epistemic community in the past. While 
they provided advice and recommendations, there was no conscious and active policy 
advocacy. lOS This meant that the 'epistemic power' in the ATS regime was able to be 
captured by other actors. 
In a formal sense the policy advocacy of the Scientific Committee is limited to providing 
the Commission with the best possible scientific advice and recommendations. The advice 
99 See Chapter 2, pp.32-37 for an summary of epistemic community theory and pp.53-54 for the methodology 
used here. The concept of intellectual order is discussed in Chapter 2, pp.52-53. 
100 Andreas Hasenclever, Peter Mayer, and Volker Rittberger, op. cit., p.216. 
101 Emanuel Adler and Peter M. Haas, op. cit., p.380. 
102 Claire Dunlop, op. cit., p.141. 
103 Lorraine Elliott, op. cit., pp.17-18. 
104 Mahinda Harischandra Parera, op. cit., p.90. 
274 
and recommendations produced by the Scientific Committee are consensual, allowing the 
advice to be argued down to the lowest common denominator. This consensual advice does 
not guarantee agreement in the Commission where political and economic interests can 
lead to recommendations being declined or amended. The amount of discussion about 
decision-making that occurs during the plenary sessions of the Commission is limited. 
More extensive discussions take place within SCAF, SCOI and in the margins of the 
meeting. The more political an issue the more likely it is that the issue will be discussed 
within SCOI, or some ad hoc group, rather than in the Scientific Committee. 106 This 
further limits the influence that the scientific community can have in policy selection. 
Informally members of the Scientific Committee can influence the position of their 
delegation in the decision-making process, and the Chair of the Scientific Committee is 
present during the Commission meeting. Representative observers from other IGOs would 
not usually form part of an epistemic community as they do not usually advocate for policy 
change in the ATS regime. 
Elliott's analysis of the role played by epistemic communities in the ATS concentrated on 
two elements: "the consensual knowledge base of such networks and a degree of conscious 
policy advocacy.,,107 In respect of intellectual leadership leading to the creation of 
CCAMLR Elliott found that "the scientists had begun to function as a nascent epistemic 
community.,,108 The community was limited in its impact by the small number of scientists 
on delegations, and the overshadowing of scientific concerns by economic and political 
interests. On the whole Elliott was sceptical about the role played by any epistemic 
community in the ATS: 
In spite of concerns to protect the Antarctic environment, the environment regime 
was driven and shaped by political concerns rather than environmental ones. It was 
not primarily a knowledge-driven regime. Decision-making lagged increasingly 
behind knowledge and the scientific knowledge and advice which parties requested 
from SCAR, while crucial to the development of an effective environmental 
protection regime, was rarely accepted as the primary determinant of environmental 
rules. The scientific community, through SCAR, did not function as an epistemic 
community. 109 
105 Lorraine M. Elliott, op. cit., ibid., p.20S. 
106 CCAMLR-XVI, S.7, p.25 The usual procedure of following scientific advice was not followed, due to the 
political nature of the conservation measures being discussed. 
107 Lorraine Elliott, op. cit. 
108 ibid., p.92. 
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Elliott identified the scientific community and NGO organisations, as two different and 
sometimes competing groups. Because of the potential competition for funds and influence 
SCAR found the world park concept antithetical to the idea of free scientific investigation, 
and the Madrid Protocol was "received with less than full enthusiasm". 110 Parera may have 
identified an epistemic community within CCAMLR, without labelling it as such, for the 
period 1990-1991: 
Among the factors that most significantly affected the CCAMLR regime was the 
leadership of Australia in the coalition of non-fishing states that brought about the 
adoption of a conservation strategy to give effect to the CCAMLR regime's 
ecosystem objectives. The role of domestic and transnational groups in influencing 
the policy processes of both Australia and the CCAMLR regime was a significant 
factor. 111 
Environmental NGOs have been credited with playing a significant role In the 
development of environmental protection In Antarctica. Environmental NGO 
representatives can be included in CCAMLR delegations, and through ASOC in its role as 
an independent observer. The NGOs do have a network of professional members, many of 
whom are competent experts in scientific fields relevant to CCAMLR. Greenpeace has 
been active in scientific activities, in part to gain credibility for its statements and more 
acceptance as a legitimate actor in Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. 112 However, the 
NGOs often differ from the Scientific Committee in their conclusions about information. 113 
This overlap in membership makes determining epistemic community membership 
problematic. 
Analysing the discourse at CCAMLR meetings quickly reveals that it is extremely difficult 
to construct a simple division of the members into different epistemic communities. This is 
because in tackling the IUD fishing problem, CCAMLR is pursuing multiple solutions and 
the position taken by a state on one issue that might be categorised as 'pro-conservation', 
can be countered by that state taking a position on a different issue as 'pro-fishing'. The 
109 ibid., p.208. Emphasis added. 
110 Mahinda Harischandra Parera, op. cit., p.82. At p.102 Parera comments on the irony that unregulated 
science reduces the value of science due to the impact of pollution, and on p.97 note 75 that some scientists 
welcomed the new environmental rigour that would preserve pristine conditions for research. 
111 ibid., p.253. See also pp.242-244. 
112 In 1986/87 Greenpeace established the World Park Base on Ross Island and maintained it for five years. 
http://www.greenpeace.org/~comms/climate/polartour/ptO l.html, (site visited 31 January, 2002). 
113 For example NGO by-catch figures are higher because they assume that vessels involved in IUU fishing 
spend longer at sea in the Southern Ocean than the Scientific Committee does. Alan Hemmings Interview, 22 
November 2000. 
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analysis is also heavily reliant on those statements which actually make it into the public 
record of the meeting. The informal and transient nature of an epistemic community makes 
it difficult to identify. 
It appears possible to identify three different and competing epistemic, or epistemic-like, 
communities operating within CCAMLR at the time of the IUU fishing problem. Two of 
the epistemic communities are the 'fishing community', those states where the fishing 
interest is strongest, and the 'conservation community', where the conservation interest is 
strongest. This is very similar to the traditional analysis of most scholars about the division 
of interests within CCAMLR. The third epistemic-like 'environmental community' is 
represented by the environmental NGOs associated with CCAMLR, such as ASOC, IUCN, 
and Greenpeace, overlapping with those national delegations that include representatives 
from environmental groups. The presence of competing schools of thought may reduce 
their influence as consensus within the regime will be more difficult to achieve, but may 
also result in a more effective regime as more ideas may be considered. 
Determining principled, normative, and causal beliefs 
Determining the principled, normative and causal beliefs of an epistemic community is 
part of the process of identifying an epistemic community. The principled and normative 
beliefs within all the CCAMLR epistemic communities are to an extent those to be found 
within the ATS and CCAMLR regimes. The general ATS principles and norms include a 
commitment to peace and science in the Antarctic region, and the preservation of the 
sovereignty compromise that allows this.114 One important point is that CCAMLR is a 
fisheries management regime operating within the ATS, rather an being than otherwise 
independent regional organisation. 
For CCAMLR, the concept of rational use is a commitment to conservation and 
exploitation. It does not fence off the Southern Ocean as a world park, nor does it open the 
fisheries to limitless exploitation. The current belief is that the preservation of the 
ecosystem is to be achieved through a precautionary approach, with management of the 
resources relying on the best scientific advice provided by the Scientific Committee. 115 
114 See Chapter 2, pp.lO-15. 
115 See Chapter 4, pp.137-141. 
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Causal beliefs in the role of the relationship between the Committee and the Commission 
and how the scientific advice is to be used have developed over time. This was highlighted 
by the difficulties in the early period of CCAMLR when arguments supporting fishing 
outweighed those supporting conservation, culminating in a strengthening of the 
consideration to be given to the Scientific Committee's advice. 116 The difference between 
the fishing and conservation communities is that the conservation community was more 
precautionary in their approach when the data was anomalous in order to prevent possible 
damage, while the fishing community advocated continued fishing until the problem was 
proven. 
These principles and normative beliefs are generally accepted by the NGOs involved in 
CCAMLR, although they pressure CCAMLR members to live up to its ideals and 
commitments. There are some different value-based rationales on issues such as 
sovereignty claims and the possibility of the exploitation of minerals in Antarctica, but the 
NGOs and other epistemic communities agree that sustainable exploitation of resources in 
the Southern Ocean should be possible, even if the scientific evidence that it can be 
possible for some stocks is still lacking. The distinction between conservation community 
and environmental community occurs because individuals in the conservation community 
are more committed to the principles and norms of the ATS regime than individuals drawn 
from the environmental NGOs. The NGOs are not as committed to principles such as 
ATCP dominance of Antarctic politics and the territorial sovereignty compromise, but they 
do generally accept the status quo of the ATS regime and work within it rather than to 
undermine it. NGOs are also wary about the effects of being socialised into the CCAMLR 
process, they act as 'outsiders' to the decision-making process, and while they advocate 
policy they are not in a position to take control of policy-setting. Members of the fishing 
and conservation communities should be in more of a position to take control of policy-
setting. 
The causal beliefs within CCAMLR epistemic communities in respect of the IUU problem 
have some points of agreement. Despite some initial disagreement over the extent of the 
problem there is now common agreement that the IUU problem is a serious one that 
undermines the credibility of the ATS and CCAMLR regimes. There is agreement that 
116 See Chapter 4, pp.133-135. 
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longliners are fishing in a way that threatens several species of seabird with extinction, and 
the commercial extinction of some stocks of Patagonian toothfish. 117 The presence of 
CCAMLR observers on fishing vessels makes it difficult for the fishing community to 
argue that the rate of incidental mortality is low. 
The fundamental points of difference between the different epistemic communities lie in 
their responses to the problems of IUU fishing in the late 1990s. Members of the fishing 
community have generally taken a minimal response to the problem, preferring to work 
within the existing framework of measures and insisting on the expansion of legitimate 
fishing. Members of the conservation community have so far accepted the necessity of a 
legitimate fishing industry, but have attempted to expand the framework of conservation 
measures into new areas. While the environmentalists have supported new measures, they 
argue that they do not go far enough in tackling the problem, and have called for a 
moratorium on toothfish harvesting. These responses highlight different beliefs about how 
precautionary an approach CCAMLR should take, what conservation measures can be 
effective, and what conservation measures are legitimate for CCAMLR to take. 
Tracing epistemic community activities 
To trace the activity of an epistemic community is to attempt to trace the activities of 
individual people that can be identified as originating from that community. A number of 
areas in the development of conservation measures have been identified for investigation, 
and this should allow communities and membership to be identified through statements 
made. The public record of CCAMLR meetings does not allow every individual to be 
traced, although this record can be supplemented by interviews, press releases, NGO 
publications and other secondary sources. Within the Commission and Scientific 
Committee, statements are rarely linked with individuals, and in the Commission and 
SCOI statements are often identified to a particular state. 
Individual delegations can be analysed to some extent in an attempt to place them in the 
fishing group or the conservation group. The size of most delegations is quite small with 
five or less delegates, although some states, such as Australia, Japan, and the United States, 
117 See Chapter 5, p.l79 for a statement on incidental mortality, and p.l85. for an estimate of damage to 
toothfish stocks around the Prince Edward and Marion Islands. 
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usually have larger delegations of ten or more delegates. Some states include 
environmental NGO representatives within their delegation, such as Australia, New 
Zealand, and the United States, but states are more likely to include representatives of their 
fishing industry in their delegation. The portion of the delegation drawn from fishing or 
environmental departments of a state's bureaucracy may also indicate whether fishing or 
conservation interests are favoured. For example Japan usually includes several industry 
advisers and no NGO adviser, while the United States usually includes both. Smaller 
delegations make it harder to categorise a state into an epistemic community, as among 
other things they have less opportunity to make statements. 11 8 
One problem is that the high workload and technical nature of the Scientific Committee's 
work has meant that over the years it has subcontracted work to several working groups, 
such as WG-EMM, and WG-FSA. The working group level is relatively opaque as 
environmental NGOs observers are excluded, and also because some of the data under 
discussion comes from commercial sources in confidence. This data is later made public in 
an aggregate form. The Scientific Committee now facilitates the flow of information 
between the different working groups to the Commission and its Standing Committees. 
Some environmental advocacy can come from the scientists of dependent species, such as 
seabirds. 119 
Karen Litfin's concept of knowledge-brokers could be useful in investigating the role of 
the chairs and vice-chairs of the Commission, the Scientific Committee, and the various 
Standing Committees and Working Groups.120 The Executive Secretary and other positions 
within the CCAMLR secretariat are also potentially able to playa lmowledge-broker role. 
The Chair of the Scientific Committee would seem important, as they are present at the 
Commission meeting and bear some responsibility for the Scientific Committee's report. 
The role of the Chair is to some extent constrained by the position, as they should be acting 
in the interests of CCAMLR, not just their state. 121 The limitation of this method is that 
118 See also the problems with the European Union in Chapter 5, pp.217-220. 
119 Alan Hemming interview, 22 November 2000. 
120 See Chapter 2, pp.34-35. 
121 According to the Rules of Procedure the Chair and Vice-Chair hold office for two meetings, and can be 
elected to a second term of office. In most cases this limits the term of formal authority to four years. The 
terms for the convenors of the working groups are not fixed, four years is considered appropriate, SC-
CAMLR-XIII, 20.3-20.4, p.93. It is possible that an individual may chair a subordinate group before 
progressing further up, for example a Working Group Convenor may become chair or vice-chair of the 
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while it allows some tracing of activities it does not encompass the other informal 
relationships that can occur such as the informal drafting groups for conservation measures 
that occur during a Commission meeting. Delegates who are experienced with the ATS 
regime are more likely to be in a position to act as knowledge-brokers, as they will have 
the contacts and understanding necessary to influence how information is used. It is 
interesting to note that the chairs are distributed among the members so that they are not 
concentrated among anyone group of members, either by geography or interest in 
harvesting or conservation. 122 
Politics is spread throughout the CCAMLR system and at no point does science alone 
decide what decisions are made. This increases the importance of the transformation rules 
of the CCAMLR regime. Arguments within working groups that lead to consensus being 
withheld from advice or data can flow all the way up the Commission. The Scientific 
Committee has on occasion been unable to gain a consensus on what level TAC should be 
set for a particular species, or SCQI has been unable to agree on a conservation measure, 
and the Commission has had to choose between different options. In these situations some 
delegates are more persuasive than others in the Commission and in the margins of the 
meeting. 
Demonstrating epistemic community influence 
Demonstrating the influence of an epistemic community on decision-makers is dependent 
in part on managing to trace the activities of that community. Epistemic communities 
should elucidate cause and effect relationships, and provide advice about results of a 
proposed course of action. It would be useful to identify the factors that give a specific 
epistemic community the upper hand. The process of doing this involves identifying 
credible alternative outcomes that were foreclosed, and exploring alternative explanations 
for actions. 
Scientific Committee as happened with Denzil Miller, and a Vice-Chair can become Chair, for example 
Grant Bryden in SCOL 
122 The Chair of the Commission is determined by automatic election, following in English alphabetical order 
from Australia, which held the chair at the first meeting, rules of procedure (footnote 2 to Rule 8). This 
means that there is not a struggle for the chair position between different factions in the Commission. If the 
chair is from a member not engaged in research activities then the vice-chair should be. In 1999 Russia was 
made Vice-Chair of the Commission in part because it would balance the chairmanship and vice-
chairmanship in terms of Member harvesting activities, CCAMLR-XVIII, 14.1, p.55. This seems to be the 
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Epistemic communities should also shed light on issue linkage and the chain of events. 
Linkages are partly framed through problems elsewhere in the globe, as the problems of 
IUU fishing and incidental mortality are not unique to CCAMLR. Observers to and from 
other IGOs help exchange information on these issues and CCAMLR members can learn 
directly from participating in activities elsewhere. The environmental community has 
played a significant role in exposing the participation of CCAMLR nationals and 
companies in IUU fishing, and uncovering the details of how the IUU fishing activities are 
conducted in the Southern Ocean.123 However, some of the fishing states have not been 
very helpful at identifying their nationals and companies that are involved in IUU fishing. 
Epistemic communities should help define the self-interest of a state, In an international 
setting this may mean that a trans-national community is helping to define the self-interest 
of more than one state, or a group of states. There has been a reasonable degree of 
congruence in accepting that IUU fishing is a serious problem for CCAMLR, but the 
different epistemic communities disagree over the course of policy to be taken in many 
areas. The lack of accurate scientific models for ecosystem management makes it difficult 
for the conservation community to define state interests to support a precautionary 
approach, and the current interpretation of rational use makes it easier for the fishing 
community to persuade states to expand fishing efforts. So far CCAMLR is not controlling 
the problem of IUU fishing, so the contribution of the epistemic communities to the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR has been limited. 
Rather than the Scientific Committee, or other parts of CCAMLR like SCOI or SCAF, 
forming an epistemic community, the different committees are more a forum where 
different epistemic communities attempt to gain the upper hand with their advice and 
arguments. Ideally it would be useful to trace the origins of a particular conservation 
measure through different drafts to the final adopted measure. This is limited by the 
availability of sources, and draft conservation measure documents are difficult to source. In 
this respect it must be noted that the bulk of discussion about contentious conservation 
measures takes place in SCOI or informal ad hoc groups, with the Scientific Committee to 
some extent being restricted to advice on TAC setting and 'alarm sounding' during the 
norm with the other chair positions in CCAMLR. Chair positions are held by countries, rather than 
individuals. 
123 See Chapter 5, pp.190-192. 
282 
IUU fishing debates. Four areas will be examined to illustrate the influence that epistemic 
communities may have had: VMS measures; the CDS; setting TAC; and the moratorium 
debate. 
Debate on the VMS measures 
VMS is useful in demonstrating the impact of epistemic communities because discussion 
on it predates the concern about IUD fishing that was prevalent from 1995 onwards. This 
analysis is based on an examination of statements made in SCOI and the Commission that 
allow the position of the members to be identified. 124 In 1993 CCAMLR began discussing 
whether the use of VMS would be helpful, and decided to acquire more information. 125 In 
1994 the Secretariat was requested to conduct a feasibility study about using VMS in the 
Convention Area, and the Science Officer submitted a draft configuration of a CCAMLR 
VMS for consideration by SCOI at the 1995 meeting. 126 In 1995 there were three principle 
sources of opposition to the implementation of VMS.127 One strand of opposition was over 
the possibility that it unduly interfered with freedom of navigation or flag state control of 
vessels. Another strand of opposition was related to the cost of implementation. The last 
strand of opposition was to the imposition of VMS in the krill fishery. This has been 
present in the VMS debate from 1994 through to 2000. In 1996 there was still no 
consensus on VMS implementation through CCAMLR, but SCOI urged national 
implementation in the Convention Area. 
In 1997 the shock· of IUU fishing to CCAMLR was obvious with the adoption of an item 
on the agenda for discussions relating to it. 128 SCOI became the centre of extensive 
discussions on a wide range of conservation measures, including VMS. Both the EC and 
Chile proposed VMS measures,129 but only Resolution 12IXVI 'Automated Satellite-
Linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMSs)' was adopted. The differences between it and 
the draft conservation measure DIXVI was that while DIXVI required VMS to be installed, 
Resolution 12IXVI requires an endeavour to install, and it further stipulates that VMS is 
not necessary in the krill fishery at the current time. The resolution also expanded on 
124 VMS is discussed in detail in Chapter 5 pp.205-207. See also Chapter 6, pp.237-238. 
125 CCAMLR-XII, Annex 5,35-36, p.107. 
126 CCAMLR-XIV, 2.31, p.132, and 2.35, p.133. 
127 CCAMLR-XIV, 2.40-2.44, pp.134-135, and 2.51, p.136. 
128 CCAMLR-XVI, 2.1, p.2. 
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reporting and technical requirements present in the draft conservation measure. These 
changes do not appear to have been discussed in SCOl or the Commission, so the 
negotiations probably occurred in the margins of the meeting. 
By the 1998 meeting many members had installed or were installing VMS in their national 
fisheries. 130 Australia and the EC submitted several proposals on VMS.l3l Australia 
attempted a draft conservation measure based on Resolution 10IXII with the aim of 
applying VMS outside the Convention Area to straddling stockS. 132 This measure did not 
progress towards adoption. However, Conservation Measure 148IXVII 'Automated 
Satellite-Linked Vessel Monitoring Systems' was adopted, but with an exception for the 
krill fishery. The reason for opposition remained the same; that the krill fishery was 
operating at a low level without unregulated activity.133 This was seen the conservationist 
states as a serious flaw in the VMS conservation measure. 134 By the 1999 meeting most 
members had introduced or were committed to VMS. 135 Proposals by Australia and the EC 
to extend VMS to the krill fishery by 1 July 2000 were opposed by several states. 136 
The table below attempts to illustrate the different positions recorded in the CCAMLR 
record from 1994 to 1999. Type one support is a strong statement in favour of the 
introduction of VMS in the Convention Area. Type two support indicates that the member 
has either implemented VMS nationally, supports the introduction of VMS into the 
Convention Area, or has argued against a statement opposing the introduction of VSM. 
Type one opposition indicates the member had a reason to be opposed to VMS in the 
129 CCAMLR-XVI, Annex 5, 1.64, p.133. 
130 CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5,2.26-2.34, pp.6-7. 
131 CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5, 2.49, p.8. 
132 CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5, 2.66, p.10, and CCAMLR-XVII, 5.40-5.41, pp.19-20. Without agreement in 
SCOI, the Commission restricted itself to encouraging members to make wider use of VMS in areas adjacent 
to the Convention Area. Australia also attempted to amend Conservation Measure 118!XVI 'Scheme to 
Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels', so that it was linked to the use of VMS, see 
CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5, 2.69, p.IO. 
133 CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5, 2.50-2.53, p.9, and 2.67, p.10. See also CCAMLR-XVII, 5.34-5.37, p.l9. 
Poland linked the discussion to a policy statement adopted at the recent meeting of the International Coalition 
of Fisheries Associations (ICFA). ICFA supported the introduction ofa mandatory VMS on all vessels 
fishing in the Convention Area with the exception of vessels fishing for krill. 
134 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.38, p.19. "New Zealand stated its view that the introduction of mandatory VMS on 
vessels fishing for finfish, is a positive development. It nevertheless found it regrettable that it has not been 
possible for all countries to subscribe to the immediate introduction of VMS and that krill vessels have been 
excluded from coverage." 
135 CCAMLR-XVIII, Annex 5, 2.18, p.I07. 
136 CCAMLR-XVIII, Annex 5, 3.13-3.24, pp.112-113, and CCAMLR-XVIII, 8.7-8.9, pp.30-31. 
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Convention Area, while type two opposition is a specific opposition to the introduction of 
VMS into the krill fishery. 
Year 
1994 
1995 
1996 
1997 
1998 
1999 
Table 6 
Position Statements made in SCQI and the 
CCAMLR Commission in relation to VMS, 1994-1999 
Type 1 Support Type 2 Support Type 1 Opposition Type 2 Opposition 
Australia Japan 
Chile Poland 
EEC Russia 
New Zealand 
Australia France Argentina Japan 
New Zealand UK Chile 
Sweden Norway Germany 
United States 
Australia Argentina Germany Japan 
New Zealand Chile Poland 
Norway EC Republic of Korea 
South Africa France 
United States Spain 
Uruguay 
EC Argentina 
Chile Republic of Korea 
Uruguay 
Australia Poland 
EC Republic of Korea 
Russia 
Ukraine 
Argentina Japan 
Australia Poland 
EC Republic of Korea 
New Zealand Ukraine 
Norway 
United States 
German opposition to VMS was based on reservations about the cost of implementing the 
system through CCAMLR. 137 Argentine and Chilean reservations in 1995 also derived 
from the disputed sovereignty claims in Antarctica.138 Argentina can appear to have a 
weaker commitment to conservation, because the UK through its de facto sovereignty 
position within the Convention Area can and does initiate unilateral measures that 
Argentina is forced to challenge in CCAMLR. Without this dispute Argentina would 
137 CCAMLR-XIV, 2.53, p.136. Argentine and Chilean budgetary reservations are at CCAMLR-XIV, 2.44, 
p.135. 
138 CCAMLR-XIV, 2.41-2.43, p.134. 
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probably appear more on a similar level to Chile in its conservation stance in CCAMLR. A 
commitment to conservation can often appear reduced through the affect of maintaining a 
sovereignty claim. New Zealand, while interested in conservation, has appeared 
ambivalent at times through its efforts to enforce its sovereignty claim to the Ross 
Dependency. This is something that a simple division the CCAMLR states into fishing and 
conservationist factions can obscure. The EC support for VMS was limited by insisting on 
national application rather than any centralisation through the CCAMLR Secretariat. Spain 
is a fishing state, but its interests lie in longlining rather than the krill fishery, and its stance 
is also obscured by the EC. 
Debate on the CDS measures 
The other significant conservation measure that had difficulty in gaining acceptance was 
the catch certification scheme, which was eventually weakened and adopted as the CDS. 139 
This proposal was initiated by the United States and Australia in 1998, and was inspired by 
the statistical documentation scheme of ICCAT. 14o In SCOI many members supported the 
idea, but there was concern about the application of conservation measures outside the 
Convention Area or within EEZs from some members. 141 The SCOI meeting time was 
exhausted before a revised measure could be discussed and the Commission discussions 
did not result in a consensus. 142 
It appears that at the April 1999 intersessional meeting that members of the fishing 
community were attempting to block the catch certification scheme. The meeting was a 
technical one rather than a policy-making one and some countries did not attend. At this 
meeting Japan blocked the presence of ASOC observers. 143 The EC presented a revised 
scheme which contained the compromises necessary to secure agreement from the states 
unwilling to impose trade controls. This is the point at which the certification scheme 
became a documentation scheme. Other informal intersessional work occurred. Dr D. 
Agnew from the UK chaired the Brussels session and the informal working group that 
drafted the CDS measure at the CCAMLR meeting later that year. 
139 The CDS is discussed in detail Chapter 5 pp.187-188, 197-201, and Chapter 6, pp.238-240. 
140 CCAMLR-XVII, 5.16, p.17. ' 
141 CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5, 2.46, p.8. 
142 CCAMLR-XVII, Annex 5, 2.47, p.8, and CCAMLR-XVII, 5.20, p.17. 
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The 'ministerial on ice' hosted by New Zealand in January 1999 appears to have played a 
significant role in changing attitudes towards the CDS at the ministerial level in many 
ATCPS. 144 There was substantial discussion ofCCAMLR at the ATCM and it appears that 
the epistemic community advocating the CDS was active. The ATCM produced a 
resolution that strongly supported the implementation of CDS. 14S This 'wake-up call' 
meant that at the following CCAMLR meeting the CDS was a high priority item, and 
rather than being discussed in SCQI it was handled by a special open-ended working 
group. 
Japan made the only statement that expressed serious reservations about the CDS and its 
agreement to the scheme was secured on the following grounds: "Firstly, the scheme 
should not be a trade restriction measure. Secondly, implementation of the scheme should 
not discriminate against non-Contracting Parties to CCAMLR. Thirdly, the scheme should 
be effective and not be problematic to Member States in regard to its implementation.,,146 
The final proposal was sponsored by Australia, the EC, and the United States. 147 Australia, 
the EC, New Zealand, Norway, South Africa, Brazil, and Chile made statements 
supporting the introduction of CDS. 148 Senator Hill and Tucker Scully were thanked for 
their efforts by New Zealand,149 Brazil also thanked Senator Hill, ISO and France also 
thanked Tucker Scully. lSI Dr Agnew was thanked by the Commission. IS2 
TAC measures 
Most other conservation measures in response to lUU fishing were adopted swiftly. This 
makes it difficult to establish position differences between different states, and position 
change over time, as the quick adoption reduces the number of statements of agreement or 
disagreement left in the meeting record. However, one notable example of an idea that is 
143 "Continuing Crisis in the Southern Ocean", The Antarctic Project Newsletter, 8 (2), July 1999, 
http://www.asoc.orglcurrentpress/juI99new.htm (site visited 27 March 2001). 
144 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.14, p.13, Senator Hill was pleased at the support from CCAMLR Member 
Environment Ministers. See also Chapter 5, p.182. 
145 See Chapter 5, note 224, p.198 for the wording ofthe resolution. 
146 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.22, p.17. 
147 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.11, p.13. 
148 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.14-5.24, pp.13-18. 
149 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.17, p.14. Scully was also thanked in 1998 for his work in this area, CCAMLR-XVII, 
18.1, p.91. 
150 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.20, p.17. 
151 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.24, p.18. 
152 CCAMLR-XVIII, 5.34, p.19. 
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yet to gain widespread support is the idea of the application of national measures. This 
appears to have only been supported by New Zealand and Norway, and has foundered on 
EC objections.153 Many of the CCAMLR conservation measures deal with the regulation 
of legitimate fisheries, such as TAC allocation and new and exploratory fisheries. This has 
attracted sustained criticism from the environmental NGOs who ask why legitimate fishing 
is expanding when the state of the fisheries is so poor and CCAMLR control is so weak. 154 
The recommendations made by the Scientific Committee about the T AC to be set for 
Dissostichus spp. in the 1998/99 season and the TAC set by the Commission are presented 
in the table below. 
Table 7 
Comparing Scientific Committee TAC Recommendation with the 
Commission 1998/99 TAC Allocation for Dissostichus spp. in tonnes155 
Area Scientific Committee Commission TAC Allocation Fishery Type 
TAC Recommendation 
48.1 Prohibition Prohibition -
48.2 Prohibition Prohibition -
48.3 Less than 3,616 3,500 Longline 
48.4 28 28 Longline 
48.6 707 North of 60° S 707 North of 60° S New Longline 
495 South of 60° S 495 South of 60° S 
58.4.1 261 261 West of 90° E Exploratory Trawl 
58.4.3 2,438 700 North of 60° S New Longline 
58.4.3 886 625 Exploratory Trawl 
58.4.4 572 (Longline) 572 New Longline 
314 (Trawl) 
58.5.2 3,690 3,690 Trawl Fishery 
58.6 3,993 (Longline) 1,555 (outside EEZ) Exploratory Longline 
1,054 (trawl) 
58.7 688 (Longline) Prohibition -
182 (trawl) 
88.1 271 North of 65° S 271 North of 65° S Exploratory Longline 
2,010 South of 65° S 2,010 South of 65° S 
88.3 Prohibition Prohibition -
153 This is discussed in Chapter 5 pp.196 and p.218. 
154 "Until IUU fishing is brought under control, ECO believes that CCAMLR has no option but to adopt a 
moratorium on the legal fisheries for both Antarctic and Patagonian toothfish. It makes no sense at all to be 
conducting 'legal' fishing when the real catch is already so far above what CCAMLR estimates as a 
precautionary level.", Eco, 'Precautionary Approach - Moratorium On Toothfish Fisheries The Only 
Option', CCAMLRXVIII, No 1, Hobart, Australia, 25 October, 1999, 
http://www.asoc.org/currentpress/ecodoc.htm. (site visited 31 January, 2002). 
155 Compiled from SC-CAMLR-XVII and CCAMLR-XVII. 
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The Scientific Committee was aware that it was operating in conditions of uncertainty, and 
it was not even known if Patagonian toothfish were a contiguous stock or not. The discount 
factor for D. eleginoides was 0.45 and for D. mawsoni it was 0.30. 156 The Scientific 
Committee: "emphasised that there was no scientific basis for selecting a particular value 
for any discount factor .... Despite these uncertainties, the Scientific Committee agreed 
that the methods used to calculate precautionary catch limits were the best available given 
existing information.,,157 This helps explain why the third issue ofECO at that meeting was 
entitled "Introduction to CCAMLR Science 101: Plucking Numbers Out of a Hat".158 
In 1999 the Scientific Committee found the GYM model to be producing yields that were 
in excess of precautionary levels due to flawed methods and assumptions.159 Four main 
options were considered for establishing precautionary catch levels by the Scientific 
Committee: 
(i) 
(ii) 
(iii) 
(iv) 
use this year's assessments by WG-FSA as a guide to setting precautionary 
catch levels, particularly for D. eleginoides (Table 7); 
recommend that the catch levels adopted by the Commission last year 
should remain until more information is available (Table 7); 
identify a maximum catch for each statistical area that would enable the 
conduct of the fisheries-based research plan in the SSRUs in that area; or 
recommend zero catches until fisheries-indercendent research is undertaken 
to provide sufficient data for an assessment. 1 0 
The figures developed by WG-FSA could not be recommended to the Commission and an 
informal group discussed the numbers in the Scientific Committee. 161 Normally figures 
agreed on at WG-FSA pass through the Scientific Committee, where corrections to 
mistakes can be made, and then pass on to the Commission where they are incorporated 
into conservation measures. Considerable effort was being given to refining the methods 
156 SC-CAMLR-XVII, 9.40, p.57. 
157 SC-CAMLR-XVII, 9.41-9.43, p.57. 
158 ECO, 'Introduction to CCAMLR Science 101: Plucking Numbers Out of a Hat', Volume CXXXVIII No. 
3, Hobart, Australia, 2 November 1998, http://www.asoc.org/currentpress/ccamlr98ec03.htm. (site visited 31 
January 2002). 
159 SC-CAMLR-XVIII, 9.15, p.52, earlier doubts were expressed in 1998, SC-CAMLR-XVII, 5.47-5.48, 
p.28. 
160 SC-CAMLR-XVIII, 9.44, p.57. The table 7 referred to here should not be confused with table 7 on the 
previous page. 
161 SC-CAMLR-XVIII, 9.15-9.16, p.52, and 9.24, p.53. 
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used by WG_FSA,162 but at that time they were still inadequate. The environmental NGOs 
have criticised CCAMLR for continuing to set TAC rather than adopting the fourth zero 
catch option suggested by the Scientific Committee. 
The moratorium debate 
The moratorium debate has been conducted mainly between the fishing and environmental 
communities. 163 Recommending a zero catch limit was among the options available to the 
Scientific Committee, however a prohibition of directed fishing for toothfish has only 
occurred in those areas where the stock is not present, such as Subarea 88.3 in the Pacific 
Ocean, or where it is known to have been fished out, such as Subarea 58.7 near the Prince 
Edward and Marion Islands. Even in the other areas where IUU fishing has been occurring, 
the Commission has continued to set TACs, choosing to believe that its conservation 
measures will bring IUD fishing under control. ASOC and Greenpeace have been calling 
for a zero catch limit, or a moratorium, on toothfish from 1997.164 To date only one 
CCAMLR member, New Zealand, has appeared to consider advocating the moratorium 
concept within CCAMLR, and that support is predicated on the outcome of the 2000/2001 
fishing season. 165 In 1998 and 1999 the efforts of the conservation community members 
focused on gaining acceptance for first VMS and then the CDS conservation measures, 
with efforts in 2000 focusing on strengthening these measures rather than supporting a 
moratorium. It would appear that the chance of a moratorium being implemented before 
the reduction of the remaining toothfish stocks is low. One development in the debate at 
the 2000 meeting is the acceptance in the Commission that it is enforcement vessels rather 
than those of the legitimate fishing operators that possess deterrence capability,166 which 
may weaken future arguments put forward by fishing community members. 
Influence of the epistemic communities in CCAMLR over IUU fishing 
What is the influence of the different epistemic communities in CCAMLR in the areas of 
policy innovation, policy diffusion, policy selection, and policy persistence? In the area of 
162 SC-CAMLR-XVIII, 5.54-5.57, pp.28-29, 6.25-6.34, pp.43-44, and 7.11-7.23, pp.47-49. 
163 Chapter 5, p.186, and pp.224-287. 
164 CCAMLR-XVI, 12.9, p.74. 
165 See Chapter 5, pp.226-227. 
166 CCAMLR-XIX, 5.5, p.19. 
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policy innovation the conservation community is more innovative than the fishing 
community. This is partially due to the structure of the transformation rules and intellectual 
order of CCAMLR as conservation community members have to demonstrate that 
regulations or restrictions on activity are necessary, while the fishing community members 
have benefited from defending the status quo of default fisheries access. The statements 
made by members of the conservation and environmental community have framed the 
political controversy, and the proposals for new conservation measures. The fishing 
community members have largely reacted to these proposals, defending status quo 
positions with established arguments, such as Japan's insistence that VMS is not required 
in the krill fishery because adequate information is already being provided and there is no 
proof of IUU krill fishing. 167 Ideas about technical solutions to incidental mortality 
problems appear to have mainly originated in those states where conservation and fishing 
interest is strong. 168 
The defining of state interests in reaction to the problem of IUU fishing has focused in 
three interrelated areas. The first of these is that the threat posed by IUU fishing to 
toothfish stocks and populations of endangered seabirds is undesirable on the grounds that 
extinction of species is undesirable. This is most likely to be an interest of the states that 
strongly support conservation. The second of these is that a failure to manage the problem 
effectively will lead to a loss of credibility for CCAMLR and the ATS, possibly leading to 
the undermining of the ATS or the replacement of CCAMLR with a new regime. This 
interest is shared by the existing members of the CCAMLR and ATS regimes, although 
less strongly among the environmental NGOs. The third area of interest is in continued 
rational use of the resources, because if the toothfish stocks become commercially extinct 
then they can not be sustainably used. While some fishing operators may be attempting to 
make a quick profit, the fishing states in CCAMLR profess to being interested in 
sustainable fishing in the Convention Area. There is a reasonable degree of common 
ground between the different epistemic communities that there is an IUU fishing problem 
and that something should be done about it. 
167 CCAMLR-XVIII, Annex 5, 3.18, p.l13. 
168 New Zealand and Norway were investigating devices for underwater setting oflonglines, CCAMLR-XVI, 
6.51, p.19. 
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The environmental community members have attempted to set higher standards, or at least 
argue for CCAMLR members to live up to the standards which they have set previously. 
The 'best practice' of New Zealand for incidental mortality is a three sea bird by-catch 
limit in the Ross Sea,169 while the NGOs ask for a zero by-catch limit on sea birds.l70 
Environmental NGOs make reference to the ecosystem approach and the precautionary 
principle and the fact that CCAMLR members do not appear to be living up them. 171 The 
new conservation measures being implemented by CCAMLR appear to be more of an 
attempt to live up to existing standards than an attempt to develop a new level of 
attainment for the objectives of the Convention. CCAMLR is unlikely to adopt a new 
environmental standard that does not allow exploitation of the living marine resources, as 
evidenced by the negative reaction of fishing community to suggestions for an MP A 
around the Balleny Islands both in CCAMLR and at the ATCM. l72 
Tracking policy diffusion requires attempting to track the exchange of ideas and where 
ideas are adopted into policy. This is difficult because of the ease with which electronic 
information can now be globally diffused, although not all governments have the capacity 
to benefit from this. To a limited extent ideas can be tracked through statements and the 
information papers at CCAMLR meetings. Outside of these meetings policy diffusion 
occurs through the environmental NGOs and the meetings and work of other IGOs. 
Although the fishing industry is eager to exploit any new fish stock this is counterbalanced 
by the commercial incentives for secrecy that impede the flow of information between 
different fishing operations. With the proliferation of other regional fishery and 
conservation bodies, and the organisation of specific international efforts to deal with 
169 New Zealand was willing to accept a maximum incidental mortality of three sea birds in Subarea 88.1 in 
Conservation Measure 21 O/XIX. 
170 In their 2000 report to the Commission ASOC submitted: "that all fishing methods that contribute to 
seabird mortality must be prohibited.", Report of the Antarctic And Southern Ocean Coalition (ASOC) to the 
XIX Meeting of the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources, Hobart, 2000 
http://www.asoc.org/ASOCreport.htm. (site visited 1 February, 2002). 
171 ibid., "CCAMLR was founded on the basis of adherence to the precautionary principle, yet fisheries have 
continued to be agreed to as a political accommodation, rather than as a considered response to the state of 
the fishery." . 
172 ibid., "ASOC understands that the Working Group on Ecosystem Monitoring and Management was 
unable to reach consensus on endorsing the Balleny Islands Protected Area proposed by New Zealand. We 
are concerned that this had more to do with concerns over limiting potential fishing areas than with the 
scientific and environmental merits of the proposal. The ricocheting of this proposal between CCAMLR and 
Antarctic Treaty fora, without apparent substantive progress towards the designation of the area, 
demonstrates a serious institutional failing within the Antarctic Treaty system." Conservation Measure 
210IXIX bans fishing for toothfish within ten nautical miles around the Balleny Islands - a distance of twelve 
nautical miles was rejected for being too territorial, Personal Notes, Felicity Wong GCAS Lecture, 13 
January 2000. 
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problems of fishing overcapacity, incidental mortality, and IUU fishing, CCAMLR 
operating in an interdependent world. Several of the conservation measures adopted by 
CCAMLR in response to IUU fishing were inspired by efforts in other IGOs. CCAMLR 
was in part responsible for the diffusion of the idea of the ecosystem approach and the 
precautionary principle, but does not appear to have been at the forefront of innovation 
with IUU fishing. IGOs can be important in developing technical solutions and 
communicating ideas between states, while NGOs are able to operate transnationally and 
help spread ideas into the domestic arena. 
The consensus based decision-making system used in CCAMLR is crucial to 
understanding which political factors allow an epistemic community to have their ideas 
adopted in CCAMLR. This is because the size of a winning coalition that supports a new 
idea has to include almost all of the CCAMLR members, while a blocking coalition only 
has to attract the support of a few members. The presence of the reservation system makes 
it difficult for one member by itself to block measures in CCAMLR. The CDS measure 
that was blocked in 1998 was adopted in 1999 because the reservations of the fishing states 
were overcome through compromises. The scope of the CDS was reduced from a 
verification scheme to a documentation scheme, and Australia and the United States did 
not proceed with a CITES listing for the Patagonian toothfish. 173 
The VMS measures adopted by CCAMLR are all potentially ineffective because of their 
lack of application to krill vessels, but this compromise was necessary to secure the 
support of fishing states. There is a continuing effort to improve the VMS coverage from 
conservation group members. The fishing states may be attempting to preserve a 
bargaining chip for use in future negotiations over TAC allocation for krill. If krill fishing 
does expand, then the fishing states will need new arguments to delay VMS 
implementation in krill vessels. One condition for epistemic success may be that an idea 
has to appeal to a winning coalition in the decision-making body or group. One limiting 
factor on policy adoption at a CCAMLR meeting is that delegations to CCAMLR are 
subject to established goals and instructions. Within the time frame of a CCAMLR meeting 
altering these goals can be difficult. A delegation that exceeds its instructions and makes 
173 See Chapter 5, note 230, p.199, and Greenpeace Critique a/the CCAMLR Catch Documentation Scheme 
[1999J as a Mechanism to Prevent Illegal, Unregulated and Unreported Fishing For Toothfish Species in the 
Southern Ocean February, 2000, http://www.greenpeace.org/~oceans/reports/ccamlarcritque.pdf, (site visited 
1 February, 2002). 
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commitments that its state is unable to live up, could see the state exercising the objection 
procedure. This may be a reason why controversial measures take more than one meeting 
to gain acceptance. 
Flag state measures for increasing compliance from nationals and companies have been 
advocated by Norway, and supported by New Zealand and the environmental NGOs, but 
no progress was made here until 2000 when Resolution 13 lXIX, 'Flagging and Licensing 
of Non-Contracting Party Vessels' was adopted. Even members which strongly supported 
other conservation measures were reluctant to back these measures. This was perhaps 
because they were too radical a departure from existing notions of what was acceptable for 
flag-state measures in relation to vessels operating on the high seas. However the 
resolution adopted in 2000, following up from actions in other IGOs may indicate a 
broader social change in acceptable flag-state ideas. One condition for epistemic 
community success may be that a new concept can not depart too radically from the 
existing intellectual order of what is acceptable, at least for a minor shock like IUU fishing. 
A crisis may allow greater departures from existing norms and values. Although the IUU 
fishing problem is a continuing problem for CCAMLR, part of its initial impact has now 
passed and it is a 'business as usual' problem, and the idea of a moratorium is not being 
widely advocated. Although the precautionary principle should deal with the problem of 
uncertainty by the implementation of cautious catch limits, the uncertainty in the Scientific 
Committee's assessments of the problems and solutions allows the fishing community to 
argue for continued access to the fisheries. A similar problem with krill would pose a more 
significant threat to the entire ecosystem and a moratorium could attract stronger political 
support. For example, groups like Greenpeace would be able to highlight the connection 
between Baleen whales and krill. A factor in epistemic success is the domestic support that 
the idea can attract, and some ideas will attract more support than others. The 
environmental NGOs have focused their publicity campaigns on the sea birds of the 
Southern Ocean in part because they attract more public empathy than the toothfish. 174 
Policy acceptance in CCAMLR appears to take its final form based less on epistemic 
consensus or even scientific information, and more on commercial interests and political 
174 This has been called the 'Albatross factor'. Personal Notes, Alistair Graham Lecture, 22 June, 2000. 
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bargaining at this stage of its development. Members of the conservation community are 
willing to trade off access to fisheries for some progress towards attaining conservation 
goals, while members of the fishing community are willing to allow slow progress as long 
as exploitation of the resources continues. The environmental community call for a 
moratorium may tilt the bargaining in favour of the conservation group through shifting the 
middle ground of the zone of agreement, but 'horsetrading' ofTAC and state access to new 
and exploratory fisheries continues. The introduction of more accurate ecosystem models 
may strengthen the role of scientific information in the policy process in the future. 
Although CCAMLR has adopted 215 conservation measures in the period from 1982 to 
2000, only 58 conservation measures remain in force in the 2000/2001 season. This allows 
policy persistence to be analysed to some extent as measures are revised, dropped, or 
replaced. CCAMLR now generally performs well at gaining feedback on problems with its 
conservation measures and making minor adjustments to improve measures where 
necessary. Despite the fact that measures have to be renewed annually, conservation 
measures have generally stayed in place until replaced by an amended measure or 
changing conditions that rendered them obsolete. This reflects well on the 'spirit of 
cooperation' among the CCAMLR members, as once in place attempts are not made to 
remove measures. Although the change in the system is slow, it is not prone to taking steps 
backward. Because conditions of uncertainty persist, fostering dissension rather consensus 
over some scientific questions, there is room for substantial change and modification of the 
framework of CCAMLR conservation measures in the future. One policy that has persisted 
through the IUU fishing problem is the TAC allocation system in the new and exploratory 
fisheries conservation measures. 
Epistemic community summary 
The Scientific Committee acts less like an epistemic community and more as a forum for 
different epistemic communities to express dissent. Three different epistemic communities 
can be tentatively identified within CCAMLR: the environmental community, the 
conservation community, and the fishing community. The contribution to problem-solving 
effectiveness by the epistemic communities is limited by the lack of consensus between 
communities. This is because of the differences in principled and causal beliefs between 
the members of the different communities, which lead to the different communities making 
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different interpretations of the uncertain conditions that CCAMLR is experiencing with 
IUU fishing. Consequently, while the communities have generated information, elucidated 
relationships, provided advice, and helped states to define their interests, the different 
communities have been working at cross-purposes to each other. 
The different communities have had mixed success in their influence on CCAMLR policy. 
The fishing community has kept access to the fisheries open by maintaining a traditional 
interpretation of rational use that supports continued exploitation, but has contributed little 
to problem-solving effectiveness or learning. The conservation community has managed to 
implement limited change in CCAMLR policy in support of conservation. The 
environmental community has been unsuccessful in getting a moratorium policy adopted, 
but has played an important role in increasing regime transparency and in generating the 
public support that gave the conservation community the political clout it needed to reach a 
compromise with the fishing community over new conservation measures. Traditional 
interest group politics in combination with the consensus based decision-making 
procedures of the ATS regime can prevent epistemic communities from influencing policy 
decisions in CCAMLR. Environmental groups appear to be as capable as groups of 
professional experts at participating in epistemic communities. Tracking key individuals 
and their activities is easier than tracing the influence of a network of professionals, but the 
knowledge-broker concept still has some of the same operationalisation problems that 
epistemic communities have. 175 
In drawing linkages between epistemic communities and the determinants of effectiveness, 
some determinants are more relevant than others. The nature of the ATS regime issue area 
is such that science has traditionally played an important role, so it seemed reasonable to 
anticipate that epistemic communities could generate ideas and learning that would 
translate into increased government capacity through the use of epistemic power. In 
practice the existing intellectual order and transformation rules of CCAMLR impede the 
use of espitemic power in support of solving the problems of IUU fishing and incdiental 
mortality. Fishing states have been able to use their epistemic power to maintain access to 
the new fisheries in the Southern Ocean. However, the actions of non-state actors in the 
175 It will be interesting to see the impact of the appointment of Dr. Denzil Miller, formerly Chair of the 
Scientific Committee, to the position of Executive Secretary for CCAMLR from February 2002, 
http://www.ccamlr.orglEnglish/e_ccamlr_news.htm. (site visited 5 February, 2002). 
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environmental community have been important in increasing regime transparency, which 
has had the flow on effect of increasing the ability of conservationist states to introduce 
new conservation measures as their political capacity in this issue area has increased. 
CCAMLR: Regime Change 
Does theory explain the key dimensions of regime change in the case of the CCAMLR 
regime? The four theoretical models developed by Keohane and Nye will be used here to 
analyse the CCAMLR regime. 176 
The economic process model 
The main economic development that has threatened the CCAMLR regime has been the 
advent of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean. The origins of IUU fishing are diverse, but 
stem from the initial development of fishing in the Southern Ocean and the introduction of 
technology that makes fishing for toothfish practical. 177 This fits well with the first premise 
of the economic process model. The second premise fits less well, as while some 
CCAMLR members interested in fishing appear motivated to protect their domestic 
standard of living, other CCAMLR members are more interested in conservation and 
appear willing to sacrifice demands for a rising standard of living in order to preserve the 
environment of the Southern Ocean. The main economic benefit that gives an incentive to 
modify the CCAMLR regime to be effective in dealing with the problem of IUU fishing, is 
the promise of a sustainable harvest from the fisheries of the Southern Ocean, a harvest 
which is threatened by the unsustainable nature of IUU fishing. This fits well with the third 
premise of the economic process model. The model predicts that regime change will be a 
process of gradual adaptation to the economic activity of IUU fishing, and this has a good 
fit with the slow introduction of the VMS and CDS conservation measures by 
CCAMLR. l78 
176 See Chapter 2, pp.37-40 and pp.54-55. 
177 See Chapter 3, p.98, and Chapter 5, pp.l88-189. 
178 For more detail on this see Chapter 6, pp.282-286. 
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The overall power structure model 
The power structure of the ATS and CCAMLR regimes is to some extent the product of 
the Cold War, when the United States and the USSR were superpowers. The ATS regime 
as a whole has significant impediments to the application of military power by restricting 
the military role in Antarctica to providing logistic support for scientific activities. 179 The 
end of the Cold War and the decline of Russian power has not had a significant impact on 
the rules of the ATS and CCAMLR regimes. The overall power structure model is 
unsatisfactory in explaining what regime change has occurred in CCAMLR in response to 
the problem of IUU fishing. Although the United States has exercised leadership on this 
issue, this has been dependent on the ability of its delegates rather than on any application 
of military power. 180 
The issue structure model 
This model predicts that the states with issue-specific power will be most influential in 
making rules. Some of the issue-specific sources of power in relation to IUU fishing and 
the CCAMLR regime include: geographical proximity of port states, existing EEZ 
jurisdiction, commitment of enforcement capabilities, control over the level of fishing 
effort, and control over issue-specific information and its uses. These have changed in the 
1990s as fishing effort in the Southern Ocean has increased, followed by a greater 
commitment of enforcement capability within EEZs. To some extent change in the 
CCAMLR regime has been driven by states dissatisfied with how CCAMLR has handled 
the problem of IUU fishing. However, the consensus-based decision-making procedures of 
the CCAMLR regime make it difficult for any state to use power resources to force 
change, but comparatively easy for states to impede change. The bargaining process in 
CCAMLR has led to a pattern of outcomes where compromise leads to the introduction of 
conservation measures of limited effectiveness in dealing with the problem of IUU fishing. 
Another problem with the issue structure model is with the fact that issue-linkages have 
179 See Appendix I, Antarctic Treaty, Article 1. 
180 One example of this was the role played by Tucker Scully. See Chapter 6, note 88, p.267, and p.286. 
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been successfully drawn by both the fishing and conservationist states to different issue 
areas. 181 
The international organisation model 
This model predicts that the power resources used to determine regime change will depend 
on organisationally dependent capabilities, such as voting power, coalitions, and elite 
networks. The consensus based decision-making procedures of the CCAMLR regime are 
important in explaining regime change, or in this case, regime inertia. The existing norms 
favour exploitation of the living marine resources of the Southern Ocean, and this has 
impeded efforts at dealing with the problem ofIUU fishing. These norms could be changed 
by a shift in coalitions, or the development of a consensus among the different epistemic 
communities, but this is yet to develop. One part of the model is that other international 
organisations will be a source of regime change, and this is true to an extent for the 
CCAMLR regime, as many of the conservation measures implemented by CCAMLR were 
first trialed in other international organisations, or by members in their domestic 
jurisdiction. 
Regime change summary 
The least useful of the four models of regime change was the overall power structure 
model. The economic process model is good at illustrating the initial causes that drive 
regime change, but the issue structure and international organisation models are better at 
explaining the exact process by which regime change has occurred in the CCAMLR 
regime. 
CCAMLR: A Regime in Decline? 
One form of regime change is change that leads to the decay or decline of a regime, 
possibly leading to the dissolution of a regime. The effectiveness of CCAMLR in solving 
181 For example, the EC drew attention to the rejection of flag state measure proposals by other regional 
organisations such as NAFO as part of its arguments against Norway's proposals. CCAMLR-XVIII, Annex 
5,2.45, p.ll1. 
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the problems ofIUU fishing has been limited, and while it remains the legitimate regime in 
its issue area, there are some 'triggers' that could initiate a collapse of the regime. Is 
CCAMLR a regime in a state of decline or decay? What are the potential consequences of 
this situation? 
Defining decline and decay 
A regime may be in a state of decline when its process and goal effectiveness does not fit 
well with actual problem-solving effectiveness. 182 For CCAMLR this means that although 
it may be adopting conservation measures that maintain the compromises that were 
necessary for the creation of the regime, it is failing to effectively deal with current 
problems such as IUU fishing. A regime may be in a state of decay when it starts failing to 
meet process and goal effectiveness solutions because its problem-solving has been 
ineffective. For CCAMLR this might be indicated by a paralysis in its decision-making 
procedures, significant unilateral actions by sovereignty claimants in Antarctica or other 
disputed territories within the Convention Area, or if the incidental mortality becomes 
irreversible for some dependent species threatened with extinction. Currently CCAMLR 
could be considered to be in a state of decline, although there is the risk of post hoc ergo 
propter hoc problems in making such a judgement, as a regime could only judged to 
definitely be in a state of decay when it actually starts collapsing. 
Christopher Joyner has listed several areas that could cause the ATS to stagnate, resist and 
decay, but he does not explore these issues in great depth. 183 One area is that persistent 
pathological conflict could destroy the reason for the existence of the ATS regime. Another 
area is where a steady degeneration of the operation of the ATS could lead to frustration in 
policy, disorganised planning, and increasing non-cooperation. Joyner points out that the 
ATS has often undergone periods of creative tension where the ATCPs have been able to 
transform conflict into productive change for the regime. If the process can be repeated 
again with CCAMLR and the IUU fishing problems then the ATS regime should be 
strengthened. Joyner argued that agreements within the ATS had to mesh their design to 
attain the objectives common to the regime. This obviously limits the degree of change that 
is possible for CCAMLR. If CCAMLR were to adopt measures that increased the 
IS2 See Chapter 2, pp.28-29. 
IS3 Christopher C. Joyner, op. cit., pp.95-96. 
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effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime at the cost of the stability and effectiveness of the 
wider ATS regime, then these measures could be ultimately self-defeating. This is an 
unlikely scenario because the key provisions of the Antarctic Treaty are embedded within 
the Convention. 
The consensus decision-making procedure has a limited process and problem 
effectiveness. There is a consensus in CCAMLR about the severity of the IUU shock and 
the extinction dangers, but there is a disagreement over the best solutions to the problem 
among the different epistemic communities. 184 Some conservation measures have achieved 
consensus, but often the bargaining that has resulted in the consensus has left a critical 
defect in the measure, such as the fact that VMS does not include the krill fishery, and that 
the CDS does not impose strong market end obligations to reject uncertified fish. Other 
areas, such as the application of stronger national measures or a moratorium, have been 
blocked. This means that CCAMLR has not yet emerged from the period of creative 
tension. There is still room for more conservation measures to strengthen the regime, and 
there is still the opportunity for resistance to cause a stagnation in problem-solving 
effectiveness that can undermine the regime and transform a period of decline into a state 
of decay. The CDS and VMS conservation measures represent one area where a majority 
based decision system might have resulted in more rapid acceptance and 
implementation. 18s This is qualified by the point that fishing states would have a lesser 
obligation for compliance under a majority decision where they were in opposition, and 
could lead to more use of the objection procedures for opting out of a conservation 
measure. 
CCAMLR is still the legitimate authority for the Southern Ocean, and the accession by 
Namibia and Vanuatu indicates successful expansion of membership while the regime was 
under stress. Although there is a questionable degree of compliance with CCAMLR 
conservation measures by some members,186 the CCAMLR members remain committed to 
the regime. External criticism from the states that were previously critical of the ATS 
regime when it was negotiating CRAMRA has not been a problem for CCAMLR. The fact 
that some developing states have been connected to the IUU fishing problem may 
184 See Chapter 6, p.2Sl. 
185 See Chapter 6, p.255. 
186 See Chapter 5, pp.190-192. 
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contribute to this - but it is peculiar that critics like Malaysia have not made greater use of 
this opportunity to criticise the non-compliance by CCAMLR member nationals. If 
criticism did develop through the UN and other forums, then this might add to the pressure 
on CCAMLR members to deal effectively with the IUU problems rather than risk the 
chance of CCAMLR being replaced with a new non-ATS regional fisheries management 
regime. 
A maj or renegotiation of the Convention should not be anticipated while it is under 
pressure from IUU fishing. Although the regime has flaws, its members do not 
contemplate attempting to replace it with a new regime. This would be too risky with the 
potential for problems arising from economic pressures in areas with disputed sovereignty 
claims. Unlike the Antarctic Treaty or the Madrid Protocol, the CCAMLR regime does not 
have the formal possibility for a review conference. The members have to make the current 
system work if the credibility of the CCAMLR and ATS regimes is to be maintained. It 
was less difficult to negotiate the Madrid Protocol after CRAMRA was derailed because 
mining activities, apart from basic geological research, had not started in Antarctica. 
Negotiating a new regime for marine living resources in the Southern Ocean would be 
difficult with existing commercial pressure on the resources. Continued difficulties with 
CCAMLR may affect considerations given towards developing frameworks for handling 
other efforts for commercial use of Antarctica, such as privately conducted tourist and 
science operations. 
The reasons for the creation of the ATS regime and its sub-regimes remain valid. 
Sovereignty is the issue that could most likely unravel the ATS regime, followed by 
economic interests and then conflict over environmental issues. CCAMLR has the 
potential to become a self-maintaining 'dead letter' regime if the fisheries problems are not 
dealt with effectively. One slow change in technology is the steadily improving access to 
Antarctica and the Southern Oceans. Commercial enterprises are now able to operate 
profitably in a region where once only governments used to operate. Before CCAMLR 
entered into force the overexploitation of fishing stocks occurred under fishing fleets that 
were significantly subsidised by their governments. The exploitation that is occurring 
today is to a much greater extent conducted by fishing fleets operating without subsidies 
from their governments. 
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A litmus test for the CCAMLR regime may be the use to which the EEZ concept is put. A 
new declaration of an EEZ from a sovereignty claimant in Antarctica would indicate 
strongly that the claimant believed that CCAMLR was sufficiently ineffective that the risk 
of upsetting the ATS was worth the unilateral action to protect the environment. The 
reaction to this by the other ATS members, and to a lesser extent the reaction from third-
parties that do not support sovereignty claims to Antarctica, would be crucial in 
determining what happened next. In this situation CCAMLR would be in a state of decay 
as large parts of the Convention Area would potentially be excluded from conservation 
measure application. If the current situation continues, where EEZ have largely been 
undeclared in Antarctica or are not currently enforced, then CCAMLR is either being 
sufficiently effective to satisfy the claimants, or the claimants judge that the cost of such an 
action is not worth it. In this situation the CCAMLR regime might still be in a state of 
decline. Other signals from members that indicate the CCAMLR regime may be in a state 
of decay include: exercising reservations rather than joining a consensus; or using the 
objection provision to opt out of a conservation measure; members not attending meetings; 
members not making an effort at meetings to solve problems; or withdrawal from the 
Commission. Signals from outside the regime that indicate decay in CCAMLR may 
include: external pressure from third-party states, or from other international regimes; and 
progress in other regimes that bypasses CCAMLR efforts. The last point is interesting in 
light of the decision of twelve states to coordinate on protecting seabirds in the Southern 
Ocean with an agreement on the Conservation of Albatrosses and Petrels. 187 This could 
result in more problem solving effectiveness in respect of incidental mortality but possibly 
not carried out within the framework of the CCAMLR regime. 
The consequences of collapse 
The consequences of an outright collapse of the CCAMLR regime would be senous. 
Without international regulation and with the continued presence of IUU fishing, the 
SORS would have strong incentives to consider unilateral enforcement, such as the 
establishment of EEZ and other actions that would undermine the sovereignty compromise 
that underlies the entire ATS regime. The ATS may be undermined even if an ineffective 
187 Senator the Ron Robert Rill, "Brighter Future for Endangered Albatrosses", 
http://www.environment.gov.au/minister/env/2001lmr6feb01.html (site visited 7 March, 2001) and Ron Phil 
Goff, "Government to Consult Over Safeguarding Petrels and Albatrosses", 
http://www.executive.govt.nz/speech.cfm?speechralph=33638&SR=O (site visited 12 March, 2001). 
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CCAMLR regime is maintained, but the loss of CCAMLR would be a serious blow to the 
ATS. Awareness of these negative consequences increase the incentives for the members 
to keep the regime together by compromising, but it is questionable if this is enough to 
make the regime effective. If the regime continues to be ineffective at solving its problems 
the cost to the SORS for inaction will rise. 
A CCAMLR regime collapse would affect the conduct of science and the benefits that the 
internationalisation of Antarctic and Southern Ocean science has allowed to develop. 
Commercial pressure already exists on information sharing principles, 188 and an 
unwillingness to share propriety information could undermine the sharing of scientific 
information that has been a hallmark of the ATS. One important part of CCAMLR is the 
sharing of data obtained by commercial interests 'in confidence' to the Scientific 
Committee and the Commission for their use in decision-making about the Southern 
Ocean. 189 A collapse of CCAMLR, would disrupt the accumulation and analysis of data 
necessary for good science and the development of effective conservation measures. 
CCAMLR can not be treated in isolation, in addition to being a fisheries organisation that 
is part of the ATS regime, it is also part of the growing network of global fisheries 
organisations and other associated environmental regimes. The new international 
agreements negotiated to deal with overcapacity and exploitation problems in the 1980s 
demonstrate that these organisations do not work in isolation. 19o The international fisheries 
regimes face similar problems in different areas and these problems can have common 
solutions. The growing web of fisheries regimes is not conducive to global failure, if 
CCAMLR fails in the short term it may learn from other regimes, or be replaced by an 
FAO agreement outside the ATS, or a new ATS driven regime. 
Visualising regime decline 
There have been some pessimistic assessments of CCAMLR in recent years as the IUU 
problem has grown. In 1997 Victoria Hallum feared that CCAMLR would go through the 
motions "expressing concern, making various proposals, and adopting weak and 
ineffectual measures, but continuing to ignore the real issues. While all this is going on the 
188 The United States took information on sea ice conditions off the world wide web for fear ofIUU fishers 
utilising it. Personal Notes, Felicity Wong GCAS Lecture, 13 January 2000. 
189 See Chapter 4, p.131. 
190 See Chapter 3, pp.89-95 for a summary of environmental trends. 
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unsustainable onslaught will persist and the species that the regime is supposed to protect 
will continue to dwindle, dying 'not with a bang but a whimper.,,191 In 1997 CCAMLR had 
only just begun to adopt measures that dealt with the alarming rise in IUU fishing through 
the early to mid-1990s. By 2000 the IUU fishing and its associated impact on incidental 
mortality among seabirds does not appear to have been appreciably ameliorated, despite 
some limited and localised enforcement successes and the continued elaboration of 
conservation measures. So while CCAMLR is not in a state of decay it may be in a state of 
decline. 
One way that these developments can be visualised and interpreted is by using Young's 
ordinal scale of success concept in an attempt to represent the effectiveness of the 
CCAMLR regime in a graph format. One axis represents the degree of effectiveness, the 
other the elapsed period of time. Following Young the effectiveness axis is rated from one 
through to five, representing varying degrees of effectiveness. 192 Presumably a rating of 
less than one would indicate the absence of a regime in that issue area. The scale of the 
time axis will depend on the regime being studied, in this example it is restricted to the 
time period that CCAMLR has been in existence. This graph is a simple tool for 
visualising the development of effectiveness in the CCAMLR regime and is not a 
comprehensive performance index. Young also suggests that the ATS would be regarded 
as very effective, but at the same time ranks most marine fishery regimes as being 
ineffective. 193 An ordinal scale might have some problems in reconciling the tension 
between ATS effectiveness and the potential ineffectiveness of its marine regime 
component in CCAMLR. 
191 Victoria Hallum, op. cit., p.65. 
192 Oran Young, op. cit., p.285 "a 1-5 scale of effectiveness might give a 5 to a regime that decisively solves 
the problem at stake, a 1 to a regime that is completely ineffectual, a 2 to a regime that is marginally 
effective, a 3 to a regime that produces substantial effects, and a 4 to a regime that is very effective without 
solving the problem altogether." 
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Graph 2 
Effectiveness over Time for the CCAMLR regime 
A 
1990 1995 2000 2005 
CCAMLR starts as an ineffective regime in 1982, lacking the ability to operate effectively 
due to a lack of knowledge about its issue area and the necessity of developing its decision-
making procedures. Effectiveness initially rises in the 1980s as knowledge is accumulated 
and some initial decision-making problems are resolved, but hits a plateau when political 
problems prevent effective decision-making and the implementation of conservation 
measures. 1989-1991 is characterised as a period of decline and ineffectiveness while these 
problems are resolved, followed by a surge in effectiveness in the early 1990s during 
which CCAMLR attains its greatest level of perceived effectiveness. The problems of IUU 
fishing and incidental mortality come into view in the mid-1990s and the failure by 
CCAMLR to deal quickly with the problems leads to a decline in effectiveness that 
continues to the present day where CCAMLR is at best marginally effective, despite the 
adoption of new conservation measures to deal with the problems of IUU fishing and 
incidental mortality. 
U sing the graph a variety of future outcomes can be imagined to represent the potential 
effectiveness that CCAMLR may have. A continued decline in effectiveness could see 
CCAMLR reach position (F), where with a rating of one CCAMLR would be ineffectual 
and essentially a 'dead letter regime', while a 'regime collapse' is represented by position 
(G) where the effectiveness of CCAMLR drops below one. If CCAMLR deals effectively 
with the toothfish problems this might justify increase the effectiveness up to three at 
position (C). Establishing a framework that also deals with the imaginable potential 
193 ibid., p.272. 
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problems as well - such as extending VMS application to krill vessels - might justify a 
rating closer to four for effectiveness at position (B). If CCAMLR continues with a 
business as usual attitude, with no new conservation measures, this stagnation might be 
represented by position (D), but might justify a lower rating. One problem with this graph 
is that it does not do a good job of accounting for past failures, for example commercial 
extinction of the Patagonian toothfish is a cost that might take decades to recover from. If 
the problem had been dealt with quickly it might have justified a rating of four to five, but 
the time delay to date means that CCAMLR can only be given a rating of three or less for 
effectiveness. 
307 
Chapter 7 
Conclusions 
Early assessment 
The Southern Ocean was the last major ocean to be explored and exploited. Whale, seal, 
and some finfish stocks were severely affected before the entry into force of the CCAMLR 
regime. When CCAMLR was established it was hoped that its ecosystem approach and 
precautionary principles would allow it to develop into an effective regime before the 
ecosystem could be further damaged by unregulated exploitation. CCAMLR had the 
potential to be effective - what was required was the political will to make it happen. One 
significant factor in CCAMLR's favour was that in the 1980s there were no stocks under 
heavy pressure from overfishing or IUU fishing. However, the 1980s saw a lost window of 
opportunity for the development of a framework of conservation measures. This happened 
because of the division in CCAMLR between conservation and fishing interests and the 
inability to gain a consensus that followed from this when unequivocal scientific advice 
was lacking. The conservation measures developed for protecting existing stocks and 
restoring depleted stocks were inadequate, and the status quo situation favoured fishing 
interests. There was a lack of commitment from the CCAMLR members to ensure 
enforcement and compliance with conservation measures in the Southern Ocean. A great 
deal of the attention of the Commission and the Scientific Committee was used up in 
resolving how scientific advice was to be generated and used by CCAMLR. Despite 
problems with data submission, CCAMLR did make some progress towards establishing 
the knowledge base required for effectiveness. CEMP was successfully developed, and a 
system of observation and inspection implemented. In the early 1990s, CCAMLR appeared 
to be in a good position, with the adoption of a range of new conservation measures and 
the establishment of the system of observation and inspection. 
CCAMLR at the limits of rational use 
At the end of the 1990s CCAMLR appears to have reached the limits of the traditional 
conception of the principle of rational use, because continued exploitation of the toothfish 
stocks would contribute to a definite reduction in the highest possible long term yield for 
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toothfish and potentially irreversible reductions in seabird populations. The framework of 
conservation measures established by CCAMLR did not prevent 'bad actors' from 
initiating IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean, as the risk of apprehension or punishment is 
low. With the environmental difficulties of the Southern Ocean, enforcement is not a 
sufficient solution by itself, as it can just lead to a displacement of IUU effort to different 
areas. The involvement of CCAMLR members in IUU fishing definitely undermines the 
authority of the CCAMLR regime and makes it vulnerable to external criticism. 
CCAMLR has had difficulty in formulating innovative conservation measures to tackle the 
IUU problem, or in learning from the experience of other fisheries and conservation 
regimes. One factor in this is the lack of consensus in the Scientific Committee about 
solutions to the problem of IUU fishing, and the difficulty in setting TAC for toothfish has 
not helped. The other factor preventing innovative measures is the opposition of fishing 
interests in the Commission. Incidental mortality measures have had some success in the 
legitimate fishing industry, because a technical solution is possible and it matches up with 
the economic incentives of the fishing operations. However, until IUU fishing is controlled 
incidental mortality will continue to be a major problem for CCAMLR. 
It is possible that the continued evolution of scientific models that strengthen the Scientific 
Committee's ability to predict the consequences of harvesting activities will eventually 
increase the strength of arguments made for adopting a precautionary approach. However, 
the objective of conservation in the Convention includes rational use, and this will always 
allow a state interested in pursuing fishing activities to make a strong argument for the 
continuation of fishing activities until it is conclusively proven that a stock has been over-
exploited. This over-exploitation could be termed 'rationalised abuse' of the marine living 
resources. At the present time it would not appear to be rational to continue expanding the 
fishing effort in the entire Convention Area. However, it appears that sustainable fishing 
may be possible in some parts of the Southern Ocean which have been closely regulated 
and not badly affected by IUU fishing, such as the Ross Sea. This provides a loophole for 
continued fishing elsewhere in the Southern Ocean, for while some operators continue to 
fish it may be too much to expect forbearance from the fishing operators in other states 
who will want their slice of the toothfish market. 
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CCAMLR is in some respects held "hostage to its original assumptions".l Although 
CCAMLR can change some aspects of its rules and decision-making procedures there are 
limits imposed on the possible extent of change because of the principles and norms 
embedded in the Convention when it was negotiated. The area where this has the greatest 
impact is in relation to disputed sovereignty claims and EEZ jurisdiction in the Southern 
Ocean. The diplomatic hedging by the UK and Argentina in relation to the 
FalklandslMalvinas Islands dispute at Antarctic forums is a sterile ritual that is a 
continuing waste of valuable meeting time and political attention in the ATS. This is a 
reminder of the limits of the compromise on sovereignty embodied by Article IV of the 
Antarctic Treaty, and that while some actors may wish to imagine Antarctica as an 
internationalised territory, the claimant states are determined to maintain their claims. 
CCAMLR is not yet capable of implementing the ecosystem approach and the 
precautionary principle. Despite this problem CCAMLR should remain the dominant 
forum for resolving the IUU fishing problem in the Southern Ocean, as it is unlikely that 
any other body could intervene more effectively than CCAMLR. The Patagonian toothfish 
may be preserved in some areas, but some stocks will reach commercial extinction. If the 
slow recovery of the stocks exploited before CCAMLR entered into force is any guideline, 
these toothfish stocks are unlikely to recover before 2020-2030. This means that CCAMLR 
has failed to attain one part of its conservation objectives. Despite this the Commission 
will almost certainly continue to authorise an expansion in fishing effort and after a hiatus 
of a decade of low effort interest in krill appears to be increasing. In light of the lack of 
success in managing the IUU fishing problems it is doubtful if CCAMLR is in a position to 
manage the level of krill catch that it has set a TAC for. 
Assessment - the current effectiveness of CCAMLR 
Without the problems of IUU fishing and associated incidental mortality a current 
assessment of CCAMLR would be favourable, although measures like CDS would 
probably not have been implemented without the pressure of IUU fishing. This would have 
left CCAMLR in a position to be affected by a similar shock or crisis in the future. 
Responses by CCAMLR to this problem could have been faster, but this was unlikely in 
1 Alan Hemmings interview, 22 November 2000. 
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the face of fishing interests slowing the development of conservation measures, and the 
time that it takes to develop public awareness of the issue and domestic pressure on 
governments to deal with the problem. The parameters of the IUU fishing problems do not 
appear to have changed significantly since they first became an issue. IUU fishing remains 
a challenge to the credibility of CCAMLR and the ATS. The by-catch of seabirds in IUU 
fishing remains unacceptably high. Knowledge of the stocks being targeted and the effects 
on dependent species remains poor. The much vaunted CDS complicates the information 
gathering of the Scientific Committee without fully addressing the market-end incentives 
that drive the IUU fishing. 
The toothfish shock highlights the ineffectiveness of CCAMLR, but it may contribute to 
increased regime effectiveness in the future. This will be important if exploitation of krill 
increases, or if previously exploited finfish stocks recover to a harvestable level and attract 
renewed interest. However, this does not justify the ineffectiveness of the regime in 
dealing with the current impact of the toothfish shock. It appears that a sustained shock is 
less likely to destabilise the regime, but that developing effective measures takes longer. If 
the toothfish problem had been perceived more as a crisis, then while it may have been 
more likely to destabilise the regime, it could have seen conservation measures developed 
over a shorter period of time. CCAMLR and the ATS regimes have remained stable -
despite warnings of the urgency of the IUU fishing problems and their potential to 
undermine the CCAMLR regime. This stability comes at the price of a reduction in the 
resilience of the regime through its lack of innovation, which illustrates how CCAMLR has 
the potential to become brittle under stress. 
The toothfish shock has affected some areas of effectiveness in CCAMLR, but not all of 
them. While there has been some enhancement of transparency and capacity, other 
fundamental characteristics of the regime and its issue area remain unchanged. For 
transparency the role of the environmental NGOs is crucial in keeping the CCAMLR 
members honest. The paradox is that increased enforcement and conservation efforts have 
made it harder to track the full extent of IUU fishing, and without that data it may be 
harder for arguments in favour of further conservation measures to gain acceptance. The 
capacity devoted by some members to the problem has increased, but this has not by itself 
solved the IUU fishing problem. A membership influx of developing states with minimal 
capacity may superficially improve the effectiveness of the regime, but may burden the 
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Secretariat and other members with new financial costs as they attempt to raise these states 
up to the standard desired by CCAMLR. The greatest physical power to solve the problem 
is possessed by those states that act as gateways and transshipping points for the trade in 
toothfish. 
Regime theory has been of mixed use in analysing CCAMLR's response to IUU fishing. 
The contestable nature of the concepts of regime theory and the vagueness in terminology 
increase the difficulty of applying regime theory to the case study in a precise manner. This 
has been the case with the attempt to apply the determinants of effectiveness, rather than 
consolidating or refining regime theory, the result is more a vigorous stirring up of the mud 
in a silted up riverbed. A different framework with fewer individual factors might be a 
more profitable approach in future for analysing regime effectiveness. The hard case 
concept is useful, in that it demonstrates that CCAMLR has made a difference because it 
has shaped the behaviour of the actors involved in the regime, even if it has not yet 
successfully increased the level of compliance among the commercial operators involved 
in IUD fishing. The natural experiments and counter-factual arguments presented in 
Chapter 6 represent to some extent a 'common sense' approach to investigating the case 
study. These are useful in analysing conservation measures and the development of the 
CAMLR regime, but do little to advance regime theory as a field of study. 
Epistemic communities and regime effectiveness 
Identifying an epistemic community is a difficult task, it does not wave flags, or issue 
membership cards. Although Haas stresses the role of individuals in an epistemic 
community, in CCAMLR it is easier to find out a state or NGO position on an issue than 
that of an individual because of the way CCAMLR meetings are recorded. Identifying a 
community is a task that overlaps with that of determining its principles, norms, and causal 
beliefs. Three epistemic community like groupings can be tentatively identified and their 
activities traced in CCAMLR: the environmental community, the conservation community, 
and the fishing community. The point of difference between the environmental community 
and the conservation community is in the conservation communities' adherence to ATS 
norms and principles, while the difference between the conservation and fishing 
communities is in their interpretation of the precautionary principle. 
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The concept of the 'domain' or 'issue area' of an epistemic community is fuzzy. Is an 
epistemic community a group that pushes forward one concept, or several concepts? Is an 
epistemic community an active and continuing force in a particular issue area, with 
concepts that evolve over time, or does the community expire with the success or failure of 
its ideas in the policy arena? If an epistemic community does persist over time in a regime 
then it should begin to act like an established interest group. Informal associations already 
exist within the ATS regime, such as those based around a common language, 
geographical position, or common heritage. The existence of competing epistemic 
communities appears to be a feature of CCAMLR, but this is possibly not a negative 
feature if the friction between different communities can lead to creative tension that 
eventually enhances regime effectiveness. 
Tracing the activities of an epistemic community is difficult when a clear distinction 
between individuals and states or other actors can not be drawn. Litfin's concept of a 
'knowledge-broker' is useful, but is also difficult to operationalise within the CCAMLR 
regime. Tracing activities also overlaps with demonstrating an epistemic communities 
influence, or lack thereof. The conservation community has been effective making it 
known that the problem of IUU fishing exists, and the environmental community has also 
highlighted the role played by CCAMLR member state nationals and companies. The 
fishing community has had some success at impeding the imposition of higher standards of 
environmental protection, especially attempts at imposing flag state measures on nationals 
and the moratorium idea. VMS, CDS and TAC issues have seen more mixed degrees of 
success for the different epistemic communities. The TAC system has stayed largely as it 
is, a short term success for the fishing community as fisheries continue to expand. 
However, if this success leads to abuse of the resources, then it becomes clear that 
epistemic communities do not necessarily lead to a more effective regime, and could in 
fact lead to a less effective regime. VMS has begun to be introduced following adoption at 
the national level in many member states and a growing international acceptance in other 
fisheries. The introduction of CDS is perhaps the signal achievement of the conservation 
community. Although the CDS was reduced in scope below what was desired by the 
environmentalists, efforts by environmental community members acting outside CCAMLR 
helped lead to the political pressure to adopt the CDS. 
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Several factors are important in determining whether or not a policy can be adopted by 
CCAMLR. Firstly it has to be capable of occurring within the decision-making procedures 
of CCAMLR. For the fishing community to defend the status quo requires a blocking 
coalition of only a few member states, while for a conservation community policy to be 
adopted a degree of near unanimity needs to be obtained. Secondly, when the situation is 
treated as ordinary, or only a mild shock, then for a new idea to succeed it must not be too 
radical a departure from existing ideas. In a crisis situation new ideas are more likely to be 
adopted. Thirdly, the politics of CCAMLR is framed by science, and this is where the 
fishing community gain some of their bargaining power, because the information provided 
from their fishing activities is essential to the production of CCAMLR science. 
Arguments have been made that the scientific community will have to be more political in 
its advocacy of policy if it wants to play a more effective role in Antarctic affairs? The 
problem with this is that in desiring for science to more actively drive politics, there is the 
risk of undermining the credibility of the science in CCAMLR through that political 
association. If the CCAMLR members are still divided on the basis of their political and 
economic interests, then what a scientific community can achieve in respect of the 
environment is severely limited by those interests, even when the states are aware that it is 
in their own self-interest to preserve and study the living marine resources of the Southern 
Ocean. Bargaining in CCAMLR is still framed by a consensus among the members about 
the freeze in the territorial sovereignty issue. A major issue for the future effectiveness of 
CCAMLR will be the impact of the development of accurate ecosystem models over the 
next decade and the effect that will have on political debates relying on conservation with 
rational use. 
The concept of epistemic communities is a superficially seductive one, on the surface it 
appears to explain why ideas can have the influence they do in making regimes more or 
less effective. However, operationalising the concept of epistemic communities proved to 
be difficult with CCAMLR and the identification of the three epistemic communities is 
less than satisfactory. The different communities are too easily conflated with interest 
2 Bruce Davis, "Science and Politics in Antarctic and Southern Oceans Policy: A Critical Assessment", in 
R.A. Hall, H.R. Hall, and M.G. Haward, Antarctica's Future: Continuity or Change?, Tasmanian 
Government Printer: Hobart, 1990, p.44. Become political in two ways persuade "governments and 
communities alike that scientific research in Antarctica produces both basic long term benefits and immediate 
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groups for the influence of ideas to be demonstrated over that of more traditional 
bargaining processes. To have a greater confidence in that finding would require the 
operating of CCAMLR to be so transparent that few if any diplomatic secrets could be 
preserved from public scrutiny, an unlikely development in international relations. 
Future policy suggestions 
No single conservation measure by itself is likely to solve the problems of IUU fishing, but 
each can contribute to a growing framework of measures that should increase the 
effectiveness of the CCAMLR regime. In the future it is to be hoped that the states with an 
interest in the krill fishery can be persuaded to accept VMS for krill vessels before the krill 
fishery expands significantly beyond current fishing efforts. The CDS can be improved and 
some of the resolutions adopted in 2000 may form the basis for future conservation 
measures. The CDS will also require cooperation with non-members to work. This will 
involve an expansion of diplomatic effort by the CCAMLR Secretariat and other interested 
member states. Flag state measures have some of the greatest untapped potential, but also 
face strong opposition from some members. Globally there does appear to be some 
movement towards moderating the worst excesses of the problems caused by flags of 
convenience and flag state irresponsibility. Bearing this in mind legal innovation remains a 
promising approach for the development of new conservation measures. 
Another area where the Secretariat could play a greater role is in the collection and 
distribution of information related to the IUU fishing problems. A degree of centralisation 
in the Secretariat could avoid duplication of effort among the members. With the lack of 
information caused by displacement of IUU fishing activities and evasion on the part of the 
IUU fishing operators, the Commission can not afford to be fussy about the sources of its 
intelligence. Better use could be made of information from environmental NGOs like 
ISOFISH and Greenpeace. Demanding the highest possible levels of certainty for 
information can delay decision-making to the point where the decision is made too late. 
More creative use could be made of legal fishing, research, and tourism vessels to report 
directly to the CCAMLR Secretariat. As relates to regime transparency it would be better if 
the catch reports of different EU members were not aggregated together. 
relevant knowledge of value and society ... taking a proactive and educational role in environmental 
conservation of the continent." 
315 
In dealing with the problem of uncertainty, CCAMLR will need to evaluate what methods 
provide for sustainable harvesting in accordance with the long term conservation 
objectives of the convention.3 The best time to carry out testing is before you expand the 
fisheries, because as the Scientists working with CCAMLR understand: the "CCAMLR 
experience has demonstrated that obtaining consensus to make difficult adjustments only 
after the need for them has become apparent is a major problem".4 In this respect 
"conservation objectives can only be achieved by implementing management measures 
even when very little is known."s But CCAMLR may yet prove adequate. As Sahurie 
phrased it: "At stake is more than the allocation of living resources; indeed, the whole 
credibility of the Treaty System for both the parties and the outsiders may be affected if 
CCAMLR becomes a corrosive matter.,,6 A zero catch limit on commercial fishing that 
allows research to establish stock size with some degree of confidence is well within the 
concept of a precautionary approach to preserving the ecosystem of the Southern Ocean. 
The concept of a moratorium is not really that radical, the main problem with the idea is 
that it lies in opposition to the short term profits that can be made by commercial operators 
in the Southern Ocean. 
Effectiveness can be difficult to apply meaningfully to the CCAMLR regime, as actors 
may pursue solutions to problems through other means in addition to the regime, so that a 
seemingly effective regime may in fact be a sideshow. Some of the range of possible 
unilateral actions are unlikely to be attempted due to the sovereignty problem. The 
CCAMLR members with Antarctic claims could consider enforcing EEZ off the coast of 
Antarctica, but apart from the conflict this would generate with non-claimants, the 
resulting EEZ would not cover all of the Southern Ocean. This suggests that solutions to 
problems in the ATS regime have to be multilateral, and may have to involve third-party 
states who may not be willing to accede to the Convention. There is the possibility of 
complementary action through other associated regimes, such as the IWC and other 
fisheries regimes to the north of the Convention Area. The global dimension of the marine 
fisheries problems mean that the CCAMLR regime by itself is not enough to solve the 
problems of the Southern Ocean. Problems with straddling stocks and migratory species 
3 SC-CAMLR-XVIIIIBG/26, p.29. 
4 SC-CAMLR-XVIIVBG/26, p.31. 
5 ibid. 
6 Emilio J. Sahurie, op. cit., p.537. 
316 
are being addressed with new international agreements that CCAMLR members will have 
to work with. 
Future areas for research 
The problems of IUU fishing in the Southern Ocean have not yet been effectively resolved. 
The IUU problem is also not restricted to the Southern Ocean, and efforts are under way to 
tackle the problem with a more global approach. So there is room for continued research 
on this problem in the Southern Ocean and at the global level. It will be interesting to see 
how links between global initiatives, such as those organised through the F AO, are 
integrated with regional fisheries organisations like CCAMLR, and other regional 
multilateral initiatives. With CCAMLR it will be interesting to see how any expansion in 
the krill fishery is handled, whether the conservation measures will be adequate to ensure 
conservation of the resource, or a repeat of the IUU fishing of the Patagonian toothfish. 
More thought about an ordinal scale of effectiveness for regimes would be a useful 
addition to existing theory. Care needs to be taken when attempting to apply a scale to a 
regime like the ATS regime, because of the potential for differing levels of effectiveness 
among the different sub-regimes of the ATS regime. Oran Young is correct to categorise 
theory relating to effectiveness as being in the middle of its development. There is still 
some way to go before a conceptually clear theory of effectiveness can be deployed to 
assess how effective a regime is. 
At the moment the estimates are that the Scientific Committee will develop useful 
ecosystem models for the Southern Ocean in the next five to ten years. It will be interesting 
to see what affect this development has on the politics of the CCAMLR regime and 
whether or not greater confidence in the limits of rational use strengthens the bargaining 
ability of the conservation and environmental communities at the expense of the fishing 
community. One possibility is that the dissent between the different communities may 
vanish, but its also possible that fishing interests will simply formulate new arguments to 
protect their commercial interests and this would demonstrate the weakness that ideas and 
information alone can have on regime effectiveness. 
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Sovereignty remains an area about which much is said but little can be done. Change in 
this area appears unlikely to come from within the ATS, because the central principles and 
norms underpinning the ATS regime are unlikely to be removed. The ATS regime is to 
some extent frozen in 1959 in the manner in which it treats sovereignty, which also applies 
to CCAMLR due to its links between the Convention and the Antarctic Treaty. While this 
may make the ATS regime stable, it does not always contribute to regime effectiveness. It 
will be interesting to see how the development of wider trends in sovereignty dealing with 
the use of common spaces, such as the high seas, and how they might be applied to 
Antarctica and the Southern Ocean. While the development of sovereignty has become 
more complex since 1959, or even 1982, with more attention being paid to distinctions like 
flag state, port state, and coastal state, legal innovation could be a source of solutions to 
problems as well as a cause of friction. 
Regime change has occurred in CCAMLR in response to the problems of IUU fishing and 
incidental mortality. Of the four models of regime change the models that concentrate on 
politico-military resources are of the least use in explaining change in the CCAMLR 
regime - probably because of the limited use of such power resources in a demilitarised 
Antarctica and on the high seas of the Southern Ocean. The economic process model is 
good at illustrating the initial causes that drive regime change, but the issue structure and 
international organisation models are better at explaining the exact process by which 
regime change occurs. 
Part of the attraction in the case study was the potential for a decline in the effectiveness of 
CCAMLR, possibly even a collapse of the regime if fishing interests moved to completely 
block progress towards more effective conservation measures. A decline in the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR is also interesting for the implications it has for the wider ATS 
regime. So far the indications are that while CCAMLR has reached a less than optimal 
level of effectiveness it is in no real danger of collapse. Its membership continues to grow, 
external criticism from non-member states has been muted, and some progress is being 
made towards the conservation objectives. As Joyner observed, the ATS is prone to going 
through periods of creative tension, and what may appear as an ineffective regime at one 
point in time has often within a few years regained a high level of effectiveness. Regime 
decay is an interesting area requiring further exploration, but case studies like CCAMLR 
are not as useful as those involving regimes which have failed. In this respect it might be 
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worthwhile to investigate the failure of the CRAMRA regime with respect to regime 
theory, although there is probably not as much to be learned from a non-regime case study 
as there is from a regime that was successfully created and collapsed while in operation. 
Final summation 
The 'white gold' of toothfish in the Southern Ocean has caused a significant expansion in 
uncontrolled fishing and an alarming rate of incidental mortality among many of the sea 
bird species of the Southern Ocean. Despite CCAMLR's ecosystem approach and 
precautionary principles control over the fishing effort has not been regained. This is not 
necessarily due to the approach and principles being flawed in and of themselves, but more 
due to a lack of scientific knowledge to generate the data and conclusions that would lead 
to the political impetus required to respond decisively to the threat posed by IUU fishing. 
In 2000 John Croxall observed that: "Having spent the best part of 25 years working with 
albatrosses and seeing the prospects of these wonderful birds decline, I find it ironic that 
many populations may be saved from extinction only because fish caught by long-liners 
will become commercially extinct.,,7 That the commercial extinction of toothfish may 
prevent further depletion of seabird numbers is an example of the "toothless fishing" of the 
CCAMLR regime.8 
If the ATS and CCAMLR regimes had accumulated a bank of authority and credibility for 
their management of the Southern Ocean, then the shock of the IUD fishing problems has 
left a black mark on that record. From the earliest time that CCAMLR has been struggling 
to deal with this problem comments have been made that the issue is a challenge to the 
credibility of the CCAMLR and ATS regimes. In 1997 Stuart Prior observed that 
CCAMLR worked well when no one fished in the Convention Area: "But now it 
[CCAMLR] may prove to be a Maginot line, outflanked by flags of convenience.,,9 A 
fisheries regime that is only effective when there is no significant harvesting is not an 
effective fisheries regime. The effectiveness of the ATS in turn depends in part on the 
effectiveness of its component regimes, so if CCAMLR is ineffective then the ATS is also 
ineffective. It has become obvious that the concerns of the developing world and the 
7 http://www.naturezoneuk.co.uklbirdzone/SAVINGTHEALBATROSS/ (site visited January 20,2001). 
8 lowe the phrase to Gary Steele. 
9 "Toothfish Plunder Threatens Southern Oceans", Antarctic: The Journal a/the New Zealand Antarctic 
Society, 15 (2), 1997, p.30. 
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environmental NGOs as to the ability of the ATCPs to manage Antarctica in the best 
interests of the world were not entirely misplaced. Individuals and companies from within 
the club of developed nations in CCAMLR have exploited the living marine resources of 
the Southern Ocean, making a substantial profit, and leaving an environmental disaster that 
may take decades to reverse - if some of the affected species can ever be restored to their 
former population levels. Strong external criticism of CCAMLR, outside of the 
environmental NGOs, is yet to be launched on the basis of this problem, but if the Madrid 
Protocol was not in place the external CHM advocates would have gained a substantial 
weakness in the ATS that could be exploited. Unfortunately, this is not an isolated 
incident, but one of many such cases that have happened as the limits of the marine living 
resources of the world's oceans have been reached. Hopefully the 'spirit of cooperation' 
that the ATS is known for will prove capable of overcoming the problems of the last 
ocean. 
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APPENDIX I: The Antarctic Treaty 
Done at Washington, 1 December 1959; entered into force 23 June, 1961. 
The Antarctic Treaty 
The Governments of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, the French Republic, Japan, New 
Zealand, Norway, the Union of South Africa, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, the United 
Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and the United States of America, 
Recognizing that it is in the interest of all mankind that Antarctica shall continue for ever to be 
used exclusively for peaceful purposes and shall not become the scene or object of international 
discord; 
Acknowledging the substantial contributions to scientific knowledge resulting from international 
cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica; 
Convinced that the establishment of a firm foundation for the continuation and development of 
such cooperation on the basis of freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica as applied during 
the International Geophysical Year accords with the interests of science and the progress of all 
mankind; 
Convinced also that a treaty ensuring the use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only and the 
continuance of international harmony in Antarctica will further the purposes and principles 
embodied in the Charter of the United Nations; 
Have agreed as follows: 
Article I 
1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any 
measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the 
carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon. 
2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific 
research or for any other peaceful purpose. 
Article II 
Freedom of scientific investigation in Antarctica and cooperation toward that end, as applied during 
the International Geophysical Year, shall continue, subject to the provisions of the present Treaty. 
Article III 
1. In order to promote international cooperation in scientific investigation in Antarctica, as 
provided for in Article II of the present Treaty, the Contracting Parties agree that, to the greatest 
extent feasible and practicable: 
(a) Information regarding plans for scientific programs in Antarctica shall be exchanged to permit 
maximum economy of and efficiency of operations; 
(b) Scientific personnel shall be exchanged in Antarctica between expeditions and stations; 
(c) Scientific observations and results from Antarctica shall be exchanged and made freely 
available. 
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Article IV 
1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as: 
(a) A renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica; 
(b) A renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its 
nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; 
(c) Prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition 
of any other State's rights of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica. 
2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for 
asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights 
of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial 
sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force. 
Article V 
1. Any nuclear explosions in Antarctica and the disposal there of radioactive waste material shall 
be prohibited. 
2. In the event of the conclusion of international agreements concerning the use of nuclear energy, 
including nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material, to which all of the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for 
under Article IX are parties, the rules established under such agreements shall apply in Antarctica. 
Article VI 
The provisions of the present Treaty shall apply to the area south of 60° South Latitude, including 
all ice shelves, but nothing in the present Treaty shall prejudice or in any way affect the rights, or 
the exercise of the rights, of any State under international law with regard to the high seas within 
that area. 
Article VII 
1. In order to promote the objectives and ensure the observance of the provisions of the present 
Treaty, each Contracting Party whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
referred to in Article IX of the Treaty shall have the right to designate observers to carry out any 
inspection provided for by the present Article. Observers shall be nationals of the Contracting 
Parties which designate them. The names of observers shall be communicated to every other 
Contracting Party having the right to designate observers, and like notice shall be given of the 
termination oftheir appointment. 
2. Each observer designated in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article shall 
have complete freedom of access at any time to any or all areas of Antarctica. 
3. All areas of Antarctica, including all stations, installations and equipment within those areas, 
and all ships and aircraft at points of discharging or embarking cargoes or personnel in Antarctica, 
shall be open at all times to inspection by any observers designated in accordance with paragraph 1 
of this Article. 
339 
4. Aerial observation may be carried out at any time over any or all areas of Antarctica by any of 
the Contracting Parties having the right to designate observers. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall, at the time when the present Treaty enters into force for it, inform 
the other Contracting Parties, and thereafter shall give them notice in advance, of 
(a) All expeditions to and within Antarctica, on the part of its ships or nationals, and all expeditions 
to Antarctica organized in or proceeding from its territory; 
(b) All stations in Antarctica occupied by its nationals; and 
(c) Any military personnel or equipment intended to be introduced by it into Antarctica subject to 
the conditions prescribed in paragraph 2 of Article I of the present Treaty. 
Article VIII 
1. In order to facilitate the exercise of their functions under the present Treaty, and without 
prejudice to the respective positions of the Contracting Parties relating to jurisdiction over all other 
persons in Antarctica, observers designated under paragraph 1 of Article VII and scientific 
personnel exchanged under sub-paragraph l(b) of Article III of the Treaty, and members of the 
staffs accompanying any such persons, shall be subject only to the jurisdiction of the Contracting 
Party of which they are nationals in respect of all acts or omissions occurring while they are in 
Antarctica for the purpose of exercising their functions. 
2. Without prejudice to the provisions of paragraph 1 of this Article, and pending the adoption of 
measures in pursuance of subparagraph 1 (e) of Article IX, the Contracting Parties concerned in any 
case of dispute with regard to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica shall immediately consult 
together with a view to reaching a mutually acceptable solution. 
Article IX 
1. Representatives of the Contracting Parties named in the preamble to the present Treaty shall 
meet at the City of Canberra within two months after the date of entry into force of the Treaty, and 
thereafter at suitable intervals and places, for the purpose of exchanging information, consulting 
together on matters of common interest pertaining to Antarctica, and formulating and considering, 
and recommending to their Governments, measures in furtherance of the principles and objectives 
of the Treaty, including measures regarding: 
(a) Use of Antarctica for peaceful purposes only; 
(b) Facilitation of scientific research in Antarctica; 
(c) Facilitation of international scientific cooperation in Antarctica; 
(d) Facilitation of the exercise of the rights of inspection provided for in Article VII of the Treaty; 
(e) Questions relating to the exercise of jurisdiction in Antarctica; 
(t) preservation and conservation of living resources in Antarctica. 
2. Each Contracting Party which has become a party to the present Treaty by accession under 
Article XIII shall be entitled to appoint representatives to participate in the meetings referred to in 
paragraph 1 of the present Article, during such times as that Contracting Party demonstrates its 
interest in Antarctica by conducting substantial research activity there, such as the establishment of 
a scientific station or the dispatch of a scientific expedition. 
340 
3. Reports from the observers referred to in Article VII of the present Treaty shall be transmitted to 
the representatives of the Contracting Parties participating in the meetings referred to in paragraph 
1 of the present Article. 
4. The measures referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article shall become effective when approved by 
all the Contracting Parties whose representatives were entitled to participate in the meetings held to 
consider those measures. 
5. Any or all of the rights established in the present Treaty may be exercised as from the date of 
entry into force of the Treaty whether or not any measures facilitating the exercise of such rights 
have been proposed, considered or approved as provided in this Article. 
Article X 
Each of the Contracting Parties undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter 
of the United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity in Antarctica contrary to the 
principles or purposes of the present Treaty. 
Article XI 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of the present Treaty, those Contracting Parties shall consult among 
themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent, in each case, of all parties 
to the dispute, be referred to the International Court of Justice for settlement; but failure to reach 
agreement on reference to the International Court shall not absolve parties to the dispute from the 
responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the various peaceful means referred to in 
paragraph 1 of this Article. 
Article XII 
1. (a) The present Treaty may be modified or amended at any time by unanimous agreement of the 
Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for 
under Article IX. Any such modification or amendment shall enter into force when the depositary 
Government has received notice from all such Contracting Parties that they have ratified it. 
(b) Such modification or amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting 
Party when notice of ratification by it has been received by the depositary Government. Any such 
Contracting Party from which no notice of ratification is received within a period of two years from 
the date of entry into force of the modification or amendment in accordance with the provision of 
subparagraph l(a) of this Article shall be deemed to have withdrawn from the present Treaty on 
the date of the expiration of such period. 
2. (a) If after the expiration of thirty years from the date of entry into force of the present Treaty, 
any of the Contracting Parties whose representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings 
provided for under Article IX so requests by a communication addressed to the depositary 
Government, a Conference of all the Contracting Parties shall be held as soon as practicable to 
review the operation of the Treaty. 
(b) Any modification or amendment to the present Treaty which is approved at such a Conference 
by a majority of the Contracting Parties there represented, including a majority of those whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX, shall be 
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communicated by the depositary Government to all Contracting Parties immediately after the 
termination of the Conference and shall enter into force in accordance with the provisions of 
paragraph 1 of the present Article. 
(c) If any such modification or amendment has not entered into force in accordance with the 
provisions of subparagraph l(a) of this Article within a period of two years after the date of its 
communication to all the Contracting Parties, any Contracting Party may at any time after the 
expiration of that period give notice to the depositary Government of its withdrawal from the 
present Treaty; and such withdrawal shall take effect two years after the receipt of the notice by the 
depositary Government. 
Article XIII 
1. The present Treaty shall be subject to ratification by the signatory States. It shall be open for 
accession by any State which is a Member of the United Nations, or by any other State which may 
be invited to accede to the Treaty with the consent of all the Contracting Parties whose 
representatives are entitled to participate in the meetings provided for under Article IX of the 
Treaty. 
2. Ratification of or accession to the present Treaty shall be effected by each State in accordance 
with its constitutional processes. 
3. Instruments of ratification and instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Government 
of the United States of America, hereby designated as the depositary Government. 
4. The depositary Government shall inform all signatory and acceding States of the date of each 
deposit of an instrument of ratification or accession, and the date of entry into force of the Treaty 
and of any modification or amendment thereto. 
5. Upon the deposit of instruments of ratification by all the signatory States, the present Treaty 
shall enter into force for those States and for States which have deposited instruments of accession. 
Thereafter the Treaty shall enter into force for any acceding State upon the deposit of its 
instruments of accession. 
6. The present Treaty shall be registered by the depositary Government pursuant to Article 102 of 
the Charter of the United Nations. 
Article XIV 
The present Treaty, done in the English, French, Russian and Spanish languages, each version 
being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the archives of the Government of the United States 
of America, which shall transmit duly certified copies thereof to the Governments of the signatory 
and acceding States. 
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APPENDIX II: Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine and Living Resources 
Done at Canberra, 20 May, 1980; entered into force 7 April, 1981. 
Text of statement included in the Final Act of the Conference. 
"1. Measures for the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources of the waters adjacent to 
Kerguelen and Crozet, over which France has jurisdiction adopted by France prior to the entry into 
force of the Convention, would remain in force after the entry into force of the Convention until 
modified by France acting within the framework of the Commission or otherwise. 
2. After the Convention has come into force, each time the Commission should undertake 
examination of the conservation needs of the marine living resources of the general area in which 
the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet are to be found, it would be open to France either to 
agree that the waters in question should be included in the area of application of any specific 
conservation measure under consideration or to indicate that they should be excluded. In the latter 
event, the Commission would not proceed to the adoption of the specific conservation measure in a 
form applicable to the waters in question unless France removed its objection to it. France could 
also adopt such national measures as it might deem appropriate for the waters in question. 
3. Accordingly, when specific conservation measures are considered within the framework of the 
Commission and with the participation of France, then: 
(a) France would be bound by any conservation measures adopted by consensus with its 
participation for the duration of the measures. This would not prevent France from promulgating 
national measures that were more strict than the Commission's measures or which dealt with other 
matters; (b) In the absence of consensus, France could promulgate any national measures which it 
might deem appropriate. 
4. Conservation measures, whether national measures or measures adopted by the Commission, in 
respect of the waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet, would be enforced by France. The system 
of observation and inspection foreseen by the Convention would not be implemented in the waters 
adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet except as agreed by France and in the matter so agreed. 
5. The understandings, set forth in paragraphs 1-4 above, regarding the application of the 
Convention to waters adjacent to the Islands of Kerguelen and Crozet, also apply to waters adjacent 
to the islands within the area to which this Convention applies over which the existence of State 
sovereignty is recognized by all Contracting Parties." 
Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine living Resources 
The Contracting Parties, 
RECOGNIZING the importance of safeguarding the environment and protecting the integrity of 
the ecosystem of the seas surrounding Antarctica; 
NOTING the concentration of marine living resources found in Antarctic waters and the increased 
interest in the possibilities offered by the utilization of these resources as a source of protein; 
CONSCIOUS of the urgency of ensuring the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources; 
CONSIDERING that it is essential to increase knowledge of the Antarctic marine ecosystem and 
its components so as to be able to base decisions on harvesting on sound scientific information; 
BELIEVING that the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources calls for international co-
operation with due regard for the provisions of the Antarctic Treaty and with the active 
involvement of all States engaged in research or harvesting activities in Antarctic waters; 
RECOGNIZING the prime responsibilities of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the 
protection and preservation of the Antarctic environment and, in particular, their responsibilities 
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under Article IX, paragraph 1(t) of the Antarctic Treaty in respect of the preservation and 
conservation of living resources in Antarctica; 
RECALLING the action already taken by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties including in 
particular the Agreed Measures for the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora, as well as the 
provisions of the Convention for the Conservation of Antarctic Seals; 
BEARING in mind the concern regarding the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources 
expressed by the Consultative Parties at the Ninth Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty and 
the importance of the provisions of Recommendation IX-2 which led to the establishment of the 
present Convention; 
BELIEVING that it is in the interest of all mankind to preserve the waters surrounding the 
Antarctic continent for peaceful purposes only and to prevent their becoming the scene or object of 
international discord; 
RECOGNIZING in the light of the foregoing, that it is desirable to establish suitable machinery for 
recommending, promoting, deciding upon and coordinating the measures and scientific studies 
needed to ensure the conservation of Antarctic marine living organisms; 
HAVE AGREED as follows: 
Article I 
1. This Convention applies to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area south of 60° South 
latitude and to the Antarctic marine living resources of the area between that latitude and the 
Antarctic Convergence which form part of the Antarctic marine ecosystem. 
2. Antarctic marine living resources means the populations of fin fish, molluscs, crustaceans and all 
other species of living organisms, including birds, found south of the Antarctic Convergence. 
3. The Antarctic marine ecosystem means the complex of relationships of Antarctic marine living 
resources with each other and with their physical environment. 
4. The Antarctic Convergence shall be deemed to be a line joining the following points along 
parallels of latitude and meridians of longitude: 
SODS 0°; SODS, 300 E; 4SoS, 300 E; 45°S, 800 E; 5SoS, 800 E; S5°S, lS00 E; 600 S, 1500 E; 600 S, SooW; 
SODS, SooW; SooS, 0°. 
Article II 
1. The objective of this Convention is the conservation of Antarctic marine living resources. 
2. For the purpose of this Convention, the term 'conservation' includes rational use. 
3. Any harvesting and associated activities in the area to which this Convention applies shall be 
conducted in accordance with the provisions of this Convention and with the following principles 
of conservation: 
(a) Prevention of decrease in the size of any harvested population to levels below those which 
ensure its stable recruitment. For this purpose its size should not be allowed to fall below a level 
close to that which ensures the greatest net annual increment; 
(b) maintenance of the ecological relationships between harvested, dependent and related 
populations of Antarctic marine living resources and the restoration of depleted populations to the 
levels defined in sub-paragraph (a) above; and 
(c) prevention of changes or minimization of the risk of changes in the marine ecosystem which are 
not potentially reversible over two or three decades, taking into account the state of available 
knowledge of the direct and indirect impact of harvesting, the effect of the introduction of alien 
species, the effects of associated activities on the marine ecosystem and of the effects of 
environmental changes, with the aim of making possible the sustained conservation of Antarctic 
marine living resources. 
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Article III 
The Contracting Parties, whether or not they are Parties to the Antarctic Treaty, agree that they will 
not engage in any activities in the Antarctic Treaty area contrary to the principles and purposes of 
that Treaty and that, in their relations with each other, they are bound by the obligations contained 
in Articles I and V of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Article IV 
1. With respect to the Antarctic Treaty area, all Contracting Parties, whether or not they are Parties 
to the Antarctic Treaty, are bound by Articles IV and VI of the Antarctic Treaty in their relations 
with each other. 
2. Nothing in this Convention and no acts or activities taking place while the present Convention is 
in force shall: 
(a) constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in the 
Antarctic Treaty area or create any rights of sovereignty in the Antarctic Treaty area; 
(b) be interpreted as a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of, or as prejudicing, 
any right or claim or basis of claim to exercise coastal state jurisdiction under international law 
within the area to which this Convention applies; 
( c) be interpreted as prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or 
non-recognition of any such right, claim or basis of claim; 
(d) affect the provision of Article IV, paragraph 2, of the Antarctic Treaty that no new claim, or 
enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the 
Antarctic Treaty is in force. 
Article V 
1. The Contracting Parties which are not Parties to the Antarctic Treaty acknowledge the special 
obligations and responsibilities of the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties for the protection and 
preservation of the environment of the Antarctic Treaty area. 
2. The Contracting Parties which are not Parties to the Antarctic Treaty agree that, in their activities 
in the Antarctic Treaty area, they will observe as and when appropriate the Agreed Measures for 
the Conservation of Antarctic Fauna and Flora and such other measures as have been recommended 
by the Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties in fulfilment of their responsibility for the protection 
of the Antarctic environment from all forms of harmful human interference. 
3. For the purposes of this Convention, 'Antarctic Treaty Consultative Parties' means the 
Contracting Parties to the Antarctic Treaty whose Representatives participate in meetings under 
Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Article VI 
Nothing in this Convention shall derogate from the rights and obligations of Contracting Parties 
under the International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling and the Convention for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Seals. 
Article VII 
1. The Contracting Parties hereby establish and agree to maintain the Commission for the 
Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources (hereinafter referred to as 'the Commission'). 
2. Membership in the Commission shall be as follows: 
(a) each Contracting Party which participated in the meeting at which this Convention was adopted 
shall be a Member of the Commission; 
(b) each State Party which has acceded to this Convention pursuant to Article XXIX shall be 
entitled to be a Member of the Commission during such time as that acceding party is engaged in 
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research or harvesting activities in relation to the marine living resources to which this Convention 
applies; 
(c) each regional economic integration organization which has acceded to this Convention pursuant 
to Article XXIX shall be entitled to be a Member of the Commission during such time as its States 
members are so entitled; 
(d) Contracting Party seeking to participate in the work of the Commission pursuant to sub-
paragraphs (b) and (c) above shall notify the Depositary of the basis upon which it seeks to become 
a Member of the Commission and of its willingness to accept conservation measures in force. The 
Depositary shall communicate to each member of the Commission such notification and 
accompanying information. Within two months of receipt of such communication from the 
Depositary, any Member of the Commission may request that a special meeting of the Commission 
be held to consider the matter. Upon receipt of such 
request, the Depositary shall call such a meeting. If there is not request for a meeting, the 
Contracting Party submitting the notification shall be deemed to have satisfied the requirements for 
Commission Membership. 
3. Each Member of the Commission shall be represented by one representative who may be 
accompanied by alternate representatives and advisers. 
Article VIII 
The Commission shall have legal personality and shall enjoy in the territory of each of the States 
Parties such legal capacity as may be necessary to perform its function and achieve the purposes of 
this Convention. The privileges and immunities to be enjoyed by the Commission and its staff in 
the territory of a State Party shall be determined by agreement between the Commission and the 
State Party concerned. 
Article IX 
1. The function of the Commission shall be to give effect to the objective and principles set out in 
Article II of this Convention. To this end, it shall: 
(a) facilitate research into and comprehensive studies of Antarctic marine living resources and of 
the Antarctic marine ecosystem; 
(b) compile data on the status of and changes in population of Antarctic marine living resources 
and on factors affecting the distribution, abundance and productivity of harvested species and 
dependent or related species or populations; 
(c) ensure the acquisition of catch and effort statistics on harvested populations; 
(d) analyse, disseminate and publish the information referred to in sub-paragraphs (b) and (c) above 
and the reports of the Scientific Committee; 
(e) identify conservation needs and analyse the effectiveness of conservation measures; 
(f) formulate, adopt and revise conservation measures on the basis of the best scientific evidence 
available, subject to the provisions of paragraph 5 of this Article; 
(g) implement the system of observation and inspection established under Article XXIV of this 
Convention; 
(h) carry out such other activities as are necessary to fulfil the objective of this Convention. 
2. The conservation measures referred to in paragraph l(f) above include the following: 
(a) the designation of the quantity of any species which may be harvested in the area to which this 
Convention applies; 
(b) the designation of regions and sub-regions based on the distribution of populations of Antarctic 
marine living resources; 
(c) the designation of the quantity which may be harvested from the populations of regions and 
sub-regions; 
(d) the designation of protected species; 
(e) the designation of the size, age and, as appropriate, sex of species which may be harvested; 
(f) the designation of open and closed season for harvesting; 
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(g) the designation of the opening and closing of areas, regions or sub-regions for purposes of 
scientific study or conservation, including special areas for protection and scientific study; 
(h) regulation of the effort employed and methods of harvesting, including fishing gear, with a 
view, inter alia, to avoiding undue concentration of harvesting in any region or sub-region; 
(i) the taking of such other conservation measures as the Commission considers necessary for the 
fulfilment of the objective of this Convention, including measures concerning the effects of 
harvesting and associated activities on components of the marine ecosystem other than the 
harvested populations. 
3. The Commission shall publish and maintain a record of all conservation measures in force. 
4. In exercising its functions under paragraph 1 above, the Commission shall take full account of 
the recommendations and advice of the Scientific Committee. 
S. The Commission shall take full account of the any relevant measures or regulations established 
or recommended by the Consultative Meetings pursuant to Article IX of the Antarctic Treaty or by 
existing fisheries commissions responsible for species which may enter the area to which this 
Convention applies, in order that there shall be no inconsistency between the rights and obligations 
of a Contracting Party under such regulations or measures and conservation measures which may 
be adopted by the Commission. 
6. Conservation measures adopted by the Commission in accordance with this Convention shall be 
implemented by Members of the Commission in the following manner; 
(a) the Commission shall notify conservation measures to all Members of the Commission; 
(b) conservation measures shall become binding upon all Members of the Commission 180 days 
after such notification, except as provided in sub-paragraphs (c) and (d) below; 
(c) if a Member of the Commission, within ninety days following the notification specified in 
measure, in whole or in part, the measure shall not, to the extent stated, be binding upon that 
member of the Commission; 
(d) in the event that any Member of the Commission invokes the procedure set forth in sub-
paragraph (c) above, the Commission shall meet at the request of any Member of the Commission 
to review the conservation measure. At the time of such meeting and within thirty days following 
the meeting, any Member ofthe Commission shall have the right to declare that it is no longer able 
to accept the conservation measure, in which case the Member shall no longer be bound by such 
measure. 
Article X 
1. The Commission shall draw the attention of any State which is not a Party to this Convention to 
any activity undertaken by its nationals or vessels which, in the opinion of the Commission, affects 
the implementation ofthe objective of this Convention. 
2. The Commission shall draw the attention of all Contracting Parties to any activity which, in the 
opinion of the Commission, affects the implementation by a Contracting Party of the objective of 
this Convention or the compliance by that Contracting Party with its obligations under this 
Convention. 
Article XI 
The Commission shall seek to co-operate with Contracting Parties which may exercise jurisdiction 
in marine areas adjacent to the area to which this Convention applies in respect of the conservation 
of any stock or stocks of associated species which occur both within those areas and the area to 
which this Convention applies, with a view to harmonising the conservation measures adopted in 
respect of such stocks. 
Article XII 
1. Decisions of the Commission on matters of substance shall be taken by consensus. The question 
of whether a matter is one of substance shall be treated as a matter of substance. 
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2. Decisions on matters other than those referred to in paragraph 1 above shall be taken by a simple 
majority of the Members of the Commission present and voting. 
3. In Commission consideration of any item requiring a decision, it shall be made clear whether a 
regional economic integration organization will participate in the taking of the decision and, if so, 
whether any of its member States will also participate. The number of Contracting Parties so 
participating shall not exceed the number of member States of the regional economic integration 
organization which are Members of the Commission. 
4. In the taking of decisions pursuant to this Article, a regional economic integration organization 
shall have only one vote. 
Article XIII 
1. The Headquarters of the Commission shall be established at Hobart, Tasmania, Australia. 
2. The Commission shall hold a regular annual meeting. Other meetings shall also be held at the 
request of one-third of its members and as otherwise provided in this Convention. The first meeting 
of the Commission shall be held within three months of the entry into force of this Convention, 
provided that among the Contracting Parties there are at least two States conducting harvesting 
activities within the area to which this Convention applies. The first meeting shall, in any event, be 
held within one year of the entry into force of this Convention. The Depositary shall consult with 
the signatory States regarding the first Commission meeting, taking into account that a broad 
representation of such States is necessary for the effective operation of the Commission. 
3. The Depositary shall convene the first meeting of the Commission at the headquarters of the 
Commission. Thereafter, meetings of the Commission shall be held at its headquarters, unless it 
decides otherwise. 
4. The Commission shall elect from among its members a Chairman and Vice-Chairman, each of 
whom shall serve for a term of two years and shall be eligible for re-election for one additional 
term. The first Chairman shall, however, be elected for an initial term of three years. The Chairman 
and Vice-Chairman shall not be representatives of the same Contracting Party. 
5. The Commission shall adopt and amend as necessary the rules of procedure for the conduct of its 
meetings, except with respect to the matters dealt with in Article XII of this Convention. 
6. The Commission may establish such subsidiary bodies as are necessary for the performance of 
its functions. 
Article XIV 
1. The Contracting Parties hereby establish the Scientific Committee for the Conservation of 
Antarctic Marine Living Resources (hereinafter referred to as 'the Scientific Committee') which 
shall be a consultative body to the Commission. The Scientific Committee shall normally meet at 
the headquarters of the Commission unless the Scientific Committee decides otherwise. 
2. Each Member of the Commission shall be a member of the Scientific Committee and shall 
appoint a representative with suitable scientific qualifications who may be accompanied by other 
experts and advisers. 
3. The Scientific Committee may seek the advice of other scientists and experts as may be required 
on an ad hoc basis. 
Article XV 
1. The Scientific Committee shall provide a forum for consultation and co-operation concerning the 
collection, study and exchange of information with respect to the marine living resources to which 
this Convention applies. It shall encourage and promote co-operation in the field of scientific 
research in order to extend knowledge of the marine living resources of the Antarctic marine 
ecosystem. 
2. The Scientific Committee shall conduct such activities as the Commission may direct in 
pursuance of the objective of this Convention and shall: 
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(a) establish criteria and methods to be used for determinations concerning the conservation 
measures referred to in Article IX of this Convention; 
(b) regularly assess the status and trends of the populations of Antarctic marine living resources; 
(c) analyse data concerning the direct and indirect effects of harvesting on the populations of 
Antarctic marine living resources; 
(d) assess the effects of proposed changes in the methods or levels of harvesting and proposed 
conservation measures; 
(e) transmit assessments, analyses, reports and recommendations to the Commission as requested 
or on its own initiative regarding measures and research to implement the objective of this 
Convention; 
(f) formulate proposals for the conduct of international and national programs of research into 
Antarctic marine living resources. 
3. In carrying out its functions, the Scientific Committee shall have regard to the work of other 
relevant technical and scientific organizations and to the scientific activities conducted within the 
framework of the Antarctic Treaty. 
Article XVI 
1. The first meeting of the Scientific Committee shall be held within three months of the first 
meeting of the Commission. The Scientific Committee shall meet thereafter as often as may be 
necessary to fulfil its functions. 
2. The Scientific Committee shall adopt and amend as necessary its rules of procedure. The rules 
and any amendments thereto shall be approved by the Commission. The rules shall include 
procedures for the presentation of minority reports. 
3. The Scientific Committee may establish, with the approval of the Commission, such subsidiary 
bodies as are necessary for the performance of its functions. 
Article XVII 
1. The Commission shall appoint an Executive Secretary to serve the Commission and Scientific 
Committee according to such procedures and on such terms and conditions as the Commission may 
determine. His term of office shall be for four years and he shall be eligible for re-appointment. 
2. The Commission shall authorize such staff establishment for the Secretariat as may be necessary 
and the Executive Secretary shall appoint, direct and supervise such staff according to such rules 
and procedures and on such terms and conditions as the Commission may determine. 
3, The Executive Secretary and Secretariat shall perform the functions entrusted to them by the 
Commission. 
Article XVIII 
The official languages of the Commission and of the Scientific Committee shall be English, 
French, Russian and Spanish. 
Article XIX 
1. At each annual meeting, the Commission shall adopt by consensus its budget and the budget of 
the Scientific Committee. 
2. A draft budget for the Commission and the Scientific Committee and any subsidiary bodies shall 
be prepared by the Executive Secretary and submitted to the Members of the Commission at least 
sixty days before the annual meeting of the Commission. 
3. Each Member of the Commission shall contribute to the budget. Until the expiration of five 
years after the entry into force of this Convention, the contribution of each Member of the 
Commission shall be equal. Thereafter the contribution shall be determined in accordance with two 
criteria: the amount harvested and an equal sharing among all Members of the Commission. The 
Commission shall determine by consensus the proportion in which these two criteria shall apply. 
349 
4. The financial activities of the Commission and Scientific Committee shall be conducted in 
accordance with financial regulations adopted by the Commission and shall be subject to an annual 
audit by external auditors selected by the Commission. 
S. Each Member of the Commission shall meet its own expenses arising from attendance at 
meetings of the Commission and of the Scientific Committee. 
6. A Member of the Commission that fails to pay its contributions for two consecutive years shall 
not, during the period of its default, have the right to participate in the taking of decisions in the 
Commission. 
Article :xx 
1. The Members of the Commission shall, to the greatest extent possible, provide annually to the 
Commission and to the Scientific Committee such statistical, biological and other data and 
infotmation as the Commission and Scientific Committee may require in the exercise of their 
functions. 
2. The Members of the Commission shall provide, in the manner and at such intervals as may be 
. prescribed, information about their harvesting activities, including fishing areas and vessels, so as 
to enable reliable catch and effort statistics to be compiled. 
3. The Members of the Commission shall provide to the Commission at such intervals as may be 
prescribed information on steps taken to implement the conservation measures adopted by the 
Commission. 
4. The Members of the Commission agree that in any of their harvesting activities, advantage shall 
be taken of opportunities to collect data needed to assess the impact of harvesting. 
Article XXI 
1. Each Contracting Party shall take appropriate measures within its competence to ensure 
compliance with the provisions of this Convention and with conservation measures adopted by the 
Commission to which the Party is bound in accordance with Article IX of this Convention. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall transmit to the Commission information on measures taken 
pursuant to paragraph 1 above, including the imposition of sanctions for any violation. 
Article XXII 
1. Each Contracting Party undertakes to exert appropriate efforts, consistent with the Charter of the 
United Nations, to the end that no one engages in any activity contrary to the objective of this 
Convention. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall notify the Commission of any such activity which comes to its 
attention. 
Article XXIII 
1. The Commission and the Scientific Committee shall co-operate with the Antarctic Treaty 
Consultative Parties on matters falling within the competence of the latter. 
2. The Commission and the Scientific Committee shall co-operate, as appropriate, with the Food 
and Agriculture Organisation ofthe United Nations and with other Specialised Agencies. 
3. The Commission and the Scientific Committee shall seek to develop co-operative working 
relationships, as appropriate, with inter-governmental and non-governmental organizations which 
could contribute to their work, including the Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research, the 
Scientific Committee on Oceanic Research and the International Whaling Commission. 
4. The Commission may enter into agreements with the organizations referred to in this Article and 
with other organizations as may be appropriate. The Commission and the Scientific Committee 
may invite such organizations to send observers to their meetings and to meetings of their 
subsidiary bodies. 
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Article XXIV 
1. In order to promote the objective and ensure observance of the provisions of this Convention, the 
Contracting Parties agree that a system of observation and inspection shall be established. 
2. The system of observation and inspection shall be elaborated by the Commission on the basis of 
the following principles: 
(a) Contracting Parties shall co-operate with each other to ensure the effective implementation of 
the system of observation and inspection, taking account of the existing international practice. This 
system shall include, inter alia, procedures for boarding and inspection by observers and inspectors 
designated by the Members of the Commission and procedures for flag state prosecution and 
sanctions on the basis of evidence resulting from such boarding and inspections. A report of such 
prosecutions and sanctions imposed shall be included in the information referred to in Article XXI 
of this Convention; 
(b) in order to verify compliance with measures adopted under this Convention, observation and 
inspection shall be carried out on board vessels engaged in scientific research or harvesting of 
marine living resources in the area to which this Convention applies, through observers and 
inspectors designated by the Members of the Commission and operating under terms and 
conditions to be established by the Commission. 
(c) designated observers and inspectors shall remain subject to the jurisdiction of the Contracting 
Party of which they are nationals. They shall report to the Member of the Commission by which 
they have been designated which in turn shall report to the Commission. 
3. Pending the establishment of the system of observation and inspection, the Members of the 
Commission shall seek to establish interim arrangements to designate observers and inspectors and 
such designated observers and inspectors shall be entitled to carry out inspections in accordance 
with the principles set out in paragraph 2 above. 
Article XXV 
1. If any dispute arises between two or more of the Contracting Parties concerning the 
interpretation or application of this Convention, those Contracting Parties shall consult among 
themselves with a view to having the dispute resolved by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, 
conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement or other peaceful means of their own choice. 
2. Any dispute of this character not so resolved shall, with the consent in each case of all Parties to 
the dispute, be referred for settlement to the International Court of Justice or to arbitration; but 
failure to reach agreement on reference to the International Court or to arbitration shall not absolve 
Parties to the dispute from the responsibility of continuing to seek to resolve it by any of the 
various peaceful means referred to in paragraph 1 above. 
3. In cases where the dispute is referred to arbitration, the arbitral tribunal shall be constituted as 
provided in the Annex to this Convention. 
Article XXVI 
1. This Convention shall be open for signature at Canberra from 1 August to 31 December 1980 by 
the States participating in the Conference on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living 
Resources held at Canberra from 7 to 20 May 1980. 
2. The States which so sign will be the original signatory States of the Convention. 
Article XXVII 
1. This Convention is subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by signatory States. 
2. Instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval shall be deposited with the Government of 
Australia, hereby designated as the Depositary. 
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Article XXVIII 
1. This Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following the date of deposit of the 
eighth instrument of ratification, acceptance or approval by States referred to in paragraph 1 of 
Article XXVI of this Convention. 
2. With respect to each State or regional economic integration organization which subsequent to the 
date of entry into force of this Convention deposits an instrument of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession, the Convention shall enter into force on the thirtieth day following such 
deposit. 
Article XXIX 
1. This Convention shall be open for accession by any State interested in research or harvesting 
activities in relation to the marine living resources to which this Convention applies. 
2. This Convention shall be open for accession by regional economic integration organizations 
constituted by sovereign States which include among their members one or more States Members 
of the Commission and to which the States members of the organization have transferred, in whole 
or in part, competences with regard to the matters covered by this Convention. The accession of 
such regional economic integration organizations shall be the subject of consultations among 
Members of the Commission. 
Article XXX 
1. This Convention may be amended at any time. 
2. If one-third of the Members of the Commission request a meeting to discuss a proposed 
amendment the Depositary shall call such a meeting. 
3. An amendment shall enter into force when the Depositary has received instruments of 
ratification, acceptance or approval thereof from all the Members of the Commission. 
4. Such amendment shall thereafter enter into force as to any other Contracting Party when notice 
of ratification, acceptance or approval has been received by the Depositary. Any such Contracting 
Party from which no such notice has been received within a period of one year from the date of 
entry into force of the amendment in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall be deemed to have 
withdrawn from this Convention. 
Article XXXI 
1. Any Contracting Party may withdraw from this Convention on 30 June of any year, by giving 
written notice not later than 1 January of the same year to the Depositary, which, upon receipt of 
such a notice, shall communicate it forthwith to the other Contracting Parties. 
2. Any other Contracting Party may, within sixty days of the receipt of a copy of such a notice from 
the Depositary, give written notice of withdrawal to the Depositary in which case the Convention 
shall cease to be in force on 30 June of the same year with respect to the Contracting Party giving 
such notice. 
3. Withdrawal from this Convention by any Member of the Commission shall not affect its 
financial obligations under this Convention. 
Article XXXII 
The Depositary shall notify all Contracting Parties of the following: 
(a) signatures of this Convention and the deposit of instruments of ratification, acceptance, 
approval or accession; 
(b) the date of entry into force of this Convention and of any amendment thereto. 
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Article XXXIII: 
1. This Convention, of which the English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, 
shall be deposited with the Government of Australia which shall transmit duly certified copies 
thereof to all signatory and acceding Parties. 
2. This Convention shall be registered by the Depositary pursuant to Article 102 of the Charter of 
the United Nations. 
Drawn up at Canberra this twentieth day of May 1980. 
IN WITNESS THEREOF the undersigned, being duly authorized, have signed this Convention. 
Annex for an Arbitral Tribunal 
The arbitral tribunal referred to in paragraph 3 of Article XXV shall be composed of three 
arbitrators who shall be appointed as follows: 
The Party commencing proceedings shall communicate the name of an arbitrator to the other Party 
which, in turn, within a period of forty days following such notification, shall communicate the 
name of the second arbitrator. The Parties shall, within a period of sixty days following the 
appointment of the second arbitrator, appoint the third arbitrator, who shall not be a national of 
either Party and shall not be of the same nationality as either of the first two arbitrators. The third 
arbitrator shall preside over the tribunal. 
If the second arbitrator has not been appointed within the prescribed period, or if the Parties have 
not reached agreement within the prescribed period on the appointment of the third arbitrator, that 
arbitrator shall be appointed, as the request of either Party, by the Secretary-General of the 
Permanent Court of Arbitration, from among persons of international standing not having the 
nationality of a State which is a Party to this Convention. 
The arbitral tribunal shall decide where its headquarters will be located and shall adopt its own 
rules of procedure. 
The award ofthe arbitral tribunal shall be made by a majority of its members, who may not abstain 
from voting. 
Any Contracting Party which is not a Party to the dispute may intervene in the proceedings with the 
consent of the arbitral tribunal. 
The award of the arbitral tribunal shall be final and binding on all Parties to the dispute and on any 
Party which intervenes in the proceedings and shall be complied with without delay. The arbitral 
tribunal shall interpret the award at the request of one of the Parties to the dispute or of any 
intervening Party. 
Unless the arbitral tribunal determines otherwise because of the particular circumstances of the 
case, the expenses of the tribunal, including the remuneration of its members, shall be borne by the 
Parties to the dispute in equal shares. 
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Appendix III: Table of Conservation Measures in Force 2000/2001 
Code Conservation Measure Title 
CM2/III Mesh Size 
CM3IIV Prohibition of Directed Fishery on Notothenia rossii around South Georgia 
(Statistical Subarea 48.3) 
CM4N Regulation on Mesh Size Measurement 
CM5N Prohibition of Directed Fishery on Notothenia rossii In the Peninsula Area 
(Statistical Subarea 48.1) 
CM6N Prohibition of Directed Fishery on Notothenia rossii around South Orkneys 
(Statistical Subarea 48.2) 
CM7N Regulation of Fishing around South Georgia (Statistical Subarea 48.3) 
CM 19/IX Mesh Size for Champsocephalus gunnari 
CM29IXIX Minitnisafipt10fthe Tncidenta1 Mortality of· Seabirdsmthe.Courseq:fLonglirie 
....... 
· Fishing or LOnglin.e FjshiIlgResellfcn inJQeConV¢ntjonA.r~a . 
CM311X Notification that Members are Considering Initiating a New Fishery 
CM32/XIX Precautionary Catch Limitations on Euphausia superba in Statistical Area 48 
CM401X Monthly Catch and Effort Reporting System 
CM45IXIV Precautionary Catch Limitation on Euphausia superba in Statistical Division 
58.4.2 
CM 51IXIX Five-day Catch and Effort Reporting System 
CM 61IXII Ten-day Catch and Effort Reporting System 
CM63IXV Regulation of the Use and Disposal of Plastic Packaging Bands on Fishing 
Vessels 
CM641XIX The Application of Conservation Measures to Scientific Research 
CM 65lXII Exploratory Fisheries 
CM 72/XVII Prohibition of Directed Fishing for Finfish in Statistical Subarea 48.1 
CM 73IXVII Prohibition of Directed Fishing for Finfish in Statistical Subarea 48.2 
CM95IXIV Limitation of the By-Catch of Gobionotothen gibberifrons, Chaenocephalus 
aceratus, Pseudochaenichthys georgian us, Notothenia rossii and 
Lepidonotothen squamtfrons in Statistical Subarea 48.3. 
CM 106/XIX Precautionary Catch Limitation on Euphausia superba in Statistical Division 
58.4.1 
CMt1.8IXVn · Scheme .toPl'()thote ··CompHa.nce .. hyNon-C()ntt~cting .• Party. ·Vessels with 
... GCA,MLR Col1servatiQl1Meas1Jr~s . 
CM119/XVII LiceIlsillgandJnspecfjonGbHgations Qf Contracting Parties with regard toth~ir 
.. Flag¥¢ssel$ Opetatiuginllie CQnyenti()nA.n~a 
CM 121/XIX Monthly Fine-Scale Biological Data Reporting System for Trawl, Longline and 
Pot Fisheries 
CM 122/XIX Monthly Fine-Scale Catch and Effort Data Reporting System for Trawl, 
Longline and Pot Fisheries 
CM 129IXVI Prohibition of Directed Fishing for Lepidonotothen squamifrons In Sataistical 
Division 58.4.4 (Ob and Lena Banks) 
eM 146/XVII 1v1arkirigof Fishing·'Ve.S$tHSand Fishing (Jear ••..... 
ClVt147/XIX Provisions to· . ensure •• Goiril?n~ncewith· ·CCAMLRConsetvationMeasures . by 
Vessels,. illdudtUgCQOpefationOetween··Contracting.Parties 
CM 148/X\lII ........ · AutomatedSateIHte-Linked Yt;lsselmonitoring Systems (VMS) .. 
CM 160/XVII Prohibition of Directed Fishing for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical 
Subarea 58.7 
CM17Q/XPC .. ·C~tch·pOC1J.lllel1.ta#()fi S¢h:e1l1ef<)rI)issostichtls .. sPP· ... .... 
CM 171IXVIII Prohibition of Directed Fishery 011 Gobionotothen gibberifrons, 
Chaenocephalus aceratus, Pseudochaenichthys georgian us, Notothenia rossii 
and Lepidonotothen squamifrons in Statistical Subarea 48.3. 
354 
CM 173IXVIII Minimisation of the Incidental Mortality of Seabirds and Marine Mammals in 
the Course of Trawl Fishing in the Convention Area. 
CM 180/XVIII Catch Limit on Dissostichus eleginoides and Dissostichus mawsoni in Statistical 
Subarea 48.4 
CM 192IXIX Directed Fishing for Dissostichus spp. in the 2000/01 Season 
CM 193/XIX Prohibition on Directed Fishing for Dissostichus spp. except in accordance with 
Specific Conservation Measures in the 2000/01 Season 
CM 194IXIX Limitation of the Total Catch of Champ so cephal us gunnari in Statistical Subarea 
48.3 in the 2000/01 Season 
CM 195IXIX Fishery for Champsocephalus gunnari in Statistical Division 58.5.2 in the 
2000/01 Season 
CM 19600X Limits on the Fishery for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical Subarea 48.3 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM 19700X Fishery for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical Division 58.5.2 in the 2000/01 
Season 
CM 198/XIX Limitation ofthe By-catch in Statistical Division 58.5.2 in the 2000101 Season 
CM 199/XIX Precautionary Catch Limit for Electrona carlsbergi in Statistical Subarea 48.3 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM200IXIX General Measures for Exploratory Fisheries for Dissostichus spp. in the 
Convention Area in the 2000/01 Season 
CM201lXIX Limitation of By-catch in the Exploratory Fisheries in Statistical Divisions 
58.4.1, 58.4.2 and 58.4.3 in the 2000/01 Season 
CM202IXIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus spp. in Statistical Subarea 48.6 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM203/XIX Exploratory Trawl Fishery for Dissostichus spp.on BANZARE Bank in the 
2000/01 Season 
CM204/XIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus spp. on BANZARE Bank outside 
Areas under National Jurisdictions in the 2000/01 Season 
CM205/XIX Exploratory Trawl Fishery for Dissostichus spp. on Elan Bank (Statistical 
Division 58.4.3) in the 2000/01 Season 
CM206/XIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus spp. on Elan Bank (Statistical 
Division 58.4.3) outside Areas 
under National Jurisdictions in the 2000/2001 Season 
CM207/XIX Exploratory Trawl Fishery for Dissostichus spp. in Statistical Division 58.4.2 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM208IXIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical Division 
58.4.4 in the 2000/01 Season 
CM209/XIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus eleginoides in Statistical Subarea 
58.6 in the 2000/01 Season 
CM210/XIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus spp. in Statistical Subarea 88.1 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM211IXIX Exploratory Longline Fishery for Dissostichus spp. in Statistical Subarea 88.2 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM21200X Exploratory Trawl Fishery for Chaenodraco wilsoni, Lepidonotothen kempi, 
Trematomus eulepidotus and Pleuragramma antarcticum in Statistical Division 
58.4.2 in the 2000/01 Season 
CM213IXIX Exploratory Fishery for Martialia hyadesi in Statistical Subarea 48.3 in the 
2000/01 Season 
CM214/XIX Experimental Harvest Regime for the Crab Fishery in Statistical Subarea 48.3 in 
the 2000/01 Season 
CM215IXIX Limits on the Crab Fishery in Statistical Subarea 48.3 in the 2000/01 Season 
Resolution Flagging and Licensing of Non-Contracting Party Vessels 
13/XIX 
Resolution -
141XIX 
R~so!l!tiQn. 
1$1XIX< 
J.{esolution· 
r~jX·IX 
CM 18IXIX 
CM62IXIX 
CM 82IXIX 
Procedure for According Protection to CEMP Sites 
Protection of the Seal Islands CEMP Site 
Protection of the Ca e ShirreffCEMP Site 
Highlighted measures and resolutions have been reproduced in full (below). 
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Appendix IV: Selected Conservation Measures 
CONSERVATION MEASURE 29/XIX 1,2 
Minimisation of the Incidental Mortality of Seabirds in the Course of Long line Fishing or Longline 
Fishing Research in the Convention Area 
The Commission, 
Noting the need to reduce the incidental mortality of seabirds during longline fishing by 
minimising their attraction to fishing vessels and by preventing them from attempting to seize 
baited hooks, particularly during the period when the lines are set, Adopts the following measures 
to reduce the possibility of incidental mortality of seabirds during longline fishing. 
1. Fishing operations shall be conducted in such a way that the baited hooks sink as soon as 
possible after they are put in the water. Only thawed bait shall be used. 
2. For vessels using the Spanish method of longline fishing, weights should be released before line 
tension occurs; weights of at least 8.5 kg mass shall be used, spaced at intervals of no more than 40 
m, or 6 kg mass shall be used, spaced at intervals of no more than 20 m. 
3. Longlines shall be set at night only (i.e. during the hours of darkness between the times of 
nautical twilight 3) 4 . During longline fishing at night, only the minimum ship's lights necessary 
for safety shall be used. 
4. The dumping of offal is prohibited while longlines are being set. The dumping of offal during 
the haul shall be avoided. Any such discharge shall take place only on the 
opposite side of the vessel to that where longlines are hauled. 
5. Vessels which are so configured that they lack on-board processing facilities or adequate 
capacity to retain offal on board, or the ability to discharge offal on the opposite side of the vessel 
to that where longlines are hauled, shall not be authorised to fish in the Convention Area. 
6. A streamer line designed to discourage birds from settling on baits during deployment of 
longlines shall be towed. Specification of the streamer line and its method of deployment is given 
in the appendix to this measure. Details of the construction relating to the number and placement of 
swivels may be varied so long as the effective sea surface covered by the streamers is no less than 
that covered by the currently specified design. Details of the device dragged in the water in order to 
create tension in the line may also be varied. 
7. Other variations in the design of streamer lines may be tested on vessels carrying two observers, 
at least one appointed in accordance with the CCAMLR Scheme of 
International Scientific Observation, providing that all other elements of this conservation measure 
are complied with 5 • 
8. Every effort should be made to ensure that birds captured alive during longlining are released 
alive and that wherever possible hooks are removed without jeopardising the life of the bird 
concerned. 
1 Except for waters adjacent to the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
2 Except for waters adjacent to the Prince Edward Islands 
3 The exact times of nautical twilight are set forth in the Nautical Almanac tables for the relevant 
latitude, local time and date. All times, whether for ship operations or observer reporting, shall be 
referenced to GMT. 
4 Wherever possible, setting of lines should be completed at least three hours before sunrise (to reduce 
loss of bait to/catches of white-chinned petrels). 
5 The streamer lines under test should be constructed and operated taking full account of the principles 
set out in WG-IMALF-94/19 (available from the CCAMLR Secretariat); testing should be carried out 
independently of actual commercial fishing and in a manner consistent with the spirit of Conservation 
Measure 65/XII. 
APPENDIX TO CONSERVATION MEASURE 29/XIX 
1. The streamer line is to be suspended at the stern from a point approximately 4.5 m above the 
water and such that the line is directly above the point where the baits hit the water. 
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2. The streamer line is to be approximately 3 mm diameter, have a minimum length of 150 m and 
have a device at the end to create tension so that the main line streams directly behind the ship even 
in cross winds. 
3. At 5 m intervals commencing from the point of attachment to the ship five branch streamers each 
comprising two strands of approximately 3 mm diameter cord should be attached. The length of the 
streamer should range between approximately 3.5 m nearest the ship to approximately 1.25 m for 
the fifth streamer. When the streamer line is deployed the branch streamers should reach the sea 
surface and periodically dip into it as the ship heaves. Swivels should be placed in the streamer line 
at the towing point, before and after the point of attachment of each branch streamer and 
immediately before any weight placed on the end of the streamer line. Each branch streamer should 
also have a swivel at its attachment to the streamer line. 
Towing point 
I 
Swivel Streamers 
CONSERVATION MEASURE l18/XVII 
Streamer line Weight or other device 
for cnmting tension 
Scheme to Promote Compliance by Non-Contracting Party Vessels with CCAMLR Conservation 
Measures 
The Commission hereby adopts the following conservation measure in accordance with Article 
IX.2(i) of the Convention: 
1. A non-Contracting Party vessel which has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in the 
Convention Area is presumed to be undermining the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation 
measures. In the case of any transhipment activities involving a sighted non-Contracting Party 
vessel inside or outside the Convention Area, the presumption of undermining the effectiveness of 
CCAMLR conservation measures applies to any other non-Contracting Party vessel which has 
engaged in such activities with that vessel. 
2. Information regarding such sightings shall be transmitted immediately to the Commission in 
accordance with Article XXII of the Convention. The Secretariat shall transmit this information to 
all Contracting Parties within one business day of receiving this information, and to the Flag State 
of the sighted vessel as soon as possible. . 
3. The Contracting Party which sights the non-Contracting Party vessel shall attempt to inform the 
vessel that it has been sighted engaging in fishing activities in the Convention Area and is 
accordingly presumed to be undermining the objective of the Convention and that this information 
will be distributed to all Contracting Parties to the Convention and to the Flag State of the vessel. 
4. When a non-Contracting Party vessel referred to in paragraph 1 enters a port of any Contracting 
Party, it shall be inspected by authorised Contracting Party officials knowledgeable of CCAMLR 
. conservation measures and shall not be allowed to land or tranship any fish until this inspection has 
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taken place. Such inspections shall include the vessel's documents, logbooks, fishing gear, catch on 
board and any other matter, which may include information from a VMS 1, relating to the vessel's 
activities in the Convention Area. 
5. Landing and transhipments of all fish from a non-Contracting Party vessel, which has been 
inspected pursuant to paragraph 4, shall be prohibited in all Contracting Party ports if such 
inspection reveals that the vessel has on board species subject to CCAMLR conservation measures, 
unless the vessel establishes that the fish were caught outside the Convention Area or in 
compliance with all relevant CCAMLR conservation measures and requirements under the 
Convention. 
6. Contracting Parties shall ensure that their vessels do not receive transhipments of fish from a 
non-Contracting Party vessel which has been sighted and reported as having engaged in fishing 
activities in the Convention Area and therefore presumed as having undermined the effectiveness 
of CCAMLR conservation measures. 
7. Information on the results of all inspections of non-Contracting Party vessels conducted in the 
ports of Contracting Parties, and on any subsequent action, shall be transmitted immediately to the 
Commission. The Secretariat shall transmit this information immediately to all Contracting Parties 
and to the relevant Flag State( s). 
1 The term VMS shall be taken to mean a system which operates to the same standard as defined in 
Conservation Measure 1481XVII. 
CONSERVATION MEASURE 119/XVII 1,2 
Licensing and Inspection Obligations of Contracting Parties with regard to their Flag Vessels 
Operating in the Convention Area 
1. Each Contracting Party shall prohibit fishing by its flag vessels in the Convention Area except 
pursuant to a licence 3 that the Contracting Party has issued setting forth the specific areas, species 
and time periods for which such fishing is authorised and all other specific conditions to which the 
fishing is subject to give effect to CCAMLR conservation measures and requirements under the 
Convention. 
2. A Contracting Party may only issue such a licence to fish in the Convention Area to vessels 
flying its flag, if it is satisfied of its ability to exercise its responsibilities under the Convention and 
its conservation measures, by requiring from each vessel, inter alia, the following: 
(i) timely notification by the vessel to its Flag State of exit from and entry into any port; 
(ii) notification by the vessel to its Flag State of entry into the Convention Area and movement 
between areas, subareas/divisions; 
(iii) reporting by the vessel of catch data in accordance with CCAMLR requirements; and 
(iv) operation of a VMS system on board the vessel in accordance with Conservation Measure 
1481XVII. 
3. The licence or an authorised copy of the licence must be carried by the fishing vessel and must 
be available for inspection at any time by a designated CCAMLR inspector in the Convention 
Area. 
4. Each Contracting Party shall verify, through inspections of all of its fishing vessels at the Party's 
departure and arrival ports, and where appropriate, in its Exclusive Economic Zone, their 
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compliance with the conditions of the licence as described in paragraph 1 and with the CCAMLR 
conservation measures. In the event that there is evidence that the vessel has not fished in 
accordance with the conditions of its licence, the Contracting Party shall investigate the 
infringement and, if necessary, apply appropriate sanctions in accordance with its national 
legislation. 
5. Each Contracting Party shall include in its annual report pursuant to paragraph 12 of the 
CCAMLR System of Inspection, steps it has taken to implement and apply this conservation 
measure; and may include additional measures it may have taken in relation to its flag vessels to 
promote the effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures. 
1 Except for waters adjacent to the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
2 Except for waters adjacent to the Prince Edward Islands 
3 Includes permit 
CONSERVATION MEASURE 146/XVII 1 
Marking of Fishing Vessels and Fishing Gear 
The Commission hereby adopts the following conservation measure in accordance with Article IX 
of the Convention: 
1. All Contracting Parties shall ensure that their fishing vessels licensed 2 in accordance with 
Conservation Measure 119/XVII to operate in the Convention Area are marked in such a way that 
they can be readily identified in accordance with internationally recognised standards, such as the 
F AO Standard Specifications and Guidelines for the Marking and Identification of Fishing Vessels. 
2. Marker buoys and similar objects floating on the surface and intended to indicate the location of 
fixed or set fishing gear shall be clearly marked at all times with the letter(s) and/or numbers of the 
vessels to which they belong. 
1 Except for waters adjacent to Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
2 Includes permitted 
CONSERVATION MEASURE 147/XIX 1 
Provisions to ensure Compliance with CCAMLR Conservation Measures by Vessels, including 
Cooperation between Contracting Parties 
1. Contracting Parties shall undertake inspections of those fishing vessels that intend to land or 
tranship Dissostichus spp. at their ports. The inspection shall be for the purpose of determining that 
the catch to be unloaded or transhipped is accompanied by the Dissostichus catch document 
required by Conservation Measure 170/XIX, that the catch agrees with the information recorded on 
the document and, if the vessel carried out harvesting activities in the Convention Area, that these 
activities were carried out in accordance with CCAMLR conservation measures. 
2. To facilitate these inspections, Contracting Parties shall require vessels to provide advance 
notice of their entry into port and to convey a written declaration that they have not engaged in or 
supported illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing in the Convention Area. The inspection 
shall be conducted within 48 hours of port entry and shall be carried out in an expeditious fashion. 
It shall impose no undue burdens on the vessel or its crew, and shall be guided by the relevant 
provisions of the CCAMLR System of Inspection. Vessels which either declare that they have been 
involved in IUU fishing or fail to make a declaration shall be denied port access, other than for 
emergency purposes. 
3. In the event that there is evidence that the vessel has fished in contravention of the CCAMLR 
conservation measures, the catch shall not be landed or transhipped. The Contracting Party will 
inform the Flag State of the vessel of its inspection findings and will cooperate with the Flag State 
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in taking such appropriate action as is required to investigate the alleged infringement, and, if 
necessary, apply appropriate sanctions in accordance with national legislation. 
4. Contracting Parties shall promptly advise the Secretariat of any vessels denied port access or 
permission to land or tranship Dissostichus spp. The Secretariat shall promptly convey such reports 
to all Contracting Parties. 
1 Except for waters adjacent to the Kerguelen and Crozet Islands 
CONSERVATION MEASURE 148/XVII Automated Satellite-Linked Vessel Monitoring Systems 
(VMS) 
The Commission hereby adopts the following conservation measure in accordance with Article IX 
of the Convention: 
1. Each Contracting Party shall, no later than 1 March 1999, establish an automated Vessel 
Monitoring System (VMS) to monitor the position of its fishing vessels, which are licensed 1 in 
accordance with Conservation Measure 1191XVII, to harvest marine living resources in the 
Convention Area, and for which catch limits, fishing seasons or area restrictions have been set by 
conservation measures adopted by the Commission. 
2. Any Contracting Party unable to establish VMS in accordance with paragraph 1 shall inform the 
CCAMLR Secretariat within 90 days following the notification of this conservation measure, and 
communicate its intended timetable for implementation of VMS. However, the Contracting Party 
shall establish VMS at the earliest possible date, and in any event, no later than 31 December 2000. 
3. The implementation of VMS on vessels while participating only in a krill fishery is not currently 
required. 
4. For the purpose of this Measure, VMS means a system where, inter alia: 
(i) through the installation of satellite-tracking devices on board its fishing vessels, the Flag State 
receives automatic transmission of certain information. This information includes the fishing vessel 
identification, location, date and time, and is collected by the Flag State at least every four hours to 
enable it to monitor effectively its flag vessels; 
(ii) performance standards provide, as a minimum, that the VMS: 
(a) is tamper proof; 
(b) is fully automatic and operational at all times regardless of environmental conditions; 
(c) provides real time data; 
(d) provides the geographical position of the vessel, with a position error of less than 500 
m with a confidence interval of 99%, the format being determined by the Flag State; and 
(e) in addition to regular messages, provides special messages when the vessel enters or 
leaves the Convention Area and when it moves between one CCAMLR area, subarea or 
division within the Convention Area. 
5. In the event of technical failure or other non-function of the VMS, the master or the owner of the 
fishing vessel, as a minimum: 
361 
(i) shall communicate at least once every 24 hours, starting from the time that this event was 
detected, the data referred in paragraph 4(i) by telex, by fax, by telephone message or by radio to 
the Flag State; and 
(ii) shall take immediate steps to have the device repaired or replaced as soon as possible, and, in 
any event, within two months. If during that period the vessel returns to port it shall not be allowed 
to commence a further fishing trip without having the defective device repaired or replaced. 
6. In the event that the VMS ceases to operate, the Contracting Party as soon as possible shall 
advise the Executive Secretary of the name of the vessel, the date, time and the location of the 
vessel when the VMS failed. The Party shall also inform the Executive Secretary when the VMS 
becomes operational again. The Executive Secretary shall make such information available to 
Contracting Parties upon request. 
7. Contracting Parties shall report to the Secretariat before the start of the annual meeting of the 
Commission in 1999, on the VMS which has been introduced in accordance with paragraphs 1 and 
2, including its technical details, and each year thereafter, on: 
(i) any change in the VMS; 
(ii) in accordance with paragraph XI of the CCAMLR System of Inspection, all cases where they 
have determined, with the assistance of the VMS that vessels of their flag had fished in the 
Convention Area in possible contravention of CCAMLR conservation measures. 
I Includes permitted 
CONSERVATION MEASURE 170/XIX Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. 
The Commission, 
Concerned that illegal, unregulated and unreported (IUU) fishing for Dissostichus spp. in the 
Convention Area threatens serious depletion of populations of Dissostichus spp., 
Aware that IUU fishing involves significant by-catch of some Antarctic species, including 
endangered albatross, 
Noting that IUU fishing is inconsistent with the objective of the Convention and undermines the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures, 
Underlining the responsibilities of Flag States to ensure that their vessels conduct their fishing 
activities in a responsible manner, 
Mindful of the rights and obligations of Port States to promote the effectiveness of regional fishery 
conservation measures, 
Aware that IUU fishing reflects the high value of, and resulting expansion in markets for and 
international trade in, Dissostichus spp., 
Recalling that Contracting Parties have agreed to introduce classification codes for Dissostichus 
spp. at a national level, 
Recognising that the implementation of a Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. will 
provide the Commission with essential information necessary to provide the precautionary 
management objectives of the Convention, 
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Committed to take steps, consistent with international law, to identify the origins of Dissostichus 
spp. entering the markets of Contracting Parties and to determine whether Dissostichus spp. 
harvested in the Convention Area that is imported into their territories was caught in a manner 
consistent with CCAMLR conservation measures. 
Wishing to reinforce the conservation measures already adopted by the Commission with respect to 
Dissostichus spp., 
Inviting non-Contracting Parties whose vessels fish for Dissostichus spp. to participate in the Catch 
Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp., 
hereby adopts the following conservation measure in accordance with Article IX of the 
Convention: 
1. Each Contracting Party shall take steps to identify the origin of Dissostichus spp. imported into 
or exported from its territories and to determine whether Dissostichus spp. harvested in the 
Convention Area that is imported into or exported from its territories was caught in a manner 
consistent with CCAMLR conservation measures. 
2. Each Contracting Party shall require that each master or authorised representative of its flag 
vessels authorised to engage in harvesting of Dissostichus eleginoides andlor Dissostichus mawsoni 
complete a Dissostichus catch document for the catch landed or transhipped on each occasion that 
it lands or tranships Dissostichus spp. 
3. Each Contracting Party shall require that each landing of Dissostichus spp. at its ports and each 
transhipment of Dissostichus spp. to its vessels be accompanied by a completed Dissostichus catch 
document. 
4. Each Contracting Party shall, in accordance with their laws and regulations, require that their 
flag vessels which intend to harvest Dissostichus spp., including on the high seas outside the 
Convention Area, are provided with specific authorisation to do so. Each Contracting Party shall 
provide Dissostichus catch document forms to each of its flag vessels authorised to harvest 
Dissostichus spp. and only to those vessels. 
5. A non-Contracting Party seeking to cooperate with CCAMLR by participating in this Scheme 
may issue Dissostichus catch document forms to any of its flag vessels that intend to harvest 
Dissostichus spp. 
6. The Dissostichus catch document shall include the following information: 
(i) the name, address, telephone and fax numbers of the issuing authority; 
(ii) the name, home port, national registry number, and call sign of the vessel and, if issued, 
its IMO/Lloyd's registration number; 
(iii) the reference number of the licence or permit, whichever is applicable, that is issued to 
the vessel; 
(iv) the weight of each Dissostichus species landed or transhipped by product type, and 
(a) by CCAMLR statistical subarea or division if caught in the Convention Area; 
andlor 
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(b) by F AO statistical area, subarea or division if caught outside the Convention 
Area; 
(v) the dates within which the catch was taken; 
(vi) the date and the port at which the catch was landed or the date and the vessel, its flag 
and national registry number, to which the catch was transhipped; and 
(vii) the name, address, telephone and fax numbers of the recipient(s) of the catch and the 
amount of each species and product type received. 
7. Procedures for completing Dissostichus catch documents in respect of vessels are set forth in 
paragraphs Al to AI0 of Annex 170/A to this measure. The standard catch 
document is attached to the annex. 
8. Each Contracting Party shall require that each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into its 
territory be accompanied by the export-validated Dissostichus catch document(s) and, where 
appropriate, validated re-export document(s) that account for all the Dissostichus spp. contained in 
the shipment. 
9. An export-validated Dissostichus catch document issued in respect of a vessel is one that: 
(i) includes all relevant information and signatures provided in accordance with paragraphs 
Al to All of Annex 170/A to this measure; and 
(ii) includes a signed and stamped certification by a responsible official of the exporting 
State of the accuracy of the information contained in the document. 
10. Each Contracting Party shall ensure that its customs authorities or other appropriate officials 
request and examine the import documentation of each shipment of Dissostichus spp. imported into 
its territory to verify that it includes the export-validated Dissostichus catch document(s) and, 
where appropriate, validated re-export document(s) that account for all the Dissostichus spp. 
contained in the shipment. These officials may also examine the content of any shipment to verify 
the information contained in the catch document or documents. 
11. If, as a result of an examination referred to in paragraph 10 above, a question arises regarding 
the information contained in a Dissostichus catch document or a re-export document the exporting 
State whose national authority validated the document( s) and, as appropriate, the Flag State whose 
vessel completed the document are called on to cooperate with the importing State with a view to 
resolving such question. 
12. Each Contracting Party shall promptly provide by the most rapid electronic means copies to the 
CCAMLR Secretariat of all export-validated Dissostichus catch documents and, where relevant, 
validated re-export documents that it issued from and received into its territory and shall report 
annually to the Secretariat data, drawn from such documents, on the origin and amount of 
Dissostichus spp. exported from and imported into its territory. 
13. Each Contracting Party, and any non-Contracting Party that issues Dissostichus catch 
documents in respect of its flag vessels in accordance with paragraph 5, shall inform the CCAMLR 
Secretariat of the national authority or authorities (including' names, addresses, phone and fax 
numbers and email addresses) responsible for issuing and validating Dissostichus catch documents. 
14. Notwithstanding the above, any Contracting Party may require additional verification of catch 
documents, including, inter alia, the use of VMS, in respect of catches by its flag vessels outside 
the Convention Area, when landed at and exported from its territory. 
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RESOLUTION 12/XVI Automated Satellite-Linked Vessel Monitoring Systems (VMSs) 
The Commission, 
Noting the extreme concern over the high levels of illegal, unregulated and unreported fishing for 
Dissostichus eleginoides and other marine living resources, 
considers that: 
1. Subject to paragraphs 2 and 3, members shall endeavour, by the end of the Comission meeting 
in 1998, to establish an automated vessel monitoring system (VMS) to monitor the position of 
its flag vessels licensed or permitted in accordance with Conservation Measure 119/XVI to 
harvest Dissostichus spp. or other marine living resources in the Convention Area for which 
catch limits, fishing seasons or area restrictions have been set by Conservation Measures 
adopted by the Commission. 
2. Any Member not in a position to establish a VMS by the date specified in paragraph 1 shall so 
inform the CCAMLR Secretariat in advance of the 1998 annual meeting and, if possible, 
notify its intended alternative timetable for the implementation of a VMS. 
3. The implementation of VMS on vessels while participating in the krill fishery is not currently 
necessary. 
4. Once its VMS is established, each Member should monitor the position of its flag vessels 
vessels licensed or permitted in accordance with Conservation Measure 1191XVI. Should the 
VMS cease to transmit, the Member shall take immediate steps to ensure that the transmission 
is swiftly restored. 
5. Members should report to the Secretariat before the start of the annual meeting of the 
Commission on: 
(i) any VMS in operation, including its technical details; and 
(ii) in accordance with paragraph XI of the System of Inspection, all cases where they have 
determined with the assistance of VMS that vessels of their flag had fished in the Convention 
Area in possible contravention of CCAMLR Conservation Measures. 
1 For this purpose, VMS means a system where, inter alia: 
(i) information collected shall include the vessel identifier, location, date and time, which shall be 
collected with a required frequency to ensure that the Member cabn effectively monitor its vessel; 
and 
(ii) performance standards, at a minimum, include a system that: 
(a) is tamper proof; 
(b) is fully automatic and operational at all times regardless of environmental conditions; 
(c) provides real time data; and 
(d) provides latitude and longitude with a position accuracy of 500m or better, with the format to 
be determined by the Flag State. 
RESOLUTION 13/XIX Flagging and Licensing of Non-Contracting Party Vessels 
The Commission, 
Concerned that illegal, unregulated and unreported (IVU) fishing in the Convention Area continues 
to persist, 
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Noting that IUU fishing is inconsistent with the objective of the Convention and undermines the 
effectiveness of CCAMLR conservation measures, 
Recognising that the vast majority of the IUU fishing in the Convention Area is undertaken by 
fishing vessels flying the flag of non-Contracting Parties, 
Inspired by the F AO Agreement to Promote Compliance with International Conservation and 
Management Measures by Fishing Vessels on the High Seas, 
urges all Contracting Parties, consistent with their domestic legislation, to avoid flagging a non-
Contracting Party vessel or licensing such a vessel to fish in waters under their fisheries 
jurisdiction, if that particular vessel has a history of engagement in IUU fishing in the Convention 
Area. 
RESOLUTION 14/XIX Catch Documentation Scheme: Implementation by Acceding States and 
Non-Contracting Parties 
The Commission, 
Having considered reports on the implementation of the Catch Documentation Scheme for 
Dissostichus spp. established by Conservation Measure 170IXVIII, 
Being satisfied that the Scheme has been successfully launched, and noting the improvements to 
the scheme made by Conservation Measure 170IXIX, 
Conscious that the effectiveness of the Scheme depends also on implementation of the Scheme by 
those Contracting Parties which are not Members of the Commission (,Acceding States') but which 
fish for, or trade in, Dissostichus spp., as well as by non-Contracting Parties. 
Concerned at the evidence that several acceding States and non-Contracting Parties which continue 
to be engaged in fishing for, or trading in, Dissostichus spp. are not implementing the Scheme, 
Particularly concerned at the failure by such acceding States to implement the Scheme, to uphold 
and promote its objectives, and to meet their obligations under Article XXII to exert appropriate 
efforts with regard to activities contrary to the objectives of the Convention, 
Determined to take all necessary measures, consistent with international law, to ensure that the 
effectiveness and credibility of the Scheme is not harmed by non-implementation of it by acceding 
States and non-Contracting Parties, 
Acting pursuant to Article X of the Convention, 
1. Urges all Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties not participating in the Catch 
Documentation Scheme which fish for, or trade in, Dissostichus spp. to implement the Scheme as 
soon as possible. 
2. Requests to this end that the CCAMLR Secretariat convey this resolution to such Acceding 
States and non-Contracting Parties and give all possible advice and assistance to them. 
3. Recommends that Members of the Commission make appropriate representations concerning 
this resolution to such Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties. 
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4. Reminds Members of the Commission of their obligation under the Catch Documentation 
Scheme to prevent trade in Dissostichus spp. in their territory, or by their flag vessels, with 
Acceding States or non-Contracting Parties when it is not carried out in compliance with the 
Scheme. 
5. Decides to consider the matter again at the Twentieth Meeting of the Commission in 200 I with a 
view to taking such further measures as may be necessary. 
RESOLUTION IS/XIX Use of Ports not Implementing the Catch Documentation Scheme for 
Dissostichus spp. 
The Commission, 
Noting that a number of Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties not participating in the Catch 
Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp., as set out in Conservation Measure I70IXIX, 
continue to in trade in Dissostichus spp.; and 
Recognising that these Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties thus do not participate in the 
landing procedures for Dissostichus spp. accompanied by Dissostichus Catch Documents; 
urges Contracting Parties, 
1. Where they are unable to provide an authorised Flag State official(s) to monitor a landing for the 
purposes of validating Dissostichus Catch Documents, to discourage their flag vessels authorised to 
fish for Dissostichus spp. from using ports of Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties which 
are not implementing the Catch Document Scheme for Dissostichus spp. 
2. To attach to the authorisation to fish a list of all Acceding States and non-Contracting Parties that 
are implementing the Catch Documentation Scheme. 
RESOLUTION 16/XIX Application of VMS in the Catch Documentation Scheme 
The Commission agreed that, on a voluntary basis, subject to their laws and regulations, Flag States 
participating in the Catch Documentation Scheme for Dissostichus spp. should ensure that their 
flag vessels authorised to fish for or tranship Dissostichus spp. on the high seas maintain an 
operational VMS, as defined in Conservation Measure I 48/XVII, throughout the whole of the 
calendar year.! 
! This requirement does not extend to vessels ofless than 19 m engaged in artisanal fisheries. 
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Appendix V: A Brief Description of the Main Species Exploited in the Southern Oceanl 
Krill (Euphausia superb) 
Distribution 
Circum-Antarctic south of the Antarctic Polar Front, with centres of abundance in the Scotia Arc 
and some regions close to the continent in the Indian Ocean sector. Usually confined to the 
Antarctic surface water (0-100 m depth) in oceanic areas, krill has also been found close to the sea 
floor down to 350-400 m depth in shelf areas. 
Size and Age 
Krill grows to a maximum of 64 mm in length and may live for six to seven years. 
Biology 
Krill attain sexual maturity at two (females) and three (males) years of age. They spawn up to 10 
000 eggs between December and March, with considerable interannual variation in timing. 
Recruitment success appears to be closely linked to the extent of pack-ice in the winter before and 
after spawning. In summer, krill preys on microscopic plankton, such as flagellates and diatoms, 
while in winter it feeds largely on ice algae from the undersurface of ice flows. Aggregations of 
krill can cover many square kilometres and may contain hundreds of thousands of tonnes of krill. 
Krill is the staple food of many baleen whales, seals, seabirds, fish and squid. Because of its 
position in the food web between the microscopic phytoplankton and the large vertebrate predators, 
and its abundance, krill is considered the key species in the Seasonal Pack-ice Zone and parts of the 
Ice-free and High-latitude Antarctic Zones. 
Exploitation 
Krill harvesting started in 1972173 and peaked in 1981/82 (Figure 7). By the mid-1980s annual 
catches had stabilised at 350 000 to 400 000 tonnes, but they declined substantially at the beginning 
of the 1990s when countries of the former Soviet Union stopped fishing for krill. Annual krill 
catches are currently in the order of 90 000 to 100 000 tonnes. 
Status 
It is unlikely that the present level of fishing will have an adverse effect on the stock(s). 
Marbled rockcod (Notothenia rossii) 
Distribution 
Marbled rockcod is a widely distributed species, found at the northern end of the Antarctic 
Peninsula, around the Scotia Arc, off Prince Edward, Crozet, Kerguelen, Heard, McDonald and 
Macquarie Islands, and on Ob and Lena Banks. 
Size and Age 
The species grows to a length of 85 to 92 cm and a weight of 8 to 10 kg. It can live for 15 to 20 
years. 
Biology 
Three stages of the life cycle of this species have been distinguished: the fingerlings are pelagic for 
the first 6 to 12 months of their lives, after which they settle on the bottom in near-shore waters, 
often in kelp beds. They remain in shallow waters for four to six years. On reaching maturity at a 
length of 43 to 48 cm and an age of five to seven years, they migrate offshore to South Georgia was 
no longer viable after the end of the 1980s, although a low total allowable catch (TAC) was set to 
1 Reproduced from Kock, Karl-Hermann (ed), Understanding CCAMLR's Approach to Management, May 
2000, http://www.ccamlr.org/English/e-pubs/e_app_to_manag/TEXTJmal_.pdf, (site visited March 19, 
2001). 
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reopen the fishery at a lower level (Figure 2). Currently, the species is exploited at South Georgia 
and Heard Island, and at the Kerguelen Islands only when a strong year class enters the fishery 
(Figure 5). 
Status 
The South Georgia stock recovered from three episodes of heavy exploitation in the mid-1970s and 
in the early and mid-1980s. However, stock size remained low after a fourth decline following the 
1989/90 season. The stocks around the South Orkney and the South Shetland Islands are still only 
fractions of their sizes at the beginning of the fishery in 1977/78. The stock around the Kerguelen 
Islands supports a fishery only when a strong year class enters the fishery, and there is evidence 
that this stock has declined over the last decade. A low TAC has recently been set for the stock -
probably never before commercially exploited -living on banks near Heard Island. 
Grey rockcod (Lepidonotothen squamifrons) 
Distribution 
The grey rockcod has a circum-Antarctic distribution around the sub-Antarctic islands and 
seamounts that lie between them, such as the Ob and Lena Banks in the Indian Ocean sector. The 
species is found down to 800 m. 
Size and Age 
The maximum sizes observed were from 50 to 55 cm and the weights from 2,500 to 3,000 g. Fish 
may live as long as 16 to 20 years. 
Biology 
Although mostly found at the bottom, the grey rockcod feeds primarily on macro zooplankton, such 
as euphausiids, pelagic amphipods, jellyfish and salps. The fish becomes sexually mature at 28 to 
36 cm (from 5 to 9 years old) at South Georgia and in the Kerguelen Islands. They spawn from 
October (Kerguelen, Crozet) to February (South Georgia). Fecundity varies from 58 000 to 196000 
eggs, depending on the size of the fish. Egg diameter is from 1.4 to 1.7 mm. The larvae hatch from 
the end of November. 
Exploitation 
This species has been exploited commercially, mainly off the Kerguelen Islands and on Ob and 
Lena Banks. At South Georgia, grey rockcod has been harvested only irregularly, and generally 
less than 1 000 tonnes per annum has been taken. In the Kerguelen Islands, grey rockcod was the 
third most important species (after marbled rockcod and mackerel icefish) for almost two decades 
of fishing (Figure 5). The fishery was closed by the French authorities at the beginning of the 1990s 
after it became evident that the stock was heavily depleted. The fishery on Ob and Lena Banks, 
where grey rockcod was the only target species, was closed by CCAMLR at the beginning of the 
1990s for the same reason. 
Status 
Recent surveys suggest that the stock off the Kerguelen Islands is still at a low level; consequently, 
the fishery remains closed. The status of the two stocks on Ob and Lena Banks is unknown. In 
recent years, a low TAC was set to provide an incentive to reopen the fishery and to conduct a 
scientific survey to assess the status of the stock. This TAC was not taken and the fishery was 
closed again in 1997/98. The status of the stock around South Georgia is also unknown. Directed 
fishing for this stock is prohibited. 
Patagonian toothfish (Dissostichus e/eginoides) 
Distribution 
Patagonian toothfish is widely distributed, from the slope waters off Chile and Argentina south of 
30 to 35°S, south of South Africa and south of New Zealand, to the islands and banks in sub-
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Antarctic waters of the Atlantic and Indian Ocean sectors and Macquarie Island on the Indo-Pacific 
boundary of the Southern Ocean. Southernmost records of the species are for the South Orkney 
Islands and the South Sandwich Islands. It is found as deep as 2,500 to 3,000 m. 
Size and Age 
The maximum size and weight observed are, respectively, 238 cm and about 130 kg. Reliable age 
estimates for individuals larger than 100 to 120 cm are scarce. However, individuals close to the 
maximum size are likely to be from 40 to 50 years old or even older. 
Biology 
Patagonian toothfish feed on a variety of other fish, octopods, squid and crustaceans. They become 
sexually mature at 70 to 95 cm when they are 6 to 9 years old and spawn over the continental slope 
from June to September. The species' fecundity ranges from 48 000 to more than 500 000 eggs, 
varying with fish length and geographical locality. The eggs, which are from 4.3 to 4.7 mm in 
diameter, are generally found in the upper 500 m of the water column in waters from 2 200 to 4 
400 m deep. They probably hatch in October-November. 
Exploitation 
Patagonian toothfish are being exploited by longline and bottom trawl both inside and outside the 
Convention Area where catches were first reported in 1976/77. Longline fishers targeted fish 
around South Georgia from 1985/86, with annual reported catches of 4000 to 9 000 tonnes (Figure 
2). Fishing was by Soviet longliners in the first few years, but is now mostly by Chilean and 
Argentinian vessels. Around the Kerguelen Islands, Patagonian toothfish has been targeted since 
1984/85, first by the former USSR fleet (later Ukrainian) and later by French trawlers. In recent 
years, it has also been exploited by Ukrainian longliners. Annual reported catches in this region 
have been in the order of 1 000 to 9 000 tonnes (Figure 5). Since 1996/97, longlining for 
Patagonian toothfish has expanded rapidly into the slope waters of previously unfished islands, 
banks and seamounts in the Indian and Pacific Ocean sectors of the Southern Ocean. In spite of 
conservation measures implemented by CCAMLR, there is a considerable amount of unregulated 
and illegal fishing. In the 1996/97 season, estimated catches from unregulated and illegal fishing 
exceeded those from regulated fishing by a factor of at least five. 
Antarctic toothfish (Dissostichus mawsoni) 
Distribution 
The geographical distribution of Antarctic toothfish is confined to the waters around the Antarctic 
continent with a northern limit at about 600 S. There are occasional records of this species from as 
far north as 57°S in the Atlantic and Indian Ocean sectors. Its bathymetric range extends to about 
800m. 
Size and Age 
The maximum size and weight observed are, respectively, 180 cm and about 75 kg. Individuals of 
140 to 165 cm in length have been estimated to be from 22 to 30 years old. 
Biology 
Antarctic toothfish feed on a variety of other fish, octopods, squid and crustaceans. They are likely 
to become sexually mature at a similar length to Patagonian toothfish and probably spawn over the 
continental slope in August-September. The species' fecundity ranges from 470,000 to more than 
1.3 million eggs, depending on the length of the fish. 
Exploitation 
Since 1996/97 Antarctic toothfish have become the target of a number of new and exploratory 
fisheries. 
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Status 
The fishery is regulated by precautionary TACs imposed by CCAMLR for new and exploratory 
fisheries. 
Patagonian rockcod (Patagonotothen guntheri) 
Distribution 
This species is found on the southern Argentine Patagonian shelf, and off the 
Falkland/Malvinas Islands and Shag Rocks. Single specimens have been found at South Georgia. It 
is most abundant in waters shallower than 250 m, but has been found at 350 m depth. 
Size and age 
The species attains a total length of 23 cm. The maximum age recorded is 6 years. 
Biology 
Patagonian rockcod is apparently benthopelagic, leaving the bottom to feed in the water column. 
At Shag Rocks this species generally preys on krill and, to a much lesser extent, the hyperiid 
amphipod Themisto gaudichaudii. It attains sexual maturity when 12 to 16 cm long. The egg size is 
1.4 mm in diameter. Fecundity ranges from 6 000 to 23 000 eggs. In the Shag Rocks area, they 
spawn from September to October. 
Exploitation 
This species was exploited in the Shag Rocks area from 1978179 to 1989/90. Because of the small 
size of the species, catches were mostly reduced to fish meal. The fishery was closed by CCAMLR 
after it became apparent that the stock was depleted. 
Status 
The current status of the stock is unknown. CCAMLR has prohibited directed fishing for this 
species. 
Sub-Antarctic lanternfish (Electrona carlsbergi) 
Distribution 
This species has a circumpolar distribution between the Subtropical Convergence and the waters 
just south of the Antarctic Polar Front. Dense aggregations have been found around South Georgia 
and Shag Rocks. Sub-Antarctic lanternfish are found mostly in the upper 200 m of the water 
column, but at greater depths towards the Subtropical Convergence. 
Size and Age 
The maximum size and weight rarely exceed 10 cm and 14 g respectively. Fish live four to five 
years. 
Biology 
The main components of the diet are copepods, pelagic amphipods and euphausiids. Fish attain 
sexual maturity at 75 to 78 mm. Spawning is likely to take place between the sub-Antarctic and the 
Subtropical Frontal Zone in the austral summer-autumn. Egg diameter is from 0.7 to 0.8 mm. This 
species spawns several batches of eggs over the season. It is not known when the larvae hatch. 
Exploitation 
The Soviet Union began a trawl fishery for lanternfish (reported indiscriminately as E. carlsbergi) 
in the Antarctic Polar Front in the 1980s, with annual catches initially varying between 500 and 
2,500 tonnes. Catches increased from 1987/88 by 14 000 to 23,000-29,000 tonnes in the two 
subsequent seasons, and peaked in 1990/91 (78 000 tonnes) and 1991192 (51,000 tonnes) (Figure 
371 
2). The fishery lapsed in the 1992/93 season, as it was no longer considered to be economically 
viable. 
Status 
The status of the stock(s) is unknown. A TAC has been imposed by CCAMLR on the fishery in the 
South Georgia region (Statistical Subarea 48.3). 
Humped rockcod (Gobionotothen gibberifrons) 
Distribution 
The geographic distribution of this species is confined to the Atlantic Ocean sector (northern part 
of the Antarctic Peninsula, islands of the Scotia Arc). Humped rockcod has been found down to 
750 m, but is most abundant between 100 and 400 m depth. 
Size and Age 
This species may grow to 55 cm in length and 1,800 to 2,000 g in weight. At South Georgia, fish 
may live from 15 to 20 years. 
Biology 
Humped rockcod eat primarily benthic prey, such as tube worms, brittle stars, sea urchins and 
molluscs. The fish becomes sexually mature at 34 to 36 cm at South Georgia and at a slightly 
smaller size on the more southerly grounds. Spawning occurs at the end of the austral winter, but 
with latitudinal differences between stocks. Fecundity ranges between 21,000 and 130,000 eggs. 
Egg diameter is 2.0 to 2.5 mm. The larvae hatch in spring and early summer. Juveniles change 
from pelagic to benthic life at the end of the austral summer. 
Exploitation 
The first catches of this species were reported in 1976177. Together with some icefish species, 
humped rockcod has been primarily a by-catch of the bottom trawl fishery targeting mackerel 
icefish. Only in some years, such as in 1977178 at South Georgia, was this species targeted by the 
fishery, taking annual catches of more than 5 000 to 10 000 tonnes. The directed fishery on this 
species was closed by CCAMLR in 1989. 
Status 
There is evidence that the stock around South Georgia has partly recovered from depletion. The 
status of the stock near the South Orkney Islands is unknown. The stock around Elephant Island 
appears to have been little affected by fishing. 
Wilson's icefish (Chaenodraco wilsoni) 
Distribution 
Wilson's icefish has a circum-Antarctic distribution, with northernmost records coming from the 
South Orkney and the South Shetland Islands. It is found down to 800 m depth. 
Size and Age 
Maximum size and weight observed are, respectively, 43 cm and about 700 g. Ages have not been 
estimated. 
Biology 
Wilson's icefish feeds primarily on krill, and to a lesser extent on fish~ It becomes sexually mature 
at 23 cm and spawns in October-November, but its spawning grounds are unknown. Fecundity is 
300 to 2 000 eggs in individuals of 30 to 32 cm in length. Egg diameter is from 4.4 to 4.9 mm. The 
larvae are likely to hatch in the austral autumn-early winter. 
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Exploitation 
Polish and former East German trawlers reported catches of 10,100 tonnes and 4,300 tonnes 
respectively from Statistical Subarea 48.1 in 1978179 and 1979/80, when concentrations of 
Wilson's icefish were detected north and northeast of Joinville Island at the tip of the Antarctic 
Peninsula (Figure 4). In the 1980s this species was taken regularly in an exploratory fishery of the 
Soviet Union off the coasts of the Antarctic continent. Depending on the ice conditions and the 
availability offish aggregations, between 270 and 1,800 tonnes were caught each year. The fishery 
lapsed at the end of the 1980s when it was no longer considered to be economically viable. 
Status 
The status of the stock(s) is unknown. 
Scotia Sea icefish (Chaenocephalus aceratus) 
Distribution 
The geographic distribution of this species is confined to the Atlantic Ocean sector (northern part 
of the Antarctic Peninsula, islands of the Scotia Arc, Bouvet Island). Scotia Sea icefish has been 
found down to 770 m, but is most abundant between 100 and 350 m depth. 
Size and Age 
Females attain 70 to 75 cm and up to 3,800 g, males attain 55 to 58 cm and 1,300 g. At South 
Georgia, they may live for 13 to 15 years. 
Biology 
Post-larvae and juveniles up to 30 cm in length feed primarily on pelagic and benthopelagic 
organisms, such as krill and mysids. Older juveniles and adult fish are bottom-dwelling and prey 
mostly on other fish. Males reach maturity at 35 to 45 cm and females at 45 to 55 cm. The species 
spawns from April to July in coastal waters. Fecundity ranges from 3,000 to 22,000 eggs. The 
diameter of ripe eggs is 4.4 to 4.7 mm. The larvae hatch between August and October. 
Exploitation 
Catches of the species have been reported since 1976177. Scotia Sea icefish has primarily been a 
by-catch species in the bottom trawl fishery targeting mackerel icefish. Only occasionally, such as 
in 1977/78 at South Georgia, has the species been targeted by the fishery. Annual reported catches 
never exceeded a few thousand tonnes per statistical subarea. However, there is evidence that part 
of the by-catch in other fisheries was not reported. The fishery was closed by CCAMLR in 1989 
when stock assessments indicated that some stocks had been depleted to below 50% of their sizes 
before exploitation. 
Status 
Research surveys suggest that the stocks around South Georgia and Elephant Island have largely 
recovered from depletion. The status of the stock near the South Orkney Islands is unknown. 
South Georgia icefish (Pseudochaenichthys georgian us) 
Distribution 
South Georgia icefish is found off islands of the Scotia Arc and the northern part of the Antarctic 
Peninsula down to 475 m. 
Size and Age 
The species attains a length of 55 to 60 cm and a weight of 2,000 to 2,500 g. Specimens up to 15 
years of age have been reported; however, age determinations differ widely between researchers. 
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Biology 
South Georgia icefish feed almost exclusively on krill and fish. At South Georgia, they spawn in 
the austral autumn (March to May). Fecundity ranges from 5,000 to 11,000 eggs; the eggs are up to 
4.8 mm in diameter. The larvae hatch between August and October. 
Exploitation 
The first catches were reported in 1976/77. The species has been a regular by-catch in the bottom 
trawl fishery, but has been targeted only in some years, such as 1977/78 at South Georgia and in 
1979/80 in the South Orkney Islands. Annual reported catches exceeded a few thousand tonnes per 
statistical subarea in 1977/78. However, there is evidence that part ofthe by-catch in other fisheries 
was not reported. The fishery for this species was closed in 1989 after it became evident that the 
stocks at South Georgia and off the South Orkney Islands were depleted. 
Status 
The stock at South Georgia appears to have partly recovered from exploitation in the late 1970s-
early 1980s. The status of the stock around the South Orkney Islands is unknown. 
Stone crabs (Paralomis spinosissima, P. formosa) 
Distribution 
These species have been found at the South Orkney Islands, but appear to be most abundant in the 
South Georgia-Shag Rocks area. They are found at depths between about 100 m to more than 
1,000 m. 
Size and Age 
Maximum carapace length is 122 mm in males and 112 mm in females of P. spinosissima and 102 
mm in males of P. formosa at South Georgia. No age estimates have yet been made. 
Biology 
Information on the biology of the two species is limited to estimates of length at sexual maturity. 
Female P. spinosissima mature at 62 mm carapace length, male P. spinosissima at 66 mm (Shag 
Rocks) and 75 mm (South Georgia), and male P. formosa at 80 mm carapace length (South 
Georgia). 
Exploitation 
P. spinosissima was the main species in the experimental crab fishery in the Shag Rocks-South 
Georgia area between 1992/93 and 1995/96. The fishery used crab pots; all other bottom gear was 
prohibited. It was limited to sexually mature male crabs. A TAC of 1 600 tonnes per annum was 
imposed on the fishery. The one US fishing vessel that entered the fishery removed a total of 835 
tonnes of crabs over three seasons (see section 1.2). The fishery was discontinued after the 1995/96 
season because it was not viable. 
Status 
The impact fishing has had on the stocks is unknown. 
Martialia hyadesi 
Distribution 
The squid Martialia hyadesi is a circum-Antarctic species whose distribution is linked to the 
Antarctic Polar Front. It appears to be particularly abundant in the southwest Atlantic Ocean sector, 
but is also found near the Kerguelen Islands and Macquarie Island. 
Size and Age 
The species attains a maximum mantle length of 50 cm. Its life span is probably two years. 
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Biology 
M hyadesi feed largely on mesopelagic fish, such as lanternfish. The species reproduces once 
during its lifetime. Its spawning areas are not known, but the catch of a few small juvenile 
specimens on the edge of the Patagonian shelf suggests there is some spawning there. This species 
is a large part of the squid diet of tooth fish, southern elephant seals, grey-headed and black-browed 
albatrosses, and white-chinned petrels. 
Exploitation 
M hyadesi are regularly caught in small quantities on the extreme eastern edge of the Patagonian 
shelf in the fishery for the squid Illex argentinus. In some years, when oceanographic conditions 
are favourable, it is present in much larger quantities in this fishery. About 26,000 tonnes were 
caught in 1995 on the Patagonian shelf edge to the northeast of the FalklandlMalvinas Islands. 
There is currently an exploratory fishery for M hyadesi in Statistical Subarea 48.3 (South Georgia), 
where about 80 tonnes were caught in 1996/97. 
Status 
The status of the stock(s) is unknown. 
